The objective of this section is to explain the Foucauldian analysis methods, ‗archaeology‘ and
‗genealogy‘ and to highlight their role in this study. These methods have been widely discussed and applied by many scholars, including Shumway (1989), Apperley (1997), Harootunian (1998), Barrett (1991), Thacker (1997), Preece (1999), Besley (2002), Ossen et al. (2004), Salanjira (2009), Scott (2009), Veyne (2010), and Chrulew (2010).
Besley (2002:11) states that Foucault began using the concept of archaeology in his early works, especially in The Order of Things (1970) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). The specific meaning of this concept can be retrieved in the interview between Foucault and Brochier in which Foucault (1989:45) states:
After all, this word ―archaeology‖ can almost mean – and I hope I will be forgiven for this – description of the archive. I mean by archive the set (l‘ensemble) of discourses actually pronounced; and this set of discourses is envisaged not only as a set of events which would have taken place once and for all and which would remain in abeyance, in the limbo or purgatory of history, but also a set that continues to function, to be transformed through history, and to provide the possibility of appearing in other discourses.
Four salient points can be drawn from this excerpt, these being, the object of archaeology is discourse; archaeology describes discourses already pronounced about events or phenomena;
these discourses and events/phenomena may have passed or are still on-going; these discourses and events/phenomena may change with time and require new approaches.
In addition to the term ‗discourse‘ as the subject of archaeological analysis, Ossen et al.(2004) suggest other terms such as ‗presuppositions of a given system of thought‘ (:45), ‗ways of looking at the world‘ (:46), and ‗theoretical knowledge‘ (:47). Moreover, they specify that the attempt in archaeology is, ―to trace links between the different domains of ‗life, work, and language‘, revealing relationships that are not readily apparent‖ (:47). As they elaborate, they also present these ‗links‘ and ‗relationships‘ as ―rules of formation of discourses, or discursive systems‖ (:46).
Convincingly, their argument is that archaeology is concerned about thought and knowledge as well as their connectivity.
While the meaning and the object of archaeology are specified, the literature goes on to delineate what archaeology is not and what it does not do. In the above-mentioned interview, Foucault (1989:46) elaborates on this point:
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It is always the relative beginnings that I am searching for, more institutionalizations or the transformations than the founding or foundations.
And then I am equally bothered by the idea of excavation. What I am looking for are not relations that are secret, hidden, more silent or deeper than the consciousness of men (sic). I try on the contrary to define the relations on the very surface of the discourse; I attempt to make visible what is invisible only because it is too much on the surface of things.
It emerges that archaeology is not concerned with what is ‗hidden and invisible‘, nor is it concerned about the very origin of discourses or thought. Instead, it is concerned about what is not perceived because there is no established order of considering them.
In the same vein, Shumway (1989) and Besley (2002) highlight the difference between archaeology and the history of ideas. While the latter uses models of consciousness, creation, evolution or development to explain changes and differences, the former strives to discover the transformation system which shapes changes in human sciences (Besley, 2002:13; Shumway, 1989:98).
Within this debate, Ossen et al. (2004) express the veracity of discourses which are analysed.
They point out that in fact, archaeology analyses, not what is claimed to be true in knowledge, but rather the truth game. This means that, as they clarify, archaeology analyses operations of rules that bring discourses into being as well as the way discourses are ordered (:46). For Ossen et al. (:46) some core questions of archaeology are: ―Why at different periods specialists in knowledge perceive objects differently?‖ and ―how is it that one particular statement appears rather than another?‖ In addition, Shumway (1989) evokes three other questions suggested by Foucault in order to define enunciative modalities: ―who is speaking?‖; ―From what institutional site is he [sic] speaking?‖ ―What is his [sic] [author] relationship to the objects of his discourse?‖
(:101). It therefore appears from this account that archaeology provides a range of issues to consider when analysing discourses. These issues have inspired the present study, in particular, the development of this chapter.
Besides archaeology, genealogy is another Foucauldian method of analysis which has informed the shape of this study. Apperley (1997:17), Thacker (1997:30) and Besley (2002:13) locate Foucauldian genealogy circa 1970s. They explain that this method constitutes a Foucauldian shift in emphasis from discourses and discontinuity as well as rules that govern the formation of discourses to social practices, institutions, and technology. Their point here is that at this time, Foucault was no longer interested in mere archaeological analysis and had begun to embrace a new approach. In addition, authors such as Shumway (1989), Besley (2002) and Ossen et al.
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(2004) observe that the word genealogy was borrowed from the biological field by the German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche in his work The Genealogy of Morals edited in 1956. He was describing ―morals as having an historical ‗descent‘ rather than being ‗immobile forms‘ existing from the beginning of time‖ (Ossen et al., 2004:109). According to Besley (2002:13), Nietzsche‘s works, in particular, The Genealogy of Morals profoundly influenced Foucault, which resulted in him maintaining and using the term ‗genealogy.‘
Concerning genealogy as a method of analysis, Besley (2002:13) suggests that it traces ―the historical process of descent and emergence by which a given thought system or process comes into being and is subsequently transformed.‖ Besley implies that the genealogist explores historical aspects of a given thought. It appears that although discourses may be used in genealogical analysis, they are not the focus which has now become the historical background of a phenomenon.
However, as such, genealogy is not interested in the past. As Besley (2004:14) elaborates further:
Genealogy seeks to explain present-day cultural phenomena and problems by looking to the past and analysing how it was derived and constituted historically.
It not only looks at who we are at present but also opens up possibilities of what might be and from where we might start to be different in the present.
This method therefore regards the past that explains the current phenomenon under scrutiny.
Shumway (1989), Besley (2002), Ossen et al. (2004) have also pointed to the difference between genealogy and traditional historical analysis. From their observations, two main differences emerge. The first difference resides in the search for the origin of a phenomenon. According to Shumway (1989:109) and Ossen et al. (2004:48), unlike historical analysis, genealogy avoids the search for origin or essence. The reason for this rationale is that this would be an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, which in turn would be an assumption of the existence of
―immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession‖ (Shumway, 1989:109) or would simply be reinstating Platonic essentialism (Ossen et al., 2004:48). According to genealogists, ―what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things‖ (Shumway, 1989:109). Hence, in order to avoid this essentialism, genealogists focus on tracing processes of descent and emergence (Ossen et al., 2004:48).
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The second difference is found in historical elements observed during the analysis. Foucault (1971) warns that genealogy differs from the evolution of a species and the map for people‘s destiny. In this way, it avoids focusing on the evolution and process of development (Besley, 2002). As was seen above, its emphasis is rather on the descent and emergence (Ossen et al., 2004:48). However, Besley (2002:14) points out that, ―the analysis of descent involves a move backward in time to reveal the many events, struggles, complexity, fragility, contingency, and continuities that exist behind historical beginnings.‖ Likewise, Smart (1985) rejects the meaning of emergence as ―a culmination of events, or as the end of a process of development.‖ Instead, he takes it ―as a particular momentary manifestation of the ‗hazardous play of domination‘ [...] as transitory ‗episode in a series of subjugations,‘ or embodiments of dynamic relationships of struggle‘‖ (:57).
Reading from these two different perspectives, it appears that genealogy does not provide the entire history of a phenomenon from its very essence up to the current situation. Instead, it rather selects certain episodes and events that mark changes during the evolution of the phenomenon.
It is now clear that while archaeology focuses on discourses, genealogy focuses on phenomena.
However, although some critics argue that in the 1970s, Foucault‘s priority shifted from the field of knowledge to practice, thus from archaeology to genealogy (Apperley, 1997:17; Shumway, 1989:107-108), Ossen et al. (2004:45, 47) warn that genealogy must be viewed as supplement to, and not as an alternative to archaeology. This warning reiterates exactly what Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:104), emphasised twenty-one years ago that ‗There is no pre- and post- archaeology or genealogy in Foucault.‘ Their remark therefore is in agreement with Foucault‘s own observation that:
[A]rchaeology and genealogy might be complementary, and hinted that each might be mapped on to a branch of the power/knowledge dyad, genealogy concerning itself with power whilst archaeology concerns itself with knowledge (Foucault, 1980).
This means that in his view, Foucault suggests that the two methods, archaeology and genealogy, should be applied in parallel because neither one is complete on its own to produce a reliable analysis.
In view of these remarks, both methods are referred to in order to analyse the social and discursive context of the present study. Five points summarise the inspiration of these methods in the present study. Firstly, each contextual subject emerging from the title of the present study
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in both vertical and horizontal ways is explored. The vertical analysis consists of regarding the phenomenon in its historical emergence as permitted by genealogy. Likewise, the horizontal analysis consists of looking at the range of discourses about the subject in its different aspects as made possible by archaeology. Secondly, in the present study, the historical analysis does not necessarily provide the origin, evolution or development of the phenomenon analysed, but some episodes that mark shifts. Thirdly, the analysis does not excavate unknown or hidden events of the phenomenon, but instead deals with what is already known and pronounced through previous discourses. Fourthly, the content of analysis may not reflect the whole truth about the phenomenon but emphasis is placed on analysing what is assumed in the available discourses.
Lastly, all the analysis is conducted with the intention to understand the current phenomenon of HIV and AIDS in South Africa and the response of the FMCSA. In this chapter, the social and discursive analysis concerns HIV and AIDS and its gendered nature in South Africa and the involvement of the FMCSA in responding to this phenomenon. In the next section, these methods will be used to explore the social and discursive context of HIV and AIDS in South Africa.
2.3 HIV and AIDS in South Africa