2. Introduction
2.4 Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria
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that their income levels increased. Meanwhile they also observed that higher income levels, democratic, and economically opened countries are more likely to be targets of international terrorism.
Inferably, there is a lack of consensus among scholars regarding the role of socio-economic indicators in the emergence of persistence of terrorism and other studies have adopted a middle ground regarding the forgoing disagreement over the role of socio-economic in the emergence of terrorism. This general lack of consensus as identified above is not inconsequential. According to Piazza (2011: 340) these ambiguities has “left terrorism studies unable to articulate a clear counter-terrorism policy recommendation”. While linking socio- economic factors to “religious terrorism”20 might further seem to be a quantum leap, it appears that such is not necessarily malapropos. As Schimid (2004b:212) rightly observed:
Additional factors need to exist in order to fuse religion with political violence. Poverty of the people (not necessarily of the terrorist who identifies with them), social injustice and state repression are often listed as prime causes of insurgent terrorism. They can drive people to migration, revolt, crime, suicide or religious fervour. The terrorist temptation is often a combination of some or all of these. The migration is to paradise, the revolt is against the status quo, the method used is normally considered criminal, suicide preceded by murder is one of the means and religion offers a justification.
The implication of the above – namely the divided opinion over the role of socio-economic factors in the rise of terrorism and Schimid’s observation – for the study of Boko Haram terrorism constitutes the focus of the subsequent review and analysis.
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environment for various forms of revolutions by non-states actors, such as Boko Haram and the popular Niger Delta Crises (Maiangwa, 2012; Uadiale, 2012). In this light, corruption and maladministration have been identified as the prime factor behind the deterioration of the Nigerian state, which is in turn believed to be critical to the growing politicisation of religion that sustains Boko Haram (Mantzikos, 2010; Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012). The economic inequality that has existed between the mostly affected northern region and the southern region is widely recognized as quintessential to the Boko Haram uprising. Other factors such as religious fundamentalism and the long standing North-South ethnic rivalry are also underscored (Klugman, 1999; Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011; Blanquart, 2012). Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of the deplorable socio-economic condition of northern inhabitants, which potentially contributes to the volatility of the region, has only been scantly identified and analyzed in existing studies.
Hence, the rationale for the choice of this topic is to give the above a more focused attention as way of deepening the understanding of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, thereby contributing to the growing scholarly efforts to understand the situation. The key assumption here is that the socio-economic conditions of the peoples in northern Nigeria is critical to the emergence, the flourishing as well as the possible control of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. This assumption is pivoted on the highly contested poverty-terrorism nexus (Weinberg et al., 2004; Richardson, 2011; Jackson and Sinclair, 2012). Looking at the sect’s membership which comprises largely “illiterate youths some of whom were school dropouts or petty itinerant traders, who with the readymade army of jobless drifters, especially the Almajiri”21 in the mostly affected state of Borno, Yobe and Bauchi States, socio-economic factors can certainly be proven to be significant to the rise of Boko Haram (Forest, 2012;
Musa, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013; Umar, 2013). To understand this dynamics, an inquiry into the history of Nigeria political economy and its tendency to fuel poverty and desperation is pertinent. This analysis constitutes the focus of the subsequent chapter.
21Almajiri is an Arabic term that refers to someone who leaves their home in search of knowledge of the Islamic religion. Its plural is Almajirai
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CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA AND TERRORISM
A predatory capitalism has bred misery, turned politics into warfare and all but arrested the development of productive forces. The Nigerian ruling class has assaulted the masses with physical and psychological violence and thwarted their
aspirations, particularly their escape from underdevelopment and poverty.
Legitimacy has receded to the background, making way for relations of raw power and the perception of right as being coextensive with might
Claude Ake22
3.0 Introduction
The prevalence of various forms of collective actions and organised violence, against established authorities and institutions in modern day Nigeria is arguably a manifestation of Claude Ake’s apt description of politics in Nigeria. With particular reference to the crises in the northern region of the country, the root causes hinges on the failings of successive operators of the statecraft, since Nigeria’s independence, especially the [mis]management of the nation’s vast resources towards growth and development both politically and economically (Omitola, 2012: 5). The resultant fragility of the Nigerian state – virtually tittering on the verge of collapse – has wrongly meant the state’s perpetual reliance on its monopoly of the use of force to maintain its continuing existence. Sadly, the heavy-handed and brutal crises management approach adopted by the Nigerian government has only served to escalate more political violence for which many attribute to Boko Haram insurgence that assumed a goriest dimension in the aftermath of the approach. It was in some of the military operation that the alleged extra judiciary killing of the sect’s leaders by the Nigeria security agencies took place. As Forest (2012:64) aptly observed, “for many members of the sect, the unjust circumstances surrounding the death of Yusuf served to amplify pre-existing animosities toward the government”.
Thus, in the quest to understand the economic predicates of Nigeria’s current security challenges, this chapter provides a general description of the Nigeria’s political economy and
22 During his Presidential Address to the 1982 Convention of the Nigerian Political Science Association in which he criticized the Nigerian society, politics (cited in Marenin, 1985),
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its tendency to fuel violence including terrorism. Towards this end, the following are analysed in this chapter: [i] the pre-Nigerian oil economy especially the prominence of agriculture during the era; [ii] the subsequent oil-centric economy and how this trend reduces Nigeria to a mono-cultural economic state and its ramifying effect on the state and society in Nigeria; [iii] the problem of corruption particularly among the elites, against the backdrop of the state’s oil-dependent nature, and how this continues to be a major factor in the underdevelopment of Nigeria; [iv] the economic crises in Nigeria particularly since the 1980s, and the consequence of its [mis]management – particularly the macro-economic and macro-social implications of the Structural Adjustment Programs SAP; [v] the general problem of poverty and economic frustration in Nigeria and the consequent increased violence against the state in response to the situation.
This historico-economic overview is one of the windows into the socio-economic malaise underlying Nigeria’s various security issues, including the Boko Haram insurgency, which is hardly a transient phenomenon considering its intransigence to the military counter-terrorism so far. While the deficiency on the part of the security agencies is acknowledgeable, the need to adequately understand the background underlying factors, particularly socio-economic ones that have bred such anti-state resistance in Nigeria is equally pertinent. As Uadiale (2013:81) aptly argues, what is clearly essential to various conflicts in Nigeria today are
“political questions about the allocation efficiency of the state; the control of economic resources; and the monopolization of political and economic power”. These have continued to create the socio-economic and political ambiance for antipathy towards the government by various non-state agencies.