2.4 Characteristics and classification of property
2.4.1 Characteristics of things
A thing is generally classified as corporeal, that is, an object that is part of corporeal reality because it can be sensually191 observed and occupies a certain space.192 In Roman law, corporeal things were defined as things that could be touched or felt.193
Roman-Dutch writers such as Voet,194 Van der Keessel,195 and Huber, scrupulously pursued the Roman law distinction between corporeals and incorporeals.196 A somewhat broader concept of corporeals was introduced by other authors such as Grotius197 and Van Leeuwen198 to include not only material objects that could be touched, but also physical objects such as gases that could be experienced by all the senses.199
In contrast to the strict adherence that only corporeal objects should qualify as things, various incorporeal things have been recognised in South African legislation. Subjective rights currently recognised in South African laws are real rights200 (with things as objects);
personal rights201 (with performance as objects); intellectual property rights (with intellectual property as objects); personal rights202 (with aspects of personality as objects). As far as common law is concerned, if any of these arbitrary rights serves as
191 Using the five senses.
192 Van der Merwe and De Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes 13; also see Van der Walt Introduction to the law of property 15.
193 Van der Merwe and De Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes 13; also see Van der Walt Introduction to the law of property 15.
194 Van der Merwe “Things” par 17; also see Commentarius 1 8 11, 1 8 18.
195 Van der Merwe “Things” par 17; also see Prael ad Gr 2 1 10, 2 1 14.
196 Van der Merwe “Things” par 17; also see Commentarius 1 8 11, 1 8 18.; Prael ad Gr 2 1 10, 2 1 14.
197 Van der Merwe “Things” par 17; also see Inleidinge 2 1 10.
198 Van der Merwe “Things” par 17; also see RHR 2 1 4.
199 Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 14. Van der Merwe “Things” par 17.
200 Kain v Kahn 1986 4 SA 251 (C); In Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155, the will stated that the piece of land should be distributed in four parts amongst the children. Furthermore, locks would have to be drawn to see who gets which part. However, these locks will only be drawn once the first child reach majority. The child who draws the lock with the farmhouse would be obliged to pay the other three siblings. The registrar rejected the transfer as it did not amount to a real right.
201 In terms of s 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 only real rights in land can be registered, personal rights can only be registered if the Registrar is of the opinion that the personal right is complementary to the registrable real right.
202 In Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) the court distinguish between a real right and a personal right.
the object of a real right, they shall be treated as an incorporeal thing.203 However, if either of these arbitrary rights themselves acts as the object of a real right, it is considered to be an incorporeal thing in the sense of common law.
Dogmatic issues are triggered by the restriction of things to corporeals and the required corporeality characteristic. There are, nonetheless, a variety of ways to resolve this contradiction.204 One of the suggestions is that the concept of incorporeal things should be dismissed on dogmatic grounds and that the (infrequent) presence of such incorporeal thing should be limited to playing a limited role in practise.205 In such a case, the character of corporeality would be preserved, and the presence and recognition of intangible objects would be limited to the rare exception created by statute or precedent.206
Another suggestion to resolve this issue is the need for modern South African legal practise to accept the concept of incorporeal things and that it should be fulfilled by disregarding the characteristics of the corporeality of a thing.207
As a final solution, it is submitted that incorporeal things should be viewed for what they really are, namely patrimonial rights serving as the object of limited real rights. This essentially implies that, in the broader sense, certain patrimonial rights (together with corporate things) that serve as objects of limited real rights are treated as property.208 The problem remains that, if such classification proves necessary, whether incorporeal things should be classified as movable or immovable according to criteria. In other words, to establish whether a right is movable or immovable one needs to rely on the existence of the entity to which it relates. Logically, the answer to the question of whether a right is movable or immovable depends on the existence of the entity to which it relates.209
203 Examples of case law where incorporeal things have been acknowledged include: Ben-Tovin v Ben- Tovin 2001 3 SA 1074 (C); and Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd 2003 5 SA 309 (SCA); also see Erlank Property in Virtual Worlds 233.
204 Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 18.
205 Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 41.
206 Erlank Property in Virtual Worlds 234.
207 Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 41.
208 Erlank Property in Virtual Worlds 234.
209 Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 41.
As far as this approach is concerned, a distinction should be drawn between real and personal rights, all personal rights being movable. As far as real rights are concerned, a further distinction should be made between real rights of immovable and movable things as objects.
In the Cooper case,210 a distinction was made between a usufruct and a quasi-usufruct.211 An example from a deceased estate point of view would be a usufruct. A usufruct over a vehicle would be regarded as a movable asset, whereas a usufruct over a property would be regarded as immovable.
In deceased estates the classification of a thing as corporeal or incorporeal plays an important role, especially with the division of things into movables and immovable.
However, the classification of incorporeality has been labelled as illogical, due to the fact that incorporeals cannot be moved.
In so far as the law relates to these two kinds of things, the importance of subdividing things into movable and immovable things is not only technically essential, but also of practical importance.
According to section 2 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, there needs to be a written contract between the parties involved in the sale of immovable assets, whereas with a contract of sale in respect of movable assets one need not have a written contract.
Another example would be where a transfer of ownership of a movable asset takes place
210 In the Cooper case, Mr Cooper bequeathed one half of the residue of his estate to his son. The bequest was subject to a lifelong usufruct in favour of the surviving spouse. The spouse died on 02 September 1992. The first and final liquidation account was drawn up by the executrix, who is the first defendant in this case, reflecting the residue of the estate consisting of certain shares and cash to the value of R357 034.13. Half of the aforementioned cash sum, namely R178 517.07, and the amount of R315 156, is awarded to the claimant, being the market value of one half of those shares at the date of the testator's death. The plaintiff was not satisfied with the award, arguing that some of the shares were subject to adjustment and should have been valued on 02 September 1992. The defendant refused to amend as according to her the shares forming part of the tesator’s estate were subject to a quasi- usufruct. A life interest in the nature of a true usufruct can pertain to incorporeal property such as shares. However, shares, cannot be the subject of a quasi-usufruct since they are not capable of consumption through use.
211 Cooper case par 32.
on delivery, whereas immovable property would only be transferred by way of a deeds registration.
It is the author’s understanding that the common-law distinction between corporeals and incorporeals is rooted in modern property law and also acts as a further sub-classification of things. In common law and practice, objects and incorporeal items in the form of rights are known as movables or immovables (corporeal). The respective classifications are also viewed separately.
“Movable” and “immovable” are the most important classification of things.212 According to Silberberg213 immovables are land and everything attached to it, either by natural or artificial means.214 However, according to the Administration of Estates Act, immovable property means land and any real right in land or minerals (other than any right under a bond) registerble in any office in the Republic used for the registration of title to land or the right to mine.215
Movable things, on the other hand, are self-explanatory, provided that they can be easily moved from one place to another without being damaged or losing their identity.216 The size, nature and composition must also be taken into account.