CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
4.4 COMPANY RELATIONS AS MICROCOSM OF INDUSTRY RELATIONS
Act states that the minister must extend collective agreement, as requested, by publishing a notice in the Government Gazette declaring that, from a specified date and for a
specified period, the collective agreement will be binding on the non-parties specified in the notice. It is correct to state that the conditions applicable to 'unorganized' employees within the industry, in terms of being compelled by the Act to comply with the
agreements reached at the bargaining council, are equally applicable to 'unorganized' employers. Participation by these parties is clearly non-existent at this industry level.
4.4 COMPANY RELATIONS AS MICROCOSM OF INDUSTRY
never had the right and opportunity to influence the outcome of some of the policies it sometimes had to implement internally. The denial of this right and opportunity, however, sterns from the company's choice in opting not to affiliate itself to any association.
Whilst the current arrangement is that the employer has no influence in terms of what transpires at the national bargaining council level, the situation on the part of the
employees is somewhat different. The majority of workers in the company are organized under the banner of two trade unions. Some are members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). Others are members of the South African Workers Trade Union (SA WTU) and there are those who are not members of these two trade unions.
Current figures released by management in this regard suggest that the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) represents 44%. The South African Workers Trade Union (SAWTU) represents 34% and the remaining 22% are non-members. Whilst the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) commands the majority support at the industry level, at this plant representation suggests this is not the case.
Although it is sufficiently represented but it does not enjoy outright majority, and as a result its influential muscle is to a certain extent limited. To this end, it is essential to distinguish between the dimensions of worker participation to be able to identify in which of the two is the power of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
(NUMSA) to influence decisions restrained. Because of the significant power and influence the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) enjoys at the
industry level and resulting from the fact that, at this level, participation is confined to the determination of terms and conditions of employment, the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), remains the most influential even at the company level. This is true because through the influence that the National of Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) is able to exert, the form and nature of the decisions taken at this level are through the minister of labour's intervention extended to the company under investigation even though, it is not party to these decisions.
On this basis, it is without doubt that workers organized under the banner of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) are able to participate in determining terms and conditions of employment governing their employment relationship. This ability to participate in the decision making process is nevertheless dependent on the extent to which ordinary workers are afforded the opportunity, within the structures of the trade union to make contributions. On the question of 'co-operative issues', the muscle power of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) at the company level are somewhat diminished relative to its power on 'distributive issues'.
On the question of the South African Workers Trade Union's (SAWTU) ability to define and influence decisions at the industry level. the situation is different. Unlike the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). the South African Workers Trade Union (SA WTU) does not form part of the nine trade unions represented at the national bargaining forum that are party to the agreement governing terms and conditions of employment affecting all employees employed within the industry. To confirm the binding nature of this agreement, the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of
South Africa (SEIFSA) Handbook of the main agreement for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry (1997/98) stipulates that:
''The conditions of employment in this handbook form a main agreement which is the outcome of negotiations between the registered employer associations and registered trade unions which are parties to the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry."
It goes on to clearly state that:
"The main agreement is gazetted in terms of section 32 of the Labour Relations Act (1995) and as such is legally binding on all employers and employees in the industry."
It thus becomes apparent that participation by workers organized under the banner of the
South African Workers Trade Union (SA WTU), either in the definition of issues or the influencing of the outcome of the issues commonly referred to as "bread and butter issues", is non existent. Despite this situation, they are bound by the decisions taken in this regard.
While there may be many reasons that could explain why the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa's (NUMSA) power of influence on co·operative issues at plant level is restrained, it is important to indicate two of these for the purpose of this exercise:
One is the fact that the trade union movement in this country, particularly, over the decades focussed its attention on wage issues. The premise for this approach being the assumption that workers should stay away from 'management issues' and focus their energies and efforts on increasing wages and the betterment of their terms and conditions of employment because seeking to deal with 'core business issues' might mean co.aptation and collective management of the capitalist system.
The second one is that the labour legislation governing relations between labour and capital has without doubt failed to ensure that joint decision making remains not only rhetorical but becomes practically feasible. As a result, for a number of decades, the South African labour legislation never made any visible attempt to bring the question of management prerogative to serious scrutiny on issues widely termed 'core business issues' .
Since the company under investigation is part of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry, in which a wide range of terms and conditions of employment are negotiated at the national bargaining forum, and it is clearly stated in the main agreement that no party may compel another party to negotiate any of the issues
negotiated at the bargaining forum, it makes sense to argue that the only issues that may be negotiated at plant level are 'co-operative issues'. However, analysis of the Labour Relations Act (1995), viewed by many as a major victory on the part of the workers in terms of its attempt to subject these core issues to joint decision making, reveals that the 'major victory' notion espoused by some scholars and labour relations practitioners alike represents an over-simplistic analysis of the Act. Indeed the Act falls short of its intended purpose in this regard.
4.5 LABOUR RELATIONS ACT (1995) AND JOINT DECISION'