Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the relationship between democratisation and reconstruction in Angola. It has argued that democrausauon and reconstruction are two related processes.

Since reconstruction is the vision now facing Angola following the end of the civil war, democratisation is necessary for Isustainable development. This is because through democratisation Angola's politics ern best be liberalised from the political absolutism of the past toward open and publicly accountable politics. While absolutist politics has been the major factor behind the civil

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democratic politics provides an appropriate deterrent against such political pursuit. Because democracy can allow open politics, accountable use of power and resources, and human rights and freedom, which together provide the potential ground for effJctive nation-building.

In light of this discussion, the chapter has outlined the treaty of April 2002, the memorandum of understanding sibed between the incumbent MPLA government and UNITA, and suggests that it offers a plausible framework for peace and democratisation in Angola. In this way, it sets a favourable foundation for reconstruction. Unlike previous accords, which were based on a winner-take-all democratic model, the Luena memorandum is conciliatory and ratifies power sharing and socio-economic justice.

Thus, the next chapter explores the response to the road map, including that of the church.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESPOlNSE TO THE ROAD MAPI

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the Isignificance of democratisation for the reconstruction of Angola. It argued that democratisation is the necessary stepping-stone for reconstruction because it offers the best ground for political liberalisation in the country.

Lack of political liberalisation was the mother cause of the civil conflict, which in turn hindered nation building and development. The chapter concluded that the road map for peace and democratisation signed in April 2002 presents a plausible foundation for democratisation leading to national reconstruction. Since the road map is the bridging contract between the past and the future, the present chapter explores the state of its implementation. It first looks at JOw UNITA, the government, and the international community have responded to it. T le focus of the discussion then moves to the response of the church i.e. the Inter-ecclesi 1 Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). This discussion aims to ascertain strengths and weaknesses in the church's response to the democratisation process.

4.2 Response to the road map: U ITA

There was a rapid and full compliance with the military provision of the treaty.Ceasefire became effective from 18 March 2002 as soon as the negotiations began between theI

government and UNITA forces in rho town of Cassamba in Moxico province (Griffiths 2004:1). It is estimated that about 85,585 UNIT A soldiers presented themselves at designated quartering camps all over the country by July 2002, accompanied by their families. UNITA handed over abrut 90% of the total weaponry it possessed to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA- the new single army) (Porto and Glover 2006:67). Itwas estimated that the remaining 10% were in civilian hands. As part of its "four layered military structure", UNITA had used "village militia units, each averaging anything between thirty to sixty people. Tbeir task was to hold ground and harass government

forces spending the night in their locations (Rupiya and Njeri 2005:98).11 The level of insecurity predicted as a result

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Ithe scattered 10% of UNITA's weaponry did not happen. The fear was that they ould be used in "banditry and localised violence"

(Rupiya and Njeri 2005:98). Because of this prompt response and cooperation, UNITA was praised by the UN, the troikJ observers, and the MPLA government. By August 2002, the process of quartering and disarmament was formally concluded and the 'Mixed Military Commission (CMM)', the process monitor, was dissolved. In its place, a Joint Political Commission (CCP) was established (Monitor 2004).

On the political front, UNITA initi lly experienced a struggle around legitimacy between its different factions: the mainline UNITA which after Jonas Savimbi and his deputy Antonio Dembo died came under toe leadership of General Lukamba Gato; the overseas UNITA camp;and the New UNIT

1

which had broken away from Savimbi and stationed in the capital Luanda. However, in

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all the factions came together and elected Isaias Samakuva, formerly head of the overseas camp, as new UNITA president. Following this process, the movement soon reuniied as one (Griffiths 2004:3; Monitor 2005). Indeed, UNITA has transformed from a military moI vement to a political party. Ithas been active

in the Government of Unity andlNational Reconciliation (GURN), in the National Assembly, in the Angolan Armed rorces (FAA), and it has exacted its party activities politically.It has generally used thl press, peaceful rallies, and alliances with other social players to make its case againstIwhat it has often viewed as government military harassment and political intoleranle. For example, in March 2004 it joined thirty civil associations and other opposition political parties in an anti-government campaign. This campaign was not limited to thd capital Luanda as there were also meetings and demonstrations in other provinces. The motto of the campaign was "at present, the exercise of liberties and rights is the greatest challenge facing the Angolan people"

(Lopes 2004:36).

I1At the end of 2003,Angolan Police gues timated that about 3-4 millionsmall armsand light weapons were in civilian hands,the large portion of which wasin possession of ex-UNITA militia as well as MPLA or FAA militia. Thesegroups were not inc uded in theprogram of demobilization (Monitor 2005).