My discussion has shown how it is possible to save the moral residue argwnent. In so doing, I outlined the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist. I also discussed the debate between opponents and proponents of genuine moral dilemmas. Were a genuine moral dilemma to exist it would have to satisfy the conditions of a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable loss, and a situation imposed on the agent by the world. I discussed proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Williams and Marcus, while outlining a number of candidates that satisfy the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.
After discussing the debate concerning the existence of moral dilemmas I spelt out the moral residue argument and the negative emotions of self-assessment involved therein. McConnell, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Greenspan provide two compelling objections to the efficacy of the moral residue argument, arguing that it is flawed on two counts as it begs the question and fails to acknowledge that there are cases where it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even when the agent has done nothing wrong. These objections, however, depend on specific conceptions of appropriate moral residue that neither explain what the agent has done wrong, nor provide an account of why the agent feels the harsh self-judgement of guilt, shame, or remorse that she does. In response to the flawed conceptions of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections I proposed that the independent standard of integrity would both overcome the objections and provide a more precise conception of appropriate moral residue. That is, a conception of moral residue that can tell a story about why the agent experiences negative emotions of self-assessment, and explain what it is that makes the residue appropriate i.e what constitutes doing wrong in cases of dilemmas.
I based my analysis of integrity on McFall's conception of integrity. After estaplishing the conditions of integrity and how a better conception of appropriate moral residue is one when the agent has compromised her integrity and thus done something wrong, I showed how integrity can be used as an independent standard of
231Blondei, 1999, Page 351
proving that agents like Sophie and Agamemnon did something wrong. This I did by showing that there is evidence in bothSophie'sChoice andJphigenia at Aulisof both Sophie and Agamemnon' s moral residue, and the fact that they would have
experienced moral residue regardless of how they had acted.
Both Sophie and Agamemnon's respective commitments satisfied the conditions for integrity laid out in the third section. Consequently, in making their respective choices they both violated an identity-conferring commitment, and thus, undennined their integrity. Had either Sophie or Agamemnon acted on their other commitment they would similarly have compromised their integrity and done something wrong. Itfollows that they both would have undermined their integrity and thus done something wrong no matter how they had acted. Given that both Sophie and Agamemnon had coherent commitments, they were not responsible for the inevitable wrongdoing of the choice that faced them. Thus, they both faced a
situation that satisfies the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma outlined in the first section. In showing that Sophie and Agamenmon both experienced appropriate moral residue and both would have done something wrong regardless of how they acted, and by showing how their situations meet the criteria of an
irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable loss, and a situation imposed on them by the world, I proved that genuine moral dilemmas exist and that the moral residue argwnent can be salvaged and can support that fact.
The implications of my discussion are that much of moral theory as it stands will have to be revised. The likes ofKant, Ross, and followers of utilitarianism and other rule-based ethical theories will have to revise their general conceptions that a conflict of commitments is mtionally resolvable, and allow for the possibility that genuine moral dilemmas exist and that not all conflicts are rationally resolvable by appealing to some rule-based ethical theory or hierarchical system of ranking values and conunitments.
That the moral residue argwnent can be salvaged points to the fact that moral psychology can tell us much about whether a person is an adrrtimble moml agent or not. Itcan also shed light on whether the agent has actually done something wrong or not. My discussions similarly highlight the importance of personal integrity in
making moral decisions and acting morally, and - again - in discerning whether an agent actually has done something wrong that it is contrary to her personal
commitments.
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It is important to look at moral dilemmas, moral residue, and integrity, because of the further implications for moral theory and moral decisions. Given that an agent's emotions of negative self-assessment can be used as evidence that she has violated her integrity, it follows that moral residue and integrity are a central part of an agent's moral decisions. Furthennore, the fact that moral dilemmas exist, and violating integrity means that an agent has done something wrong, is evidence that all morality is essentially a personal morality in the sense that an agent with integrity makes a range of commitments, and it is essentially up to her to decide what she commits herself to, and to ensure that she does not undermine or violate those commitments. Although agents should ideally aim to reduce the conflict between their personal commitments,m as shown - there are cases where that is not possible and cannot necessarily be foreseen, means that much of moral theory as it stands needs to be enhanced to account for the degree of moral luck involved in being moral and making moral decisions. It thus seems that goodness is fragile, and that the emotions of moral residue and the moral residue argument interpreted in tenns of the independent standard of integrity, have a role to play in supporting the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
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