List of Abbreviations
Chapter 5. Trend and Incident Analysis
5.2 Information as a Strategic Asset
5.2.2 Conflict and Competition in an Asymmetric and Unconventional Environment
Asymmetric conflict is usually when one participant has a vast superiority over the other, most commonly in technological abilities or numbers; this situation usually results in an unconventional conflict, where the inferior participant changes tactics to compensate for the asymmetry. There are also cases of moral or ethical asymmetry, such as the use of child soldiers, suicide bombers, and human shields. With the modern pervasiveness of information and communications technology, the information asymmetry between adversaries and competitors has become more pronounced.
5.2.2.1 State of Asymmetric Conflicts
The majority of modern armed-conflicts are unconventional, and involve non-state actors. Table 5.1 shows the number of armed conflicts for the period 2002 to 2005, from a dataset initiated by Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand (2002). Table 5.2 shows the number of non- state armed conflicts for the same period. The two tables originate from different data-sets, so there is not a perfect match, however it can be seen that a large number of conflicts are classed as minor, and that the number of non-state armed conflicts is relatively large; from this it can be determined that the vast majority of armed conflicts are low-intensity with non-state actors. Figure 5.2 shows the number of armed conflicts for a longer period (1994-2008); as can be seen from 2003 there has been a gradual increase in the number of armed conflicts, primarily due to the increase in minor armed conflicts. From Table 5.2 it appears that the majority of non-state conflicts occur in Sub- Saharan Africa, making this particularly relevant to the study from a South African perspective.
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Table 5.1: Armed Conflicts 2002-2005
2002 2003 2004 2005
Minor (25-999 deaths p.a.) 25 24 25 27
Major / War (>1000 deaths p.a.) 7 5 7 5
Total 32 29 32 32
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Ver.4-2009 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, International Peace Research Centre, 2009); Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Table 5.2: Non-State Armed Conflicts
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 23 17 14
Americas 2 2 4 3
Asia, Central and South 3 5 3 4
Asia, East & SE & Oceania 2 0 1 1
Middle East & North Africa 3 3 3 3
Total 34 33 28 25
Source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Internation Peace Research Institute, 2007).
Figure 5.2: Number of Armed Conflicts per Year, source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Ver.4-2009 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, International Peace Research Centre, 2009); Gleditsch et al. (2002)
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The low-intensity unconventional conflicts may have an impact on business, in that many revolve around the areas rich in strategic raw materials; therefore industries reliant on these materials may face shortages or increased prices, or may be required to introduce additional security measures for their operations in regions of conflict. Security and defence-related industries may actually receive a boost due to conflict in that there is a greater demand for their products and services. Tourism may also be negatively affected in areas which experience heightened levels of violence. It is therefore important to follow the trends in conflict as it may impact on business, or on the political environment resulting in increased tensions and therefore the possibility of related security incidents.
5.2.2.2 Strategic Information Related to Piracy
Piracy at sea is growing, particularly off the coast of Somalia, where pirates see this as a viable financial or economic venture; and they have learnt that the ransom for the crew and cargo is far more rewarding than robbery (Carney, 2009). Many shipping corporations have learnt that tolerating the pirates and paying the ransom is often less costly and troublesome than having to deal with the insurance, the resulting investigations and the negative impact on their reputations (Torchia, 2009). Webb (2009) reports that the Somali pirates are utilising a form of business intelligence, whereby informants in London are providing shipping details to the pirates by satellite phone; this information provides the pirates with a strategic asset that allows them to plan and choose their targets. However, the pirates still make mistakes despite their advantage of being forewarned; the French naval flagship was misidentified in poor light and attacked, which resulted in the capture of five pirates (Asquin, 2009). Decision makers in the shipping companies, and those who rely on these companies, would be wise to keep track of pirate tactics and trends to evaluate the risk of using shorted (but pirate-infested) routes as opposed to longer (but safer) shipping lanes.
Due to hostilities amongst many of the nations that are providing naval forces to police the pirate- infested waters, a fully co-ordinated effort is difficult; this has resulted in a neutral communications channel called Mercury (StrategyPage.com, 2009b). This circumvents the political hostilities, and together with increased aerial reconnaissance is hindering the pirate's operations (StrategyPage.com, 2009b).
Broadcasts may also be pirated; as they are wireless, it is easy to receive the signal, which then could be unscrambled using modified decoders, enabling the broadcast to be viewed without having to pay the subscription. An example is DirectTV in the United States; the access cards for their TV systems were pirated (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). The company monitored online activity,
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to understand the workings of the signal pirates, and then using this information released apparent updates that rendered the pirated access cards useless (ibid.). It is also possible to interfere with these broadcasts by transmitting another signal over it, which effectively jams the signal; this occurred in Sri Lanka, where the British Broadcasting Corporation suspended their partnership with the Sri Lankan national broadcaster after the transmission had been interfered with (TamilNet.com, 2009). Other media, such as CDs, DVDs, and software are also pirated, resulting in loss to the production companies; it is in their interests to protect the copyright of their products, which has resulted in an ongoing struggle between to improve copyright protection schemes and methods to break them.
5.2.2.3 Strategic Information and Asymmetric Competition in Business
During the industrial age, organisations that were heavily dependent on communications needed to be centralised; however, the rapid advancements in information and communications technology have allowed organisations to become geographically dispersed without compromising their communications. Even though organisations are physically dispersed, the employees may become virtually coalesced through regular contact via the use of communications technologies and social networking applications.
The concept of asymmetric conflict may be seen in the corporate sector. Small, medium, and micro enterprises (SMMEs) are disadvantaged when compared to larger companies; they do not have the financial strength, buying power, employee numbers and possibly brand recognition that the larger corporations are renowned for. By making effective use of information technologies, and particularly the Internet, the SMMEs can compete on a global scale. Their smaller size and lower overheads allows them to be more adaptable, undercut costs of their larger competitors, or offer customised services, all of which would prove to be an advantage. This is analogous to small guerrilla forces in a military context.
Information regarding the culture of a target audience is of strategic value in both propaganda and marketing. Iraqi propaganda broadcasts during the 1991 Gulf War failed in their attempt to disillusion American forces due to their lack of understanding of American culture; the broadcasts claimed that the soldier‟s wives would be sleeping with Tom Cruise, Tom Selleck, and Bart Simpson (Denning, 1999). Coca Cola introduced Diet Coke into Japan, and the product failed and had to be renamed Low-Calorie Coke due to a negative perception of dieting in Japan (Nakamoto, 1996); this shows how a lack of understanding the target audience can have negative strategic implications.
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Corporations may also be provided opportunities by asymmetric conflict: a California-based company developed software based on PayPal‟s model for identifying cyber-criminals which they used to discover terrorist financing networks and trends in roadside-bomb attacks (Weinberger, 2009).
5.2.2.4 Network Warfare as an Asymmetric Conflict
Cyber-attacks provide the attacker with an asymmetric advantage: Hayden (2010), a retired general, claims that Internet "geography" favours the attacker. Major cyber-attacks include the DDoS attacks against Estonia and Georgia. The largest Estonian bank was forced to close its Internet banking website and is estimated to have lost over $1 million (Rolski, 2007). The cyber-attack on Georgia preceded the Russian military incursion into South Ossetia, and by targeting the government and media organisation the Georgian ability to communicate domestically and internationally was severely hindered (Hart, 2008); this gave the Russians information dominance regarding the view of the conflict.
Cyber-incidents may also be used to gain information; Section 5.4 will discuss these in more detail.
Phishing attacks are aimed at tricking online banking customers into revealing sensitive account information that allows criminals to access the money (Pickworth, 2009). Phishing attacks were involved in the SMS banking fraud in 2009, where an excess of R5 million was stolen (De Vries, 2009); a scam that targeted South African Airways in 2007 resulted in a R14 million loss (Rondganger, 2007). Remediation costs from major outbreaks of viruses and worms may also prove to be costly (Veerasamy & Eloff, 2008).
Cyber-attacks are asymmetric in that the attacker may be able to maintain a high degree of anonymity; whilst it is possible to identify individual computers that are involved in a DDoS attack, the persons controlling them may never be identified. The cost to the attacker is also far less than that of the defender. Cyber-based scams also present a lower risk than a physical robbery, and may be more rewarding, as can be seen from the examples the amounts stolen were in the order of millions of Rands.
It is not yet established as to what constitutes network warfare in the form of cyber-war: some contend that for it to be a true cyber-war, then it should be nation-states as the main protagonists (Schneier, 2010; Fiterman, 2010). Others argue that due to the global shift towards unconventional conflict between sub-national groups and organisations, cyber-war cannot be expected to follow the traditional war between nation-states, and will rather exhibit the trend of sub-national groups and
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organisations participating as a major protagonist (Fiterman, 2010). Should this be the case, then it is probable that cyber-war would exhibit asymmetries, as are found in the modern unconventional conflicts.