The European Union funded ‘Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme’ (EU Programme) was initiated in 1999 aimed to achieve economic and social development of previously disadvantaged communities through nature-based tourism, as well as building local capabilities regarding tourism operations and management (Background Document 2001). The programme was meant to cover the entire Wild Coast. In Xolobeni specifically, a hiking and horse-riding trail and two rest camps were constructed along the coast.
Initially, the programme was seen as a success. Numerous community members were trained in eco-tourism activities, including trained guides, trail and camp
maintenance, as well as management and marketing of tourism operations (Midterm Review 2003). Local residents were employed for almost all parts of the operation, including the construction and maintenance of the trails and camps, tending and supply of horses, caterers for the two camps, and community guides (Ibid). Tourists began to trickle in, and a fly-fishing company was formed that shared profits with the community (Ibid).
Unfortunately, the programme was not able to sustain its success after the EU initiators withdrew, leaving the management of AmaDiba Adventures to local residents and a local NGO, PondoCROP. It is likely that PondoCROP lacked the capacity to effectively assist in management, while local residents turned out to be insufficiently trained during the earlier stages (Wright 2005). Currently, the fly-fishing business is non-existent, only one of the two rest camps is operating while both are in need of renovation, and the number of tourists is extremely limited.11
11 Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11; Interview with Mzamo Dlamini, 19/02/11; Interview with Zeka Mnyamana, 19/02/11 (All worked with AmaDiba Adventures).
There are several reasons for the eventual failure of AmaDiba Adventures. One major issue was the theft of over 400 000 rand of AmaDiba funds by a PondoCROP employee charged with overseeing finances (AmaDiba Adventures Forensic
Investigation). In addition, Zamile Qunya, MRC/TEM’s community liaison, is alleged to have sabotaged the tourism operation in order to make way for the mining. In order to disperse profits to the community and help manage AmaDiba Adventures, a community trust was created entitled Accoda Trust. The board of Accoda was elected by the community, and the board could be replaced if the community felt it necessary. The former director of Accoda Trust, Philip Ndlovela, along with several AmaDiba
Adventures employees, alleges that Zamile Qunya, another Accoda board member, also stole funds from Accoda.12 Qunya is also accused of failing to pass on important information, accepting tourist reservations without appointing a guide or telling the caterers to prepare food. Furthermore, Colin Bell, former CEO of Wilderness Safaris, alleges that Qunya sabotaged an agreement between his company and AmaDiba
Adventures in which Wilderness Safaris would have expanded the operation, accepting 75 percent of the financial risk while giving the community 85 percent of the profits.13
In addition to the obstacles posed by Qunya and PondoCROP, the eventual failure of AmaDiba Adventures appears to be due to a lack of ownership by the community due to a lack of participation:
Community respondent 2, with support from community respondent 1 and community respondent 3, argues that the programme had “…no proper involvement, local government was not approached and consultation with community was passive, with people being told what they were to do”. Community respondent 2 notes that this approach resulted in a lack of ownership and commitment, “… people have just sat, watched, listened and showed no ‘passion’ for the programme … there are people involved with this ecotourism who are just interested in the money because they don’t have passion as the ideas they had were not used, they are just doing what was said ...
they feel that they are not involved … It’s like spoon-feeding people, they cannot do it themselves…we don’t feel like it is for the community”. (Wright 2005: 70)
12 Interview with Philip Ndlovela, 22/02/11; Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11; Interview with Mzamo Dlamini, 19/02/11.
13 Interview with Colin Bell, 22/03/11.
The claims of the community respondents were backed up by both the Midterm Review (2003) and the programme training manager, who claimed:
programme management did not understand the beneficiary community, “The programme was dominated by white people, for the development of black people … they did not know how to go about this development … the black voices in the programme were not heard, not listened to … they [the black people] had a better understanding of their communities”. (Wright 2005: 80)
Not only were local residents merely passive recipients of the tourism
development, but local government were also largely excluded from the process. The Midterm Review (2003) asserts that insufficient steps were taken to ensure local
government institutions would take ownership of the project. Local residents involved in the project complained that the exclusion of local government made government officials feel “alienated”, hindering cooperation with residents involved in tourism (Wright 2005:
77). The local government’s hostility towards the tourism development likely
contributed to their steadfast support of the mining project, as discussed in section 3.6, as they had no reason to protect the tourism industry.
Much like Betterment and the gum tree development, the EU Programme suffered from a lack of popular participation. Involving local residents in the planning and design of the project would have likely increased people’s stake in the project, giving them a sense of ownership and empowerment as opposed to their sense of being “spoon-fed”.
Unlike Betterment and the gum tree development, however, the programme did not infringe on any pre-existing livelihood strategies. As a result, instead of being fiercely resisted by the community, the programme merely floundered once the substantial
financial, managerial, and technical support of the EU Development Programme made its scheduled departure.
In terms of Pretty’s (1995) typology, the EU Programme constituted functional participation. Groups such as Accoda Trust were formed to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Most major decisions were made without the input of local people by the EU project management. However, while AmaDiba Adventures is barely running currently, the programme may have opened the way for self-mobilization (Pretty’s highest level of participation) by the Xolobeni community to develop their own
tourism industry in the future. Many community members, in their evaluations of the project, “argue that the community needs to change their current practice of waiting for the funders to come to them; ‘…listening to the funders and being driven by the funders and not by us driving the funding’” (Wright 2005: 74). Perhaps local people will initiate their own tourism development in the future due to their experience with AmaDiba Adventures.