6.2 Conclusion in Terms of the Findings of the Study
6.2.4 The effectiveness of IPID strategies to ensure police accountability
Three strategies were mentioned by the IPID investigating officers, namely: (i) investigations;
(ii) recommendations for disciplinary and/or criminal procedures; and (iii) adherence to sections 29 and 33 of the IPID mandate. It was discovered that problems associated with
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inadequate capacity and lack of cooperation by police officers, complainants, witnesses and station commanders, as well as a lack of evidence from complainants, had an adverse effect on the investigation of cases of torture and assault. It was also revealed that the investigators relied on the availability of resources and evidence to ensure the effectiveness of their investigation strategies, but that a lack of information hampered this process. It was thus concluded that IPID strategies to investigate cases of torture and assault were ineffective in ensuring that rogue police officers were held accountable for their actions.
The issue of IPID recommendations for disciplinary measures and criminal prosecution was also unpacked. A investigator would issue a recommendation report to a prosecutor to:
indicate that the investigation was conducted;
serve as guidance for the prosecutor in his or her decision whether or not to prosecute;
and
offer the investigating officer’s opinion on the desired outcome of the case.
However, all of these depend on the thoroughness of the investigation, because an investigation has a huge impact on the decision whether disciplinary and criminal procedure actions will be taken. However, some IPID investigations admitted that they were often unable to provide strong evidence or arguments that would ensure the prosecution and conviction of a police suspect, regardless of the fact that they might sense that this person was guilty of the crime. In terms of ensuring police accountability, this has weakened the effectiveness of the strategy of disciplinary and criminal recommendations drafted by investigating officers once they have finalised their investigations. However, this finding does not discredit the importance of the strategy of recommendations, but it indicates that the challenges that result in the ineffectiveness of this strategy are to be addressed and not overlooked. It is evident that the IPID investigating officers overlooked the importance of their recommendations in relation to police accountability. It was revealed that this strategy might be ineffective because prosecutors’ assessment of the evidence often took into consideration the fact that the police officer was executing his or her duties during the offence, and thus it was argued that prosecutors requested ‘ridiculous’ information from IPID investigators pending their decision to prosecute or not.
To ensure the effectiveness of the recommendations and of the oversight body as a whole, it is important to address the issues that are summarised in Figure 6.3 below. This figure shows that an influx of cases of torture and assault obligates the IPID to investigate this problem, but the
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challenge is that the IPID is inadequately capacitated and the productivity of its investigations is jeopardised as a consequence. The lack of evidence produced by complainants, such as failure to identify suspects and no medical reports, also contributes to the weakness of the investigation. The outcomes of these challenges result in ineffective investigations and hence in the dismissal of disciplinary and criminal prosecution recommendations by prosecutors.
These dismissals in turn result in a high rate of declined cases of torture and assault by the NPA, which means a low rate of conviction for torture or assault.
Figure 6.3: Factors that contribute to the cycle of police brutality (torture and assault) in the IPID organisation
Source: Researcher’s illustration
Thus, police officers enjoy impunity in that many escape being held accountable for their actions, which amounts to a lack of accountability. In a vicious circle, this leads to an influx of cases of torture and assault that occur in an upward spiral. Manby (2000) states that “for an oversight body to be really effective in bringing about the desired changes in police culture and practices, it is essential that it also have [sic] the capacity to identify the underlying systemic problems”. This means that the problem of torture will only stop when both the IPID and SAPS organisations acknowledge their challenges and solve them in a practical manner.
However, the findings revealed that one strategy that was employed by IPID investigators was effective, which was the application of sections 29 and 33. Act No. 1 of 2011 section 29 (1)
Influx of police torture
and assault
Lack of evidence, resources, and cooperation by suspects and complainants Ineffective
investigations due to insubstantial
and unsubstantiated
findings Ineffective
disciplinary and criminal prosecution recommendations NPA declines
to prosecute
Lack of police accountability
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and (2) as well as section 33 (3) (RSA, 2011) assists IPID investigating officers in solving the issue of a lack of cooperation and compliance by members of the SAPS. Although the findings indicated that the police at times eluded investigators and delayed cooperation, it was stated that investigators were able to enforce cooperation by reminding SAPS officials, regardless of rank, of section 29 which obligates them to comply with requirements and cooperate in the investigation. If officers still failed to do so, then section 33 would apply and such persons would be punishable for failure to cooperate. This strategy proved to be effective, because after having eluded investigators for a while, warning statements were issued, whether the police officer was a suspect or a witness in the case.
6.2.5 Drawing the line between minimum force and excessive use of force by the police