5. THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
5.3 Emission reduction targets and timetables
98
99 parties. Developing states are not under an obligation, under the Convention, to reduce their levels of emissions. This implies that developing states can focus on industrial growth without the limitations imposed by emission reduction obligations. The Convention, thus, recognises and protects the position of developing states and their priority for economic growth. It gives room for developing states to adopt policies and practices focused on economic and industrial growth irrespective of the implications on their emission levels.
However, even for developed states, the obligations and limits contain no clear targets and timetables. Within international environmental negotiations, the term ‘targets and timetables’
usually refer to specific quantitative and legally binding commitments.192 The adoption of targets and timetables for greenhouse gas emissions has been referred to as one of the most controversial provisions in the entire negotiation of the UNFCCC.193
Two major standards have dominated the discussions on targets and timetables: a per capita target and a gross domestic product (GDP) target.194 A per capita target takes into consideration the population of a state in determining the level of emissions, which such state should be allowed. This principle works in favour of states with relatively large populations, especially when this population is compared to their level of emissions. Developing states would benefit from this kind of application. The GDP target, on the other hand, would favour states with efficient use of energy.195 These states are able to show that their levels of emissions are
‘justified’ by their high levels of production. This method would favour developed states since developing states seem to be less efficient in GDP terms.196
Calculating emission targets per capita is more equitable since emissions are allocated by population. It recognizes that ‘every human has an equal right to use the atmospheric resource’.197 It also ensures that states who have used more than their proportionate share of atmospheric space pay for it. Adopting this principle would mean that most industrialized states with their higher-than-average emission levels would need to reduce their emissions significantly. Developed states were, however, unamenable to this position. The various developed states offered different sets of standards. These standards varied in the level of
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid 512.
194 Michael Grubb ‘The greenhouse effect: Negotiating targets’ (1990) 66 International Affairs 71-72; Bodansky (n170 above) 512.
195 Grubb (n194 above) 82; Bodansky (n170 above) 512.
196 Grubb (n194 above) 83.
197 Ibid.
100 austerity which they projected, the range of gases provided for, the emphasis placed on net or gross emissions and the mode of implementation.198
Ultimately, the Convention adopted an approach that provided for a general target and timetable without setting a per capita or GDP standard for each state. Developed state parties jointly adopted a target to return to their 1990 emission levels.199 The timetable for reaching this target is, however, ambiguous. Article 4(2)(a) provides that developed states recognize that a return to their 1990 emission levels by the end of 2000 would be instrumental to the required change in longer-term emission trends.200 It acknowledges that reaching the target by the year 2000 will enhance a positive outcome but does not state in unequivocal terms that developed parties have a duty to reach this target by that year.
The provision is further modified by stating that this ‘timetable’ is to take into consideration the variations in each parties’ ‘starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the parties to the global effort’.201 As though this were not enough, the commitment on emissions reduction targets and timetables is further weakened by article 4(6) of the Convention, which gives ‘a certain degree of flexibility’ to states referred to as
‘economies in transition’.202
Thus, although article 4(2)(a) seeks to create a legal obligation on developed parties to adopt national policies to reduce their emissions, the provision is modified to the extent that it is doubtful if any legal obligation remains. Article 4(2)(b) sets a target of returning to 1990 emission levels but developed states are given so much leeway in article 4(2)(a) that there is no provision obliging them to achieve the target.203 As Daniel Bodansky notes, when it comes to the ‘quasi-target and quasi-timetable, the Convention uses less obligatory language. The target is phrased as an ‘aim’ and the verbs used to characterize the timetable are all descriptive rather than imperative.’204
198 Bodansky (n170 above) 515.
199 Article 4(2)(b) of the UNFCCC.
200 Article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC.
201 Article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC.
202 Article 4(6) of the UNFCCC. Economies in transition were countries in Eastern Europe who had suffered some economic downturn in the 1980s.
203 Bodansky (n170 above) 516.
204 Ibid.
101 It is, however, important to note that the UNFCCC does not saddle developing states with any emission reduction responsibilities. As seen in article 4(2)(a), the ‘starting point’ of each state party is taken into account in placing emission reduction obligations on them. Since developing states have a very recent starting point of emissions, they have no current obligations to limit emissions. The UNFCCC thus protects the rights of developing states to the utilisation of their fair share of atmospheric space in pursuit of development. This distributive justice conception of equity ensures that the climate change treaty does not impose restrictions that will have an impact on the right or ability of this group of states to achieve their developmental objectives.