ENTITIES
2.4 Empirical support for cognitive attribution theory
The theories of Heider (1944, 1958), lones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) formed a theoretical anchor for an enormous volume of work in attribution theory in the years that followed. However, by the early 80's, there was a growing realisation that the enormous research output was not making the core concepts of attribution theory any clearer. Instead, a large volume of research was generating increasingly specific exceptions to the prevailing theories (Harvey& Weary, 1984). Two influential reviews, by Kelley and Michela (1980) and Harvey and Weary (1984) offer a useful summary of the research output in the field and form the core of this brief review. I will discuss the empirical findings regarding the theories
of Heider (1944, 1958), Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) in turn before moving on to some of the more general challenges to the field.
2.4.1 Empirical support/or Heider's theory
Heider's (1958) theory of attribution did not directly attract much empirical verification. By the mid-80's the keystone of cognitive attribution theory - that the desire to predict and control is a fundamental and universal motivation for attribution - was still unverified.
Nevertheless, the proposition was not disconfirmed by any empirical studies. Pittman and Pittman (1980, as cited in Harvey & Weary, 1984) found that attributional activity increases after experiences of lack of control, suggesting indirectly that attribution may be associated with achieving control.
Perceived intentionality of behaviour received more empirical attention. Heider's (1958) model predicts that intentional actions are more likely to be attributed strongly to the actor than unintentional ones. Several authors have confirmed that actions judged to be intentional are more likely to be responded to personally (e.g. by praise, blame or retaliation) than those that are judged to be unintentional (Dyck & Rule, 1978; Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Tedeschi et aI., 1974, Weiner & Peter, 1973; all as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980). However, help is more likely to be given to people whose need is judged to be unintentional (Ickes & Kidd, 1976; Piliavin et aI., 1969, all as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980). Therefore the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of perceived intentionality on attribution is contextual rather than universal.
Heider's (1958) statement that "behavior ... tends to engulf the total field" (p. 54) was later taken up as the 'fundamental attribution error' (Ross, 1977) in which attributors place too much emphasis on dispositional determinants of behaviour and ignore situational factors.
Weary, 1984) but there has been a great deal of debate about whether this is a naive attributionerror or a sophisticated response by participants to the demands of the research setting (e.g. Funder 1982; Hamilton, 1980; Harvey et aI., 1981b; all as cited in Harvey &
Weary, 1984).
2.4.2 Empirical support for Jones and Davis theory ofcorrespondent inference
One of the clearest empirical findings in the field is that attributions are stronger and more confident when the number of non-common effects is small, and become less confident as the number of non-common effects increases (Azjen & Holmes, 1976; Newtson, 1974, both as cited in Kelley and Michela, 1980).
lones and Davis (1965) gave the motivational element of "hedonic relevance" and other motivational factors a relatively minor role in their original model, but this aspect has received a great deal of empirical attention. Three comprehensive reviews conclude that empirical results show that attributions for success are generally internal and attributions for failure are generally external, in other words, that success is generally attributed more to the person and failure more to the situation (Kelley& Michela, 1980; Miller& Ross, 1975;
Zuckerman, 1979). However, Younger et al. (1977, as cited in Kelley& Michela, 1980) found that, in the case of extreme financial success or failure the opposite holds, suggesting that even this consistent finding is somewhat contextual. The general conclusion drawn is that such attributions are due to 'self-serving' or 'ego-defensive' motivations, but it is also
acknowledged that recognizing the social and communicative aspects of attribution explains this 'bias' to some extent.
Kelley and Michela (1980) report that many empirical studies based on elements of lones and Davis's (1965) model have yielded ambiguous results. However, they argue that such
ambiguity can be resolved when it is acknowledged that people engage in attributional talk 35
with some awareness of its social and interactional effects. "Attributions are an important part of what people communicate about themselves" (1980, p. 475), and the self-presentational expectations and constraints experienced by subjects influences the attributions they report (Bradley, 1978; Feather & Simon, 1971, both as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980; Orvis et aI., 1976; Scott & Lyman, 1968).
2.4.3 Empirical support/or Kelley's 'man-the-scientist'model
McArthur (1972) tested all eight patterns of covariation between distinctiveness, consensus and consistency and reported results "largely consistent" with Kelley's ANOVA model.
These results have been consistently replicated (see Frieze & Weiner, 1971; Ruble &
Feldman, 1976; Zuckennan, 1979). However, McArthur (1972) found that consensus infonnation is given much less weight than distinctiveness and consistency infonnation.
Major (1980, as cited in Harvey & Weary, 1984) showed that, when given a choice, subjects are less likely to request consensus infonnation than consistency or distinctiveness
infonnation in order to come to attributional conclusions. Nisbett and Borgida (1975, as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980) show that consensus has no effect on attribution at all, but others have found that consensus infonnation is very sensitive to order effects (Ruble & Feldman, 1976; Zuckennan, 1979). Hansen and Donoghue (1977, as cited in Harvey & Weary, 1984) found that knowledge of one's own behaviour influences attribution more than knowledge of others' behaviour. Harvey and Weary (1984) make sense of this riddle by arguing that the influence of consensus infonnation depends on situational constraints (e.g. Kassin, 1979;
Solomon et aI., 1981, both as cited in Harvey & Weary 1984).
Empirical results are more consistent when it comes to the importance of consistency and distinctiveness infonnation in attribution (Harvey & Weary, 1984; Kelley & Michela, 1980).
Himmelfarb (1972, as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980) demonstrated that consistency and
distinctiveness infonnation is given more weight if derived from situations similar to the presented attributional puzzle. Several authors have verified the prediction that the more consistent the prior behaviour, the more the outcome is likely to be linked to a stable attribute of the actor (Bell et aI., 1976; Regan et aI., 1974; Zuckennan, 1979, all as cited in Kelley &
Michela, 1980). Others show that inconsistent behaviour is often attributed to situational factors (Frieze & Weiner, 1971; Hayden & Mischel, 1976; as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980; Karaz& Perlman, 1975, as cited in Kelley& Michela, 1980).
Several caveats to Kelley's parsimonious model have been identified and explored. For example, the primacy of a stimulus has been shown to have an effect on its importance in the naIve ANOVA (Feldman & AlIen, 1975; lones & Goethals, 1972; Jones et aI., 1968; Ross et aI., 1975, all as cited in Kelley and Michela, 1980).Aneffect is most likely to be attributed to the potential cause that is most salient at the time the effect is observed (McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor& Fiske, 1975; Taylor et aI., 1978, all as cited in Kelley& Michela, 1980).
Also, Chapman and Chapman (1969, as cited in Kelley & Michela 1980) introduce the concept of "illusory correlation" in which prior beliefs can result in observers detecting non- existent covariation and failing to see genuine covariation (cf. Golding & Rorer, 1972 as cited in Kelley & Michela, 1980). Ithas also been found that actors and observers make different attributions (lones, 1976; lones& Nisbett, 1972; Lay et aI., 1973; Lenauer et aI., 1976;
Nisbet et aI., 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1975, all as cited in Kelley & Michea, 1980). This difference is possibly due to " ... their different interests in how a given event is explained, in particular, the actor's concern to receive credit for the good consequences of his actions and to avoid blame for the bad consequences" (Taylor& Koivurnaki, 1976; Snyder et aI., 1976, both as cited in Kelley& Michela, 1980, p. 478). This is related to the growing realisation thatreported attributions fulfill self-presentational functions in social interaction, and that observers respond in predictable ways to expressed attribution (Arkin et aI., 1980; Forsyth et
aI., 1981; Greenberg, 1982; Greenberg et aI., 1982; Jones & Sigall, 1971; Orvis et aI., 1976;
Tetlock, 1980; Weary & Arkin, 1981; Weary & Bradley, 1979; Weary 1980; Weary et aI., 1982, all as cited in Harvey & Weary, 1984). Therefore an understanding of attributional processes requires the observation of people using attribution in naturalistic settings.
Harvey and Weary conclude their review with the following words:
As should be clear from this review ... the field is alive with controversy and issues. On the one hand, this controversy reflects the lack of consensus about certain key concepts and about the most defensible theoretical interpretations for phenomena. It also reflects the fact that in certain domains of attribution work, the relevant evidence and the appropriate paradigms and procedures are in question. On the other hand, the controversy that has swirled about in the attribution literature may reflect the vitality and appeal of the topic and its constituent set of phenomena (1984, p. 453).
The following discussion outlines some of the challenges and controversies that began to be raised at that time by both insiders and outsiders to the field. Itis not my intention to resolve any of these disputes, but merely to draw attention to the voices of dissent that had begun to make themselves heard. Many of these challenges were later addressed or shown to be inconsequential by the linguistic models (cf. Au, 1986; Brown & Fish, 1983; Semin &
Fiedler, 1988) and the social constructionist approaches (e.g. Antaki, 1994; Edwards &
Potter, 1993) that will be discussed below.