CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.7 Post independent Zimbabwe and the legacy of “development” and displacement
3.7.1 The Fast Track Land Reform Program (Jambanja) and the development-displacement
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In Southern Africa, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project is one of the largest water projects in Africa. It also led to the displacement of 400 households (Hitchcock 2015). This exercise is unique because most of the victims were entirely dependent on food relief and other livelihood support from the government, multilateral agencies and the Civil Society (Hitchcock 2015). Such a situation is too idealistic to apply in displacements in the Zimbabwean context. Currently, the government is incapacitated to relocate and rehabilitate the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims leaving them to fend for themselves. For every US$1 generated by treasury, US$0, 90 towards meeting salaries for the government’s workforce is leading to serious financial problems for the government (Nhodo 2014). The dire political environment obtaining in Zimbabwe also means that the much needed financial support from the international agencies has not been forthcoming, leaving them more vulnerable than the Lesotho Highlands Water Project victims Thus Nyamadire et al (2014) posit that the problem in relocations in Zimbabwe is that the government lacks funding and mechanisms for compensating loss of families, land shrines and heritage, which are critical components in rural economies. Thus, very little has been done to reduce transactional cost and stress in the forced relocations in Zimbabwe.
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the violent removal of white farm owners and the subsequent redistribution of land to black Zimbabweans was to address the dual goal of decolonization and development, which were the fulcrum of the liberation struggle. Nevertheless, in practice the programme was a highly political and partisan exercise.
The farm invasions were actually in protest to the ‘no vote’ in the constitutional referendum done in the same year, which could have led to a smooth and orderly process of redistributing land to Africans through constitutional means. Other extenuating factors include the collapse of the negotiations with the former British colonizers on the funding for land reform, the failure of the 1998 donor conference to raise funds for land acquisition and the incessant legal battles between the ZANU PF government and the white farm owners on land acquisition (Moyo 2006).
Irrespective of the moral necessities, a serious drawback of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe is that it benefited mainly the war veterans and ZANU PF supporters, excluding former farm workers and those seen as traitors or those working against the ruling party (Magaramombe 2010). The program is estimated to have displaced and dislocated over 4 000 white farm owners and close to 1 million Former black farm workers and their families from their land and sources of livelihood (Sachikonye 2005). Of these displaced persons the former farm workers were the worst affected category. This is partly because the majority of these farm workers were of a foreign origin and this background inevitably made them invisible leading to severe marginalization.
What is clear is that before the FTLRP and displacement the farm workers developed a ver y strong sense of community, social networks and solidarity. This type of displacement consequently had a knock on effect of ripping apart the farmworker’s communal solidarity as it dispersed, dismantled and fragmented the normal social organization and the newly created kinship and personal ties in the farm villages (Cernea 2000). Over and above this, these displacements culminated in the serious levels of stress, insecurity and confusion for the former farm workers (Hartnack 2016). The general economic contraction, unprecedented inflation, breakdown in state services, severe unemployment, shortages of basic commodities and the political violence orchestrated by the war veterans and the militia worsened the situation for the displaced farm workers (Kinsey 2010, Magaramombe 2010).
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What also made the situation unpalatable for these displacees were the inherent differences of farm workers in terms of origins, language, tradition and customs. These aspects are the critical ingredients for adaptation and building resilience for people under vulnerability such as these farm workers following their forced movement (Hartnack 2005). Of note is the fact that the Tokwe Mukosi dam displacees (which are the focus of this study) differ from the FTLRP displacees because they share a lot with regards to origins, language religion, tradition inter alia.
Given this unique geographical and social context, various livelihood assets, social networks, social institutions and social capital become the hallmark for dealing with vulnerability. The differential conditions between the actors in question have also been captured by Rutherford (2008). He observed that the displaced farm workers in a significant way belong to a community whose activities, resources and leadership are worryingly reliant on the state. Thus they lacked alternative means of survival such as strong social institutions, social networks and social capital.
They are therefore operating on the margins of the socio-economic and political order in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye2003). In most cases these former farm workers have fallen into the
“forgotten people” category (Hartnack 2005).
In spite of the rhetoric of neutrality in the land distribution, an insignificant number of farmworkers (less than one percent)benefited from the resultant land redistribution (Magaramombe 2010). In respond to the displacement farm workers adopted a cocktail of coping mechanism, some moved into the cities and towns, peri-urban areas and others crossed the national borders into the neighboring countries. The majority however did not have many options and remained in the same farm villages becoming ‘the displaced in place’ (Magaramombe 2010).
In other contexts this kind of displacement is known as ‘in situ displacement’ (Feldman et al 2003). Therefore, what this means is that there was no physical or geographical movement of the farm workers as opposed to the Tokwe Mukosi villagers who had to move into harsh and alien territories to pave way for the dam construction. These farm workers continued to occupy the same geographical spaces and their dislocation was socio-economic rather than geographical dislocation (Partridge 2000). Much as the picture appeared gloomy for the displaced former farm workers, a significant proportion was fortunate to get material and financial support from churches and other philanthropic organizations, without which they could not survive (Hartnack
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ibid). Such a background is however far removed from the intricacies of Tokwe Mukosi experience, where external support and protection is erratic. This situation then pushes the Tokwe Mukosi displacees to fall back on community based protection.
3.7.2 State repression and displacement under Operation Murambatsvina/ Operation Restore Order.
When one looks at the post independent Zimbabwean history of population movement, it is very clear that this history is littered with repression and violence (Bratton and Masunungure 2006).
After the violent displacements of white farmers and the predominantly black farm workers under the FTLRP, the next major event in a series of displacements was Operation Murambatsvina. This operation is also known as Operation Restore Order. It was a wide spread state sponsored campaign against the citizens in the major cities and towns in Zimbabwe. From the ZANU PF government’s perspective this cleanup campaign was not only inevitable but functional for the urban populace. The reasons proffered for the brutal campaign were summed up by the chair of the Harare city council commission in Potts (2006). She said at that time,
The aim is to enforce city by-laws in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal structures touting/abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street/life prostitution, vandalism of property, infrastructure, stock theft, illegal activities, among others have led to the deterioration of standards thus negatively affecting the image of the city…………..Operation Murambatsvina is going to be a massive exercise in the CBD and suburbs which will see the demolition of all illegal structures and all activities in undesignated areas…. Pge 275.
As has always been the tradition Operation Murambatsvina was justified by the government as nothing more than a move against criminal elements in the cities and towns (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008). This was just a smokescreen, in reality this operation was aimed at curtailing independent economic and political functions which were seen as
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harboring the opposition party in the towns and cities, following the dismal performance of the ruling party in the preceding plebiscite (Brett and Masunungure ibid). Based on this reality check Operation Murambatsvina was simply a serious form of punishment inflicted on the urban populace for supporting the Movement for democratic change, which is the biggest opposition party in Zimbabwe (Mlambo 2008).
To further demonstrate its arrogance the government went on to state that it did not make any resident homeless just because these were nefarious persons living in shakes and it had a moral obligation to deal with them (Dorman 2016). This is ominously the same arrogance that continues to guide the state-people relations in forced displacements including the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. According to the special envoy sent to monitor the situation in Zimbabwe by the United Nations Anna Tibaijuka (2005), more than 700 000 citizens lost their livelihoods and or homes owing to this unprecedented crackdown. To corroborate this Potts (2008) posits that this draconian operation had far reaching implications on the evicted persons’ social and economic life as well as the inalienable right to life if we consider the unintended consequences of this operation from the pro-poor perspective.
While there is voluminous literature on the impact of forced displacements in general and Operation Murambatsvina in particular, very little is known with regards to how the affected persons try to recover and reassert their livelihoods in post displacement situations. Emphasis of previous studies on violent displacements has almost always been on why the state acted that way, why displacements occurred and the general impact of displacements on the livelihoods of the displacees (Brett and Masunungure 2008, Sachikonye 2006, Human Rights Watch 2007, Chipungu and Adebayo 2012, Kamete 2009). This lacuna in research has also been observed by the Internal Displacement monitoring Center (2008). Referring to Operation Murambatsvina, it noted that three years after Operation Murambatsvina there is no elaborate stresses, figures or estimates of the victims in the aftermath of this operation. It therefore becomes prudent to focus more on the experiences of the displacees in post displacement situation, not only as victims but as rational and strategic actors capable of dealing with their situation. This enables us to move away from the victimhood perspective which continues to inform studies on Internally Displaced
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Considering the forgoing position, it is clear that there has been dearth of literature on what the displacees do for themselves in post displacement situations in Zimbabwe. Credit can marginally be extended to Pottes (2006) as well as Musoni (2010), for attempting to look at how the victims tried to devise other means of survival in response to forced displacements. It is documented that a significant number of the victims of Operation Murambatsvina died due to the disruption of their livelihoods and the related stress and trauma (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008). For those who survived this scourge, a significant number moved in to stay with relatives.
Those who were fortunate to have links with rural communities migrated to rural areas, and others moved into peri-urban areas where they had access to the city, thereby maintaining their livelihoods through commuting. (Potts 2006).
The humanitarian community also came in to ameliorate the detrimental effects of Operation Murambatsvina albeit on a limited scale. The findings of these scholars in post displacement communities are telling, but this context is remarkably different from the Tokwe Mukosi forced displacements. This is because the victims of Operation Murambatsvina lacked a sense of community as they were largely based on the different social, economic and geographical differences. This made it highly impossible for them to mobilize social capital, local institutions and social networks for adaptation and building resilience in response to their predicament.
Contrary to the experiences of Operation Murambatsvina victims, the said aspects become the backbone of the adaptive capacities of the Tokwe Mukosi victims tied to their unique background.
In addition to the aforementioned differential experiences, while the humanitarian community was there to assist the victims of Operation Murambatsvina, it is sadly not available for the Tokwe Mukosi Victims owing to an avalanche of political and economic factors in Zimbabwe’s political economy (Hove 2008). These contextual differences, adaptive capacities and strategies of urbanites like the Operation Murambatsvina victims are inevitably different from the rural
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communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community, thereby lending credence to a study that looks at significance of social networks, social capital and local institutions for adaptation and building resilience among the displaced rural communities.
3.8 Conclusion
The fulcrum of the foregoing chapter was to situate this study in the past and the present scholarship trends on Internally Displaced Persons. It shows the continuities and discontinuities between this study and such scholarship trends. I however started by showing the ambiguities surrounding the definition of Internally Displaced Persons within the scholarship community. I then moved on to problematize yet another key term in this study, which is development. It has become a buzzword in literature and practice as nation states have moved to implement dam projects in the quest for development and modernity. In such a review, my aim was to look at the winners and losers in this development-displacement paradox. I showed that in almost all the cases, the very poor are the losers as they suffer the unintended consequences of development. I then proceeded to focus on the experiences of mega dam projects and displacement from both the global, regional community, and then I cascaded to the Zimbabwean context. Here I argue that the Zimbabwean experience at Tokwe Mukosi is at variance with regional and international trends owing to a plethora of political, economic and social obstacles to meeting the minimum standards for IDPs. Some of these misfortunes are economic problems, political instability and the general culture of violence in the state-people relations in this development and displacement matrix. Such variations become the plausible justification for engaging in a study of this magnitude.
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