Chapter 6: Transition pathways and typologies in the Global South
6.2. Results
6.2.2. Intersection of multiple trajectories and socio-technical outcomes
138 The Energy Committee subsequently instructed the development of the ECAP to operationalise the Strategy (CCT, 2010a). This resulted in a process of identifying ‘reconfiguration’ objectives and targets, consolidating and up-scaling initiatives that were already being implemented and launching new projects and programmes. The ECAP process thus provided a tool to mobilise and coordinate resources.
Overall, collaboration between NGOs, the research community and City of CT officials has resulted in raising awareness (articulation of selection pressures), fostering knowledge, the development of policy to re-orient the City’s electricity regime and developing institutional structures and capacity for managing such a reconfiguration process (CCT, 2011b).
Notably, since 2012 Eskom has confronted a major financial and supply crisis characterised by periods of rolling black outs and load shedding associated with insufficient long-term planning, poor financial management and rising debt (Burton and Winkler, 2014). This has resulted in a re- negotiation of regulation and power dynamics between national government and the City in relation to energy autonomy82. However, it is only since the risk of revenue loss has become visible that the Utilities and Finance Directorates’ have entertained the possibility of alternative socio- technical configurations (Interview 16. 16 September 2013). Thus, as a result of threats to the City’s core business model, radically different utility and revenue models are being openly considered and debated. This openness for alternatives is evident in a several engagements between the Electricity Department, ERMD and Sustainable Energy Africa (Meeting 81. Electricity Department. 05 July 2013). Thus, the risk of regime collapse has opened up space for potential alternative configurations to take root.
139 between these two radically divergent pathways for reconfiguring its electricity regime. Either of these trajectories may find dominance in the City, which would have markedly different socio- economic, cultural, behavioural and political outcomes. Examining these trajectories thus enables an exploration of the socio-economic outcomes of transitions in relation to access, control, political economies and equity.
On the one hand, the City is developing policy and plans to pursue large-scale energy infrastructure, predominantly natural gas and an associated gas economy. This centralised-supply model is being driven by the City Executive Management Team and politicians, primarily for economic growth, energy autonomy and energy security reasons (CCT, 2011a). This plan is manifest in high-level policy documents such as the IDP, 2012-2017 (CCT, 2012a) and the City Economic Growth Strategy, 2013 (CCT, 2013d). A number of mechanisms are proposed to develop this energy infrastructure, including public-private partnerships, private incentives (such as offtake agreements), municipal- led development of Closed Cycle Gas Turbine plants and policy incentives to support local energy sector development (CCT, 2012a; CCT, 2011n). This plan is criticised and opposed by climate and energy-based NGOs and activists in Cape Town as well as nodes in the City. Apart from the fossil- fuel basis for such infrastructure, an underpinning critique by these actors relates to the socio- economic, political and cultural implications of such a techno-economic configuration. This critique is well summarised by a Programme Manager of the Electricity Governance Initiative:
A gas economy would be largely centralised. It would follow the top-down approach to infrastructure which has traditionally dominated. It would be like the national coal- electricity model - centralised, top-down, limited participation. This would reproduce the interests of the industrial-resource extractive complex. This model promotes jobless growth. It would also heavily undermine energy efficiency, demand-side management and behaviour change efforts (Interview 7. 30 September 2013).
In summary, the above highlights that such a technical configuration will have built-in ‘political effects’ in terms of beneficiaries (corporate and industrial), reinforcing the incumbent political economy, environmental implications and reproducing top-down command and control.
In contrast, climate and energy-based NGOs and activists in Cape Town are promoting a socio- technical configuration based on decentralised-demand energy infrastructure. This is evident from a range of documents including the ‘State of Energy and Energy Futures Report’ (CCT, 2011c). As highlighted by a report prepared for the Energy Committee, titled ‘The role of the City of Cape Town in energy generation’, such an energy configuration in Cape Town would support a vastly different socio-economic system based on distributed political power and decision-making (CCT, 2011i).
Notably, energy efficiency and SSEG technologies are inherently labour intensive and provide local jobs in installation and manufacture (SEA, 2015a). This is evident by a study commissioned by the
140 Energy and Climate Change Unit that assesses the ‘Developmental Impacts of the ECAP’ (McDaid, 2011). The report highlights that energy efficiency, renewable energy and SSEG projects in the ECAP would result in a range of socio-economic benefits in terms of various indicators, particularly when compared to centralised generation. Further, the Optimum Energy Future (OEF) study (CCT, 2011c) highlights that a distributed technical configuration would provide various multiplying effects including the growth of technical support service industries. Importantly, the OEF study notes that energy efficiency and demand-side management tend to occur alongside cultural shifts whereby social value is placed on energy conservation and sustainability (CCT, 2011c). In brief, a decentralised-demand model requires innovation that is systemic in nature as it requires shifts in diverse social, regulatory, technical and economic contexts. Thus, in summation, the technical configuration of this trajectory would have different socio-economic outcomes in terms of beneficiaries (households and local businesses), distribution of power and decision-making and improved environmental performance. A report titled ‘Energy Scenarios for Urban South Africa’
highlights that it would result in a reorganisation based on a more bottom-up diffusion of control (SEA, 2015b). Conversely, the preceding chapter highlighted that such a model, in Global South contexts, contests with a more centralised, developmental energy model. As shown, it would also have negative implications in terms of access, redistribution of resources and energy-poverty alleviation. Although it would benefit new players, it would nevertheless, to a large extent, support and reinforce the incumbent political economy.
Notably, these two potential trajectories appear to be somewhat mutually exclusive. There is widespread evidence that cheap and abundant electricity undermines demand-side management, SSEG and energy efficiency (Eberhard, 2010; Burton and Winkler, 2014). Notably, Eberhard (2010) demonstrates the extent that a large generation expansion programme (over-supply) in the 1970s significantly undermined energy efficiency and DSM efforts. In brief, a centralised-supply model, and a ‘gas economy’ (CCT, 2011n) would potentially threaten an Optimum Energy Future (CCT, 2011a) as well as the service companies that have developed around energy efficiency and demand- side management policies and support instruments (CCT, 2015b). This was brought to the fore in a series of meetings between the Strategic Policy Unit and the Energy and Climate Change Unit in which these ‘energy futures’ were contested (Meeting 65. CCT Strategic Policy Unit. 12 April 2013).
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