THE BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDIES SELECTED
CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 5 PROJECT ANALYSIS
5.6 Itevievv
5.6.1 Introduction
Reviewers according to the IEM guidelines "assess the content, comprehensiveness and adequacy of reports, as well as the organisational and presentational qualities of reports. They may wish to identify any issues not covered, inaccuracies in information, problems with logic or any conflicts apparent in the assessment process" (DEA, 1992d, P 5).
Ariadne 4001132kV substation
The request by the advisory panel that Eskom select preferred sites and, together with associated transmission lines, present these alternatives to I&AP's for review was never undertaken by Eskom (De Kock, 1991; Klopfer, 1996) in spite of the the IEM Guidelines of 1989's requirement to do so.
Ariadne-Venus 400kV line
At the behest of a few landowners (approximately between 10 and 12) and key I&APs Eskom was forced to subject the first attempt at the Ariadne-Venus 400kV line EIA to review. Strong objections, particularly by the Nottingham Road community and the NPB, at a public meeting on 28 July 1993, were raised against the exclusion of the consideration of other alternatives to the east of the N3 highway. At this meeting Eskom agreed to review the alternatives at a greater level of detail, in the light of additional information obtained from the I&APs. The initial problems with inadequate scoping and omissions in available data, pointed out at this meeting by I&AP's, were addressed by the establishment of a Joint Review Committee, the holding of two workshops, the gathering of further information from I&APs, the involvement of specialists and additional field work. (Lombard and Associates, 1993). Eskom tried to resolve the impasse by agreeing to appoint an environmental consultant (selected by the I&AP's) during October 1993 to review the EIA procedure and further agreed to review any additional corridors proferred by landowners.
Already 4 months late, the first Ariadne-Venus 400kV Line Route Selection, Environmental Impact Assessment (November 1993) was published and made available for review. The constraints imposed on the routing of the 124km Ariadne-Venus 400kV line by the siting of the Ariadne substation, however, was never subject to review.
The review was not complete since additional information was not available. The study on Cranes had only commenced on 4 October 1993; further studies on impacts on hoofed game and on veld and farming issues had also been commissioned. These, however, were not available by the time the consultant's review was complete and the final EIS with its recommendation not available (Lombard and Associates, 1993). The review of the impact assessment process therefore did not include a review of the re-evaluation of corridor alternatives nor of the final environmental impact report.
It is noticeable that the necessary studies and information were not forthcoming. Eskom circumvented the full review process and prematurely arrived at a decision similar to the one they had made previously. It was at this point, after the requirements of the review procedure had not been met, that Eskom was found out and forced to repeat the EIA in its entirety. Thus Eskom had undertaken the review only under duress and then still disobeyed its recommendations with the dire consequence of having to repeat the EIA.
It is interesting to note that only when the vested interests of individual landowners was threatened was there any requirement for review. The passage of a portion of the powerline through black tribal areas was not questioned by the residents nor subject to review. A summary letter of the process and findings was circulated to all I&APs and the sizeable report made available at numerous indicated points for review.
The feedback from I&APs synthesised by the independent Environmental Evaluation Unit re- formulated and changed the report format and issues covered. As a result the draft report of March, 1995, which was conducted subsequent to Eskom deciding to repeat the EIA, was revised and re- published for the third time (Willemse, 1995c). The comprehensive final document, excluding three previous lengthy reports was comprised of an EIR - 234 pages; Synthesis of I&APs comments
+
-100 pages; Eskom's response to I&APs Comments +- 250 pages and a Summary Report - 19 pa ges and a detailed AO sized gloss map (Willemse, pers comm., 1997) depicting major issues, the study area and alternative corridors.In response to the request by I&APs, Eskom appointed an independent high-ranking advisory panel to review the revised EIR and to make a recommendation on the most appropriate corridor taking into account the comments of I&APs. The EIA was also reviewed by the KZN environmental portfolio committee and regional and national government environmental ministeries.
I&APs' review was continuous and ongoing (iterative) and, where possible, their concerns were accommodated. The decision was very apparent and obvious once the EIA was complete making the review stage by the panel of experts a matter of course. It enabled Eskom, who complied with the review panel's recommendations, to make an appropriate decision and ensured that there was little opposition to the next phase of negotiations for a suitable line route within the proposed corridor (Tunnicliffe, pers comm., 1997).
Ariadne-Hector 400kV line
For the Ariadne-Hector 400kV line EIA a final assessment of all the alternatives was conducted by the independent environmental consultant and a recommendation presented at a public meeting with key I&APs (Funston, letter, 1995). Once consensus was reached the corridor was adopted after a final site visit.
A draft report, detailing the peferred corridor, was compiled and circulated for review. There being no major changes to accommodate, the report was not revised and negotiation within the 'preferred' corridor commenced. The review of the draft EIR also constituted the point of appeal according to the Eskom IEM procedure as enunciated in the EIA report (Funston, 1995a, plO).
Hector 4001275kV substation
The draft document was to be released for public comment between the 10 and 30 September 1994 prior to a decision being reached on 03 October 1994. The draft document, however, was ultimately only hand delivered on 17 October to the majority of I&APs and comment requested by not later than 27 October 1994, (Gouws, et ai, letter, 1994a). This ultimately, according to the NPB, resulted in only a week for its review (McClintock, letter, 1994b). The soonest they could deliver comment was by the last week in November. The NPB Planning department played an objective yet highly crucial role in the Ariadne-Venus 400kV line EIA and were regarded by Eskom as a key I&AP. Eskom's response to the NPB was: "Our contractors will be starting the earthworks at Hector site on 11 November 1994 ... We look forward to receiving your comments in the last week of November 1994, and will incorporate any major issues into our Management Plan" (Moir, letter, 1994a). The NPB comments which were therefore tabled after construction had commenced, would have little meaningful influence even if retrospectively included in an EMP.
The report, due to its complexity and time allotted for its review, would have required that its content be presented to the layman before such a person was able to understand and comment on its content.
".... one of the comments from the public was that this person found the report "too technical" and
"he could not understand it" (Gouws, et ai, letter, 1994b). No other comment was received from the public perhaps verifying this fact.
This epitomises a disregard for IBM requirements and a disregard for the need to influence and provide mitigatory measures for activities such as construction prior to their commencement.
NPB comments (McClintock, letter, 1994c) on the EIS report were eventually forthcoming and some of the recommendations adopted (Gouws, et aI, 1995a) but were too late to provide meaningful input into the substation's design and construction - the latter was nearing completion.
A letter entitled: "Eskom-NPB Joint Planning" stated: ".. ... Subsequent arrangements were made .... to address certain questions raised by the consultant, and the Board's botanist .... and the Regional Ecologist .... both visited the site and provided comment on the consultant's report on the basis of their inspection" (Sandwith, letter, 1995). This shows that the document was reviewed. A site visit was included in this process, however, this was three months after construction had commenced making the review process superfluous.
Pongola- Vergenoeg 132kV line
For the Pongola-Vergenoeg 132kV line EIA, I&APs merely reviewed a Preliminary EIA report. No review of the procedure or adequacy of the study was conducted. There was no review of a draft report or opportunity for comment internally i.e. by Eskom or externally by I&APs in spite of the request by I&APs to see such a document.
Ariadne-Bulwer 132kV line
For the Ariadne-Bulwer 132kV line EIA the findings of the EIA were subject to both external and internal review with the involvement of the NPB as a key I&AP, in the absence of a statutory authority. A public meeting was held to facilitate review where the findings of investigations and the potential alternative corridors were proferred with the intention to elicit a decision by I&APs. After a process of evaluation the I&APs had selected their preference. Eskom management then also reviewed the findings and made a decision. Eskom management and I&APs agreed on the final route selected and the mitigatory measures to be adopted. In addition Eskom Survey (responsible for project design) were part of the review panel on both occasions in order to understand the need to deviate the line and other mitigatory measures.
A protocol to guide subsequent interaction and review between Eskom Distribution Land Development Management and the NPB Planning department, who were responsible for reviewing Eskom EIRs, was entered into.
Due to limited response from tribal authorities the best option was proferred by Eskom for the portion of the study area (Phase 2) which passed through their jurisdiction and representatives of the tribal authority were driven through the route to obtain their approval.
The placement of copies of the report with its recommendation on a preferred route was left for perusal and final review at a convenient locality. Copies were also circulated to key authorities. This was met with no response and only one I&AP was noted as having 'read' the report.
The review stage merely allowed Eskom management and some I&APs to fully appreciate the process followed and the conclusion arrived at. I&APs understood the reasons for the line route's location and therefore approved subsequent phases of the project viz. its negotiation with no opposition as a result.
Similarly Eskom management understood the reasons for any additional cost incurred in its routing.
The report was praised by the NPB.
Ariadne-Eros 4001132kV line EIA
The Ariadne-Eros 400/132kV line EIA's two final corridors were discussed at the various public meetings and appeared to be accepted by I&APs. This not only constituted the consultation process but also informally constituted the review process especially as no choice had to be made between alternative corridors as both were to accommodate powerlines (Funston, pers comm., 1998). A draft report was compiled and placed at strategic points for review. A copy was given to the NPB for comment.
The line negotiations did not proceed with ease as a result of inadequate review and the project was delayed for 18 months as a resullt (Richardson, pers comm., 1996).
Eros 4001132kV substation
For Eros substation a decision was made within Eskom in consultation with technical staff comprising a multi-disciplinary team and directly affected landowners. The Ariadne-Eros 4001132kV line EIA report, with its brief expose of the process followed to locate the substation, served as the only means by which the selection of the substation site could be reviewed by the public or specialists.
Kokstad-Mount Frere 132kV line
For the Kokstad-Mount Frere 132kV Line EIA the review was conducted prior to the production of the final EIR which was temporarily supplanted by an interrim document summarising the process followed, stating issues and the means of evaluation. Key factors informing the decision were collated into a document which was presented at both external and internal review meetings and this was seen as adequate.
Based on issues the three alternative corridors were compared and a preferred alternative selected at an internal review meeting which was attended by Eskom managers and an environmental auditor from Eskom Corporate Environmental Audit Division who was requested to be present and comment on the procedure followed. This was to prevent further 'bullying' and lack of consideration for the process by Eskom management. The evaluation was repeated at an external review meeting in Kokstad and the selected alternative, that had been separately agreed upon and selected by Eskom, confirmed.
Due to limited response from tribal authorities the best option was proferred by Eskom for the portion of the study area (Phase 2) which passed through their jurisdiction and then representatives of the tribal authority were driven through the route to obtain their approval - in essence the decision was made on their behalf.
The placement of copies of the report with its recommendation on a preferred route was left for perusal and final review at a convenient locality. Copies were also circulated to key authorities. This was met with no response and only one I&AP was noted as having read the report proving how ineffectual this method was for puproses of review.
The review of alternatives and issues gained the full support of I&APs and authorities without suspicion. The white landowners were satisfied with the process followed as it was seen to be transparent and participatory. This allowed subsequent phases of the project such as negotiation, survey and construction to proceed with minimal delay and without adversity from landowners.
Mount Frere 132122kV substation
For the Mount Frere substation, authority review was included as part of the consultation phase with the Mount Frere Transitional Local Council and this was considered adequate given the size of the
substation and its limited potential for impact.
5.6.2 Trends Associated with Review
Review was never requested by those without land tenure such as the predominantly Black communities. The reasons for this are numerous and well documented elsewhere.
Review, by means of the report being made available for perusal by I&APs, was considered adequate by Eskom, irrespective of whether I&APs could understand the highly technical and voluminous document or not. The use of this medium for review is considered inappropriate. The need for review of the report might also be considered superfluous if the EIA and involvement of I&APs was sufficiently thorough during the process and consensus reached on the decisions arrived at. Continual review, where I&APs are part of an ongoing process which may even continue through to monitoring, as opposed to once off review is also more preferable.
Internal review by Eskom management as well as external review by I&APs proved to establish an atmosphere of consent, trust and co-operation especially for subsequent stages of the project.
The need for expert / specialist review was appreciated by Eskom to some extent as the NPB was consulted and considered to be the review authority for the time. This was necessary where Eskom had both conducted the EIA and also was responsible for making the final decision. Where there comment was not heeded it coulld result in massive damage such as at Hector substation.
Undertaking a review of the EIR once construction has already commenced, with little chance of any recommendations being implemented, shows a distinct lack of understanding of the importance associated with this process and amounts to little more than 'green-washing' or going through the motions.
Internal review was necessary 111 order to educate Eskom management so as to develop their understanding and support for the EIA process and its decision. Internal review also balanced the decision in terms of cost and economic criteria which were concerns more understood by Eskom management than I&APs who neglected to give heed to issues which did not directly affect them.