In this chapter I have introduced and contextualised my study and I have explained why and how I embarked upon it. In respect of the conceptual framework which I use, mention is made of the ‘spatial turn’ and its importance in adding to the understanding
of the process by which I was socialised. Symbolic Interactionism is introduced as the theoretical lens I use to understand the influence of the ‘spatial turn’ in my narrative. In the next chapter I proceed to my Literature Review/Theoretical Framework.
CHAPTER TWO FRAMING MY STORY
A literature review frames a study and places it into its context. In building on the principle that knowledge accumulates, and the notion that academic studies build on each other, a literature review shows what work has been done in the field in question.
Key issues, theories, concepts and methodologies are highlighted and gaps and omissions come to light (Cresswell, 2012; Karichi, 2006).
My literature review begins with an examination of the concept of identity as a basis upon which to understand race and whiteness as social constructs. I distinguish between the category ‘white people’ and the ideology of ‘whiteness’ before embarking upon a review of whiteness in its international and southern African contexts.
Proceeding from here I consider education’s role in the reproduction of whiteness.
I then explain the ‘spatial turn’ of my study and Symbolic Interactionism as the theoretical lens through which I view the interaction between the geopolitical and educational spaces of my study, this being pivotal to an understanding of the reproduction of my whiteness. I then move to a consideration of whiteness and its reproduction in the geopolitical spaces of my southern African experience. In respect of each of these, namely Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia and South Africa, my literature review proceeds thematically in that it is structured around the three spatial threads which are so strongly evident in my narrative, namely political space, geographical space and educational space.
2.1. IDENTITY AS A CONCEPT
Identity-based forms of oppression have been at the root of much human suffering through the pages of history and many are the identity based political movements that have fought, and continue to fight, for human rights on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, age and other forms of socially recognized identity (Alcoff, 2003; Hall, 1996; Kearney, 2003; Wetherell, 1996). It is important to realise, in this regard, just how important identity is. Wetherell (1996) contends that it is impossible to understand people’s lives without making some
reference to one or other of the social markers referred to above. Identity is the central organiser in people’s lives, reaching out into their life history, their personality, their group membership and their life chances.
The concern in this thesis is with ‘social identity’ which is premised upon the broad agreement among sociologists that the relationship between individuals and society is central to an understanding of how identity is constructed and experienced (Francis, 2006; Neuman, 1997; Wetherell, 1996). Such agreement is built upon the conviction that there is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the social arena, or, as Wetherell (1996, p. 300) puts it “…how all that has made my society might connect with all that has made me”.
Up to the 1980s a dominant line of thinking was that people’s identities were fixed or bounded (Francis, 2006; Kearney, 2003). Scholars caught little of the dynamic nature of society or identity and tended to see individuals as static portraits. A related line of thinking was that identities were constructed by powerful social influences bearing down on individuals. There was little recognition that within social contexts individuals could also be responsible for their own identity construction (Alcoff, 2003; Brown, 1996;
Kearney, 2003). Alcoff (2003, p. 5) contends that this reduced individuals to social objects which could gain “…their intelligibility and force only within a social realm”, and adds that the foundations of this kind of thinking were laid by the likes of Hegel, Marx, Freud and Mead.
Since the early 1980s, post-modernist thinkers have reacted strongly to this modernist view of the nature of identity. They have argued that notions of culture and identity are constantly changing and have rejected modernist grand narratives of historical progress which posited permanency and constancy and which spoke for others, often setting people’s goals and priorities, and dictating their values and priorities (Alcoff, 2003;
Bauman, 1996; Kearney, 2003). They have preferred to articulate a diversity and fluidity of voices and see identity as a subjective formation since just as individuals might be
‘made’ by the organising structures and relationships of society, so too they can ‘make’
themselves, depending on how they respond to what society would try to make of them (Alcoff, 2003; Austin, 2001; Connell, 1987; Giroux, 1997b; Hall, 1996; Kearney, 2003;
McLaren, 1993; Mendieta, 2003; Wetherell, 1996).
To see identity as a subjective formation is to focus on the “…endlessly performing self”
(Hall, 1996, p. 1). It is to see individuals as being continually engaged in an on-going identity project as they try to build on what has gone before in their lives. It is to recognize that far from being fixed identities are constantly evolving. It is also to recognize that identities are fragmented and that there are shifting understandings and constructions of personality (Mendieta, 2003; Wetherell, 1996). It is to acknowledge furthermore, that as identities are constructed a certain degree of conflict and contradiction is inevitable as individuals weave their way through a complex range of societal relationships and pressures (Connell, 1987). It is too often assumed that identity is homogenous and that individuals are marked off in clear cut ‘either or’ terms, black or white, or man or woman, or heterosexual or homosexual or working class of middle class, for example (Connell, 1987). Wetherell (1996, p. 307) notes, in this regard that, “…social identity is not necessarily evenly distributed in this way”, and that it is more of a mix of positions, with some combinations being particularly difficult for individuals to accommodate.
Kearney (2003) worries, given the stress in post-modernist thinking on identity on the diversity and fluidity of voices, about whose voice it is that comes to dominate in a sea of alternatives. There is a danger that those with more power might come to dominate those with less. He believes however, that ‘storied identities’ are important in this regard since they enable individuals to come to the centre of their identity formation. This is important, given the focus of this thesis, and the notion is dealt with in detail further on.
Of central significance in identity construction is the idea that identities are constructed through difference, or in relation to the ‘other’ (Apter, 2007; Beddard, 2000; Bhabha, 1990, 1994; Chennault, 1998; Ferguson, 2006; Giroux, 1998; Hall, 1996; Kincheloe &
Steinberg, 1998; Rodriguez, 1998; Roman & Eyre, 1997; Rutherford, 1990; Said, 1978, 1993; Spivak, 1990). It is only “…through the relation to the ‘other’, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term - and thus its identity-can be constructed” (Hall, 1996, pp.
4-5). Giroux’s (1998, p. 42) take is that “…we know ourselves through others and how we define the others affects how we define ourselves”. Building on this, Hall (1996, p. 5) contends that identities are only able to operate as points of reference and attachment
“…because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render outside”. It should be
added that while difference is key in identity construction fear is as well since that which is feared is also placed at the margin (Roman & Eyre, 1997).
In respect of the construction of white identity, which is discussed in detail further on, the notion of the ‘other’ became especially marked as whites came into contact with non-whites as they moved beyond the confines of safe, ‘civilised’ Europe from the 16th century (Apter, 2007; Beddard, 2000; Chennault, 1998; Ferguson, 2006; Gillborn, 2007;
Giroux, 1998; Hall, 1996; Holmes, 2007; Keating, 1995; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1998;
McLaren, 1998; Said, 1978). It was beyond Europe, in the ‘barbarian’ worlds of non- whites, “…that white people’s sense of themselves as being white became contingent upon a negation of a corollary blackness and an assertion of that blackness as the basis of a competing racial identity” (Chennault, 1998, p. 300). As Giroux (1998, p. 42) puts it,
“…white identity has relied on the control and subjugation of other bodies to define itself”.
Power and exclusion are key concepts here. Hall (1996) explains that constructing an identity involves power in that as something is excluded a polarity, which might well contain an element of conflict and violence, as between blacks and whites, or between men and women, for example, emerges. Identities always emerge “…within the play of specific modalities of power” (Hall, 1996, p. 4). Foucault’s (1980) point in this regard is that power is not something that one person exerts on another. It is rather that power emerges from a situation in which all people engaged in interaction are positioned to influence each other. So, just as society may have power on its side when it ‘makes’
individuals, to varying degrees, so too do individuals act from a position of power when they respond in various ways to the organising principles of society, especially when these are used to create opportunity and advantage (Crenshaw, 2003; Hall, 1996;
Wetherell, 1996).
Hall (1996) demonstrates the point by noting that while the British, for example, might have exercised disproportionate amounts of power over people in their various colonies it was also true that dispossessed peoples developed strategies which enabled them to counter this, often developing new identities as a result. Crenshaw’s (2003) supportive elaboration is that in identity formation the process of naming is not unilateral. Those who are subordinated can subvert the naming process in empowering ways. By declaring that they are black or women or homosexual, for example, individuals can
provide an anchor of subjectivity for themselves. They are able to make a statement of resistance and at the same time engage in a positive discourse of redefining themselves.
Yet it can also be the case that those who are oppressed in various ways may act to reinforce the relations of domination by consenting to them (Bell, 1997; Du Bois, 2001 (1915); Fanon, 1967; Gramsci, 1971b; Hardiman & Jackson, 1997; Woodson, 1933).
This might happen when the dominant group is so successful in entrenching itself that its world view becomes accepted by all as common sense. In such cases oppressed peoples internalise the roles and attitudes that maintain their oppression to the degree that they become brokers of the same.
Nuttall (2009) argues that the absoluteness of difference as a theoretical construct in identity construction needs to be reconsidered. She believes that social markers are not immutable in time and space and that to confine one’s thinking to the lens of difference all the time is to limit the pursuit of social justice. She believes that boundaries between people are actually quite flexible and porous and sees individuals as being mutually entangled as distinct from always being at opposite poles. Just as they become entangled so they can become disentangled. She believes that self-narrative has a key role to play in enabling individuals to discover and understand their mutual entanglement and the possibilities for their disentanglement. This holds out promising prospects for the renegotiation of their identities. Nuttall (2009) points to examples of white South Africans who have engaged in a process of disentangling themselves from their fellow white South Africans with racist views. This is discussed in detail further on.
I would agree with Lipshitz (1995) however, that given the nature of whiteness, as will be shown in due course, whites cannot disentangle themselves from whiteness as such for doing so would not prevent them from continuing to be privileged as white people.
What whites can do is dis-identify (Pecheux, 1982) with whiteness. I would contend that a key starting point is for whites to become aware of the nature of whiteness, to understand something of the process by which they have been socialised into it and from there, in self-reflective awareness, to begin the process of recognizing the otherness of themselves as they learn of their own location of privilege (Rutherford, 1990). This will substantially change relations of domination and subordination in that it
will undermine the ability of whites to relegate their ‘others’ to the margins. This is a theme which I pick up and develop further on.