SOCIAL REALIST THEORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MY RESEARCH
3.5 MODES OF REFLEXIVITY
While the internal dialogues o f communicative reflexives are initiated in their own minds, people do not always trust their internal deliberations and depend on others close to them to complete their conversations for them. Their pattern “is one o f ‘thought and talk’” (Archer, 2003, p. 167). All communicative reflexives share three common features: firstly, ‘contextual continuity’ (e.g. geographic, stable group o f interlocutors, occupational) which they tend to replicate; secondly, success with dovetailing o f concerns by foregrounding the social order (i.e.
family and friends); and thirdly, contentment with their decisions. The projects that communicative reflexives envisage, within the context o f their involuntary placement, do not trigger social constraints. An effect o f communicative reflexivity is the fostering o f social immobility, reproduction and morphostasis. Social immobility is not the result o f passive agents, but rather considered deliberation which is dependent on active agents (Archer, 2003, 2007a, 2012). For Archer (2007a) “ ’staying put’ has to be worked at by an active agent”
(p. 158).
Autonomous reflexives are the antithesis o f communicative reflexives. Initial ‘contextual discontinuity’, whether forced on people or o f their own making, fosters self-reliance and the view that they should make their own way in the world. The genesis o f autonomous reflexives provides conditions for an individual with faith in his/her own standards and a certainty in relation to knowing what is ‘right from wrong’ based on a moral pragmatism gained through his/her own experiences. Generally, autonomous reflexives distance themselves from social normativity, as they are not particularly interested in participating in society other than economically (Archer, 2007a). By that I mean they are not likely to participate in socio-political structures.
Three key features o f autonomous reflexives are firstly, their readiness to move away from their natal context, secondly, their unproblematic dovetailing o f their concerns although they tend to change their ultimate concern as they learn about themselves and the world, and thirdly,
their individualism (Archer, 2003). Autonomous reflexives envisage their projects which are primarily related to their career and work. These projects often bring about contextual discontinuity as people move between career options. At the same time they foster social mobility and morphogenesis. As individualists (in their personal and political lives), they are independent and self-sufficient and are inclined to keep their reflexive deliberations to themselves (Archer, 2003).
Meta-reflexives engage with their own reflexivity; they are not only solely concerned with the propositions o f the internal conversation, but also with why the propositions are ‘uttered’. In this sense, they constantly self-monitor. Three key features o f the meta-reflexives are firstly, they experience discontinuity o f their natal context (as with the autonomous reflexives), secondly, they experience difficulty dovetailing their concerns, and thirdly, they wish that others could share their ultimate concern. Meta-reflexives have difficulty completing the
“concerns - projects - practices” sequence to their satisfaction (Archer, 2007a, p. 88). They are social critics and idealists and have difficulty establishing projects that will enable them to live up to their ideals. In a sense, they value above all else values, as they attach a value commitment to the three orders of reality. Trying to fit ‘who they seek to b e’ with the social environment proves a challenge in developing sustainable and satisfying projects related to their ultimate concern (Archer, 2003, 2007a). No structural context ever matches their cultural ideal and thus their internal conversation is perpetually focused on self and society. M eta
reflexives “are therefore practical dialecticians, people who practice the dialectics of objectivity and subjectivity, which is why there is no lasting set o f established practices for them - no final modus vivendi’ (Archer, 2003, p. 288).
W hile the stance adopted by communicative reflexives is ‘evasive ’ and autonomous reflexives
‘strategic ’, the stance adopted by meta-reflexives is that o f ‘strong evaluators’, which I would term ‘critics’, as they continually evaluate (inter)actions in relation to their ideals, through their internal conversations (Archer, 2003).
Fractured reflexives refer to people whose reflexive PEP have been temporarily suspended and who are no longer able to deal with the objective environment that they confront. They are both
‘displaced’ and ‘impeded’; unable at a particular moment in time to hold a conversation with themselves about their circumstances. While they are still capable o f internal conversations,
this self-talk is unable to provide them with guidance about what to do in practice. Archer (2003) contends that ‘fractured reflexives’ are passive agents because,
their subjectivity makes no difference to the play o f objective circumstances upon them.
Their mental activities (whose existence is not denied) perform no mediatory role for them; they permit no intentional relationship between self and society. In short, they make no difference. (pp. 299-300)
The first three modes o f reflexivity have agents who are able to take a stance towards society.
In other words, they can direct their PEP towards society in a systematic manner that facilitates the achievement o f their ultimate concerns. However, this is not possible for fractured reflexives.
Archer (2012), like Giddens, suggests that late-modernity has foregrounded the imperative for reflexivity. Contemporary society is perpetually in a state o f flux and the social contexts that persons find themselves in, differ from those in which persons started their lives. She argues that the increase in geographic mobility, greater cultural diversity and increased levels of education, all work against contextual continuity and the emergence o f communicative reflexives. The social guidelines o f the past are no longer suitable in assisting people in making choices and defining their projects (Caetano, 2014). Archer (2012) contends that the rise of contextual incongruence and discontinuity have produced conditions that are favourable for the emergence o f autonomous reflexives and meta-reflexives. Furthermore, “the reflexive imperative accentuates the fallibility o f personal projects which increases the number of individuals who are unable, even if only temporarily, to guide their actions reflexively, revealing a fractured reflexivity” (Caetano, 2014, p. 63).
These four modes o f reflexivity provide an analytic framework for analysing teacher identities.
In this respect, the analysis o f the lives o f the teachers in my study suggests that their modes of reflexivity are either communicative or autonomous. I suggest that this could be a result o f the particular context within which they grew up; a context o f economic, social and political injustices and inequality. This forms the focus o f Chapters Five and Seven.