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National Language Policy, Scorched Earth Campaign and Militarization of the State…

CHAPTER 4: SETTING THE SCENE…

4.2 Dynamics of the Conflict…

4.2.4 National Language Policy, Scorched Earth Campaign and Militarization of the State…

Burmese concept of political legitimacy. In a move to legitimize his government U Nu had opted to mix nationalism with Buddhism, while General Ne Win, mixed nationalism with socialism, and he also used military leadership as a means to introduce socialism into the country.451 Nationalism, for both U Nu and Ne Win was based on the notion of „one ethnicity, one language, and one religion‟.452 Although their approaches to ethnic and religious forced-assimilation were different, U Nu and Ne Win both had the same goal of creating a homogeneous people in the country. For instance, U Nu who opted for cultural and religious assimilation into Buddhism as a means of forced-assimilation, while Ne Win removed the rights of the country‟s religious and cultural minorities, especially minority‟s language right, as a means of creating a homogeneous unitary state.453

The process of eliminating ethnic rights began with the establishment of the 1962 Printers and Publishers Registration Law and the 1965 Censor Law.454 These laws were implemented also with the aim to prevent information from reaching ethnic areas, through prohibiting the publication of any information in ethnic languages. Thus, there was no independent newspaper, no independent radio station and no printing house for any ethnic groups nor in any ethnic language.455 This strategy was implemented hand in hand with the government policy of national language, through which ethnic languages were systematically

449 Silverstein, Josef (1981) "Minority Problems in Burma Since 1962", in Lehman (ed.,), Military Rule in Burma Since 1962 (Singapore, 1981), p. 51.

450 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

451 Smith, M. (1999), Burma: Insurgency and Politics of Ethnic Identity, London: Zeb Books.

452 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

453 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

454 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), “The Burman Military”, in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Independent Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments, Cornell University, pp. 81-101.

455 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

Page | 80 discriminated and eliminated. These two laws were perceived by the other non-Burman ethnic groups to be stumbling blocks for the publications of ethnic languages, including curriculums and teaching materials for both secular schools as well as Sunday Schools.456 As a result, the Chin and other ethnic nationalities in Burma were unable to promote their language under the military dictatorship. Since the basic rights to promote the non-Burman languages, cultures and belief systems were severely derailed, the incentive for preserving, protecting and promoting through teaching, learning, writing, of their own languages, cultures and religions became an important matter which pushed the non-Burman ethnic groups to take up arms.457

In 1962 General Ne Win declared Burmese as the medium of instruction at all levels of schools and colleges and universities.458 His policy of one national language finally reached its peak when the 1974 Constitution was formulated, which adopted Burmese as the official language of the Union of Burma.459 General Ne Win was able to fulfill his vision of building the state army, and create divisions between the state and the army. While ethnic languages were systematically eliminated and even destroyed, the national language of Burmese, the dominant language, was protected and promoted by using state mechanisms. The regime as also forced the non- Burman ethnic nationalities to speak Burmese at all the government‟s official functions and forced them to learn Burmese, as it was the only official language in the country.460Nevertheless, ethnic languages were allowed to be used for the communication purpose between the central government and ethnic states, however, no mechanisms or institutions were provided to preserve, protect and promote ethnic languages.461 Of note, the existence of Burmese as the only „official language‟ meant that the rest of the ethnic languages, including the Chin and its various dialects, were legally unofficial and therefore could be discriminated against “legitimately” in various means by using all kind of state mechanisms and existing laws.462

456 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), op. cit.

457 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit

458 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit

459 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit

460 Silverstein, J. (1981), op. cit.

461 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit

462 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), op. cit.

Page | 81 In a move to implement his national language policy, General Ne Win deployed the Tatmadaw463 as part of the military campaign against ethnic minority groups in the country.464 In addition to the nation-building process, Gen Ne Win developed a programme known as the „Burmese Way to Socialism‟ (BWS).465 In addition, to implement the BWS programme, General Ne Win established the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and used the Tatmadaw armed forces as the nucleus of nation-building.466 Thus, the Tatmadaw was deployed not only as a national institution and state mechanism, but also became “the guardian of the people and protectors of the Union”.467 Furthermore, in 1965 General Ne Win adopted the “people‟s war doctrine” as the military doctrine of the Tatmadaw with an idea of creating an army state under the disguise of the need for a strong army that would prevent the Union from its collapse.468 General Ne Win also formed hundreds of militia organizations all over the country, known as Kar-Kwe-Ye (KKY) in Burmese, and applied a four-cut strategy against ethnic armed groups.469

The four-cut strategy which was adopted by the Tatmadaw‟s military was aimed at cutting food supply to the insurgents; cut protection money from villagers to the insurgents; cut contacts between people and the insurgents; and to cut off access to personnel or recruits.470 For emphasis, Sakhong notes that the national language policy was implemented hand in hand with the military campaign of the four-cut strategy, which was also known as a scorched earth military campaign, in ethnic areas.471 Moreover, while the scorched earth campaign was designed as a short-term strategy against ethnic nationalities in the country, the national language policy was adopted as a long-term strategy to build a homogenous country under the disguise of nation-building.

463 The Tatmadaw are the national armed forces (literally, the main army). Initially formed by Aung San from a combination of different ethnic units trained by the British or Japanese in the Second World War. The Tatmadaw has controlled the government of Burma since 1958 during Ne Win's military administration. Smith, M. (1994), op. cit.

464 Smith, M. (1999), op. cit.

465 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), op. cit.

466 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), op. cit.

467 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang, (1989), op. cit, p. 51.

468 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

469 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

470 Maung Aung Myoe (2009), Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Asian Studies).

471 Sakhong, L., H (2012), op. cit.

Page | 82 4.2.5 The Ethnic Nationalities‟ response to Constitutional dictatorship and the 1988 popular