CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.4 B ROAD O RIENTATION OF THE S TUDY
4.4.1 Ontology, epistemology and methodology
The dominant approach in educational research has been to argue that coherence of research design is achieved by ensuring that the purposes and techniques of the research framework fit within a particular ―research paradigm‖ (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 71). Paradigms are generally defined as systems of interrelated assumptions about ontology (the form and
nature of reality), epistemology (the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known), and methodology (how the inquirer goes about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known) (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 36). The concept of ―paradigm‖
is variously used, depending on conceptions of the interrelationship and relative importance of ontology, epistemology and methodology (Morgan, 2007, pp. 50-54). When ontology is privileged, ―paradigm‖ is seen as a world-view, an all-encompassing way of thinking about and experiencing the world. When epistemology is privileged, ―paradigm‖ takes on a different stress. Perhaps the most widespread way of using the term in the social sciences is as an epistemological stance. Alternatively, ―paradigm‖ can be seen in terms of shared beliefs among members of a specialty area. Finally, the concept ―paradigm‖ can be used in the sense of models or methods of research. Morgan stresses that these versions of the concept paradigm are not mutually exclusive but nested within one another. He argues that none of these versions is ―right‖ or ―wrong‖: ―The question is which version is most appropriate for any given purpose?‖ (Morgan, 2007, p. 54). In other words, Morgan proposes a pragmatic view of the term paradigm. This is the approach I take in this research.
Historically, Guba and Lincoln (1994) have been most influential in comparing research paradigms in the social sciences. Their early work delineated two paradigms, namely positivism and ―naturalistic inquiry‖, later termed constructivism. Subsequently they expanded their list of paradigms to include post-positivism, critical theory, and the participatory paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). I appreciate Morgan‘s criticism that Guba and Lincoln‘s approach to paradigms is ―top-down‖ and ―metaphysical‖ because they privilege ontological issues over epistemological and methodological issues, which
―impose[s] limits on every aspect of the system‖ (Morgan, 2007, pp. 57-58). I find Morgan‘s position satisfies much of the prickly response I have to Guba and Lincoln‘s metaphysical perspective, and therefore quote at length:
Paradigms in social science research methodologies are not abstract entities with timeless characteristics; instead what counts as a paradigm and how the core content of the paradigm is portrayed involves a series of ongoing struggles between competing interest groups. Yet if the content of paradigms is subject to this level of human agency, then it makes little sense to claim that principles such as ontology, epistemology and methodology are actually defining characteristics for such paradigms. This shift from a view of paradigms as enduring epistemological stances to dynamic systems of belief within a community of scholars calls into question the metaphysical paradigm‘s basic attempt to ‗impose order‘ on the practices in social science research through an externally defined, a priori system from the philosophy of knowledge. (Morgan, 2007, p. 61)
I agree with Morgan‘s position. I regard paradigms as human constructions, and think that Guba and Lincoln‘s categorisation of research paradigms is too rigid because my own ontological, epistemological and methodological preferences do not fit neatly into the categories popularised by Guba and Lincoln. Human thought and belief cannot so easily be boxed. I feel far more comfortable with a conception of a continuum of approaches to research (see Figure 10 below) and with combining research methods to obtain richer data, where the purpose of the research indicates this.
Broadly speaking, this research was conducted from an interpretive, anti-positivist perspective. Interpretive research is subjective, small-scale, non-statistical, interprets individual specificities, aims to understand actions and meanings rather than causes, and focuses on micro-concepts such as individual perspectives, personal constructs or negotiated meanings (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). It sees the researcher making efforts to understand the human experience ―from within‖ – to interpret the world in terms of its actors.
Interpretive approaches focus on action, which Cohen et al. see as ―behaviour-with-meaning‖
(2007, p. 21). However, increasingly, researchers are accepting that qualitative research can attribute causes (Maxwell, 2004), a position with which I agree. Interpretivist research is naturalistic in that it is context-dependent and happens in an unobtrusive manner in uncontrived, real-world settings (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 19). However, I concur with Bernstein (1974) that there is a danger that such an approach can neglect the role of structural (i.e.
external) forces on behaviour and events, so my perspective is not purely interpretive. In addition, my research approach could be described as critical in that it aims not simply to describe the world, but also to play a role in changing it into something more egalitarian and democratic, and in that it sees the importance of political and social power relations and looks at both macro- and micro-concepts. From a pragmatic perspective it is legitimate for a piece of research to embody these various perspectives.
My personal beliefs about the nature of reality (ontology) fit in with what the sociologist Moore calls ―critical realism‖ which focuses on the social relations of the production of knowledge (Moore, 2004, p. 149). My epistemological beliefs, which briefly put, would hold that the researcher cannot be completely objective (my own values and habitus influence this enquiry, no matter how much I attempt to bracket them), could also be described as fitting in with what Guba and Lincoln call ―critical theory and related ideological positions‖ (1994, p.
110).
Epistemology is perhaps more central to reading research than to other areas of education research precisely because reading is a way of knowing (J. W. Cunningham & Fitzgerald, 1996). As was argued in Chapter 2, what is sometimes construed as debate over methods of reading instruction is often at base an issue of different epistemological stances.
Epistemological issues impact on what people see as the most important thing to teach about reading, how reading should be taught and how reading comprehension should be tested.
Such issues are, for example:
Can we have knowledge of a single reality that is independent of the knower?
Is there such a thing as truth?
What primary test must proposed knowledge pass in order to be true (correspondence, coherence or pragmatism)?
Is knowledge primarily universal or particular?
Where is knowledge located relative to the knower – outside, between or inside or a dualist or pluralist combination of these?
What are the relative contributions of sense data and mental activity to knowing?
To what degree is knowledge discovered or created?
My own stance is that meaning evolves through a reciprocal relationship between the mind of the reader/author and the text, that the signs on the page transact (Rosenblatt, 1994), that there is no definite meaning external to the transaction, that knowledge is created and recreated, that the reading process is universal, but every reading is unique and that the test of truth of knowledge is pragmatism, rather than coherence or accurate correspondence.