5.2 Identifying and Interpreting Dominant Themes
5.2.1 Political/Politicised homophobia
Studying the use of homophobic rhetoric by Nujoma’s administration in Namibia, Currier identified that it had not been exclusively used to control sexualities and gender identities, but to vilify and silence opposition and thereby strengthen the control of the state (Currier, 2010:122). Furthermore, Currier, who has extensively researched contemporary political homophobia and SOGI rights organising in South Africa, Namibia, Liberia and Malawi (Currier, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2019;
Currier and Cruz, 2014; 2020), determined that in other states political homophobia had been used strategically to silence dissenters, for example through smear campaigns such as was witnessed in Cameroon, to deflect attention from other problems, including increasingly autocratic rule or economic decline as suggested in Zimbabwe, and lastly to reimage the liberation history of post- colonial societies to instil the leadership with more masculine, patriarchal authority, as argued for
84 Nujoma in Namibia (Currier, 2010:115-116; Nyeck, 2013:169; Gevisser, 2000:116). In this regard, politicised homophobia differs from state homophobia, which is the existence of legislation that discriminates or criminalises homosexual activities and people, and social homophobia, which describes the attitudes and actions of people and communities that discriminate, marginalise or inflict violence on homosexuals or other gender non-conforming people (Bertolt and Massé, 2019:22).
In Weiss and Bosia’s (2013) edited collection, Global Homophobia, they noted that globally state leaders have used political homophobia to construct sexual and gender minorities as outsiders.
Sexual and gender minorities might, for example, have been characterised as entangled in or controlled by foreigners or they might have been characterised as outsiders to redefine insiders under a monolithically cis-gendered and heteronormative national identity (Weiss and Bosia, 2013).
Weiss and Bosia have defined this political homophobia as the implementation of strategies grounded in homophobic narratives, which have been “embedded in the scapegoating of an ‘other’
that drives processes of state building and retrenchment; as the product of transnational influence- peddling and alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the complicated legacies of colonialisms” (2013:12).
Currier later refined this concept as politicised homophobia, to emphasise that it was motivated by political aspirations rather than triggered as a response to homosexuality (2019:12). For example, as has been seen from the cases outlined above, politicised homophobia has not always been a response to the rise of sexual and gender minorities seeking SOGI rights. Currier suggested that politicised homophobia:
“can serve as an expedient strategy for political elites seeking to punish gender and sexual dissidents, to bolster their moral and political authority, to weaken political opponents, to buttress narratives of national sovereignty, and/or to deflect attention from sociopolitical controversies” (Currier, 2019:20).
Furthermore, Currier (2019) determined that politicised homophobia could be used by political elites pre-emptively to prevent SOGI rights groups forming, as was demonstrated in Liberia, reactively when under pressure on other issues, such as social or economic protests, and proactively to maintain and strengthen political power.
However, as well as these broader political aims, politicised homophobia served to both oppress sexual and gender minorities and to marginalise those implicated in the SOGI debate, including political opposition, NGOs and rights activists (Currier, 2019:29). This was demonstrated in Uganda as part of a wider moral crusade (Tamale, 2011). In these circumstances politicised homophobia specifically challenged the hegemony of Western activism observed through the supposed promotion of, in Nujoma’s words, “alien” rights, which subsequently served to legitimise the post- colonial leadership by reaffirming their ability to expel invaders, such as in Zimbabwe (Rukweza, 2006; Stychin, 2004:957). This strategic implementation reinforced the post-colonial nationalist
85 narrative, by rejecting the criticisms from the global North of a lack of progress on human rights protections.
Another reason suggested for the implementation of politicised homophobia has been the desire to deflect public attention away from domestic social, economic and democratic decline such as inflation, low wages, high taxes, high unemployment, poor state healthcare and other issues of socio-political concern (Tamale, 2011). Not least since this rhetoric often surfaced during periods when states have been tackling corruption, unemployment, repression and “increased hopelessness among the African populace” (Tamale, 2014:167). In Zimbabwe, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have used sexual and gender minorities as scapegoats by focussing on the threat they have posed as a distraction from their own failure to maintain economic, social and political stability (Youde, 2017:64). As noted previously, similar moral panics have also been used in Cameroon, Malawi, Senegal and Uganda, where the oppression of queer people coincided with increased civil society activism to a range of unrelated social issues.
Even in cases where the initial homophobic rhetoric was seemingly a reaction to SOGI organising, politicised homophobia became a tool for further aims. Youde argued that in Zimbabwe, Mugabe first reacted to the appearance of GALZ at the book fair, and then discovered the patriotic utility of politicised homophobia, using it to reaffirm his credentials as a liberator and defender of Zimbabwean culture and people (Youde, 2017). Increasing public dissatisfaction with his regime and management of the economy had emboldened political challengers both within his party and in 1999 from the rise of the MDC in opposition (Youde, 2017).
In claiming homosexuality as un-African, Mugabe invoked the historic colonial domination as a contemporary force threatening the sexual productiveness of Zimbabweans and at the same time reminding citizens of his success at overthrowing the colonisers and reaffirming his position as guardian of the nation (Stychin, 2004:957). Later Mugabe also used SOGI rights to delegitimise the leader of the opposition by criticising his support for them (Youde, 2017:73). Indeed, Zimbabwe presented a case in which politicised homophobia has been used to address multiple issues simultaneously. Tamale added that in more religious societies where homophobic attitudes have moral currency, the “rhetoric serves to strengthen the standing of its proponents in mainstream thought and maintains their social relevance” (2013:34). Such aims have been observed in Gambia and Senegal. It has also been evident that this rhetoric ensured international media coverage, particularly for leaders in Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Whilst much of this coverage has been negative, it has also enhanced the anti-colonial image of these leaders.
Finally, McKay and Angotti (2016:400) have highlighted that although considered a local issue some of the themes of politicised homophobic discourses have become globalised suggesting a level of cross border idea sharing. This reflects Tamale’s (2014) understanding of a toolbox of ideas, which leaders draw upon to achieve their national aims. Tamale noted:
“Among African dictatorships, non-conforming sexualities have become a metaphor for immorality and form an effective instrument in the politics of distraction. Instead
86 of blaming political mismanagement and corruption for high unemployment, the
high cost of living and poor health facilities, the red herrings will crystallise, inter alia, in the form of ‘the vice of homosexuality’ or ‘the evil of prostitution’. And the red herrings are usually fished out of the sea of morality when political accountability is looming” (Tamale, 2014:167-8)
This globalisation of discourses means that although the contexts have been different in each state, we can observe some commonalities in the narratives. As Currier noted politicised homophobia has not been continental in form, there have been various manifestations in different states and it has not been as pervasive as claims of African homophobia have suggested (Currier, 2019:256-257). In summary, it has become apparent that politicised homophobia has been utilised to meet a variety of aims that may not necessarily have direct relevance to the promotion of SOGI rights on the continent. Sexual and gender minorities have served as scapegoats in strategic programmes to increase legitimacy for autocratic or corrupt regimes, to delegitimise civil or political opposition, to deflect attention from economic or social dysfunction and to re-establish the struggle credentials of failing leaders. Given this tenuous connection with SOGI issues, it is important to understand why sexual and gender minorities have been the focus of such ire in several states on the continent and why members of the African Group within the UN have been such an active opposition to the international promotion of protection of sexual and gender minorities.
The final section of this chapter presents the queer critical discourse analysis of the continental narratives used to frame SOGI issues. This analysis seeks to identify in which ways sexual and gender minorities and rights have been othered or rendered deviant and how this othering has been manifested through the political narratives. Once again, to refer to the methodology section, this analysis takes how SOGI rights and people have been put into the discourse and, using a queer lens, asks questions about what that discourse does in terms of creating the normal and perverse and what power underlies those identifications to influence other states.
This analysis identified two dominant narratives that have been used in the implementation of a variety of politicised homophobic strategies across the continent. These interlinked narratives have attempted to claim firstly that SOGI rights and therefore sexual and gender minorities are un-African and secondly that rejecting these rights has been an essential tool in resisting neocolonialism that threatens African traditions, cultures and beliefs. Furthermore, together these narratives have made claims to particular forms of African nationalisms (not a singular, monolithic African nationalism) to which SOGI rights have been deemed counterproductive. This thesis does not claim that these have been apparent in all states, but that they have been observed in different forms across the continent and have seemingly achieved a continental consensus indicative of McKay and Angotti’s cross bordering of political homophobia (2016:400).