Opsomming:
Eiser het sekere boedelbates geeisen na wysiging van sy dagvaardingwas die pleitstukke nie gesluit nie. Eiser en sy getuies het getuienis afgele en dit wasonbestrede.Op
laasgenoemde stadium het die Bantoesakekommissaris uit- spraak van absolusie gelewer op aansoek van Verweerders.Gehou:
Dat uitspraak van absolusie nie regverdig was op die stadiumwaaropditgelewerwasnie.Sakewaarna verwysis:
Mzimela
andothers versusMzimela, 1960.N.A.C.80.100
Staden versusPrinsloo, 1947,S.A.L.R.842.
Bee versus Railway Passengers Assurance Co., 1947, (4>
S.A.L.R.356.
Goosen
versus Stevenson, 1932,T.P.D.223.Wetgewing waarna verwysis:
Goewermentskennisgewing No. 1664 van 1929.
Appel van die Bansoesakekommissarishof, Morgenson.
Craig,
Waarnemende
Voorsitter:—
Volgens
my
mening wasdaar geen regverdigingvirdieuitspraak vanabsolusieop diestadiumwaaropditgelewerwasnie.Op
15November
1963 het Eiser se prokureur aansoek gedoenom
sydagvaarding volgens ’n kennisgewing gedateer 7November
1963 te wysigen nieteenstaande diefeit dat Verweerderse proku- reur aangegee het dat hy geen beswaar daarteenmaak
nie, het die Bantoesakekommissaris geen beslissing op die geskilpunt gelewernie.Maar
seifsas dit aangeneemword
dat hy die aan- soek toegestaan het (en sy skriftelike uitspraak gee aan dat hy, tenfeite, so gedoen het) wasdit klaarblyklik met dien verstande dat die Verweerders kans sou heom
hulle pleitstukke te wysig,maar
watnie gedoen was teen dietyd van aansoekom
absolusiedeur hulle prokureur nie. Die pleitskrifte was dus nie gesluit nieennet virdaardie rede alleen moes dieKommissarisdie aan- soekvandiehand gewyshet.
Ditisvir
my
nieduidelikhoekom
die Eiser,om
teslaag,bevind dat dit nodig isom
te wys dat Verweerders op bedrieglike of onwettige wyse te werk gegaan het nie. Indien dit bevindword
dat die Eiser die regmatige erfgenaam is en derhalwe die eienaar van die nalatingskap is,maak
dit nie saak welke middele deur die Verweerders aangewend isom
die boedelbates te verkry nie.’n Regmatige eienaarisgeregtig
om
syeiendom tevindikeer tensy die besitters daarvanhulle regtedaaropkanbewys.Die feit datdie Assistent Bantoesakekommissaris te Morgenson blykbaar beslis het op 4 Januarie 1961, dat Eerste Verweerder oorledene seerfgenaam was, verskaf nie die laaste woord op die geskilpunt nie.
Ek
twyfel dat die verrigtinge ingehandig as Bewysstuk “A
”, geld as ’n ondersoek soos beoog deur artikel 3 (2) van Goewermentskennisgewing No. 1664 van 1929. Dit blyk dat die Assistent Kommissaris wie opgetree het, aangeneem het dat Eerste Verweerder die erfgenaam was weens die blote feit dathy die“ Sterfkennis ” en die“Inventaris” geteken hetas“Oudsteseun vanoorledene ”enten spytevandieverklaringvan Roslina
Ngwenya
dat “Toe
oorledenevirJotham Zuluse moeder, Ndhlovu,gekoop het, het hy ookvirJotham betaal”(my onder- streping). Dit
mag
wel wees dat Eerste Verweerder ’n buite- egtelike kind is en, volgens Bantoereg. nie geregtig isom
te erf nie. Verder is ek bewus van die feit dat oorledene se eerste huwelik’n siviele huwelik wasen asdaardie vrou nog lewe,mag
die bepalings van artikel 2 van bogemelde Goewermentskennis- gewing van toepassing wees.
As
’n getwis ontstaan,moes
artikel drie (3)van die Kennisgewing opgeroepword
endit blyk datietsvan daardie aard gebeur het. onwetend miskien. in die huidige saak (sien
Mzimela
andothers versusMzimela, 1960, N.A.C. 80).Diegetuienisdeur enten batevan Eiserten dieneffektedathy die enigste oorlewende manlike afstammeling van oorledeneis,is onbestrede.
Hy
het die bewyslas genoegsaam gekwytom
’n uit- spraak van absolusie tevoorkom
[Staden versus Prinsloo, 1947, S.A.L.R. 842 en Bee versus Railway Passengers Assurance Co., 1947(4),S.A.L.R. 356],en dieprimafacie saakwathygestig het, vereis ’n antwoord (Goosen versus Stevenson, 1932 T.P.D. 223).As
dit nie was dat die pleitskrifte nie gesluit was nie,mag
’n uitspraak van absolusietengunstevanTweede
Verweerdermiskien regverdig gewees het aangesien die enigste getuienis wat geopper~101
was dat sy sogenaamde beskermling enigiets van die bates ver- wyderhet, blyklikophoorse gebaseeris.
Met
verwysing na die Kennisgewing van Appel is daar klaar- blyklik niks op die rekordom
Appellant se bewering dat Sara Zulu (Manana), op 4Januarie 1964(of op4 Januarie 1961) voor- gehou het dat Eerste Verweerder die enigste erfgenaam was, te regverdignie.Verweerders se prokureur het gefouteer
om
aansoek tedoen om
absolusie voordat hy die pleitskrifte gesluit het en dieKom-
missarishetgefouteer
om
die aansoektoetestaan.Volgens
my
mening moet die appel slaag met koste en die Bantoesakekommissarisse uitspraakveranderword
tot“Aansoek om
absolusievandiehand gewys”,Die saak moet terugverwys word na die Bantoesakekommis*
saris virverdereverhoor naafsluitingvandiepleitskrifte.
Maraisen Chatterton, Lede,stem saam.
Vir Appellant: Adv. D.
Kuny
in opdrag van mnr. D. L. de Jager.VirRespondent: Adv.J.D.
M.
Swartinopdragvanmnr.E.W
Pienaar.
NORTH-EASTERN BANTU APPEAL COURT.
NDHLOVU
vs.PHETHA.
B.A.C.
CASE
No. 37 of 1964.Pietermaritzburg: 6th August, 1964. Before Cowan, President:
CraigandParsons,
Members
oftheCourt.BANTU LAW AND CUSTOM.
Ngqutu
cattle—
ownership.Summary:
Plaintiff, awoman
dulyassistedbyher son,sued for the return of seven head of cattle attached for her son’s debt on the ground that they were her property being progeny of the ngqutu beasts paid for her three daughters.It transpired that two of the girls were daughters of the deceased indhlunkulu wife towhose house Plaintiff had been affiliated andthatfiveof the cattleclaimed were progeny of ngqutu beasts paid for them.
The
third girl was, in fact, the daughter ofPlaintiff.Held: That the ownership of the five head of cattle vested in the indhlunkulu of which Plaintiff’s son was heir and that theywererightlyattachedfor hisdebt.
Legislation ferred to:
NatalBantu
Code
Sections3(a)and96(4).Appeal from the Court of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner,.
Camperdown.
Craig, Permanent
Member:
—
The
Plaintiff, dulyassisted by her son, Velekhaya Phetha. sued for the return of seven head ofcattle, or their value, which had been attached in satisfaction of a judgment given against Vele- khaya. She alleged she was the lawful owner of such cattle as they were theprogeny ofcertain ngqutu beastswhich were given to her in respect of the marriages of certain of her daughters.102
It is undisputed that Plaintiff's “house”, a junior one, was
affiliatedto theindhlunkulu of her latehusband and that, onthe failure of the latter house to produce male issue but only seven
daughters,Velekhaya becamethe heir thereto.
On
Plaintiff’sown
admission two of the “ daughters” (Puzani and Kadenzeka) whose ngqutubeasts sheclaims as herown
were not so related to her but are the natural daughters of the deceased indhlunkulu wife. Plaintiff has no right whatever to these cattle, which account for five of those in dispute, on the basis ofngqutuasclaimedbyher.The
contention of Mr. Menge,who
appeared for the Respon- dent (Plaintiff) in this Court, that Plaintiff, because of affiliation of her house, became to all intents and purposes the mother of the girls Puzani and Kadenzeka on the death of their natural mother was reiected.The
purpose of affiliation vide Section 3 (a)of the Natal BantuCode
is to provide against failure ofan heir in the senior house to which the junior is attached.The
rights to the ngqutu cattle which Mr.
Menge
sought to establish for Plaintiff are not provided for. explicitly or impliedly, by the Code.These five cattle are, in terms of Section 96 (4) of the Natal Bantu
Code
the property ofthe indhlunkulu of which Velekhayais the heir and were rightly attached in reduction of his debt to the Defendant whose appeal in respect ofthem must succeed.
The
othertwo cattleare, allegedly,progeny of thengqutu beast of Plaintiff’sown
daughter Lena and the onus was on Plaintiff to establish the allegation on a balance of probabilities.The
Commissioner wasfavourably impressed by Plaintiffwhom
he found was actingundercompulsion at the time of the attach- ment. If she were, which is doubtful, she kept her wits about her sufficiently to ensure that onlythe smallest cattlewere taken.
At notime during the attachment did sheresist it on the ground thatthe cattle werehers by virtueofthe ngqutu custom thoughit is on record that she resisted successfully the attachment of a black
cow
with a white spot on its side on the ground that itwas a ngqutu beast. Plaintiff's evidence as to the progeny of Lena’s ngqutu beast was vague and in no
way
complicated. Itwasa simple matterto saythat ithad had quite alot ofincrease and that of such increase a black and white bullock and a black bullock were attached. Velekhaya’s knowledge of Lena’s ngqutu beast is based on hearsay and he gave no details of its progeny.
Because of the unsatisfactory circumstances outlined above Plaintiffcannot be said to have dischargedthe onus which rested
upon
her. In the absence, however, of refutation by Defendant of what she did say he should have been absolved from the instance.In the result the appeal is allowed with costs and the Bantu Affairs Commissioner’s judgment is altered to “For the Defen- dant for the five head of cattle allegedly the progeny of the ngqutu beasts of Puzani and Kadenzeka. Defendant is absolved from the instance in respect of the two head of cattle allegedly the progeny of the ngqutu beast of Plaintiff’s daughter Lena.
Plaintiffto pay costs.”
Cowan,
President,andParsons,Member,
concur.For Appellant: Adv. P.
Roux
instructed by Cowley&
Cowley.For Respondent: Adv.
W.
O. H.Menge
instructed by Randles, Davis& Wood.
NORTH-EASTERN BANTU APPEAL COURT.
MBATA AND OTHERS
vs.KCBEKA.
B.A.C.
CASE
No. 41 of 1964.Pietermaritzburg: 6th August, 1964.