2.2 Philosophical Theories of Power
2.2.1 Pre 20 th Century Philosophical Theories of Power
In as early as the 4th century AD, Plato’s writings focused on creating possible city states with ‘good’ leaders who would rule these states and could achieve ‘human perfection’ and avoid corruption by being trained (Schuitevoeder 2000). Writing in the same century, Aristotle developed Plato’s notion further by introducing the concept of a
‘regime’ of leaders providing governance to citizens (Pangle 2011). He believed that a good and virtuous ‘regime’ could only be created by those who had achieved excellence, which was limited to adult Greek men and the upper and educated classes.
Plato’s writing structurally and culturally entrenched the notion of patriarchal power in western tradition.
By the 16th century the focus on wisdom and education had changed due to the Renaissance in Europe. In western philosophy, power and the maintenance of power for its own sake was emphasised. Philosophers like Machiavelli (Sonatan 2012) viewed man as inherently selfish and believed that ‘he’ needed to subjugate himself to a State which should provide the political framework for society to progress. Hobbes (Bejan 2010) writing in the 17th century continued the focus on man’s inability to limit his desires on power. This is what Hobbes attributed to the condition of perpetual warfare, insecurity and violence in society. The solution he posed was a sovereign figure who rules as all powerful to maintain peace against human nature for an ordered society, even if their decisions are unjust (Bejan 2010).
In a collection of his writings, edited by Masters and Kelly (1994), the 18th century philosopher Rousseau challenged this philosophy with his focus on man’s pursuit of
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happiness as opposed to virtue within the context of an emerging commercial society (Jennings 2007). He believed that man’s natural state is superior to the civilised state and that it was more valuable to express rather than repress individual expressions of power and will. Rosseau’s writings gave rise to the will of the people being more important than the authority of a philosopher, king, church or a monumental figure.
This was a move away from western philosophical views on power being the sole domain of an authority figure and emphasised the value of democracy as a form of governance (Masters & Kelly 1994).
By the 19th century the historian, Karl Marx’s theories were gaining prominence in their exploration of the effects of class and class oppression on society (Marx & Engels 1948). Marx reviewed the history of man’s acquisition of individual freedom and observed a class structure in society resulting in an unequal system of power and limitations on individual freedom (Mezhuev 2012). In this system, the elite govern the masses because they own and control the means of production, while the masses become alienated, impoverished and oppressed. Those who own the means of production have power and effectively control the lives and destinies of those who do not have ownership. Marx envisioned the revolution of the proletariat, where the state systems involved in the oppression of the masses are seized and a new system is developed where power and ownership would be equally distributed to all (Marx &
Engels 1948). Marx’s theory was a radical response to the structures of power and focussed on resisting oppression through structural change in society. While historically philosophies of power were mostly concerned with the structural notion of where power resides, more recent philosophies aimed at deconstructing power and understanding it as a more fluid, complex and relational concept.
2.2.2 20th Century Philosophical Theories of Power
The philosophical debates which had characterised previous centuries began to expand out of the political and collective realm in the late 19th and early 20th centuries into a deeper understanding of individual human motivation. These studies began to incorporate perspectives from the study of sociology and psychology, which will be discussed in more depth in a review of the literature in section 2.3 of this chapter.
Philosophers, like Adler (1937) attempted to bridge the individual and collective focus
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of power in the development of his theories which contain aspects of social psychology (Adler 1937; Rietveld 2004). Initially he argued that social pressures influence the development of the individual and that human nature is aggressive and power hungry.
His later works reviewed this claim, describing humanity as striving for perfection, with individuals who are prepared to subordinate private gains for a more perfect society (Adler 1973). Levinas, a French philosopher in the early 1900’s, followed this thinking by describing ethical actions which do not abandon autonomy and individuality, but describes autonomy as based on our responsibility to others (Rietveld 2004). Kunz (1998: 34) described Levinas approach to power as one in which “the self finds its meaning, not centred in itself as an ego establishing individual freedom and power, but as a self, facing the other person who calls the self out of its centre to be ethically responsible. The freedom and power of the self is invested in the self by and for the needs of others”.
The focus on the individual’s relationship with society is central to philosopher Max Weber’s definition of power which, according to Ricken (2006) has been widely accepted and assumed extraordinary significance as a core definition in sociology.
Weber’s definition of power is quoted by Ricken (2006: 545) as meaning “every chance of pushing through one’s own will within a social relationship even against resistance, no matter what the basis of this chance is”. The famous German philosopher, Nietzche developed a controversial theory in the late 1800’s in which power was regarded as the ultimate motivation of all behaviour and ultimately refined his views to suggest that what human beings ultimately yearn for is the experience of power (Soll 2012: 124).
The interpretation of Nietzche’s theories continues to be debated amongst philosophers today. Some claim his views to suggest power as the will to demonstrate capacity rather than the will to domination and control (Reginster in Soll 2012), while others believe that these are merely attempts to sanitise Nietzche and downplay his acceptance of objectionable and amoral exercises of power (Soll 2012). Psychological theories of the 20th century, which will be discussed in 2.3 of this chapter, also grappled with the notion of the individual’s attraction to power, while the philosophical discourse continued to grapple with the power dynamics between the individual and groups in society as a whole.
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Foucault’s writings in the 1970’s and 1980’s contributed significantly to the theories of power and transformed perspectives of numerous disciplines in the human sciences (Hook 2007: ix). Foucault regarded punishment bestowed by monarchies as a violent and demonstrative form of power which was limited in its efficacy due its discontinuous nature and risk of insurrection of the masses (Hook 2007). He contrasted two forms of power, namely sovereign power which relies on past precedents and entrenches authority through rituals dating back to its origins, with disciplinary power which is future oriented, using graduated practices to achieve desirable behaviours (Taylor 2012). In terms of the State, this approach recognised that power could be distributed more widely amongst jurists and law makers than the monarchy alone.
Foucault related this theory not only to the system of government, but also to the family system where he contentiously highlighted the sovereign power of the father in patriarchal western family structures (Taylor 2012).
In expanding the discourse on power, Foucault raised awareness of the power of discourse itself, in his assertion that the ‘author’ of ideas is one of the procedures used to control the production of discourse in society (Foucault 1982). He believed that power is “in everything, rather than includes everything, and that one kind of power does not exist” (Foucault 1982: 217). His writings represent a postmodern approach which will be elaborated on further in chapter 5 of this thesis as it provides the theoretical framework for the methodology used in this study of power. Foucault’s approach to power challenged the Marxist philosophy in claiming that promoting the rights of ‘the people’ could still lead to coercive disciplinary mechanisms of power, resulting in continued abuse of power. Foucault (1980: 119) suggests looking at how power operates in a new way, where power might be considered as “a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression”. Instead of being coercive and repressive, these networks could forward the freedom for the individual to choose for themselves who they are and what they would like to do. Foucault’s power-theoretical approach is considered with ambivalence today (Ricken 2006). On the one hand it is often perceived as a valuable shift of perspective, while on the other it is considered an over-exertion of the concept of power itself (Ricken 2006).
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A more complex and systemic view of power was highlighted by the 20th century philosopher, Kunz (1998) in his focus on those who were typically regarded as weak in society. He expanded the notion of power other than a form of repression, by stating that, “it is the very power of the powerful that is the source of their weakness, and the very weakness of the weak that is the source of their power” (Kunz 1998: 15). For Kunz the weak are powerful since they draw attention to their suffering through their situation, they historically have gathered into powerful forces and overthrown established powers and they often hold deep wisdom. Similarly tyrants are vulnerable to being overthrown, to limiting themselves through fear of loss of their power. Kunz (1998: 23) states that when we are driven by power our bondage is “first our addiction to the sweet taste of power itself; second to the stuff that power can purchase; third, our habitual blindness to the needs of others; and finally our fear of losing the power to exercise more power. Obsessive fear, compulsive needs and sensory indulgence are the weakness of power.”
The social scientist, Wartenberg (1992), continued this challenge by commenting on a study by Agee and Evans (1939) of African American tenant farmers and their landlord
‘masters’ in Alabama, USA. Wartenberg (1992: xviii) noted that “Power relationships do not involve the simple, unidirectional hierarchy that the language of domination or oppression suggests…a theory of power needs to recognise that those who are oppressed have different means of eluding the control of their masters that can even, in certain contexts, function as the basis for overthrowing them.” Wartenberg recognised the influence the noble attitudes of the oppressed tenant farmers had on their onlookers, establishing a form of power which transcended their ‘masters’. In so doing, he recognised the complexity of power dynamics and the need to view them more broadly than between two major players. The debate on power continues, however, in establishing whether this transcendent form of power is indeed a form of power without the freedom to act (Kramer 2003).
Currently the power debate recognises that ‘power over’ represents a classic definition of power as a social relationship, whereas ‘power to’ represents the capacity of an individual or group of individuals to perform certain actions or bring about a result (Morriss 2002; Pansardi 2012). Allsobrook (2012: 60) attributes the popular concept of
‘freedom without power’ which dominates contemporary debates in western political
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philosophy to “a reification of social agency that mystifies human capacities and achievements”. Pansardi (2012) agrees that power and freedom are not mutually exclusive concepts since the freedom to act depends on the way in which ‘power over’
is exercised. Likewise ‘power to’ may not necessarily presuppose that the freedom to act exists at that particular time. This debate has implications for our notions of democracy since equal distribution of power as a realisation of a democratic ideal does not necessarily ensure the growth of individual freedom. Rather it is the equal distribution of freedom among different indivduals in society that promotes democratic ideals (Pansardi 2012). This is particularly pertinent in relation to the power discourse within South Africa today given the political transition to democracy in 1994 and the current debate on what constitutes ‘freedom’ in a democratic South Africa. The following section will briefly explore the current philosophical and poltical debates on power within the South African context, which influences the South African business transformation agenda.