Chapter 2: The armed conflicts in the DRC
2.2 Armed conflicts in the DRC
2.2.2 The Second War, 1998-2002
As stated by Afoaku the armed conflict, which erupted on 2 August 1998, virtually months after the fall of the Mobutu Regime “heralded the beginning of the second war of liberation in the DRC, this time against the regime of Laurent Kabila”.131
Kabila‟s former partners, the Banyamulenga, had turned against him, protesting against bad governance and the establishment of a banana republic.Supported by neighboring countries, notably Rwanda and Uganda, rebels put into place structures such as the RCD132 and later MLC133 to organize their struggle.134
According to Nzongola,135 Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi exploited the institutional instability and the crisis in the armed forces to “create territorial spheres of interest within which they could plunder the Congo „riches‟”.136 But, since Kabila refused to support their agenda any longer, they looked to hide their unlawful intervention in the DRC by establishing a false rebellion, which would protect their economic and security interests in Eastern DRC.137
Some considered that the anti-Kabila rebellion had been artificially created by the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities, whose hostility toward Kabila‟s politics was exacerbated by an ambiguous understanding of national interests. Furthermore the suppression of civil and political rights by the then Kinshasa authorities facilitated the
131 Osita Afoaku „Congo‟s Rebels: their origins, motivations, and strategies‟ in J F Clark (ed) The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 109.
132 The RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy) had been divided into several other rebel movements, namely RCD-National, RCD- Mouvement de Libération.
133 The MLC Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo).
134 A Mbata (note 114 above; 236-237).
135 G Nzongola-Ntalaja ( note 109 above; 227).
136 Ibidem.
137 Relating to the rationale behind several illegal interventions of Rwanda and Uganda and even Burundi in the DRC there are numerous theories: Demographic – those countries are overpopulated, their respective Tutsi leaders entertained a dream to build a vast empire Hima-Tutsi in the Great lakes region between Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and east of the DRC; Economic – there are no natural resources and agriculture is the principal economic activity; Security – a fear of rebel attacks from the borders of neighboring countries. For many their lust of DRC natural resources is obvious because their armed forces had controlled all the territory of the DRC for several months. Why did they not during that time, end the rebellion? Illegal exploitation and plundering of Congo was manifest. Beyond Rwanda and Uganda, this pillage benefited other persons and countries. See M Koyame and J F Clark
„The economic impact of the Congo war‟ 12-223 and T Longman „The complex reasons for Rwanda‟s engagement in Congo‟ 129-141, 144 and J F Clark „Museveni‟s adventure in the Congo war‟ in J F Clark (ed) The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 145-161, 165); T R Essolomwa (note 107 above; 132-134).
advent of opposition, whether armed or non-armed, on a national level.138 Therefore instead of simply being military support for a Congolese rebellion to end the Kabila regime, the Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in Congo was considered in general as truly a conspiracy, which had been conceived several months139 before the outbreak of the second war on 2 August 1998. Hence: “Kabila‟s decision in July 1998 to dismiss the Rwandan contingent of FAC140 thus served as a catalyst to a crisis that was already underway”.141
As Nzogola remarks, three factors were instrumental in the Congo aggression. Firstly, the eruption of conflict on 2 August 1998 was cleverly depicted as an internal war in which neighboring countries were involved on the rebels‟ side merely to secure their own borders. Secondly, unconditional Anglo-American support to Rwanda and Uganda politics contributed significantly to the indifference of other members of international community. Thirdly, “the logic of plunder in the new era of globalization, which has to do with the growing tendency of states, Mafia groups, offshore banks and transnational mining companies to enrich themselves from crises”.142
This resistance of Kabila to any kind of neo-colonialism from his neighboring countries and western powers exploded in a tragic, deadly conflict, the worst since the Second World War. Numerous actors including, states, non-states, and intergovernmental and non-governmental forces were involved. The lust for riches would transform the DRC into a theatre of conflict between six armies of African countries143 and several armed groups, which would lead to the occupation on 31 August of virtually 60% of national territory. Mbata writes that “This conflict is probably the most important crisis Africa has experienced in its post-colonial history,
138 Osita Afoaku (note 131 above; 109).
139 According to Nzongola-Ntalaja in February 1998 there were several suspect military activities in different countries of the Great Lakes Regions and suspicious contact between some members of AFDL and neighboring countries. See G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 227).
140 FAC: Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces).
141 Osita Afoaku (note 131 above; 109).
142 Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 227).
143 According to Mbata, the most recent conflict in the DRC involved several foreign rebel groups allegedly based in the DRC and launching attacks against their respective governments. At the climax of the conflict, at least seven other African countries had regular troops in the DRC. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad lent support to President Kabila, while Rwanda, and Uganda backed the rebels.
See A Mbata (note 114 above; 237).
and one of the most complex and perplexing events that the post-Cold War world has seen,” with effects beyond the sub-region to afflict the continent of Africa as a whole”.144
Regarding the geo-strategic position of the DRC, the extent of the alliance and its implications, some classify this conflict as the first African world war.145 In addition this armed conflict has been labeled as liberation, rectification, internal, international, mixed, imperialistic, hegemonic, irredentist, opportunistic, economic, and invasion.146 Examining the recent armed conflict in Congo, Mamdani concluded that it was purely and simply aggression147 which was the source of all kinds of crime and violations of the law. There is no doubt that the nexus between war and the law is one of the most internal contradictions of humankind.
Whatever the causes, the results of that horrible war were dramatic and unacceptable.