3.3 The Urban Land Question
3.3.3 The Administrative Context
The acute shortage of AURL for low-income housing is strongly linked in several ways with the poor system of land administration. The shortage of AURL persists as a result of the land administration that fails to manage land distribution, land tenure and land utilisation. The land tenure problem is prevalent in urban South Africa where the system of assigning land rights is insensitive and undemocratic and lacks legitimacy such that it is constantly undermined by informal land ‘acquisition’
and exchange practices (McGaffin & Kihato, 2013). Such extra-legal practices make it difficult to implement land tenure reform when the legitimacy of the land tenure system is undermined by practices that ignore the rule of law. Informal land ‘acquisition’ and exchange practices result in the loss of the dimension of tenure conferred by and recorded in the urban land administration system.
For example, the confusion that is created in respect of urban land occupied by informal settlements results in unsure title and multi-layers of informal transfers and inheritances based on ownership of doubtful validity (Silas, 1983). The lack of secure tenure increases the threat of eviction and relocation of the squatters. Instead of devising a unified and comprehensive model of urban land management, the state acts as a spectator of land allocation and exchange and decision-making on land-use planning. Informal urban land transactions are an indicator of the shortage of AURL for low-income housing that causes the growth of informal settlements.
71 The land distribution problem is evident from the highly unequal landholdings that results from land appropriation and the inefficiencies and segregatory tendencies of the urban land market. The majority of urban land in South Africa is in the hands of a few wealthy individuals and private firms who often withhold urban land in strategic locations from the market for speculative reasons. The speculative behaviour of these private individuals and firms who have a monopoly on landownership pushes up urban land prices and denies low-income households the opportunity to access urban land near work opportunities (Payne, 1999).
The behaviour of these private actors leads to the land utilisation problem, that manifest when the urban poor deliberately build settlements on land reserved for commercial, industrial and recreational uses in violation of land-use zoning schemes. In most cases this land utilisation problem arises from the relative lag in the supply of AURL for low-income housing development in strategic locations. The urban land administration system fails to balance the supply of urban land for high-income residential, industrial and commercial uses with the supply of AURL for low-income housing by implementing sensible restrictions on the speculative behaviour of private landowners (Barry & Taylor, 2008; Larson et al, 2008).
The urban land administration system fails to address issues of land distribution, land tenure and land utilisation, in part because of inaccurate land registers. The availability of accurate and up-to-date land registers on land tenure, land value, land taxation, land-use and cadastral surveying and mapping is a necessary requirement for effective management of urban land (Dixon-Gough, 2006; Williamson, 2001; Kaufmann, 1999). However, the ANC-government lacks the technical, financial, legal and human resources to generate and maintain land registers needed to support land management, land-use planning and decision-making (Oestereich, 2000; Garba & Al-Mubaiyedh, 1999). The major municipalities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Mangaung, eThekwini, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo Bay find it very difficult to determine ownership of urban land because the records of land registry they inherited are inadequate, incomplete, outdated and conflictual (Siegel et al, 2013). In cases where some urban land parcels are held by a large number of absentee landowners and are occupied by squatters with adverse possession rights, it proves difficult to summarily regularise such tenure without an up-to-date land register. As a result, most urban municipalities find it very difficult to properly understand the nature of their land problem to devise an effective strategy to deliver AURL for low-income housing. In many cases, the outcome of such shortage causes an increase in the growth of informal settlements in strategic locations of the city.
In South Africa, land legislation lacks a provision that authorises urban municipalities to acquire information on registered land tenure, land value, land taxation and land-use that can support the
72 delivery of AURL. Most urban municipalities have incomplete data of land transactions and little is known in detail about the distribution of landownership among the different groups of income, gender, race and ethnicity. The problem is partly responsible for the information gap that limits the debate on ways of addressing land inequalities outside the market. A lack of such information hampers the effective formulation of a land policy that could deliver AURL for low-income housing. Hence, municipal officials are completely unequipped to identify who owns land of what size, value and use in their jurisdiction quickly and accurately. Although public agencies collect some data on the use, development and ownership of urban land, most of this data is collected in a fragmented and ad hoc manner and when it does get published it is in anecdotal form and not of much use. The situation is made worse by the municipal tradition of confidentiality over urban land ownership and exchange.
Land redistribution remains a challenge since agencies responsible for land administration are reluctant to restructure their systems that control land registration, land-use and land development in ways that are flexible to the needs of the urban majority who are poor. Usually several agencies oversee these different aspects of land management, but their lack of coordination and cooperation and lack of adequately trained human resources hinders the delivery of AURL (Siegel et al, 2013; Barry
& Taylor, 2008; Larson et al, 2008). Their lack of coordination and cooperation often stymies attempts to regularise urban land occupied by informal settlements (Siegel et al, 2013). Hence, the inefficiency of the land administration system frustrates the urban poor, compelling them to access urban land through anarchist land invasions that deepen rather than diminish land conflicts.
The way the urban land administration system is structured lacks an understanding and appreciation of the factors that inhibit the participation of the urban poor in the urban land market. Tenure legalisation and the subsequent commodification of land exchange result in price increases and high land taxes and registration fees (Napier, 2013; Gilbert A.G, 2002). These financial burdens price urban land beyond levels the urban poor can afford and the majority are pushed out of the urban land market. The need to reduce transaction costs can never be overemphasised if urban municipalities are to deliver AURL for low-income housing. Only holding a legal land title aids access to urban land, but should not be the only avenue through which the urban poor could access low-income housing.
Unfortunately, the land administration system focuses less on strengthening de facto security of tenure even though perceived security of tenure drives private sector investment in low-income housing development. The system only provides security of tenure to owners that acquire urban land through the market.
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