Chapter 3: Theories
3.4. The Ethno-philosophical Paradigm
The philosopher Bernard Matolino in his book called Personhood in African Philosophy uses the terms identity and personhood interchangeably. For example, where he engages Mbiti‟s African communitarian view he claims, “the individual becomes aware of her identity as a self through her culture which is a product and provision of her community”. (Matolino, 2014, p.53)
Following Matolino, I use the term identity and personhood interchangeably in this study to explain the impacts of socio-cultural and religious constructions on the women‟s “self”. African ethno-philosophers use the term personhood, whilst sociologists prefer identity (Matolino 2014).
Whilst the two mean the same thing they differ in emphasis. However both concepts were important in framing the study.
African ethno-philosophers, such as Matolino (2014), Mbiti (1970), Menkiti (1984), Gyegye (1987), Samkenge and Samkenge (1980), Murove (2012) and Ikuenobe (2006) understand and explain personhood and identity within an ethic of African communitarianism, known in Southern Africa as Ubuntu (Zulu), Unhu (Shona), buntfu (Siswati), botho (Sotho). It is best expressed in the ethno-philosophical paradigms discussed in the works of Tempels (1959), Mbiti (1970), Menkiti (1984), and Gyekye (1987). Matolino (2014) in his book Personhood in African Philosophy facilitates a dialogue between these ethnophilosophers on the communitarian view of personhood which he claims dominates African philosophy. Tempels, whose thesis has shaped a majority of communitarian thinkers, speaks of the Bantu notion of living being or living
“muntu”, which he refers to as force. According to him what makes one a “real” person is not the ownership of the force, but bringing the force to life (Tempels 1959). Tempels‟ observation is advanced by Matolino (2014, p.48), when he argues that the only way the being is brought to life is through ontological relations that one has with her community; hence the community
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commands a sense of self in the individual, leading her to conceive her identity and existence as a communal person. In the words of Matolino this means that “the individual is under strict metaphysical command to be in ontological relations with her surroundings so that she can come to realise her personhood” (Matolino 2014, p.46). Hence, force or the living “muntu” as a detached entity cannot effectively adumbrate personhood unless the monitoring structure like culture regulates how it would cooperate with other forces and impact on one other (Matolino 2014).
Relating this insight to the context of the study, generally a Swazi woman would not feel or be considered a “real” person by the community unless she fulfills the societal expectation to bear children, since she owes her existence to other people. Borrowing from Mbiti (1970, p.102), the Swazi community makes, creates or produces the woman‟s identity or personhood as she is constrained by communal reality to live according to stipulated cultural standards to make sense of her existence. Her fertility is therefore important because it secures her space in the community and gives her identity. Matolino (2014, p.54) confirms this observation by saying the individual becomes aware of her identity as a self through her culture and she feels obligated to procreate and to pass onto progeny the cultural values that she has inherited from her community. Put differently, the woman‟s fertility becomes important to pay the debt she owes to the community and to fulfill all the pre-set obligations that society demands from her. Thus, having an identity that you are a “real” woman goes beyond that you have a body and a mind, but it comes after you have accepted and met certain standards of social and communal responsibility to achieve recognition (Ikuenobe, 2006, p.54). Women therefore, who cannot bear children automatically disqualify themselves from obtaining personhood because they have failed to display conduct befitting of personhood (Matolino, 2014, p.33).
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As alluded to above, within a communitarian view, personhood is portrayed in terms of the primacy of the social reality in the individual‟s sense of the self (Tempels 1959). The individual therefore becomes a specific entity operating within the confines of the society; “even something as personal as marriage or bearing children is not seen as meant for individual benefit or enjoyment but to be shared with the rest of the clan” (Mbiti, 1970, p.136). Mbiti further claims that marriage and children belong to the kinsmen[sic] as opposed to being an individual event;
hence his popular assertion that “whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say:
“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti 1970, p.141). These observations accentuate the community as the ontological determinant of personhood (Menkiti, 1984, p.172);
hence it has to be guided by a certain communitarian ethic that would regulate people‟s behaviors. As noted by Matolino (2014, p.53) this ethic is developed, dictated and monitored by society, such that any independent outlook that guides ones behavior remains unjustified and without recognition if it does not reconcile with communal aspirations, expectations and injunctions. However, the individual cannot learn the ethic and be appreciative of it other than through being taught by other members of the community (Mbiti 1970). Thus,
She needs and depends on other people to develop her faculties such as that of thought, free will and language. This, then, makes the individual indebted to those who have come before her and her contemporaries because these people have been the custodians of the cultural assets that she now uses to develop into a fully functional person (Matolino, 2014, p.53).
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Bearing children for your marital family to ensure its continuity is therefore part of the communitarian ethical code, which also renders you a functional and ethically sound member of society.
Whilst Mbiti and Menkiti‟s radical communitarian positions places emphasis on the primacy of community for self-identity construction, Gyegye‟s moderate view brings a new dimension to the debate. The radical theorists, Mbiti in particular, do show the duality of equals between the community and the individual in constructing identities, but they seem to prioritise the reality of community over that of the individual (Matolino 2014). Gyegye (1987, p.38) acknowledges the significance of community realities in the formation and development of personhood since a human being is born into an already existing community, but he warns against an exaggerated role that is sometimes given to the community. Different from the other ethno-philosophers, his moderate communitarian view does recognise individual rights which grant the individual personal responsibility towards herself in determining her station (Matolino, 2014, p.67).
According to him, one has personal dreams and aspirations peculiar to her, which together with other things that belong to the domain of the individual, can form one‟s personal identity. This moderate theory therefore accommodates possibilities purported by other theories like African Feminism that women in particular can develop personal identities that are not defined by communal realities. In other words one can be a “real” woman, with or without children who, culturally, are supposed to define her. She can follow an ethic that would direct her on ways to conduct her behavior in order to be considered as worthy of the term person (Matolino 2014).