CHAPTER FOUR: EXAMINING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
4.2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (RDP)
The RDP base document and later the RDP White paper recommended the creation of effective RDP structures and institutions within national, provincial and local governments to monitor the implementation of the RDP programmes (ANC, 1994). More importantly, the RDP recommended the establishment of a national framework of implementation to guide provincial and local governments and the devolution of power to these levels of government to enable them to function efficiently. Wessels (1999:235) asserts that it is one of “the most comprehensive and detailed plan of action ever written in respect of government policy in South Africa”. Although this sounds like a exaggeration, the RDP formed the basis of transforming the social, political and economic landscape of the post-apartheid South Africa. The effective implementation of the RDP would ensure that the old order of the apartheid past was replaced in its entirety by a new order built on democractic values.
An RDP office was established in the Office of the President to facilitate and monitor the implementation of the programme. Jay Naidoo, a former leader of COSATU was appointed minister without portfolio and entrusted with spearheading the implementation of the RDP.22 Dr Bernie Fanaroff was entrusted with the responsibility to run the RDP Office. Thus, the implementation of the RDP was primarily vested on the two individuals, both from COSATU.
Although the RDP White paper did not prescribe specific roles on specific departments and the policy aspect that they would implement, it encouraged every individual citizen, local communities and various stakeholders to play a role. The role of the national office of the RDP was to provide leadership and co-ordinate implementation between different departments to ensure great efficacy of programmes. In essence, this meant that various government ministries and their departments were to design programmes in line with the ideals of the RDP, and implement them to address the gross social and economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid regime. Nonetheless, Jeffery (2010) notes that, the establishment of the national RDP office created a complex hierarchy of institutions that made the co-ordination of the
22 Jay Naidoo was a former secretary general of COSATU while, Dr Bernie Fanaroff was one of COSATU’S most senior organisers and strategists. It is not clear why the RDP and its implementation was entrusted to the two senior officials from COSATU, but it could be because the RDP was fully endorsed by COSATU because of its pro-poor outlook and it sort to address the concerns of workers.
123 programmes almost impossible to achieve. Jeffery (2010) delineates the various institutions and their functions as follows;
• A special cabinet committee (responsible for setting priorities, allocating funding, and monitoring implementation);
• An RDP core committee (to support the work of the cabinet committee);
• Standing committee in both the upper and lower houses of Parliament (to promote RDP- related legislation and monitor the impact of the programme);
• Provincial premiers and relevant MECs (to co-ordinate RDP implementation at provincial and local levels);
• An inter-governmental forum (to co-ordinate between different tiers of government);
• Local RDP forums (to monitor implementation at local level); and
• RDP task teams (to encourage inter-governmental co-operation and advise the special cabinet committee on strategic priorities).
The various sector departments and institutions were to implement the RDP programmes under the guidance and coordination of the RDP national office. The national office needed a strong institutional capacity to ensure that its subordinate institutions all contributed to the effective implementation of its array of programmes. Turok (2008:90) points out that, institutional capacity to implement the RDP at the three spheres of government remained a problem. In addition, there was a serious shortage of human resources with the necessary skills to manage and implement the RDP. The main weakness of the RDP was, as noted earlier, was its failure to stimulate economic growth. However, the implementation of the RDP programmes made major advances in addressing the socio-economic imbalances inherited from the apartheid regime (ISRDS, 2000:13). It addressed the massive shortfall in the provision of social services across the country, especially in rural areas. Therefore, visible RDP-related advances were made in the areas of housing, the provision of clear water and sanitation, electrification, health care provision, education, road construction and public works.
Furthermore, there are competing statistics on the impact of the RDP programme’s results. It has been estimated that, about 12 million people living in poor and mostly rural communities had no reasonable access to clean and safe water when the new government assumed power in 1994. However, by the beginning of 1998, standpipes had been installed within 200 metres of the households of about 1.3 million rural people (Lodge, 2002:57). By August of 1998, the
124 minister of Water Affairs at the time, Kader Asmal announced that more than 2.5 million people had access to clean and safe drinking water in the rural areas and informal settlements. In addition, a total of 236 water projects had been completed by year 2000 and these provided clean and safe drinking water to nearly 4.9 million people in the rural areas of the former homelands areas of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces. Olivier, Van Zyl and Williams (2010:121) note that during the period 1994-1999, Eskom completed 1.1 million electrical connections in rural areas and also provided electricity to 3 891 rural schools.
However, critics such as Lodge (2002) question the reliability of these statistics and argue that they do not seem to reflect the reality of the situation on the ground. For example, Lodge (2002) points out that, most water projects faced severe design faults and this resulted in unworkable bureaucratic messes on the ground. Lodge (2002) states further that, the percentage of rural households relying on rivers, streams and dams actually increased slightly between 1995 and 1999.
Further statistics and comments are instructive here. Zondi (2000) notes that, an estimated 1, 75 million homes countrywide were connected to the national electricity grid between 1994 and 2000. Another 600 000 new connections had been planned for the next three years. The first phase of electrification saw the proportion of rural homes with electricity growing from 12% to 42% in the first five years into democracy. Lodge (2002:58) confirms that, most of the electrification programmes were directed at rural areas in the former homelands regions.
Nonetheless, Lodge (2002) argues that the electrification statistics look impressive and yet they do not represent the scope of change on the ground since the majority of the rural population could only afford to use power for very limited purposes despite more houses being connected to the national grid.
In the area of primary health care provision, the Department of Health Annual Report of 1999/2000 indicates that around 500 new clinics were built in rural areas around the country between April 1994 and December 1998. This indicates that about 5 million rural people had access to primary health care facilities. In the same period, 77 000 people had their eye sight restored through cataract operations (Republic of South Africa: Department of Health Annual Report, 1998/9). By 2000, eight million children had been vaccinated under the polio-hepatitis programme that began in 1998, thereby eliminating both polio and measles (Lodge, 2002).
There was a decline in infant mortality from 51 per thousand in 1994 to 45 per thousand in 1998, which was a result of free access to maternity and immunisation programmes
125 implemented from 1994 onwards. There was a general public perception that public health care facilities had improved since 1994, and that more rural people were able to access health care.
The RDP as a government policy managed to reform the public health care system ro address the historical inequalities and allow the poor to access health care for free in public hospitals and clinics (Lomahoza, 2013:5). However, the gains made were eclipsed by the AIDS pandemic and the spread of more virulent strains of malaria and tuberculosis (TB). The consequences of HIV and AIDS were devastating to the entire health care system and the South African population, especially the rural poor. The official estimates of HIV infection rates stood at 4.7 million in 2001, which was ten times more than in 1990. As a result, the life expectancy of South Africans dropped by almost twenty years since democracy, leading to an increase in the maternal, neonatal, and child mortality cases (Delobelle, 2013:160). However, this drastic change in the state of affairs in the health sector must be understood in the context of the HIV and AIDS policy of the time under former President Mbeki’s leadership, which failed to prioritise and respond effectively to the pandemic. It is “estimated that more than 330, 000 lives were lost as a result of the government’s failure to implement antiretroviral treatment (ARV) programme” between the year 2000 and 2005 (Delobelle, 2013:160).
Another of the key areas that the RDP sought to address was land reform which was prioritised as a key component of rural development. The vision was that land reform would lead to rural development. This was a hard fact that the ANC government had recognised and accepted when it came into power in 1994. It recognised that land was at the centre of the liberation struggle, and that it could not ignore this sensitive issue without betraying its promises to the rural masses. The RDP base document stipulates that the new government should commit to redistribute 30% of commercial land within five years. However, only 39 000 rural families had been re-settled on 355 000 hectares of land by the beginning of 1999 (Karriem, 2016:10;
Lodge, 2002:58). In practical terms, this meant that only 250 000 people had received their land under the Claims Land Court. In addition, the RDP had initially promised to resettle families on 3 000 000 square kilometres of land within the first five years of multi-racial democracy, but in reality only 1% of the targeted land had been acquired and occupied by resettled people.
Thus, the biggest challenge of rural development has been the failure to effectively address the land question, which continues to be a sticking point in the South African political land scape and development. In addition, the RDP had articulated a vision of land reform which included
126 infrastructure development, security of tenure and skills development to make the land more productive.
Although the RDP was short-lived, it performed favourably in the area of employment creation in the first five years. The community-based Public Works programmes that were established as part of implementing the RDP created employment for about 240 000 people who worked in road building schemes, installation of sewage, sanitation facilities, water supplies and electricity mainly in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape (Lodge, 2002;
Goldin and Heymans, 1999). The Public Works programmes started on a positive note as it created permanent employment for some and provided skills for many others and thus made them more employable. By March 1997, more than a thousand municipalities across the country had benefited from infrastructure projects implemented through the Public Works programmes. In the area of education, about 2 500 schools had been renovated and more than 1000 new ones built by 1999 (Galdin and Heymans, 1999). In addition, one major social achievement of the RDP was the establishment of “a universal pension provision and to raise African pensions to the same level as other population groups” (Francis, 2006:6). As a result, all elderly people have a regular income to which they are entitled every month. The social security or welfare system was expanded to include disabled, children in need, foster parents and many others who are too poor to meet their basic social needs on their own, and it continues to benefit the poor. This backdrop indicates that there was substantial investment expended in rural development programmes during the implementation of the RDP policy between 1994 and 1999. However, Narsiah (2002:5) argues that when the RDP was adopted as a government policy, “it showed a significant shift from the basic principles of the RDP base document”. This indicates that, not everyone in government supported a socialist policy that promotes redistribution. To this end, Narsiah (2002:5) adds that Jay Naidoo who had been tasked to implement the RDP was “powerless as he faced resitance from government ministers who fiercely guarded scarce resources”. This explains why the RDP was replaced with GEAR policy which marked a break with the basic needs oriented RDP in 1996.
The RDP was a people-centred approach that sought to promote public participation in decision-making and implementation processes. Davies (2005:31) states in comments on public participation as explained in the RDP base document and the RDP White paper that, “[T]he birth of a transformed nation can only succeed if the people themselves are voluntary participants in the process towards the realisation of the goals they have themselves helped to
127 define”. In addition, Davies (2005) argues that, it was imperative for the democratic government to embrace and promote public participation owing to South Africa’s history of disempowerment and exclusion. Development through public participation therefore became the mantra of the RDP. In this respect, the ANC (1994:5) states that, “[R]egardless of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor, the people of South Africa must together shape their own future. Development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry.
It is about active involvement and growing empowerment”. Thus, the adoption of public participation as an approach to development was envisaged to achieve the following:
• Empower people in such a way that they could become self-reliant in the long run;
• Build local capacity through skills development programmes and development support;
• Initiative development programmes and projects using participatory approaches that animate communities at grass-root level.
Davis (2005) points out that for public participation to be effective in practice, it must be spearheaded by organisations freely formed by the people at the grass-root level. These organisations should include different interest groups present in the local community. The RDP provided the framework to develop appropriate strategies to increase people’s involvement at all spheres of government, particularly at the local government level (Theron, 2012:114).
According to Siphuma (2009) and Davies (2005), the issue of public participation received a major boost from the RDP, since people at grass-root levels were encouraged to set up RDP forums to facilitate development programmes in their areas. It also encouraged the formation of partnerships between different stakeholders involved in the implementation of rural development policies. The involvement of NGOs and other CBOs would have helped to develop policy interventions that addressed the development needs of the people living in the rural areas. It would also allow different stakeholders to monitor implementation and lobby for strategies that resonate with the rural context.
The principle of public participation implies that the government cannot make congruent and consistent policies that speak to the situation of the poor at the local level without involving them. As such, public participation processes provide the platform for people at the local level, their representatives, grass-root organisations and government to come together, engage in dialogue and find solutions to their problems.
128 The RDP was generally accepted as a pro-poor programme because it valued public participation and it spoke to the reality of the poor. The biggest implementation challenge that the RDP faced was the coordination of its programmes. Hirsch (2005) notes that, the RDP Office’s dissolution and relocation of its programmes to other departments laid bare the reality of some of its failures such as the inability to spend much of the funds allocated for the programmes. It was also discovered that the RDP Office was duplicating the functions of individual departments as a result of poor coordination. The shortage of financial resources was not a challenge to the implementation of the RDP as the problem lay with the poor management and coordination of the functions of multiple departments and independent actors involved. In addition, the shortage of skilled black managers and technicians undermined the successful implementation of the RDP. This indicates, as pointed out earlier, that South Africa lacked adequate infrastructure and institutional capacity to effectively implement the RDP at the time.
The case of the RDP demonstrates that effective policy implementation does not only depend on the availability of financial resources but on other factors such as a coordinated approach that prevents duplication and the availability of appropriate human resources.
4.3 THE INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY,