The case of six state forests in western Zimbabwe
3.4: DISCUSSION
3.4.1: Traditional forest governance approaches of pre-colonial times: Shall we return to these basics?
Results have shown that people in Zimbabwe, like elsewhere in Africa and other developing regions appreciated the value of forests because they relied heavily on them for their livelihoods sustenance and development (McCullum, 2000). Interviewed local elderly
‘experts’ pointed out that forests were major sources of a diverse range of services and goods including grazing, poles for construction, firewood, thatch grass, traditional medicines, honey, wild fruits, edible caterpillars and mushrooms among others. This led the pre-colonial communities to put in place the oldest form of elaborate forest governance systems that prevailed during pre-colonial times (Fabricius, 2004). The traditional systems were enshrined in Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) and included rules of access and use, customs and procedures that created small-scale disturbances, taboos where certain resources were prohibited from being used at certain times of the month or year, situations where certain plants and animals were out of bounce for certain families and clans as well as designation of sacred areas and forests where resource extraction was strictly controlled (Barrow, 1996).
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The traditional institutions such as kings, chiefs, headmen and healers created rules and regulations governing ownership and access to forests enforced by the chief and ruling lineages (Piearce and Gumbo, 1993). The institutions earned their legitimacy through acceptance by their subjects. The control instruments and mechanisms that were applied were based on shared norms, values and regulations that were based on community-specific customary laws (Counsell, 2009). The interviewed local elders in and around both forest groups confirmed that forest resources were accessed under specific rules and regulations that were passed from parents to children. Chiefs and headmen had mechanisms in place of monitoring and enforcing the rules and regulations through fines in form of livestock or other household assets and at most through exclusion from the chief’s area of jurisdiction.
Transparency was maximized by the clarity through which reasoning behind decisions was communicated to all members of the community (Lockwood, 2010). Everyone, young and old was made aware of the dos and don’ts with regards to forests and their resources.
Members of the community participated in rule enforcement and monitoring of transgressors. Those who contravened the rules were punished by the traditional leaders or by the supernatural through various types of misfortunes. People’s rights to resources were respected and special requests were accepted. Governance of the forests and their resources was done in the interest of the entire community where all community members had equal access to collect the multiple forest products on which indigenous material culture was based.
There was a symbiotic relationship between the forests and people in that people obtained various livelihood forest products whilst activities such as livestock grazing reduced fire hazards by reducing forest fuel load (inflammable biomass). There were no meaningful variations in traditional governance processes and mechanisms between the communities surrounding the two groups of forests studied. The application of a wide range of governance principles in a direct and indirect way made the governance quality very desirable and resultantly maintained the forest in an undegraded state.
Kwashirai (2008) and Maravanyika (2012), argue that traditional governance systems were generally based on social justice, fairness and participation, making them effective means to ensure stewardship of forest resources and livelihood sustenance. It should be borne in mind however that traditional governance systems were possible and forest condition remained stable then because human population densities were low, people’s impact on the land was minimal due to their nomadic nature and simple lifestyles (Fabricius, 2004). Where the practices still exist such as in some Sri Lankan coastal fishing villages and Indian
Panchayats forests, they have been maintained by the isolation of the villages that has kept them ‘closed’ to external influences. Similar practices in Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand became dysfunctional because the communities were open to other occupations and trade opportunities with the outside world (Baland and Platteau, 1996).
In Zimbabwe, like in other southern African states, the traditional forest governance systems collapsed due to colonial-era social engineering and forest condition suffered (Rhodes University et al., 2001). This is in line with Dietz et al. (2003)’s observation that locally evolved institutional arrangements governed by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have sustained resources successfully for long periods of time, but they often fail when external forces interfere with them or when rapid change occurs. It is evidently the case that good governance systems that prevailed during the pre-colonial era have been effective in conserving forest resources. According to Mawere (2013), the colonial and post
independent Zimbabwe’s conservation measures have been failing because the state tended to
‘favour and privilege western scientific models at the expense of the indigenous conservation practices of local people’. He supports his argument by sighting the success story of the Norumedzo forest in south-eastern Zimbabwe where blending of expert scientific based conservation methods and indigenous epistemologies enforced by traditional leaders have had positive conservation outcomes. The major question is: Can we reinvigorate the traditional governance systems that existed in the past and can they be as effective as they used to be?
Whilst attempts to reinvigorate the traditional systems have considerable appeal particularly to donor-funded programmes given the ready legitimacy of traditional authority, its potentially powerful sanctions and the challenges associated with arbitration between competing claims to resources (Brown, 1999), many authorities have acknowledged the difficulties of reverting to these systems under contemporary conditions.
Baland and Platteau (1996) argued that traditional systems’ effectiveness would be guaranteed in a static environment, that is, where peace reigns, population is stationary (or is controlled to match the resources), no technical change, economic activities are not affected by radically new trade programmes among others. The situation in Zimbabwe and other southern African countries’ forests today presents significant challenges as the conditions highlighted by Baland and Platteau no longer exist formerly. Challenges in the contemporary world that make it difficult for traditional systems to apply good governance principles are diverse and varied. These constitute drivers of change that require institutional, that is, ‘rules
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of the game’ changes and innovation that are capable of bringing about FPA resources conservation whilst adapting to technical and population change (Brousseau et al. 2011).
Central government’s intervention in environmental matters and other aspects of social organization through establishment of institutions such as Environmental, Village and Ward Development Committees as well as Councillors with different and sometimes conflicting powers and mandates make it difficult for traditional authority to flex its muscles and assert its authority over forest resources. Government programmes such as the FTLRP led to Gwampa, Gwaai and Mbembesi forest areas becoming melting pots where people of different cultures and traditions came together and settled in the same geographical area. This created tensions associated with leadership wrangles, different traditional and cultural beliefs making the much needed cooperation difficult. In the past, people in the same community would share common cultural beliefs that would make them easily work together.
Globalisation has led to rapid spread of technology, market integration and transformation of value and belief systems (Brown, 1999; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Market integration has exposed local communities to the wider world through the sale of outputs, buying of inputs, labour exchanges and financial transactions (Baland and Platteau, 1996).
These have been promoted by recent massive growth in communication technologies leading to weakening of traditional beliefs and taboos which were important components of the traditional forest governance systems. In India, traditional mechanisms of forest resources allocation and access broke down due to commercial penetration of the hill economy of Panchayat forests of Uttar Pradesh in the work of state forestry (Guha, 1985 in Baland and Platteau, 1996). Technological change in one hand may allow more intensive exploitation of forest resources whilst on the other it may be beneficial by improving the monitoring of resource users. Its overall impact has been found to be however negative. In all the six case study forests in western Zimbabwe, foresters and Forest Protection Unit (FPU) members concurred that poachers and illegal loggers use cell phones to warn each other of the movements and location of forest monitors and therefore their operations have become more sophisticated, difficult to monitor and apprehend.
Demographic changes have also increased pressure on forest resources to the extent that subtle traditional rules cannot provide effective regulation. Young generations’ interests in local community affairs and in traditional resource management systems in particular seem to be gradually fading especially when they get alternative income sources or when they get employed in distant places. Matsa and Matsa (2011) found out that migrant labour from
Matabeleland region where study forests are located to South Africa losses interest on its return to participate in discussions of local problems and therefore are unlikely to be interested in forest monitoring and traditional rule enforcement. Climate change adds another layer to challenges of traditional resources governance systems. It is resulting in resource deterioration even if they are not exploited. Its negative effect on food security has made forest resources important safety nets for communities on forest margins. Additionally, not all traditional leaders have claims to traditional legitimacy. In Zimbabwe, the institution has been politicized and some leaders are imposed on their positions by politicians for political gain.
Many therefore view the restoration of the traditional institution through the Traditional Leaders Act as a political attempt to create an authority for purposes disconnected to the local interests and natural resources governance (Brown, 1999).
While there are arguments in favour of reinvigorating traditional governance systems that existed in the past, we are sceptical that the changing circumstances create new challenges for the systems to be as effective in contemporary times and beyond. Ostrom (1999)’s work on self-governance and forest resources also shows that traditional governance regimes are not likely to work under conditions of contested boundaries, unclearly defined users, authority whose legitimacy is questionable and where rights of participation are unequal. However, although the systems may not be replicable in today’s world, they had components that may need to be incorporated in modern day forest governance systems. Since the governance system of the colonial period was associated with several ills that were an affront to the principles of good governance, a more tempered governance system may be required to address the current challenges.