CHAPTER 3: THE HARLOTRY METAPHOR AND ITS RELATION TO THE SOCIO-
3.2 Theory of Metaphor
3.2.3 The Unique Product of the Whole
Many theorists are in concert with the assumption implicit in Richards‟ definition that metaphor belongs to the field of semantics and not to the syntax of language (McFague 1982:38; Kittay 1987:10). Hence, it “should not be classed amongst such grammatical categories as noun, verb, or adjective. Nor should one think that metaphor always displays a particular syntactic form”
(Soskice 1985:18). Therefore, how combinations of words converge to form a metaphor will be our next consideration.
34 The anomalous combination of terms which is one of the characteristics of a metaphor is by Richards (cited in Soskice 1985:45; McFague 1982:38) referred to as the “tenor, or underlying subject of the metaphor, and the vehicle that presents it.” Among some traditional accounts of metaphor24, Soskice is particularly interested in the theory of Richards (cited in Soskice 1985:45, 85) who regards “metaphor as the consequences of the interanimation of words in the complete utterance” and not simply some words which are used metaphorically.25 How this interanimation is affected presupposes two accounts of meaning. The more conventional of these accounts posits that a term has a definition and determines meaning; the second or “causal account” states that “reference determines meaning [derived] from the speaker and hearer belonging to a particular community where the term has its use” (Jenkins 1989:226). Purposefully, Soskice does not choose between these two accounts because “it is not strictly words which refer but speakers using words, which makes metaphor possible” (Soskice 1985:136; cf. Jenkins 1989:226; my emphasis). According to this view, it is “communities of speakers whose language provides access to the states and relations that are of interest to them” (Soskice 1985:132; cf. Jenkins 1989:228). A further discussion of how reference or meaning are affected will be delayed for the moment and instead we consider the importance of a metaphor within its particular context of utterance.
Bearing in mind that a metaphor has to do with semantics, as agreed by an array of scholars, Soskice (1985:21) states that “in many cases ... we would [not] be able to construe unambiguously the meaning of a metaphor apart from some wider context” and she suggests that, at times, more than a sentence is needed in order to establish a metaphor. This “highlights the importance of metaphor in a context of „shared beliefs‟” (Soskice 1985:22). In this regard, Soskice (1985:22) asserts that a “metaphor is established ... as soon as the reader is able to detect that one thing is being spoken of in terms suggestive of another [which] may be as little as a phrase or may require several phrases or sentences conjointly.” Richards (cited in Soskice 1985:45) surmises that “meanings are things determined by complete utterances and surrounding
24 Soskice (1985:24-53) distinguishes between three kinds of theories on metaphor; the first one which regards a metaphor as a “simple substitution for literal speech” and, secondly, the “strictly emotive” theory on metaphor, but she finally settles for the “incremental theories which allow metaphor a cognitive status, but only as a result of the interaction of literal meanings” (Jenkins 1989:220).
25 In this regard, Soskice (1985:46) is alluding to Black and Ricoeur who seem to “misunderstand Richards‟
distinction” between tenor and vehicle. See her account for a full discussion.
35 contexts, and not by individual words in isolation.” Therefore, with metaphor as a context related device, “all kinds of factors, including stereotypes, causal relations, and so on, are the determinants of reference” (Soskice 1985:130; cf. Weems 1995:16, 23).
Returning to the reference or meaning produced in this account of metaphor, these come about
“only through the interplay of the interpretive possibilities of the whole utterance” (Soskice 1985:45; cf. Jenkins 1989:221). There is therefore a movement from “words and what they refer to (things), to ideas and their interaction, so to the [utterance] and its context” (Jenkins 1989:221). But, seemingly paradoxically, as is characteristic of Soskice‟s account of her attempt to “dissolve dichotomies”, “[the] „reference‟ of a metaphor goes beyond what we know to be the case, and this is because there is an imbalance between reference and definition: you can refer before you can define, and speak before you know what you are speaking about” (Jenkins 1989:233). Jenkins (1989:233) nevertheless notes that this “seems to be the characteristic of metaphor, for by using metaphor you are always saying more than you mean (in the sense of define), or meaning (in the sense of refer) more that you say”. It is in this sense that this
“metaphor is cognitively unique” (Soskice 1985:53) and, Soskice continues (1985:62; cf. Jenkins 1989:233), “[the] strong metaphor does not prompt the routine renaming of aspects otherwise identifiable, but suggests new categories of interpretation and hypothesizes new entities, state of affairs, and causal relations.”
Finally, a very important element of this account of metaphor is its notion of “subsidiary vehicles” in which the vehicle within a metaphor is modified by yet another metaphor to give added depth and insight into the “primary vehicle” being used (Richards cited in Soskice 1985:46). In this regard Richards (cited in Soskice 1985:46) stresses that the “tenor and the vehicle are not necessarily two terms of the utterance at all” thereby making room for (a) subsidiary vehicle(s). This notion will prove vital for our analysis of the context of Hosea‟s marriage imagery which is discussed below. But first we will briefly consider how reference is produced through this account of metaphor.
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