Problems of Government in African States

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Problems of Government in African States

By PROFESSOR JOHN BLACKING

* This is a revised version of a paper given at the Annual Council meeting

of the South African Institute of Race Relations at Port Elizabeth, in Janu- ary, 3967, end to the Black Sash in Johannesburg, in April 196't _f7.

' T H E R E A R E G O O D R E A S O N S for discussing problems of government in the whole of the African Continent, rather than in a selected area. If we were concerned solely w i t h the p r o b l e m s of economic de\elopment, it might be better to divide the continent into geographical regions, or into areas of influence of t h e franc, t h e p o u n d , and the dollar* T h e r e is even a case for dividing Africa politically into French-, English-, and Arabic-speaking areas. But we can-

not real I v understand any region of Africa w i t h o u t reference to a n u m b e r of factory which are peculiar t o t h e African continent and are to a greater or leaser degree parts of t h e environmental, historical, economic and political heritage of every country in Africa.

For example, Ivory Coast is a franc-based, French-speaking state, flanked by Liberia, Gui- nea, Mali, Upper Volta, and Ghana. In appear- ance and standards of living, it has much in com- mon with Ghana, but its strongest economic ties are with France, with the countries of the Con- seil de l'Entente (Upper Volta, Niger and Da- homey), and with the Organisation Commune Af- ricaine et Malgache, whose members extend geo- graphically from Mauritania to Madagascar and Chad to Congo, About one-fourth of its popula- tion is made up of immigrants from Upper Volta, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria, and through the influence of Islam it has ties with the Arab world. In political outlook, it has followed what Coleman and Rosborg call the "Pragmatic- Pluralistic pattern

¹

in contrast to the •Revolu- tionary-Centralizing trend' of its 3 neighbours, Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, although it is also a one-party state and has for long been associated with Guinea and Mali through common interest in the R.D.A. It is pro-Western, rather than Pro-Asian or pro-Arab* and it has adopted a policy of growth which has beenc ailed 'state capi- talism'. Ivory Coast is therefore not just another of the underdeveloped countries of the

world which happens to be in West Africa: it is a country whose problems of development and government are peculiarly African and must be seen in the context of the whole continent of Africa. The Pan-African concept has become a political ideal, even though it is still far from being a reality. African states know that their strength lies in greater co-operation amongst themselves, especially in the economic field, though there are few that want the sort of union

advocated by Kwame Nkrumah. Pan-Africanism is not a gimmick, but an idea born of a growing appreciation of the historical unity of the continent of Africa, an idea which even Cecil Rhodes envisaged in his dream of a map that would be pink from Cape to Cairo. In 1944, the Cape Times published a map called "Pan-Africa", with a statement by General Smuts:

•'Maps no longer demarcate the separation of states but emphasize their essential unity. Our common task in Africa today is t o develop the heritage handed down to us by many men and many nations. This continent rich in untapped wealth, must be used for the common good if real progress is to be achieved. We can thus make Africa the continent of the future."

(italics mine)

The extremities of Africa have been drawn to- gether by a variety of processes: the regular stream of trans-Saharan trade united north and west Africa for centuries until the growth of coastal trade and slaving shifted the direction of traffic; the advance of Arab traders and Is-

lam spread elements of cultural unity to places as far afield as Somalia, Libya, Morocco, Senegal.

Northern Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Mala- wi; the colonization of the British and the French- brought together vast tracts of Africa by impos- ing common languages and systems of education, communication, administration and commerce,

and most recently, the emergence on the interna-

tional scene of thirty-five African states within

a decade has stimulated a new continental con-

sciousness, and a common desire for rapid social

and economic development and the enhancement

The Black Sasft. February/April, 1007 Die Swart Serp, Februarie/Aprit^t 296?

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of national power and dignity* As if to confirm the emergence of the Pan-African spirit, even the T r u e Whig P a r t y of Liberia awoke from eighty y e a r s of complacent oligarchy, the Ameri- co-Liberian class began to t u r n its attention to*

wards Liberia's African neighbours, and Presi- dent Tubman formally proposed a community of

independent African S t a t e s a t the Sanniquellie Conference of 1959. We in South Africa could

well follow this e x a m p l e : our future lies in Af- rica, and if we do not abandon o u r nostalgia for a way of life t h a t now exists only in the back- w a r d p a r t s of Europe and N o r t h America* we may well become as ridiculous a s was Liberia in the thirties*

While recognizing the special characteristics of the whole continent of Africa, we must never forget t h a t each African state and its problems a r e unique. T h e r e may a p p e a r to be certain similarities between events d u r i n g the last year in U g a n d a and Lesotho, even to the extent of the political roles of Catholic and P r o t e s t a n t fac- t i o n s ; but if the two situations are studied c a r e - fully in context, it is clear t h a t President Obote's masterly handling of the Ugandan crisis and Chief J o n a t h a n ' s recent performance in Lesotho a r e very different in causation* motivation, and implication for the future. Comparisons may illuminate a social situation, but they neither explain i t n o r provide a ready-made solution to its problems. Knowledge and experience of a number of similar situations a r e merely guides to the analysis of one p a r t i c u l a r situation in its own context* I shall outline some of the pheno- mena t h a t are peculiar to the continent of Africa, and some of the chief problems of government i n - A f r i c a n s t a t e s : this may serve a s a guide with which to approach the analysis of specific problems of government in any one s t a t e .

Obviously Africa is unique by virtue of its geography alone. I t is not well endowed for the crucial e a r l y stages of pre-industrial development, a s w a s much of Asia* Only the countries to i t s north and south have a mediterranean cli- m a t e ; much of its land is inhospitable, its soil is often poor, communications a r e generally difficult, and both effective a g r i c u l t u r a l development and the extraction of its underground wealth require h e a v y c a p i t a l expenditure. Because of s h a r p drops to the sea, many rivers a r e not fully navig- able, a n d t h e interior remained largely isolated until r a i l w a y lines, and more recently a i r s t r i p s , were built. Twelve s t a t e s out of thirty-nine h a v e no coastline, and four have insufficient access, so t h a t for them the goodwill of neighbours is essential. In comparison, out of twenty-four Asian and eleven South American states* only four and two respectively have no coastline.

All the s t a t e s of Africa arc underdeveloped and have a predominantly p e a s a n t population, a n d all, including South Africa* depend for their progress on a steady supply of local labour and massive importation of capital, skills, and equip- ment from the U.S.A., Britain, and o t h e r devel-

oped countries* In this respect, they a r e like other underdeveloped countries of the world, but t h e r e t h e comparison ends. As President Hou- phouet Boigny of Ivory Coast has said : "Our sole link with the Asians is underdevelopment, and what differentiates u s profoundly is t h a t they suffer from over-population and we from under- population". Gabon is typical of m a n y African s t a t e s whose productivity could be enormously increased if its population were doubled or trebled; while U g a n d a is one of the few whose population is a t p r e s e n t well adjusted to its area and resources. Africa's population is also un- evenly d i s t r i b u t e d : for instance, sixty p e r cent of T a n z a n i a is unoccupied and seventy per cent of its population lives in ten per cent of the ter- ritory, and populations have too often grown in the a r e a s t h a t are already overpopulated* Af-

rica's peoples have on the whole had a uniformly low s t a n d a r d of living, without the extremes of wealth and poverty encountered in Asia.

Since the e r a of the Greek and Roman E m p i r e s , and probably before t h a t , Africa h a s had the misfortune of being a pool for the labour and r a w m a t e r i a l s which were needed to c a r r y out the basic development of non-African communi-

ties in other continents and even in Africa itself.

The Portuguese depended on African labour for the development of Brazil, and the slave t r a d e played a crucial p a r t in laying t h e foundations for the economic take-off of both the United

S t a t e s and Britain, Less is known of the activity of A r a b s and Asians, but t h e r e is little evidence of any development in Africa comparable to what

they did in t h e i r home countries. Until the period of serious colonization, contact with E u r o - peans and Asians was largely to the detriment of the people of A f r i c a : societies were turned a g a i n s t each other, plundered, decimated, broken;

human relations w e r e disrupted by the wholesale introduction of g u n s and liquor, and disease and misery spread rapidly by the devastation of the land and the disorganisation of its cultivators*

T h e benefits of foreign contacts w e r e t r a g i c a l l y outweighed by the d i s a d v a n t a g e s : t h e introduction of h a r d y food crops has been of inestimable value t o Africa, and the spread of Islam probably gave north and west Africa a flying s t a r t ; but t h e upheaval precipitated centuries of political instability, or alternatively t h e formation of

reactionary feudal societies such a s those in Northern Nigeria which, though much appreci- ated by British administrators, have been a serious b a r r i e r to modern progress.

A n o t h e r unique f e a t u r e of Africa with which its r u l e r s must contend, is its phenomenal cul- t u r a l diversity. This m a y have been imposed n a t u r a l l y by t h e environment of thick tropical forests, deserts, and h a r s h s a v a n n a h country, but a n equally significant cultural factor h a s been the destruction of social security d u r i n g periods

of exploitation and conquest* Groups tend to r e - act to change by cultivating t h e i r differences and developing t h e i r separateness, and this is par*

The Black Sash, February/April, 19n? Die Swart Serp, Febrttarie/April, 1SGT

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t i c u l a r l y common in societies dominated by t h e rugged individualism of p e a s a n t producers. Af- r i c a ' s peoples h a v e been divided by more linguis- tic a n d c u l t u r a l divisions t h a n a r e found in a n y o t h e r a r e a of t h e world, except the highlands of N e w Guinea and the jungles of the Amazon, b u t they have shown a r e m a r k a b l e ability to modern- ize without losing t h e i r vigour. Most of the s t a t e s of Africa a r e multi-cultural, a n d cannot be compared t o the nation-states of E u r o p e which emerged on t h e basis of common l a n g u a g e s , cul- t u r e s , and historical experience. Moreover, none of t h e m became independent a s a result of out-

r i g h t m i l i t a r y conquest. Most of Africa's r u l e r s accept the multi-cultural legacy and a r e t r y i n g to c r e a t e new, t r u l y national cultures which t r a n s c e n d the old divisions. T h i s is one reason

why the multi-cultural s t a t e s of the U.S.A. and t h e U.S.S.R. a r e of g r e a t i n t e r e s t to Africans a s experiments in nation-building. Because the U.S.S.R. is not very much smaller t h a n Africa in a r e a and population, a n d has a v a s t community of p e a s a n t s , its existence holds out hope for the creation of a Pan-African federation.

Africa h a s t h e distinction of being the most recent g r e a t land a r e a t o be p e n e t r a t e d effectively by Western civilization, and in p a r t i c u l a r by P r o t e s t a n t , r a t h e r t h a n Catholic, E u r o p e . The l a s t phase in the development of modern African nations and in t h e emergence of the Pan-African concept, began in the first half of the nineteenth c e n t u r y , with t h e creation of t h e Zulu nation, t h e foundation of Liberia in 1822, t h e N i g e r ex- pedition of Laird and L a n d e r in 1832, the conquest of Algeria by General Bugeaud, and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Christian missions in the west a n d the south, and later in t h e east, of Africa.

A f t e r this came a h u n d r e d y e a r s of colonialism, which decided the p a t t e r n and much of the f u t u r e of modern Africa. Although the colonial powers b r o u g h t together diverse societies u n d e r one gov- e r n m e n t and thereby created new and l a r g e r u n i t s , Africa h a s t h r e e times a s m a n y s t a t e s a s

South America, allowing for t h e i r respective a r e a s and populations.

Africa therefore h a s a n o t h e r distinction of h a v i n g fewer people per s t a t e t h a n a n y o t h e r continent, Europe also h a s m a n y s t a t e s in a small land a r e a , but a l t h o u g h on the average E u r o p e a n s t a t e s a r e nearly a q u a r t e r the size of African states, they h a v e nearly t h r e e times the population. T h u s in the United N a t i o n s , Bo- t s w a n a is fifty-five times a s b i g a s Gambia, but less than a fifth the size of I n d i a ; Botswana has almost twice the population of Gambia, but one five-hundredth of the population of I n d i a : all t h r e e countries h a v e o n e vote in the Assembly.

African s t a t e s have been quick to seize on the political and economic a d v a n t a g e s of a multipli- city of voices publicly expressing t h e same views and a s k i n g for the same sort of aid and invest- ments, b u t they are acutely a w a r e of the expense of m a i n t a i n i n g delegations, and of the f r u s t r a - tions of lacking the military and economic power

to c a r r y out t h e i r intentions. T h e a n n u a l budget of even the relatively prosperous s t a t e of U g a n - da, with a population of over seven million, is less t h a n t h a t of the University of Wisconsin, Madi- son, w i t h a s t u d e n t body of only 25,000. Even South Africa i s not a s rich a s General Motors.

African S t a t e s have therefore had to develop new w a y s of acquiring international power.

African governments have inherited a legacy which i s enough to d a u n t t h e most resourceful and energetic nation, and did in fact defeat the colonial powers. Even South Africa, with all its a d v a n t a g e s of climate, capital investment, skilled personnel, and legislation to mobilize and control labour, h a s been able to develop only a t i n y frac- tion of its land and peoples to a n y t h i n g like t h e i r full potential. T h e legacy comprises t h r e e sets of p r o b l e m s : environmental, c u l t u r a l , and historical or colonial. But they cannot be considered s e p a r a t e l y .

In most A f r i c a n s t a t e s , g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e t o t a m e rugged land with a s h o r t a g e of capital and machinery, a n d of skilled and even unskilled m a n - power; in addition, they h a v e to mobilize, t r a i n , and create a nation out of a largely a p a t h e t i c and self-contained p e a s a n t population; and thirdly, they have to cope w i t h 'artificial* economic and social s t r u c t u r e s t h a t were c r e a t e d to be of f a r g r e a t e r benefit to the imperial countries

t h a n to t h e i r dependencies. Each set of problems impinges on the other. Development of n a t u r a l resources depends on g e t t i n g enough capital and suitably t r a i n e d manpower, which in t u r n depends on the policy decisions t h a t governments make a b o u t taxation, foreign investment, educational priorities, and relations with o t h e r s t a t e s . T h e forms t h a t such government decisions take will inevitably be affected by the pat- t e r n s of development, government, a n d i n t e r n a - tional relations bequeathed by colonial powers, a s well a s by t h e degree of modernization and national integration achieved by the local population.

T h e r e a r e a few basic differences between French and British colonial rule, which have affected p a t t e r n s of government in several Afri- can s t a t e s . F o r instance, t h e F t e n c h adopted a policy of assimilation and centralized a d m i n i s t r a - tion, and made F r e n c h the l a n g u a g e of admini*

stration. A f r i c a n s w e r e s i t t i n g in t h e F r e n c h Assembly a n d holding F r e n c h ministerial posts long before t h e i r countries achieved independence.

The British practised indirect rule, used the local languages for administration, and tended to en- courage the development of t r a d i t i o n a l systems.

Until a f t e r t h e 1989-46 w a r , t h e British spent much more t i m e t h a n t h e F r e n c h on development, and in p a r t i c u l a r they spent i t on hospitals and schools, while t h e French concentrated on ports and railways. Now the French a r e giving f a r more aid t h a n the British to t h e i r f o r m e r co- lonies.

Both the French and British regimes geared education to the colonial s e t - u p : t h e r e was a The Black Sash, February/April, 1907 4 Vie Swart Serp, FebnturiefApril, 196?

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tendency to boost l i t e r a r y education and decry manual work, and to t r a i n lawyers and l i t e r a r y critics r a t h e r t h a n doctors, engineers, scientists and a g r i c u l t u r a l experts. In most states, there

is still only a very small proportion of the population employed in managerial, technical, crafts- m a n a n d supervisory grades, which a r e essential

elements for productive efficiency and growth.

Worse still, when independence came a large proportion of the skilled men available was swal- lowed u p into political and senior administrative

posts. Critical decisions have to be made about education and manpower, and a balance h a s to be struck between primary, secondary, technical and university education. Most states allocate between 10 and 15 p e r cent of t h e i r budget to education, whilst Nigeria decided to spend a s much a s 40 per cent. In 19H6 South Africa and Sudan spent respectively 3.9 and P>.4 per cent on education and 14.8 and 14,1 per cent on defence, Liberia spends 6 per cent on education and II) per cent on foreign delegations.* Universal pri- m a r y education is a n aim in most states, but it can be a mixed blessing and a political risk un-

less t h e r e is adequate employment or room in secondary schools to take up its products. In order to spend money profitably and equitably

on the p r i m a r y phases of education, Guinea de*

cided e a r l y against creating a University, which would have been a n effective prestige symbol, and h a s risked sending its students overseas for h i g h e r education.

The economies of most African s t a t e s have been precariously dependent on the extraction of one or two minerals, o r on t h e quasi-monoculture of cotton, cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, o r some other product whose value depends on fluctuating world prices. The economies were predominantly a g r a - rian, and industries were largely devoted to pro- cessing r a w materials. E a c h unit was a p a r t of the economy of a colonial power, and a s such was designed to provide a few r a w m a t e r i a l s and

0 Some figures for the percentage of national budgets devoted to education, health & defence

in 1964 w^fere; —

Ghana

Kenya

South Africa Sudan

Tanzania

Togo

Uganda

U.A.R.

Education

17.6

18.3

4.9 G.1 18.3

13.8

13.9

12,7

Health

5.5 4.9

:j.l

4,6 7.7

11.3

7.4 4.6

Defence

6.6 2.2

10.4 9.8 15J

12.6

U

24.3

F i g u r e s for 1966 show a tendency of some to spend more on defence and less on e d u c a t i o n : —

Education Defence South Africa 3.9 14.8 S u d a n 6A 14,1 T a n z a n i a 14.6 15*7

Uganda 10.8 10.2 DH Swart Serp, Februarie/AprU⁹ 196?

to be a market for manufactured goods. The chief problem for governments is to diversify these economies and to spread development to a r e a s which the colonial regimes ignored. Inter- state co-operation is also necessary, to avoid reduplication of expensive industries and l u x u r y enterprises.

The unevenness of African development, which was largely due to the economic objectives of colonialism, has led to serious problems of community development. The chain of events which

led to the inauguration of the Uganda Protector- ate and to the establishment there of coffee and cotton a s cash crops, also led to the construction of the railway from Mombasa, through Kikuyu and Luo country, to Kampala, and to the foundation of Nairobi a s a railhead camp and stores depot in 1809, and to the development of Kikuyu land by white settlers. T h u s the Ganda, the Kikuyu, and the Luo were n e a r e r the centres of modernization t h a n other peoples, and in spite of all the disadvantages of the colonial regime they were given a flying s t a r t , which makes it all the more difficult for them to s h a r e their windfall with those who did less well out of the colonial economy.

The urban centres and lines of communication t h a t have a l r e a d y been p a r t l y developed n a t u r a l -

ly a t t r a c t f u r t h e r investment, and a s t h i n g s a r e a t p r e s e n t South Africa is the only c o u n t r y whose g o v e r n m e n t i s able t o dictate t e r m s and direct capital t o less immediately profitable a r e a s

—- and even the South African government i s not being a s firm a s it could be for the good of the country. Quite a p a r t from doing w h a t is necessary for balanced economic development, i t is v e r y much in the political interests of governments to show t h a t all sections of the community will benefit from t h e i r schemes. T h e r e is inevitably a tendency for national politics to be used preferentially for t h e development of a section of t h e community, which thereby t a k e s the lead and gets o t h e r benefits in education, commerce, and industry. National leaders a n d mass p a r t i e s m a y have initially gained power by rallying groups on a communal basis, or identify- ing with traditional elements, but they cannot afford to continue on this basis. In T a n z a n i a , President Nyerere is the son of a chief, but T A N U (Tanganyika African National Union) is a very efficient national p a r t y , and communal politics do not figure in i t s activities. In Guinea, Sekou Toure gained much support by virtue of being a lineal descendant of Chief Samory, whom the French displaced in the late nineteenth cen- tury, b u t he came to power via t r a d e unions, and the single p a r t y rule of the PDG ( P a r t i De- mocratique de Guine6) is socialistic and t r a d i - tional chiefs have been abolished.

African governments have to direct t h e i r political programmes t o w a r d s specific technical prob-

lems of national development and can ill afford to a t t e n d preferentially to the welfare of factions

The Black Sash, February/April, 2967 3

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or sections of t h e i r population. Sometimes, in the t a s k of achieving national i n t e g r a t i o n and full participation in economic development they m a y h a v e to risk displeasing the very g r o u p t h a t b r o u g h t t h e m to power* F o r instance, in U g a n d a i t w a s the alliance with t h e royalist K a b a k a Yekka p a r t y t h a t b r o u g h t t h e nationally^mindcd U P C ( U g a n d a People's Congress) to power a t the time of independence. B u t e a r l y in 1966, when i t looked a s if a faction of K Y a n d U P C members would destroy the dominance of t h e more radical, nationally-minded U P C wing, t h e U P C had to consolidate its forces a t t h e risk of a l i e n a t i n g its K Y s u p p o r t . P r e m i e r Obotc's swift and decisive political action encouraged waverers to swing to the s u p p o r t of t h e U P C , and subsequent amendments t o t h e constitution consolidated the power of t h e central govern*

ment. T h e Kingdom of B u g a n d a had been the main obstacle t o t h i s , b u t B u g a n d a w a s suffici- cntly u n p o p u l a r with some of the o t h e r kingdoms, such a s Bunyoro, t h a t the U P C was able t o 'divide and rule'.

Even when a degree of national integration h a s been achieved, i t is often difficult to know where power really lies, a n d w h a t section of the community may suddenly e r u p t . In Kenya a t the time of independence, the membership of K A N U (Kenya African N a t i o n a l Union) w a s p r e - dominantly Kikuyu and Luo, and it stood for a s t r o n g central government. Moreover, ax 1 have said, t h e Kikuyu and the Luo had by accident become t h e i n h e r i t o r s of commercial development in urban a r e a s , notably Nairobi, the s e a t of government. T h e opposition p a r t y , KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), r e p r e s e n t e d the smaller tribes and not surprisingly favoured regional control. Ultimately, in the i n t e r e s t s of national unity, K A D U was graciously dissolved i n November 1004 by i t s leader, Ronald N g a l a . who was r e w a r d e d w i t h a cabinet post in May 1066. T h e r e was a f u r t h e r shift of power, when the left-wing K P U (Kenya People's Union), a s p l i n t e r p a r t y of the Luo l e a d e r Oginga Odinga, was heavily defeated in J u n e 1006 and c e r t a i n left-wing members were banned. In September.

R e m b r a n d t Tobacco Company, under cover of R o t h m a n ' s of Pall Mall, skilfully bought out Vice-President M u r u m b i , who w a s replaced by Daniel A r a p Moi, a n able politician who comes from X a k u r u . He is hopefully said to represent t h e interests of the smaller tribes, and in p a r t i - c u l a r the a g r i c u l t u r a l l y oriented section of t h e community. However, it would be naive to think t h a t Kenya's political future depends simply on the unification of communal elements, which P r e - sident K e n y a t t a has a p p a r e n t l y accomplished with g r e a t skill. F u t u r e power could lie with a d - herents of a p a r t i c u l a r policy, o r with o r g a n i s a - tions t h a t t r a n s c e n d both t r i b e and p a r t y , such a s youth movements o r t h e t r a d e unions, t h r o u g h which Tom Mboya originally came to the fore. A s a result of i n c r e a s i n g modernization, new e x t r a - p a r t y bureaucratic and technical groups could

begin to press f o r political power, a n d they might well find t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e r u l i n g p a r t y weakened because i t s ablest men a r e involved in the business of government. (This h a s not h a p - pened in t h e one-party s t a t e s of t h e U S S R and E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n countries, however). Trouble on t h e border between K e n y a a n d Somalia could

indirectly lead to numerical g r o w t h and g r e a t e r influence of t h e m i l i t a r y in the political field.

Military cliques h a v e played a n increasing role in African politics, though more often to seek relief f o r specific grievances, r a t h e r t h a n political power. E v e n T a n z a n i a ' s s t r o n g governing

p a r t y ( T A N U ) " w a s helpless in the face of a few hundred disgruntled soldiers s t r i k i n g for higher p a y and accelerated promotion" e a r l y in 1064 (James S. Coleman a n d C a r l G. Rosberg J r . (ed). Political Parties and National Integra-

tion in Tropical Africa, University of California P r e s s , 1964, p.677). New power groups could even, emerge within Kenya's r u r a l co-operatives, which h a v e not been a s successful a s they have been in some French-speaking t e r r i t o r i e s .

T h e future role of the predominantly peasant population of Africa is still a n unknown quantity.

Hitherto, they h a v e been coaxed to the polls b y the p a r t y t h a t speaks t h e i r l a n g u a g e , h a s t h e best organised t r a n s p o r t , or is able to make some immediately intelligible appeal on the basis of a local issue. I t is difficult to estimate how deep- rooted is t h e i r s u p p o r t of any regime. F o r cen- t u r i e s they h a v e accepted oppression and pro- tection, and the comings and goings of r u l i n g dynasties, with indifference and patience. Only under v e r y special circumstances, such a s i n R u a n d a , have African p e a s a n t s risen u n a n i m o u s - ly and conclusively a g a i n s t a regime. P e a s a n t s a r e relatively independent of o t h e r producers and of the market, and in many p a r t s of Africa the system of land tenure is not feudal and chiefs a r e not l a n d l o r d s ; a s long a s a family s t a y s in the same a r e a , the family farm is passed down from generation to generation, and it therefore r e m a i n s a stable source of occupation and income. When p e a s a n t s a r e encouraged to improve t h e i r land, they are often afraid t h a t its b e t t e r a p p e a r a n c e will hasten i t s confiscation.

T h e most u r g e n t priorities in Africa today a r e reforms of systems of land t e n u r e , the full incor- poration of p e a s a n t s in modernization and development t h r o u g h the effective dissemination of new economic opportunities and values, and the u r g e n t a n i m a t i o n of t h e countryside in town- centred economies. T h e problem h a s been well worked out by Rene D u m o n t in LSAfrique noire est mat partie ( P a r i s , 1962), and I will not dis- cuss it f u r t h e r except to s a y t h a t it is essentially a political p r o b l e m : i t requires a revolutionary outlook on modern values, and i t is made all the more difficult by the fact t h a t t h e r e h a s been a shocking lack of attention t o a g r i c u l t u r a l development in m a n y African universities. T h i s is v e r y short-sighted, because " a n a g r a r i a n revolution must both precede and accompany a n industrial

Die Swart Serp, Februarie/April, 1967 $ The Black Sash, February/A jml^t 1HT

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4EQK-

-£MMr

11i'es /(W| 2000 30*10 4000

revolution*'. The main conclusion of Professor A. Lewis's report on Industrialization in the Gold

Coast (Accra, 1953) w a s : —

"The most certain way to promote industrialization in the Gold Coast is to lay the foundation it requires by taking vigorous measures to raise food production per person engaged in agriculture. This is the surest way of pro- ducing the large and ever-increasing demand for manufactures without which there can be little industrialization/'

Guy Hunter has commented on this (Guy Hun- ter, The New Societies of Tropical Africa, OUP, 1962, p. 69): —

"If there is to be an African personality in the modern world, a great p a r t of it must be rooted in the land, round which both cult and community have been built, which is woven into every institution, which lies deep in the texture of language, and moves the heart and energies of every African more surely than ahy other

vision* Co-operative cultivation, common effort in clearing, in harvesting, in house building, in

herding cattle all go back to ancient and still lively patterns of African life. If there is a place in the world in which 'human investment' can be harnessed to cut shorter the road into the modern world, it is to be found in the villages of Africa."

The growth of towns and the development of industries are, of course, essential features of modernization in any society, but I think it is high time that we questioned the assumption that

urban life is synonymous with a modern outlook.

I t is not so in industrial Britain, and I can see

no reason why it must be so in Africa. Many

African cities are cluttered up with old-fashioned

people who merely put on the trappings of mod-

ernity, while there are thousands of really mod-

ern people who have been brought up in the

country. A modern outlook can only be acquired

by association with other modern people and in-

terestingly enough there are many Africans

The Black Sash, February/April, 19G7 Die Swart Serp, Februarie/Aprit, 190?

(7)

whose close personal contact with seemingly stuffy missionaries in r u r a l a r e a s has helped them

to become more modern t h a n t h e i r u r b a n con- temporaries, whose contact with modern people has been very superficial. T h e r e is therefore hope t h a t c o u n t r y a r e a s will be r e g a r d e d a s places of modernization fit for modern people, a s much a s the towns.

T h e r e i s a n o t h e r u n f o r t u n a t e colonial legacy which h a m p e r s the development of a t r u l y mod- e r n outlook. Inflated w a g e s and a life of l u x u r y were introduced by^f and for t h e benefit of, Euro*

pean s e t t l e r s a n d businessmen. A p a t t e r n of living s t a n d a r d s w a s set f a r above the average in E u r o p e , let alone w h a t can be rapidly attained in Africa, a n d it is unfortunately being main- tained by the numerous e x p a t r i a t e businessmen, t e a c h e r s and technical e x p e r t s , who often do use- ful work, b u t a t a price. Jt should not be forgotten t h a t i t w a s the poorest and least ostenta- tious of all e x p a t r i a t e s who laid the real foundations of modern A f r i c a n : I refer not to e a r l y t r a d e r s and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , but to the mission- a r i e s , who b r o u g h t p r i n t i n g and education, without which no modern society could come into being.

The prevalent p a t t e r n of luxurious living adds to the difficulties t h a t face the men who have taken on the mantle of government. T h e lives of colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were usually comfort*

able, though never luxurious, and they were a s - sured of employment and a pension, whereas the s a l a r i e s of t h e i r successors depend on t h e votes of t h e i r constituents. Under such circumstances it is hard for public s e r v a n t s to be entirely im- p a r t i a l and incorruptible and for a m a n to resist a chance to consolidate his position, or a t least a s s u r e himself of a n income should he fall from power. Even the incorruptible colonial admini- s t r a t o r s r a r e l y hesitated to show favour to certain sections of the population. The source of t h e i r power lay in the forces they could command from the m o t h e r country, sueh a s a g u n b o a t , an i n f a n t r y battalion, and access to or refusal of money. Their successors assumed t h e i r positions, but not t h e i r powers. Most African s t a t e s lack an effective a r m y or police force, and even if such forces exist, there is no g u a r a n t e e that they will take orders from the civil power. If p a r t y support or legislation cannot e n s u r e adequate power, a t least wealth offers an a l t e r n a - tive means. It becomes especially a t t r a c t i v e when t h e r e is a class of people who a r e both rich and show it. W h y should the new r u l e r s be less impressive t h a n e x p a t r i a t e residents and many of t h e i r own subjects? In assessing the quality of government in African s t a t e s , we must r e - member t h a t when t h e r e a r e r u m o u r s or e s t a b - lished cases of corruption, they have often been precipitated by a representative of one of the 'advanced' nations, who h a s wanted import per- mits, T V r i g h t s , a cotton monopoly, a favoured factory site, buying preferences, or political influence. To my mind, the r e m a r k a b l e t h i n g a b o u t

tropical African s t a t e s is not t h a t there is corruption, but t h a t t h e r e is so little corruption, and t h a t it is often criticized openly and even successfully rooted out*

Finally, before considering briefly w h a t some African governments a r e doing a b o u t t h e i r p r o b - lems, we must not forget t h e tremendous psycho- logical difficulties t h a t all governing p a r t i e s faced a f t e r independence. The excitement of revolution- a r y political controversy faded into the h u m d r u m problems of development, and ' t h e government', which a s colonial government had for long been a n object of abuse, had to become praiseworthy.

M a n y governing p a r t i e s were poorly organized and faction-ridden, so t h a t the single p a r t y w a s

by no meai a s effective a s it might seem. How- ever, the fact t h a t independence was successfully achieved h a s created confidence in the judgement of certain quasi-charismatic leaders, especially the older men, and people are still p r e p a r e d to accept what Houphouet-Boigny or Itfzee K e n y a t t a a s k t h e m to do. Similarly, by truculence t o - w a r d s the West, and systematic non-alignment, a y o u n g e r m a n like Sekou T o u r e h a s gained prestige and authority, a s h a s J u l i u s N y e r e r e by his cultivation of African values and his ex- position of African Socialism.

Problems of g o v e r n m e n t in Africa a r e primarily problems of development, b u t the success or failure of development p l a n s depends very much on purely political decisions. If r u l e r s see

government a s a problem of power, and tend to p e r p e t u a t e the colonial solution of bureaucratic a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , making no distinction between politics and administration, i t is because they feel t h a t they need the maximum power to make free decisions and to c a r r y out programmes for rapid development. Power is needed both to mobilize the local population and to a t t r a c t t h e interest of o t h e r s t a t e s for the sake of investment a n d development. Because of Africa's unique position in t h e world today, the methods of Afri- can governments are sometimes s u r p r i s i n g , and may even seem to be diametrically opposed to t h e i r avowed aim of development. F o r instance, African s t a t e s could gain much by co-operation with South Africa, especially in the field of education : a s i t i s , m a n y African l e a d e r s w e r e trained a t F o r t H a r e . But they prefer to p u r s u e a campaign a g a i n s t South Africa, Rhodesia and P o r t u g a l , because they consider i t necessfry for t h e i r own future welfare. I t is not a ploy to divert the attention of t h e i r own people from troubles a t home, nor is it an a t t e m p t to lay hands on Southern Africa's resources and wealth.

If African s t a t e s can persuade the powerful nations t h a t certain human values really are more i m p o r t a n t to man than m a t e r i a l comfort, and if these powerful nations then show themselves p r e p a r e d to a c t in s u p p o r t of those values r a t h e r than solely in the interest of profits in commerce and i n d u s t r y , t h e r e is a r e a l hope that a new e r a m a y dawn in t h e social and economic development of Africa in p a r t i c u l a r , and

Die Swart Serp, Febrnarkf April, 1967 % The Black Sash, February/April, 190?

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of the world in general, in which economics fire organized to meet human needs r a t h e r t h a n to

r e a p profits.

To many African states, Southern Africa seems to provide a t e s t case for the kind of relationship t h a t the rich nations propose to have with t h e poor nations, and this is why the outcome is so important for their future development. If the Americans and the British could show t h a t they a r e p r e p a r e d to sacrifice commercial interests f o r moral principles in Southern Africa, they might do the same in other p a r t s of Africa. They might then, for example, finance the building of factories in r u r a l a r e a s not because i t is likely to be immediately profitable, but because it is necessary for the welfare of a depressed population. T h e constant refusal of African politicians to compromise on moral issues may lead tempor- arily to a decrease in the flow of aid and foreign capital* But many believe t h a t in the long r u n the rich nations will feel the pinch, and t h a t they will realize t h a t neither paternalism, n o r provi- sional technical aid, nor conditional foreign ca*- pital a r e a substitute for world economic planning, in which t h e economic s u r p l u s of the rich nations will be used for the development of the poor nations, and not primarily for investment in them. They w a n t t o show people t h a t it is not Britain and the U.S.A.* but individual British and American businessmen, t h a t gain by t r a d i n g with South Africa and Rhodesia, and t h a t the nations of Britain and the U.S.A. might gain more by a different policy.

In discussions of development in African states*

g r e a t importance is often attached to political stability, and a significant relationship between political systems and economic development seems to be assumed. W h a t is too often forgotten is the astonishing political instability t h a t has ac- companied the economic growth of many Euro- pean countries. Besides* in Africa t h e r e a r e countries in strategic positions which stand to get more in the way of aid and investment if they are a little unpredictable, and even unstable, politically.

In Africa, the political community is not yet synonymous with the economic community, a s it tended to be under imperial or traditional tribal rule. The tribal system was essentially a technique of organizing the economic life of com- munities. Very often rulers did not s h a r e the same cultural tradition a s t h e i r subjects, and if they stressed the value of those traditions it was done p r i m a r i l y to w i n support. Although people aligned themselves with rulers and factions for reasons of economic security, it was the political decisions t h a t settled the courses t h a t economies took. Similarly, the future of African states depends on sound economic planning, J>ut it is the political decisions which determine the success o r failure of these plans in t h e long run.

We know what industries, hydro-electric projects, and other developments could and should be carried out in Lesotho. B u t how is the money to

be raised and how are schemes to be carried out and by whom? Will local men be t r a i n - ed to do most of the skilled work before a proi- ject is begun, o r will t h e project be rushed through with the expensive assistance of expa- triates, who Will take money out of the country?

Which private sources* or international f u n d s will be tapped for What project? W h a t will be the effect of such projects? Will they make the country s t r o n g e r and more truly independent, o r

will they simply entrench Lesotho a s a satellite of South Africa and improve the s t a n d a r d of Jiving of only a small section of the community?

These a r e the crucial decisions which affect t h e future of a country, and they a r e political decisions which governments ought to be free to

make. They must be made in the best interests of the spiritual, a s well a s the material, well*

being of a people. Aid and investment a r e of little value unless they can increase the dignity of a nation and its function in international affairs, a s wtfll as its material comfort. If some history seems to be determined by economic fac- tors, and political action is related to economic growth, i t is only because people abdicate t h e i r r i g h t to make free decisions. In the modern world, no #tate is economically independent of others, but every state h a s a chance to make a n original contribution to the history of mankind by overcoming its economic disadvantages with vigorous political action.

T h e m a j o r problem of governments in African s t a t e s is therefore to mobilize t h e i r human r e -

sources, in order to improve the a p p e a r a n c e of the continent, raise s t a n d a r d s of living, and to add a new dimension to t h e history of man. The

world situation is such t h a t no u n i t smaller t h a n a s t a t e is likely to achieve much in Africa, and the co-operution of groups of states, or even of the whole continent, will achieve much more.

T h e r e a r e t h e obvious technical problems of find- ing capital from home and a b r o a d ; developing the skills, energy and initiative without which capital cannot be made productive; and deciding

rightly on priorities between industry and a g r i - culture and a s between infrastructure a n d productive investment. A t t e m p t s to solve these p r o b -

lems will be of little avail until African p e a s a n t s really begin to move in the same direction a s t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s , and both know more or loss

where they are going. The 'vertical' integration of elite and mass is a more real and pressing problem t h a n the 'horizontal' integration of lin- guistic and cultural groups. African governments have opted for a high degree of s t a t e planning, and for a curtailment of certain individual freedoms, b u t few h a v e produced original forms of government t h a t incorporate t h e p e a s a n t r y effectively in t h e process of modernization, a n d not m a n y h a v e pursued a s vigorously a s Guinea,

Mali and Tanzania a policy of eradicating oli- g a r c h y a n d paternalism.

Most African governments h a v e carried on in the colonial tradition. They have adopted the Uie Swart Serp^t Fehruarie/April, 19G? Thi Black Sash, February/April, 19G7

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colonial techniques of p a t r o n a g e , especially in the allocation of educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; of persuasion, conversion, and t h e integration of non - p a r t y associations; of electoral and constitu- tional changes, and even deportation, b a n n i n g , a n d imprisonment.

If African s t a t e s a r e to make a m a r k on the world, they m u s t e i t h e r beat t h e existing g r e a t powers a t t h e i r own game, o r they must s t a r t a new game. N o t d u r i n g the next fifty y e a r s a t least h a s any a n y country in Africa a hope of equalling the United S t a t e s , Russia, G r e a t Bri- tain* G e r m a n y , J a p a n o r F r a n c e i n economic de-

velopment and m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y . South Africa m a y be the r i c h e s t and most overtly stable coun- t r y in Africa, but I see little m e r i t in its a p p a r - e n t aim of being a r a t h e r inferior carbon copy of the United S t a t e s , or G e r m a n y , o r Britain, especially a s this achievement depends on the worship of materialism and the denial of Chris-

tian values. T a n z a n i a , on the other hand, is one of the poorest countries in Africa, but it h a s the distinction of s t r i k i n g out in a new direction, and m a y ultimately make a g r e a t e r m a r k on the

w o r l d : i t is a nation t h a t s t a n d s for indigenous c u l t u r a l achievement, non-sectionalism, non-com- munalism, non-racialism, and a new kind of de-

mocracy. The t r a d i t i o n a l African technique of t a l k i n g until unanimous a g r e e m e n t is reached, r a t h e r t h a n forcing so-called majority decisions, m a y be one which the world needs to adopt. P r e - sident N y e r e r e h a s a r g u e d with conviction t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l t y p e of African one-party demo*

c r a c y is freer t h a n the organized two-party sys- t e m of t h e W e s t : he has even said, " H o w can you have a democracy with a t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m ? "

He m a i n t a i n s t h a t in s t a t e s with one t r u l y repre- s e n t a t i v e national p a r t y , voters stand to g e t

b e t t e r government, by choosmg the individual instead of t h e p a r t y label. F u r t h e r m o r e , all points of view a r e fully and freely discussed a t

local p a r t y meetings, and by the National E x e - cutive- In P a r l i a m e n t , the p a r t y line must be

followed, and t h e r e should be no unnecessary discussion, so t h a t accepted legislation may be c a r - ried t h r o u g h a s quickly a n d efficiently a s possible.

Even so, debates in m a n y African parliaments exhibit a wide r a n g e of discussion and criticism, i n spite of t h e c o n t r a r y impression t h a t is given

in n e w s reports.

T h e r e is, of course, a real d a n g e r t h a t demo- c r a t i c one-party systems can become a u t h o r i t a - r i a n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in view of the colonial legacy.

The distinguished G h a n a i a n , Robert G a r d i n e r , w a s one of the first to underscore the a u t h o r i - t a r i a n side of African political development, the i n t e r e s t in power for its own sake, and he stressed t h a t t h e r e must be :0\>m for differences of opin- ion and a recognition of the idea of a n 'adver- s a r y in good faith*. But he also suggested t h a t the mechanics of government should not be em- phasized to the exclusion of t h e purposes of government. T h e aims of opposition p a r t i e s are generally considered questionable. F o r instance Die Stvart Serp, Februarief April t&itT

m a n y opposition g r o u p s were members of the p r e - independence establishment, whose noses were put out of j o i n t when the colonial g o v e r n m e n t n u r t u r - ed the revolutionary p a r t i e s with mass following, and g a v e them an a u r a of legitimacy a t t h e time of independence. The s h o r t a g e of t r a i n e d men had tended to c r e a t e a n elite, and t h a t elit- ism h a s furthered the one-party tendency, because " i t c a r r i e s the implicit presumption t h a t the governing g r o u p possesses a monopoly of wisdom and legitimacy. I t follows, therefore, t h a t in t h e i r view a n opposition g r o u p recruited from t h e s a m e social s t r a t a a s t h e elite i s e i t h e r frivolous and irrelevant, o r dangerously subver- sive because its members seek only power" (Cole- m a n and Rosberg, op.ctt., p.662).

The struggle between opposition and govern- m e n t m a y also reflect outside interference in a country's affairs, and therefore have little to do w i t h the welfare of the s t a t e . The p r e s e n t p u r - pose of g o v e r n m e n t in Africa is to achieve t h e ends of r u r a l animation, the g r a d u a l industrialization of a g r i c u l t u r e , and the r a i s i n g of the s t a n d a r d of living of millions of p e a s a n t s . One- p a r t y s t a t e s , p a n - A f r i c a n collaboration, a n d a policy of non-alignment are seen a s m e a n s to this end. The c r u s h i n g problem is poverty, and t h e s a d fact is t h a t the i m p o r t a n t economic decisions are not yet being taken in Africa. If careful a n d honest investigations were made, I think it would be found t h a t the a p p a r e n t political instability and the rise and fall of individuals and factions in some African states, a r e by no means due solely to the inadequacy of local politicians and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , n o r even to t h e d e s p e r a t e s h o r t a g e of skilled personnel. African state?

a r e too often a t the mercy of political and economic forces in E u r o p e , America and Asia in general, and politically biased advisers and in- vestors or unscrupulous e n t r e p r e n e u r s in p a r t i - cular. African governments do not expect aid and capital investment without s t r i n g s , but they prefer the stringent technical conditions attached to loans from i n t e r n a t i o n a l lending institutions, such a s the World Bank, to the political and economic commitment of government-to-government finance. Several delegates a t a recent conference on development in Nairobi even considered foreign p r i v a t e investment t o be b e t t e r t h a n public

investment, provided it can be controlled and directed.

There can be no single or approved solution for t h e mechanics of government to be chosen f o r the purposes of development and the a t t a i n - m e n t of national dignity in Africa. In spite of t h e t i g h t and effective organization of the PDG,

Guinea h a s not developed a s rapidly a s some other countries, while Tunisia, with the comparably effective organization, of Neo-Destour socialism,

has done well. Similarly, s t a t e s w i t h looser org- anizations have developed both rapidly and slow- ly. Even if the Gross Domestic Product can be taken a s a reliable index of growth, i t does not fluctuate significantly with the course of political 10 The Black Sash* February/April, 19G7

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events, with the possible single exception of the Congolese Republic, and in Asia the radically different systems of government in India and

Pakistan have not produced any appreciable dif- ference in the Gross Domestic Product per head of total population in those countries.

The t e r m t h a t is often used to describe the policy of most African governments is African Socialism, though each nation i n t e r p r e t s its ma- jor tents according to its own needs. African Socialism is p r a g m a t i c : it rejects the Russian emphasis on class w a r , which i t finds irrelevant in Africa; it rejects the P e k i n g doctrine of the armed revolution; and it approves of the one- p a r t y s t a t e , which is opposed by democratic so- cialists. I t a s s e r t s and a s s u r e s the political personality of Africa, the cultural autonomy of each nation, a new concept of socio-economic development, and the propagation of African spiri- t u a l values. By a d h e r i n g to the doctrines of African Socialism, African s t a t e s are in a stronger position to m a i n t a i n t h e i r policies of non-alignment, which protects their independence; single p a i t y rule, which is designed to hasten national i n t e g r a t i o n ; and Pan-African- ism, which insures against inter-African dis- putes and s t r e n g t h e n s each s t a t e in its struggle for identity and purpose*

President N y e r e r e h a s warned Africans of the dangers of " t h e second scramble for Africa".⁰ He laments t h a t even t h e socialist countries have joined the capitalist countries in u s i n g t h e i r

* See J u l i u s Nyerere, " T h e Second S c r a m b l e "

and "Democracy and t h e P a r t y System", r e - printed in R u p e r t Emerson and M a r t i n Kilson (ed.). The Political Awakening of Africa^ N e w J e r s e y , Prentice Hall, 1965, pp. 162-165 a n d

122-128.

wealth for power and prestige, r a t h e r than the eradication of poverty, and t h a t one millionaire will spend millions on destroying another. He a r g u e s t h a t the p a t t e r n of imperialism has chang- ed, and instead of one imperialist power fighting:

against another, Africans will be turned against Africans. The big powers a r e attempting by- means of slogans to divide and rule Africa and to t h w a r t African collaboration: talk of creating l a r g e r units is dismissed as 'artificial*, although African colonial boundaries could hardly be more artificial; a t t e m p t s to deal with tribalism are labelled ' d i c t a t o r s h i p ' ; and moves for unity are 'communist* or 'imperialist' plots, depending on the affiliations of the power-hungry accuser.

African nations must stand together and resist the destruction of t h e i r value systems and t h e i r hopes for a b e t t e r s t a n d a r d of living, "African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if i t is not a t the same time P a n - Africanism."

Y e a r s of dependence have brought to the people of Africa a hesitation to t a k e responsibility, and the presence of rich, powerful, materialistic countries in the world can dull the spiritual drive of people and b l u n t t h e instruments and purposes of government in poorer countries. If decisions are made about Africa's future in London and Washington, African s t a t e s a r e n o more free t h a n if they were r : a d e in Moscow or Peking.

African states have to become m a s t e r s of t h e i r own destinies, and the surest way to achieve both t r u e political independence and ultimately the economic viability t h a t entrenches it, is f o r them to commit themselves firmly to the P a n -

African ideal a n d to reject a n y individual short- t e r m economic g a i n s which involve compromise of aims, o r alignment a t the expense of a n o t h e r African nation.