The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its implementation instruments, such as the African Standby Force (ASF), opened a new window of hope in the field of peace and security. Both the Constitutive Act of the AU and the 2002 Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) placed renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime capable of preventing, managing conflicts on the continent and solve. African Union, 2000: Article 4(d) and African Union, 2002: Article 3(e)).
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Was the migration of the OAU to the AU the answer to the problems of its limited peacekeeping capacity. These situations give rise to serious questions about the future of the AU in peace and security matters.
The concept of defense diplomacy is facilitating a shift in the role of the armed forces from the use or threat of force to a cooperative peacetime use of the armed forces and a tool of foreign and security policy. In order to benefit from this cooperation and to facilitate the objectives of the PSC, the formation of an ASF is envisaged.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
Literature on African security cooperation
Other sources in this category highlight the aspirations of African states to have a continental military system, such as the African High Command during the OAU era, and the way in which these did not succeed. Other authors such as Berman and Sams (2000), Amate (1986) and Wiseman (1984) have been consulted for the OAU operations in Chad, which was the first OAU peacekeeping mission.
Literature on the African peace and security architecture The Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy
An article on the evolving security architecture of Africa by Golaszinski (2004) also provides good insight into the purposes and initiatives of the AU in pursuit of peace and stability. Towards a Policy Framework for Peace and Security in Africa: Development, Progress and Challenges Neethling (2004); Good Governance, Security and Disarmament: The Challenge of Demilitarization in Africa by Nathan (1998); and Neethling provide useful information on shared African security.
Literature on challenges to peace and security implementation Implementing intentions is always more difficult than conceiving intentions
STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
The fifth chapter is an evaluation of the study, which presents a summary of the findings and some concluding remarks.
CONCLUSION
THE EVOLVING MILIEU OF AFRICAN SECURITY COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
It discusses security cooperation during the OAU era, and highlights the challenges the Organization has faced in its efforts to conduct peacekeeping missions. The importance of this chapter is that it highlights the weaknesses of the OAU in peace efforts.
DEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the challenges that limited or limited the OAU's peacekeeping efforts in its era. The regional security cooperation that existed in the OAU is better described as collaborative because it was less systematic and was based on mutual benefits rather than formal agreements (Cawthra, 2004:33).
SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA
To combat these uncertainties, four strategies were adopted and became the basis of security cooperation on the continent. African leaders hoped that a neutral Africa could protect the continent from becoming a Cold War battleground (Ayebade and Alao, 1998:6).
PAN-AFRICANISM AND DECOLONISATION AS CATALYSTS TO SECURITY COOPERATION
Such words of wisdom, coming from African leaders, confirmed the ideals of Pan-Africanism, which facilitated cooperation for the benefit of the people of the continent. The newly appointed African leaders therefore saw unity as essential for the rapid eradication of colonialism and for the continent's economic and political development.
THE OAU AND PEACEKEEPING
The failure of the African High Command and its alternatives as discussed in the next section further explains this deliberate fear of empowering the OAU. All these delays demonstrated the lack of readiness of the OAU to set up a peacekeeping force without significant external help.
FROM THE AFRICAN HIGH COMMAND TO THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
At the OAU Secretariat there would be an OAU Defense Advisor with the rank of General. It was rejected for the same reasons as the Task Force's rejection.
REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
Delegates recognized that "the security and stability of each African country is inextricably linked to the security of all African countries" (African Leadership Forum, 1991). Therefore, it was more appropriate to engage regional authorities to solve regional problems, since the developed world was no longer interested in Africa. Their report, commonly known as the Brahimi Report (United Nations, 2000), concluded that the UN "does not wage war", meaning that regional and sub-regional bodies have an obligation through the UN Security Council to take action when necessary.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION
Article 4(h) of the Establishment Act explicitly provides for intervention to prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity without the consent of the target state following a decision of the General Assembly. However, without UN authorization, any intervention may be considered illegal and contrary to the spirit of international law. The next chapter will attempt to identify new measures introduced by the AU to overcome the weaknesses of the old OAU.
CONCLUSION
The migration of the OAU to the AU brings new hope and optimism that the concept of the responsibility to protect will find its way to African countries, as some efforts already show that the AU is different from its predecessor. The mission's mandate was thus unclear, allowing the warring parties to take advantage of the ambiguity. In the final analysis, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the OAU's peacekeeping failures have been linked to a lack of political will, an unclear mandate, a lack of financial assistance, limited capacity and experience in conflict resolution, and foreign policy interference.
THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the configuration of the AU's peace and security architecture in order to find out how it is organized to better handle peacekeeping operations than the OAU. Having highlighted the challenges faced by the OAU in peace and security in Chapter Two, the emergence of the AU is therefore considered a new beginning in peace and security matters. It is for this reason that this chapter attempts to outline the AU and its structures that will directly address African peace and security challenges.
THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
African states as part of CADSP have the responsibility to promote CADSP through national policies. Ajulu is more pessimistic about what can be achieved from the new peace and security framework because of his mirror image of the OAU that had failed to control the continent's conflicts and instability for decades. Responsibility for the implementation of the CADSP rests with the AU PSC, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
THE AU INTERPLAY WITH NEPAD AND THE CSSDCA NEPAD was launched in Abuja, Nigeria in 2001 before the establishment of
This is in line with the AU's concern that conflict is an obstacle to the socio-economic development of the continent (African Union, 2000). CSSDCA dealt with the concept of peace and security even before the formation of CADSP. The objectives of NEPAD and CSSDCA correspond to the objectives of CADSP as well as the Constitution Act in general.
THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
These are the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and a Special Fund. 11 The five regions of the AU are the Southern African Development Community (Southern Africa), the Economic Community of West African States (West Africa), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (East Africa), the Economic Community of Central African States (Central Africa) and the Arab Maghreb Union (Northern Africa). The SDK also has a special fund known as the Peace Fund which is governed by relevant financial rules and regulations of the AU.
THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
Although the challenges facing the operationalization of the ASF are great, some progress has been achieved. At the moment, the progress of the five sub-regional brigades is at different levels. The PSC is also criticized for its bias in developing the military aspect of the ASF.
OTHER FEATURES OF THE CADSP
- AU Relations with the International Community
- AU Relations with Sub-Regional Organisations
In addition to the UN, the AU has relations with the European Union (EU), which is mostly supportive in areas where the AU lacks capacity (Behrens, 2006:7). The G8 also offers direct support to the building of the AU's peace and security infrastructure. The advantage of this arrangement is that it draws on the strengths of the UN, AU and sub-regional bodies.
CONCLUSION
As previously mentioned, peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavors that go beyond the AU's budget. It also has a decision-making and implementation mechanism, the PSC, and operational tools such as the Early Warning System and the ASF to implement decisions of the AU. These mechanisms could also facilitate better funding, which the AU critically needs to carry out its peacekeeping missions.
THE AU: FROM DECLARATIONS TO OPERATIONAL REALITIES
INTRODUCTION
The cases of Burundi and Sudan test many aspects of the AU's capacity and effectiveness. Although the deadline for the first phase of the ASF was June 2005, the AU never called on the ASF to intervene, instead still calling on individual member states to contribute troops. The influence of international politics is being tested, especially in Darfur, where there has been outrage over a UN mission to replace the AU.
THE AU BEYOND LIMITED PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Since its launch, the AU has been involved in limited peacekeeping
The various organs of the AU are still developing and have not yet matured to a level where their effectiveness can be fully tested. The two conflicts are seen as a test of the AU's ability to resolve African conflicts and its determination to fully implement the relevant principles set out in its Constitution (African Union, 2005c:8). To better understand the operational aspects of the AU and peacekeeping in Burundi, it is appropriate to first elaborate on the background of the conflict.
BACKGROUND TO THE BURUNDI CONFLICT
The Hutus, who are demographically dominant, saw themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of the Tutsis, while the Tutsis saw themselves as a threatened minority (Alusala, 2005:1). In the days before the death of President Mobuto Sese Seko of the former Zaire, the governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebels fighting the government of Kinshasa. The December 2002 ceasefire agreement provided for an African mission to carry out the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire agreements (African Union, 2003c:18).
THE AU MISSION IN BURUNDI
This was contrary to AMIB's concept of operations, which called for deployment within 60 days of the granting of the mandate (African Union, 2003a:3). AMIB's mission was to deploy within 60 days of granting a mandate to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire agreement, to further Burundi's peace process consolidate (African Union, 2003a:2). The success of the mission can be attributed to South Africa, as the 'lead nation' during AMIB.
BACKGROUND TO THE SUDAN (DARFUR) CONFLICT Sudan is the largest country on the African continent, bordering seven
It was against this background that a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached on 8 April 2004 under the auspices of the Chadian President, the AU and international observers (African Union, 2005c:1). At the tenth meeting of the PSC on 24 May 2004, it authorized the President of the Commission to take all necessary steps to ensure effective monitoring of the humanitarian ceasefire. A follow-up meeting between the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A and the JEM from 27 to 28 May 2004 in Addis Ababa culminated in an agreement on the modalities for the establishment of the CFC and the deployment of observers to be deployed in Darfur (African Union, 2005c:2).
THE AU MISSION IN SUDAN
For example, the AU conceded too much to the belligerents during negotiations on the modalities for AMIS operations. Recommendations from Human Rights Watch (2006) strongly urged the AU to renegotiate to get rid of these party representatives. This view is shared by Susan Rice (2004), a former US diplomat who argues that the AU has done its best on the ground in Darfur.
GENERIC CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING
- An overly limited mandate
- Lack of political will and weak conflict management institutions In African politics, political will is no longer a problem in authorising
- Limited capacity and experience in core conflict management areas
- Lack of financial resources
- Impact of international politics on conflict management
The danger of this camouflaged political will is that it affects the AU's overall performance. Another observation regarding African politics is the fact that the AU is a prisoner of the internal politics of its member states. The ongoing misunderstanding between the AU and the Sudanese government is a good example of this tension.
CONCLUSION
In the two conflicts discussed, the situations could have worsened if the AU had not intervened when they did. In any case, only civilians who lived in the vicinity of the AU troops were granted protection. Such political unity can garner better support from the international community and thus close the gaps in the AU's peace efforts.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 5.1 SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS
Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Letter note on the renewal of the mandate of the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), PSC/PR/2(XLII), 20 October. Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan, S May.