CHAPTER 4: THE AU: FROM DECLARATIONS TO OPERATIONAL REALITIES
4.8 CONCLUSION
The AU missions in Burundi and the Sudan provided the AU with a testing ground to move from the declaratory stage to an operational domain, a relevant test for its envisaged conflict management mechanisms. A few outstanding aspects characterise the two missions. Firstly, the AU was not hesitant to authorise and deploy troops in the two conflict areas, even though the Sudan had some restrictions in accepting deployment. Secondly, the host countries were not hostile to accept the AU interventions, unlike in the OAU era where countries preferred other bodies outside the OAU structures. Thirdly, the international community worked relatively well with the AU in spite of the fact that the AU is relatively new. Lastly, the
AU was somewhat successful tactically, given its limited numbers, and its shortcomings were related to capacity and not to its conduct in terms of the mission areas. The success of the transition of AMIB to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004 set precedence for future peacekeeping missions where deployment by regional organisations will precede a more resourceful UN mission.
The AU missions in Burundi and the Sudan reveal that the AU possesses some political will to follow through the commitments it had made to secure Africa. The two missions indicate that the AU could respond to crisis situations within the limits of its capacity and resources. More importantly, the AU is more flexible in deploying its troops even before termination of hostilities, which is a critical factor to stabilise conflict or potential conflict before any escalations. This is very important because it is in line with the so-called Brahimi Report’s recommendation for a rapid deployment force.
In the two conflicts discussed, the situations could have worsened if the AU did not intervene when it did. The UN, which is tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, was not prepared to take any meaningful action at that particular time. For a young organisation, these are commendable achievements, but some aspects clearly showed the need for a continued partnership with the international community.
In both missions, the protection of civilians was not sufficient to guarantee them safety all the time. Though this is not a traditional task of peacekeepers, when the need to do so arose, the AU peacekeepers were not in a position to carry it out in full. In essence, this task can only be achieved if the peacekeepers had numbers to cover the affected areas but also had the mandate to do so. In the cases of both Burundi and Darfur, such numbers were not there. This is proven by the fact that when the UN deployed in Burundi, they doubled the number of troops and other logistical requirements. Powell (2005:54) concludes that the mission under the AU lacked the requisite financial resources, operational and institutional capacity as well as training and expertise to fulfil its mandate as well as to provide meaningful protection to civilians. The restrictions imposed on the AMIS mandate by the Sudanese government hampered the effective protection of civilians in the areas. In any event, only civilians who lived in the vicinity of the AU troops were accorded protection. This therefore means that the AU requires extensive political and material support in order to deliver on its commitments to peace and security.
It is clear that the concept of an ASF is still far from being mature. Positive aspects have been pointed out as well as challenges to its operationalisation.
Given the fact that the AU is only four years old, it can only be hoped that it will develop with time and learn from the challenges it faced in Burundi and Darfur. Most importantly, the AU will have to reconsider its future path, whether to develop a stabilising force or a multidimensional force, which as for now seems to be beyond African means. If the AU member states cannot come up with a system to fund African peacekeeping missions, its chances of fruition will be drastically reduced.
Peacekeeping as has been highlighted, is a global responsibility. Even though Africa is playing a leading role in African conflicts, it cannot effectively police the continent without the assistance of the international community. But this assistance should be on African terms not those of donors to avoid donors taking full responsibility of African initiatives. As pointed out by Sharamo (2006:54), “… the cultivation of a strong global political will is a critical resource to effectively keep peace”. The success of an AU peacekeeping effort could be achieved based on the quality of political will it gathers from member states. Such political unity could better garner support from the international community thereby closing the gaps in the AU peacekeeping efforts. Financial and logistical constraints have a negative effect on political will, and will remain a major obstacle to AU peacekeeping efforts as long as the AU cannot provide for itself. With all these hardships in the way of the AU’s peacekeeping efforts, maybe it is a sign that no individual organisation has the absolute leverage to keep peace in Africa; a collaborative global approach with a strengthened regional response is probably the best course of action at the moment.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS