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THE PLACE OF BOYCOTT
STANLFY T R A P J D O
Lecturer in V i m , ' f i< >* • \J-» t>> n ;i>> ;• "'», ? / ? c . / . i n >>/ { / / u /<>ivri
T H E discussion c o n d u c t e d in *Ajr'ica South" on t h e mechanics oi social change have assumed that the tactic of b o y c o t t will play an i m p o r t a n t p a r t in t h e struggle for emancipation in South Africa. Non-Europeans have a long tradition of waging b o y c o t t campaigns; and in a t t e m p t i n g to discern the course of future political activity, it might prove profitable to investigate this history.
W h a t do w e mean by b o y c o t t ? It is generally defined <xs a c o n c e r t e d effort to w i t h d r a w , and to induce o t h e r s to w i t h d r a w , from political, e c o n o m i c , o r social relations with offending groups o r individuals. It is a practice that has been resorted t o , in o n e form o r a n o t h e r , for many c e n t u r i e s , though the t e r m itself is of comparatively recent origin. Captain Boycott, an Irish landlord agent, had reduced the wages of his tenant farmers and compelled t h e m u n d e r p r o t e s t to c o m p l e t e the harvesting of his c r o p s . O n rent day, Boycott sought to evict his tenants, who reacted by calling a mass m e e t i n g w h e r e Boycott's o w n employees w e r e pursuaded to desert h i m . In addition, the Irish Nationalists launched a campaign to ostracize Boycott: and his family, t h e action being designated a 4 4boycott' by Father John O'Mailley.
Boycott was often the only means by which the Asian peoples could reply to t h e assault upon their c o u n t r i e s by the W e s t e r n p o w e r s . In 190$ t h e Chinese launched a b o y c o t t of American goods as a protest against the t r e a t m e n t of their c o u n t r y m e n in the United States; and after the Nanking incident in 1929, a similar b o y c o t t of British p r o d u c t s was organized. T h e part played by e c o n o m i c b o y c o t t in the struggle for Indian freedom is well enough k n o w n .
Indeed t h e first non-Europeans to employ the boycott in South Africa w e r e t h e Indians. In 1907, the Transvaal Indian c o m m u n i t y , u n d e r the leadership of Gandhi, refused to register under the pass law regulations introduced by General Smuts.
T e n years later, the first big African b o y c o t t t o o k place, when African m i n e w o r k e r s p r o t e s t i n g against rising prices directed their anger against the concession store-keepers with w h o m they traded. W h i t e reaction was to set the pattern for later
m o v e m e n t s towards African e c o n o m i c advancement. T h e 'Natal Mercury' w r o t e of " t h e sinister influence of t h e Industrial W o r k e r s of the W o r l d notoriously financed by G e r m a n y " .
The first major a t t e m p t by n o n - E u r o p e a n organizations to launch a political boycott came in 193 c, at the t i m e of t h e disen- franchisement of the Cape Africans, when Africans responded to t h e Hertzog-Smuts legislative p r o g r a m m e by calling a series of conferences that culminated in the s u m m o n i n g of an All African C o n v e n t i o n .
This gathering, probably the most representative of non- European leaders vet assembled, rejected t h e G o v e r n m e n t ' s proposals that a Native Representative Council be established as a substitute for the Cape African franchise. On this score the conference was adamant. Yet within a short while an African delegation, many of whom had been the leading spirits in t h e All African C o n v e n t i o n , was s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e c o m m o n roll franchise for the parliamentary seats ( t h r e e in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate) provided u n d e r the Representa- tion of Natives Act, and accepting the advisory Natives' R e p r e - sentative C o u n c i l . For the n e x t t h i r t e e n years t h e question of boycotting this differential representation was to haunt t h e non- European political scene since, for a variety of reasons, t h e African National Congress chose to accept t h e concessions.
T h e n , in 1 9 4 3 , t h e Smuts G o v e r n m e n t created a C o l o u r e d Advisory C o u n c i l . T h e Coloured c o m m u n i t y , led by the N o n - European Unity M o v e m e n t , an offshoot of t h e All African C o n v e n t i o n , successfully b o y c o t t e d this advisory b o d y , reopening in the process a \ ituperous debate on t h e advisability of s u p p o r t i n g differential institutions.
T h e polemics in s u p p o r t of boycotting the " d u m m y institu- t i o n s " insisted that t h e African leaders w e r e playing t h e " h e r e n - v o l k ' s " g a m e . They w e r e deceiving t h e African p e o p l e into believing that they w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e Councils of State, thereby blunting their potential militancy. T h e N . E . U . M . d e m a n d e d t h e b o y c o t t of all inferior institutions in t h e strategy of total w i t h d r a w a l . Such a policy, h o w e v e r , was diametrically opposed to that of t h e African National Congress w h i c h was, quite unlike the N . E . U . M . , c o m m i t t e d to a policy of frontal attack on a u t h o r i t y . T h e parliamentary representatives and t h e Native Representative Council, it was therefore argued, p r o - vided additional platforms for t h e political activities of Congress.
T h e clear result was that the All African C o n v e n t i o n and its
B O Y C O T T
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allies, in conformity with their policy of withdrawal, spent most of t h e i r energies in d e n o u n c i n g the African National Congress and its s u p p o r t e r s .
T h e political boycott t e n d e d , therefore, to p e t e r o u t in a series of destructive and sterile diatribes. Yet the militant language, if n o t action, of the Unity M o v e m e n t was to have some small effect on t h e A . N . C . T h e Congress Youth League, influ- enced by some of t h e radical conceptions of the C o n v e n t i o n , provided an i m p o r t a n t pressure g r o u p within t h e African National Congress; and as a result of its activities and influence, the Congress a d o p t e d its n o w famous P r o g r a m m e of Action. This set o u t a series of tactical weapons that m i g h t be employed by the A . N . C , including t h e organization of b o y c o t t s , campaigns of civil disobedience, non-co-operation m o v e m e n t s , and one-day stoppages of w o r k .
Clearly it was necessary that t h e Congress p u t its house in o r d e r , just previous to this it had defined its a t t i t u d e to the visit of t h e British royal family. " A s a p r o t e s t " , they declared
"against t h e barbarous policy of the Union G o v e r n m e n t " in denying elementary rights to Africans, and " i n view of t h e fact that these injustices w e r e p e r p e t r a t e d in the n a m e of His Majesty, George V I " , t h e Congress p r o p o s e d to b o y c o t t t h e activities t h a t s u r r o u n d e d t h e royal visit. Very little effort was made to organize t h e b o y c o t t , and in t h e end it was a miserable failure—so m u c h so that t h e P r e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l of Congress travelled to Eshowe himself to m e e t t h e royal family.
At m u c h t h e same t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h e potential of t h e b o y c o t t was being d e m o n s t r a t e d by the Natal Indian c o m m u n i t y . In
1946, t h e Smuts G o v e r n m e n t i n t r o d u c e d t h e Asiatic Land T e n u r e and Indian R e p r e s e n t a t i o n Act, which set o u t to deprive Indians of t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d right to o w n land. In an a t t e m p t to sugar t h e pill, t w o W h i t e " I n d i a n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " w e r e c r e a t e d ; b u t t h e Indian c o m m u n i t y r e j e c t e d b o t h aspects of t h e legislation, and n o t o n e of the thirty thousand persons entitled to register did so.
T h e best k n o w n , and probably the most successful, application of the b o y c o t t tactic by t h e African people can be found in the i n n u m e r a b l e bus b o y c o t t s , t h e first of which took place in 1943 w h e n t h e p r i c e of bus fares b e t w e e n Alexandra T o w n s h i p and Johannesburg rose from 4 d . to cd. T h e poverty-stricken Africans retaliated by walking t h e n i n e and a half miles from their h o m e s to t h e c e n t r e of t h e city w h e r e thev were employed, and after
ten days the bus companies restored the old fares. In November 1944, the companies again raised the fares, and before a boycott could be organized, the police placed a ban on all gatherings of more than twenty people. Nevertheless the word got round, and for six weeks the people of Alexandra Township refused to use the bus service. Ultimately the companies gave way again, and the fares were restored to 4d.
When, at the beginning of 1957, the fare was raised once more, the people of Alexandra recalled their resounding slogan
"Azikhwelwa" (we shall not ride), and were joined by the people of Sophiatown, Western Native Township, and Lady Selborne in Pretoria, A little later Eastwood, Germiston and Eden vale were boycotting their bus services, till finally the commuters of Jabavu and Moroka, whose fares had not risen, came out in a sympathy boycott, together with Africans in Port Elizabeth, a thousand miles away.
The Nationalists hastened to change an economic boycott into a political show of strength. The Minister of Transport, Mr.
Ben Schoeman, returning from a visit to Europe, declared, "If they want a show-down they will get it. The Government will not give way, no matter whether the boycott lasts a month or six m o n t h s / ' Throwing every weapon of mass intimidation they could muster into their campaign, the Nationalists tried to break the back of the boycott. But in the end the boycotters won, and Parliament voted a subsidy for the bus company.
And it is not only bus boycotts that have been staged. Com- mercial and industrial firms who chose to victimize strikers found the non-European community boycotting their products.
The Transvaal Chamber of industries, in a confidential memo-
randum, referred to a strike of Indian workers in a textile factory
during May, 1957. The strikers were locked out (a term which is
easily interchangeable with boycott) and replaced by African
workers at lower rates of pay. The memorandum noted that
the company was confronted by a deputation from the A . N . C ,
the Natal Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the
Liberal Party, urging the company to enter into negotiations
with the Textile Workers' Union. According to the memoran-
dum, the A.N.C. then wrote to the company and accused it of
employing African labour below' the normal rates of pay in
order to break the strike, " T h e letter threatened", so the
Chamber of Industries claimed, "that unless this practice was
immediately ended, a boycott against the firm's products would
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5The Chamber was obviously perturbed by the "intervention of non-European political organizations in a workers* strike . . . and more specifically the use of the boycott of products as a weapon to achieve settlement of an industrial dispute." The Chamber of Industries could see the writing on the wall; it was evident that the non-European population was learning that "its purchasing power can be used as a weapon in its general political struggle." The Chamber found itself conceding that boycotting was a fairly common weapon used in commercial circles, and that there were also historical precedents where " t h e boycott has been used in South Africa by Europeans against Europeans, and by Europeans against non-Europeans," The latter reference was to the vicious boycott of Indian traders led by leading Nationalists, current as recently as July, 19^7, when the Nasionale Jeugbond conference "viewed the support given to Indian traders by Afrikaners as a great danger to the Afrikaans people."
To date the leading exponents of the economic boycott have been the totalitarian clique who bring conformity to Afrikaans political, economic and cultural life. It is an axiom of the sociology of nationalist movements that they are closely associated with, and are in fact channelized by, an entrepreneurial class.
And Afrikaaner nationalism is no exception. In 1939, an Eko- nomiese Volkskongres brought together Nationalist politicians, financiers and ideologists. Politicians like Drs. Verwoerd, Donges, Van Rhijn and Diederichs were present, while financier M. S. Louw played an important part with I. M. Lombard, reputedly secretary of the Broederbond. The Nationalist machine set to work eagerly. Every effort was made, to quote the leading Afrikaner Nationalist financier M. S. Louw, to channelize
"Afrikaner savings in Afrikaans financial institutions." The Afrikaner Nationalist was induced to insure only with Afrikaner insurance companies, to bank only with Afrikaner banks, to build his home through Afrikaner building societies. It was Dr.
Diederichs, now Minister of Economic Affairs, who told the
Ekonomiese Volkskongres: "As regards the relationship between
business and sentiment, it has been our standpoint that business
could not be based purely on sentiment, but that an Afrikaner
business could in no way exist without sentiment." To this end
large sums were set aside for propaganda purposes, the racist
Nationalist press put in harness, and the innumerable cultural
organizations that lead to the Nationalist machine busily
employed. From the pulpit and the classroom the call went forth to urge Nationalists to buy Afrikaans and not to purchase from firms hostile to " t h e Afrikaans way of life". If there were still any doubts as to the relationship between Nationalist business concerns and the Nationalist political ideology, a recent pro- nouncement by M. S. Louw must have dispelled any remaining illusions. "If we (the Nationalists) want a republic", he stated,
" w e must see that our economy is more independent."
It is clear that the Nationalist political machine and Nationalist capitalism are very closely related. The police state created by the Nationalist Government has left very few legal channels open to the opponents of apartheid, but, for the time being, boycott remains. Because the Nationalists have in the past made no distinction between their economic and political objectives, they are now in a particularly vulnerable position. As the Chamber of Industries noted, " t h e non-European population is learning that its purchasing power can be used as a weapon in its general political struggle." And this purchasing power is enormous. The 1957 president of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, Mr. W . P. Rousseau, stated that African purchas- ing power for the year of his term of office was £36^,000,000, or a quarter of the total national income.
In the past, whilst Nationalist capital was still in its embryonic stage, it needed only to call upon the " v o l k " to support its business and financial institutions. This, however, is no longer the case. If these institutions are to progress, they must have a wider appeal and they are now engaged in attempting to capture the non-White market. The macabre irony of the non-European population paying for its own subjection may not have occurred to the Nationalists. It has certainly occurred to the leaders of the Congress movement. Hence their call for a nation-wide
o
economic boycott of business houses that are dominated by
leading Nationalists. In the past other pressures have failed to
convince the Nationalists of the malignancy of their ways. It is
possible that an economic boycott will go a long way to creating
the environment in which social change will take place. Michael
Harmel has put the point well. "There have been", he notes,
' 'plenty of examples in history where a combination of factors
have been compelling enough to make a ruling class give way
for urgent and overdue changes, without dragging the people
through the agony of civil w a r . " Boycott alone will not achieve
