• Tidak ada hasil yang ditemukan

Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:M:Mathematical Social Sciences:Vol40.Issue3.Nov2000:

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2017

Membagikan "Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:M:Mathematical Social Sciences:Vol40.Issue3.Nov2000:"

Copied!
14
0
0

Teks penuh

Loading

Referensi

Dokumen terkait

In this paper we consider decision makers who adhere with the reflection effect as well as some other well known axioms, such as being constant risk averse and the betweenness

Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed that this space is universal not only by virtue of including all possible sequences of finite-order types, but also in light of its relation to the

Again, a quasi-strict equilibrium with the support of at most three pure strategies is locally asymptotically stable with respect to these dynamics if the level of inertia is

This equilibrium is stable because the payoffs for one round of the Mutual Cooperation (second to last round) plus one round of Exploitation (last round) is greater than the payoffs