4.1.3 “Javanese” Psychologies 6
4.2 Contextualizing the 2006 Java Earthquake
Being located where the Eurasian, Pacific, and Australian tectonic plates meet, In-donesia has a long history of seismic and volcanic hazards. Other frequent disasters include landslides, hurricanes, floods, or fires (Torrente et al.2008; PDRSEA2008).
Comparing the frequency of the disaster agents, records from 2000 to 2009 rank flooding (39.86 %) the highest, followed by earthquakes (24.32 %) and landslides (17.57 %). By far, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami resulted in the highest death toll and level of destruction. Out of a total of 178,588 disaster casualties in that decade, 167,000 lives were lost in the 2004 tsunami, mainly in the Aceh province (Ophiyan-dri et al.2010). When one and a half years later the 2006 Java earthquake hit, the tremendous destruction of the Aceh tsunami remained a close reference point for disaster management agencies, the affected communities, and the national public.
4.2.1 The Earthquake on 27 May 2006
Shortly before the 2006 Java earthquake hit, all eyes (and disaster mitigation efforts) had been directed toward Mt. Merapi, the volcano located about 27 km north of the city of Yogyakarta. Increased seismic activities had been recorded for weeks, and an eruption was expected in early March. By May 16, the highest alert level was declared, and more than 22,000 people were evacuated. Because of the threatening volcanic activity, when the earthquake hit the region on May 27, many national and international disaster management agencies were already set up in Yogyakarta, alert and prepared. The situation remained a multi-hazard scenario, because Mt. Merapi’s increased volcanic activity continued for over a month, its pyroclastic flows and rock falls only decreasing in frequency and intensity after June 28.
The actual earthquake, the focus of our case study, occurred in the early morning of May 27, 2006, at 5.53 a.m. local time. It was a 6.2 magnitude earthquake, hitting the provinces of Yogyakarta and Central Java, with the districts of Bantul in Yogyakarta and Klaten in Central Java suffering the worst of it. About 300,000 houses were destroyed and another 200,000 damaged. More than 6,000 fatalities and 20,000 injuries were recorded (OCHA2007). The high fatality rate was mainly attributed to the region’s high population density of more than 1,500 inhabitants per km2and the lack of earthquake-resistant housing construction. However, missing guidelines in disaster management systems and a lack of preparation of the people affected have
also been considered contributing factors (Bayudono2009). A material damage of up to 3.1 billion US$ (JRF2007) was registered, exceeding the financial damage estimates for the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand and comparable to those of the 2001 Gujarat, India, and 2005 Pakistan earthquakes (Leitman 2007). The damage was unusually concentrated in the housing, social, and production sectors, whereas infrastructure damage and losses were limited. The disaster had a significant socioeconomic impact, affecting living conditions and workers’ revenues in small and medium enterprises. Households and private companies without any insurance coverage were particularly impacted by the disaster (Subagyo and Irawan2008).
The damage caused by the earthquake was further aggravated by a series of sub-sequent disasters. In July 2006, another 7.7 magnitude earthquake caused an 8 m high tsunami wave, striking the southwestern coast of West Java and claiming over 650 lives. Most fatalities occurred around the tourist resort of Pangandaran, about 240 km west of Yogyakarta (Bird et al.2011). The Bantul region was additionally affected by a minor earthquake in September 2007. The volcanic activities of the
“ring of fire” continued. During our research, on 26 October 2010, Mt. Merapi had its largest eruption in over 100 years, killing nearly 400 people and displacing at least 300,000 (Surono et al.2012).
4.2.2 Politics of Disaster Management
Compared to other disasters in the region, the 2006 post-earthquake disaster man-agement had two unique characteristics. First, aid organizations were prepared to respond to an expected eruption of Mt. Merapi. Second, many international and na-tional organizations had been involved in the post-tsunami emergency and recovery process in Aceh and were keen to apply the lessons learned (JRF2007).
Many international, national, and local organizations were involved in the 2006 post-earthquake emergency and recovery process, including all relevant UN agen-cies11, about 127 international, and 248 national NGOs (Wilson and Reilly2007).
The National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster (BAKORNAS PB) along with its provincial- and district-level branches12had a leading role in co-ordinating emergency response on the ground (OCHA2006). The most influential
11The Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (MacRae2008).
12The National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, or BAKORNAS PB) was chaired by the vice president. The equivalent coordination unit on the provincial and lower administrative levels is SATKORLAK PB chaired by the governor and SATLAK PB chaired by the mayor or head of district. Official responsibilities include formulating and stipulating policies in disaster management, coordinating the implementa-tion, monitoring activities in disaster management, and rendering guidance and direction on disaster management. Later in 2008, the national structure was re-organized and the BAKORNAS PB was
body of international agents was the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Im-plementing a direct lesson learned from the 2004 Aceh tsunami, the IASC pursued a cluster approach to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts, an approach which later became a model for more effective humanitarian response (WHO2011). The disas-ter relief efforts were divided into thematic clusdisas-ters or sections, and indisas-ternational, national, and local organizations coordinated their activities within each thematic section. The clusters were defined in accordance with corresponding UN agencies and included water and sanitation, livelihood, food, agriculture, education, health, and shelter (MacRae2008).
With regard to shelter, responsibilities were clearly divided between the interna-tional and local agencies focusing on emergency and later temporary shelters, and the national governmental action was directed at the reconstruction of permanent hous-ing. The government announced its reconstruction program within a week after the earthquake, though preparations for its implementation took months. Aid agencies were concerned about the upcoming rainy season. After some hesitation, the Indone-sian Government agreed to allow the (I)NGOs to launch a temporary (short T-Shelter) program. This was despite earlier plans to avoid such a program, as had been rec-ommended by international policy standards (OCHA2007). The T-Shelter program and the construction of permanent housing were merged under the Roof First policy issued in August 2006.This policy stipulated that temporary shelter should have roofs that could also be used for permanent shelter. After these types of planning issues were resolved, the construction of temporary shelter began in September 2006. In order to foster the shelter reconstruction, the multi-donor Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF) was founded in October 200613, and its priority tasks were to build tempo-rary shelter, assist with the formulation of earthquake-resistant building standards, and supplement the governmental reconstruction program by focusing on vulnerable groups and the rebuilding of livelihoods.
The government program for permanent reconstruction relied on a community-based approach instead of contractors. In preparation for this program, 11,426 community groups (called kelompok masayarakat or in short pokmas) were founded in August 2006, each consisting of 10–15 members (Bayudono 2009). Officially the reconstruction phase began on 5 October 2006, with its first payment cycle followed by two more over the next months (Hamengku Buwono X 2008). The entitled amount of money depended on damage assessments. BAKORNAS PB de-termined the criteria of four categories: totally collapsed, heavily damaged, partially damaged, and lightly damaged. The official village heads carried out the assess-ments.14Earthquake survivors could decide on the model of house, the time plan, and
replaced by the National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Ben-cana, BNPB), which today is responsible for the formulation of disaster management policies, for operational coordination of internal disaster management activities and for managing foreign donations.
13The JRF was pledged by the European Commission, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Denmark, and the Asian Development Bank.
14In Yogyakarta Province, a maximum of 15 Mio IDR (about 1600 US$) was paid for totally collapsed and heavily damaged houses, 4 Mio for partially damaged and 1 Mio for lightly damaged
the building material independently within their respective pokmas groups, as long as standards for building earthquake-resistant housing were met (Bayudono2009;
ALNAP 2008). The reconstruction budget, however, had only been calculated to include building materials. According to the official policy, the labor force was ex-pected to be provided through mutual assistance (gotong royong) instead of paid labor.
Various disaster management policies were put into place. For example, it was assumed that using a community-based approach instead of a contractor-based approach for reconstruction would result in better quality housing construction, ac-countability, and beneficiaries’ satisfaction, in addition to building social capital (Ophiyandri et al.2010). Instead of implementing “cash for work” programs (as had been the case in Aceh), unpaid work contributions were expected. They referred to the tradition of gotong royong or mutual self-help (Wilson and Reilly2007). The regional and national governments further promoted a discourse emphasizing the need to avoid dependencies, calling instead for local wisdom and local capital to be used. The Sultan warned people not to beg for help (Hamengku Buwono X2008) and the Indonesian government did not want to accept aid that would increase for-eign debts (Bayudono2009). Posters were hung on the streets with slogans such as
“donation doesn’t flow forever, it is time to get back to work and “It gets worse if you just surrender, it gets backward if you just wait” (GYSP2008, p. 25.2). The Sultan and governor appealed to the Bantul region to be a good example for the rest of the nation, as had been the case during the historical independence war against the Netherlands.
Overall, the disaster management of the 2006 earthquake is often portrayed as a positive example of a relatively fast recovery. The government’s ability to quickly mobilize people, the tradition of gotong royong, the wide diversity of responders providing support, and the availability of trained and experienced staff from Aceh have been identified as factors contributing to the success of the response (see Wilson and Reilly2007).The international response integrated local building practices, for example, the use of bamboo for T-shelters, even though this material had usually been used by the poor. The Bantul region’s location near Yogyakarta city whose infrastructure had not been affected by the quake, contributed to relief and recon-struction efforts. Many local NGOs reside in the city of Yogyakarta. The affected villages in Bantul were rich in social resources, that is, they were equipped with active community groups, the tradition of gotong royong, and craftsmen and build-ing material were available on site. Furthermore, the national government wanted to prove better disaster management after bad publicity during the Aceh aftermath (MacRae and Hodgkin2011), so resources were more easily available.
Despite these contributing factors of success, challenges certainly remained. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Bayudono (2009) describes chaos, rumors (such as an approaching tsunami), overloaded hospitals, and an underequipped medical system. The structures of the local governments often collapsed, because its state officials were personally affected by the disaster and unable to simultaneously serve
houses (Hayashi et al.2008). In the Central Java province, however, a maximum of 20 Mio IDR was disbursed.
the public (Bayudono2009). Early relief efforts were further characterized by a lack of coordination. All agencies (international, national, and local) were focusing on logistics and started to compile their own needs assessments, without coordinating with one another. According to MacRae (2008) and Wilson and Reilly (2007), some regions received a lot of aid, while others were left out entirely and had to organize for themselves. These problems led to conflicts and generated dependencies on aid.
MacRae (2008) further criticizes that neither staff from local NGOs nor repre-sentatives from the affected communities participated in the international human response system. International NGO staff collected information and forwarded it to their superiors. Contact with the affected people was rare, MacRae referring to it as “planet INGO” (p. 194). The implementation was top-down, i.e., locals did not participate as partners but were hired to implement decisions that had been decided upon by others (MacRae and Hodgkin2011). This approach is diametrically opposed to a cultural-specific standpoint:
It is an array of universal techno-management expertise, dispersed globally, deployed and organised short- or medium-term anywhere and everywhere, in terms of its own logic, in English. Understanding of local context and communication with local people are the very things such a system is least equipped to achieve; yet their importance is blindingly obvious to anyone on the ground. (MacRae and Hodgkin2011, p. 263)
Efforts for documentation and bureaucracy were immense. Another problem con-cerned the communication and transparency of the national government; policies were either not published at all or already-published plans were later changed, thus invoking insecurity and disappointments as promises were not kept. For example, the reconstruction payments were bound to specific regulations and amounted to a maximum of 15 million Indonesian Rupiah in Yogyakarta Province and 20 million in Central Java Province, instead of the promised 30 million (MacRae and Hodgkin 2011).
Summarizing key features of the professional disaster management response to the 2006 Java earthquake, Leitmann (2007) evaluates:
Relief and recovery efforts will be more effective if they identify, use, and strengthen existing social capital (community-based skills, programs, and networks). The community-driven approach to post-disaster recovery, which builds on this social capital, requires significant investments of time and human resources but has results in greater client satisfaction, more rapid disbursement, and local empowerment. (p. 147–8)
4.2.3 Current Trends
The disaster management experiences of the 2006 Java earthquake became a valuable reference for disaster management and disaster management legislation in Indonesia, just as the evaluation of the Aceh/Nias tsunami recovery had affected the disaster response strategies in Java in 2006. Local capacities and integration of multiple stakeholders remained important directions for Indonesia’s national disaster man-agement. In 2007 the Indonesian parliament passed a new Disaster Management Bill
(Law No. 24),15 which emphasizes coordination between different governmental bodies (Hamengku Buwono X2008). The bill promotes an integrative approach to disaster management, demanding equal participation for all parties involved, from the private sector, civil society, and the local and national governments. It strengthens the role of the community in disaster risk management. Focus is put on development, prevention, empowerment, and avoiding harm alongside the provision of help. The law paved the way for the National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (NAP-DRR) 2006–2009, which is designed to integrate risk reduction and development planning on all administrative levels (PDRSEA2008).16For the first time, a gender perspective was also taken into account (Sastriyani et al.2008).