CBO identified appropriate Army unit types (for in-stance, the quartermaster field service company) by com-paring the statement of work for Task Order 59 and unit mission descriptions. CBO obtained detailed information about the missions, capabilities, employment, and man-ning of Army units from an online database called WebTAADS, which is maintained by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. CBO then identi-fied and matched units at the Standard Requirements
Code (SRC) level to specific tasks described in Task Order 59.1
The number of units needed to perform the tasks spelled out in Task Order 59 depends on the workload required for each task. The statement of work explicitly details the expected output for certain tasks: for example, provision and maintenance of latrines, showers, and laundry ser-vices to meet the needs of base-camp populations. In other cases, that statement stipulates the capacity re-quired of the contractor: for example, “the contractor shall be capable of receiving, transporting, and unloading up to 250 [cargo] pallets per day.” Using those require-ments, it is possible to determine the number of Army units that would be needed to perform specific tasks.
CBO considered the following factors to determine the number of units needed:
B Allocation rules based on the number of troops served.
The number of Army units needed to provide latrines, showers, and laundry services would be based on the ratio of the population served to the capacity of each unit. For example, allocation rules call for one quarter-master field service company to provide latrines, and a second company to provide showers and laundry ser-vices, per 21,000 troops served. The 130,000 troops in Iraq are located in six major clusters. Each cluster would require two quartermaster field service compa-nies, or a total of 12 such units to replace the LOGCAP contractor in providing these services.
B Comparison of units’ capabilities with the capacity required of the contractor. When the contractor is required to process up to 250 cargo pallets per day, one Army unit of the type allocated to the task (in this case, a transportation cargo transfer company) would have at least that much capability.
B Comparison of units’ equipment to that utilized by the contractor. In situations where measures of output (such as the numbers of troops served or the amounts of cargo processed) were unavailable, CBO attempted instead to match the amount and type of equipment utilized by the LOGCAP contractor. For example, CBO estimates that during the period covered by the analysis, the contractor provided and operated power-generating equipment in the theater with a combined capacity of about 400 megawatts. On the basis of the capacity of Army power-generating units, CBO con-cluded that about 10 Army prime power engineering battalions would be needed to provide the same amount of power. CBO used a similar process to determine the number of Army transportation units that would be needed to fulfill the transportation mis-sion in-theater.
B Ratio of logistics support units to supported combat units in past deployments or scenarios in notional deployment plans. CBO used this approach when the basis for allo-cating units to troops was not specified in unit docu-ments or when the “capacity” approach was not applicable or straightforward. Some equipment main-tenance units fall into this category. Here, past experi-ence helped guide the method used to allocate units to tasks. CBO examined the composition of forces de-ployed—that is, the ratio of support units to combat forces—in past contingencies or in notional deploy-ment plans. For example, one support unit of a certain type might be allocated per division.
In determining the number of Army units that would be required to provide logistics support, CBO assumed that Army units would provide those services in the same manner as the contractor, even when that approach was at odds with formal Army doctrine. For example, if the contract required the contractor to produce water in sev-eral different locations, CBO’s approach would have Army units produce water at those same locations, even though water production would be more centralized, according to Army doctrine. CBO used this approach to best reflect the realities of the current Iraqi conflict.
Finally, CBO also considered the geographic dispersal of the troops supported. The base-camp sites, with varying numbers of resident troops, are dispersed throughout western, central, and northern Iraq. In most cases, CBO allocated support units so that each site had a dedicated unit, rather than forcing a single unit to service multiple
1. The SRC is a coding taxonomy that the Army uses to designate a unit and a particular version of its Table of Organization and Equipment. The Army uses the WebTAADS online database to manage its units’ personnel, equipment, and command structure (which units are subordinate to which other units) at a fine level of detail. The units are listed in WebTAADS by SRC. The SRCs germane to this analysis vary in size from platoons of four soldiers to battalions of up to 657 soldiers. Note that those support units are organized differently from infantry units: the latter tend to be larger. Also note that a few support units are modular, meaning that their size can be tailored to meet specific needs.
sites. Thus, CBO allocated whole units to sites despite their having fewer resident troops than the support unit’s capacity in some instances. That approach tended to in-crease the total number of units allocated to the task order.2
Table 3-1 on page 29 presents the Army force package and associated numbers of troops determined using this process. In addition to the units that actually perform the work, the table includes headquarters units for command and control.
Assessing the Availability of Army Units
After determining the size and composition of the Army force package required to perform the logistics tasks, the next step was to verify whether the Army had sufficient forces to do that work and still meet other commit-ments—including the need to maintain a rotation base.
The Army has goals that limit the frequency and length of time that units may be deployed, and the Army pro-vides for a rotation base consisting of units that must rotate from the United States to replace those units cur-rently deployed. CBO’s analysis considered not only whether the units were available outright but also took into account whether additional units would have to be added to the force structure to maintain the Army’s rota-tion base.
CBO concluded that the Army would not be able to pro-vide all of the functions detailed in Task Order 59 with-out creating additional units and would, in fact, need to create many more units in order to meet its rotation goals. As summarized in Chapter 3 of the main text, the Army currently has 950 units with 112,435 troops of the types that perform the functions in Task Order 59. (See Table 3-2 on page 30.) Table A-1 provides additional detail, decomposing the 950 units into the 38 distinct unit types or SRCs. In total, the Army would need only 177 units—a total of 12,067 troops—to provide the functions specified in Task Order 59. However, while the 950 existing units would provide more than the required capability for some functions, they would provide less than the required capability for others. Moreover, many of those units are already deployed to South Korea, Iraq, or Afghanistan, and would not be available to replace the
contractor in Iraq. In order to fill in the gaps in capability, and to provide an adequate rotation base, the Army would need to create additional units.
Almost one-quarter of the units identified by CBO were already deployed to South Korea, Iraq, or Afghanistan during the period of performance for Task Order 59.3 CBO assumed that those 222 deployed units—consisting of a total of 29,128 troops—would not be available to perform the functions in Task Order 59. Additionally, the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would require a rotation base if logistics support was to be continuously provided over the long run.4 The Army’s goal for deployment fre-quency is 20 percent to 33 percent for active units.5 This means that, at any one time, only one-fifth to one-third of active units are deployed. For reserve units, the goal is to limit call-ups to 17 percent of the time, or one year out of six. However, a one-year deployment would most likely be immediately preceded by a three-month unit training period. Thus, reserve units can be deployed only 13 percent of the time, or one year out of every 7.5 years.
CBO assumed that the Army would meet these goals when possible, so that each deployed active unit would require at least two nondeployed units as a rotation base, and each deployed reserve unit would require at least 6.5 nondeployed units.6
There are two cases to consider when constructing the required rotation base for currently deployed units (those
2. The few exceptions to this rule are modular units whose constitu-ent parts are fully capable of independconstitu-ent operation. The platoons in a prime power company are an example of this type of unit.
3. Data were provided to the Congressional Budget Office by the Department of Defense, December 2004.
4. Unit rotation is different from the individual-rotation policy now used in South Korea (and employed during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War). Individual rotation maintains the same unit in-theater over time but moves individual soldiers into and out of the unit. Thus, Army units stationed in South Korea do not require rotational counterparts in the United States.
5. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq (September 3, 2003), pp. 34-39.
6. In cases where the Army requires an even number of reserve units to perform services described in a given SRC, the number of units allocated for rotation equals that number times the factor 6.5, yielding a whole number. For example, two reserve units would require 13 rotational units. In cases where the Army requires an odd number of reserve units, CBO rounded up the rotational units to the next whole number. For example, three reserve units would require 20 rotational units (rounded up from 3 x 6.5 = 19.5 units).
Table A-1.