Comparison of Incremental Costs Over 20 Years for Providing Logistics Support Using Only New Army Units
Option 2: Rely More on Federal Civilians for Logistics Support
Some policymakers have asked whether the military could hire federal civilians to provide logistics support to deployed forces, as an alternative to either procuring that support from private contractors or providing it using Army units. Instituting such an option would most likely require significant changes to civil service policies and practices, as discussed below. Because the ramifications of such changes are unknown, and their details are difficult to define, CBO presents a qualitative discussion rather than a detailed cost analysis of the option.
Background on Federal Civilians
Civilians deploying with the armed forces often provide uniquely governmental functions. For example, they may develop policy, oversee government contracts, or manage government assets or resources. Or they may serve in occupations that exist in the private sector (such as secre-taries, teachers, or lawyers) but in particular billets that the Department of Defense stipulates must be held by employees of the federal government. The Army may perceive a need for such workers to operate as equal members of a military staff, and some military leaders may be more comfortable working with federal civilians who (like military personnel) have sworn to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution. Civilians who maintain weapon systems or platforms in U.S. government facili-ties (such as maintenance depots) may deploy to provide similar support overseas.
The Department of Defense designates certain civilian employees “emergency-essential” to ensure that they are available during contingency operations or national emergencies. The designation applies to civilians who oc-cupy positions overseas or who would be transferred
over-11. Through June 2005, the Army National Guard had missed its monthly recruiting goals for nine consecutive months, was run-ning 10,000 soldiers below its cumulative recruiting goal for fiscal year 2005, and was 19,000 below its authorized manning level.
The Army National Guard also missed its annual recruiting goals for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Through June 2005, the active Army was running about 7,000 soldiers below its cumulative recruiting goal for fiscal year 2005. See John J. Lumpkin, “Army Guard Misses Recruiting Goal Again,” Associated Press, July 12, 2005; and Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2004 and FY2005 Results for Active and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel, CRS Report for Congress RL32965 (Congres-sional Research Service, updated June 30, 2005), pp. 10-11, avail-able at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32965.pdf.
seas during a crisis. Such positions cannot be converted to military billets because they “require uninterrupted per-formance to provide immediate and continuing support for combat operations or support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems.”12 Positions that had not been previously designated emergency-essential may be designated as such as a result of unforeseen circumstances or the exigencies of a particular crisis. Any emergency-essential employee who refuses to deploy or to remain behind after a noncombatant evacuation operation is sub-ject to disciplinary action, including removal from federal service.13
Other positions—those that “cannot be vacated during war or national emergency without seriously impairing the mission”—are designated “key employee” positions.
Such employees are considered to have “unique or scarce managerial or technical skills required by the wartime mission.”14
All federal civilians who deploy must meet certain medi-cal, dental, and psychological qualifications. When ap-propriate, the government may provide predeployment training in topics ranging from standards of conduct and customs of the host country to antiterrorism, force pro-tection, first aid, and small arms. As with military person-nel, federal civilians who are about to deploy receive wills and powers of attorney at government expense. Civilians can also receive base exchange and commissary privileges, as well as medical care in-theater.
Federal civilians who deploy overseas are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice if the Congress has declared war; they may be subject to the UCMJ during an undeclared war if they are retired military personnel.
The military commander may issue government firearms to deployed civilians. However, those civilians would lose
their noncombatant status if they used their weapons for any purpose other than defense. Even in cases of self-defense, they might lose their noncombatant status in the eyes of enemy forces.
Deployment of Federal Civilians in Recent Operations
Federal civilians have been instrumental in supporting recent contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
DoD collects monthly data on the total number of non-military personnel in the U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) area of responsibility, which includes operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as U.S.
troops stationed in adjoining countries such as Kuwait and Uzbekistan.15 The number of federal civilians (in-cluding personnel from DoD and other federal agencies, supporting military operations as well as reconstruction) averaged about 3,100 in calendar year 2003 and 3,500 in calendar year 2004 (see Figure 3-6).16 The number of contractors averaged about 8,000 in calendar year 2003 and 18,000 in calendar year 2004 (those numbers include only U.S. nationals working overseas, not host-country or third-host-country nationals).
In early 2003, in the midst of major combat operations in Iraq (which ended on April 30 of that year), a large share of contractors were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan rel-ative to federal civilians. Over the course of 2003, how-ever, the contractor share dropped as civilians entered Iraq to assist the State Department and other U.S. agen-cies with reconstruction. Federal civilians continued to be a presence during the first six months of 2004, until the Coalition Provisional Authority was disestablished and sovereignty was returned to the Iraqis on June 28, 2004.
After that time, the number of federal civilians fell slightly, and the number of contractors rose substantially.
Between March 2003 and December 2004, Army civil-ians accounted for an average of 60 percent of all DoD civilians deployed to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.
12. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Civilian Employee Deployment Guide, Pamphlet 690-47 (November 1, 1995), p. 1.
13. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, “Emergency-Essential (E-E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees Overseas” (April 10, 1992).
14. Department of Defense Directive 1400.31, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution”
(April 28, 1995); Department of Defense Instruction 1400.32,
“DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Plan-ning Guidelines and Procedures” (April 24, 1995). Sometimes a conflict can occur if a “key employee” also belongs to a Guard or Reserve unit that is activated.
15. CENTCOM’s area of responsibility comprises 27 countries, distributed among four contiguous regions: the Horn of Africa;
South Asia (Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan); the Arabian Penin-sula, Iraq, and northern Red Sea area; and Central Asia (including Uzbekistan and four other former Soviet republics). See www.
centcom.mil/images/27_AOR_Map.jpg.
16. The data are monthly snapshots compiled by the Joint Staff.
Other government sources have compiled estimates that may differ.
Figure 3-6.
Number of U.S. Contractors and Federal Civilians in the U.S. Central Command’s Area of Responsibility
figure 3-6. Number of U.S. Contractors and Federal Civilians in the U.S. Central Command’s Area of Responsibility
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
The Department of the Army provided CBO with de-tailed occupational and pay-grade data for its 1,750 civil-ian personnel who were deployed to Iraq or Kuwait dur-ing November 2004. Figures 3-7 and 3-8 show the 10 largest “professional and technical” and “trade, craft and labor” occupations, respectively.17 Eighty percent of the Army civilians deployed to Iraq or Kuwait at that time could be classified as “professional or technical.” Those occupations include equipment specialists, civil engi-neers, logistics management specialists, and miscellaneous administration and program management specialists. All of those occupations involve managing projects or over-seeing contractors rather than performing functions
themselves. Equipment specialists, for example, are expected to:
B Determine or recommend the requirements for the appropriate spare parts, tools, and operating instruc-tions to support equipment during tests;
B Maintain liaison with agencies and contractors devel-oping the equipment for the purpose of effecting solu-tions to problems;
B Review layouts, engineering and production drawings, specifications, and test reports; and
B Compare equipment offered by contractors to specifi-cations contained in bid invitations.18
Mar-03 Jun-03 Sep-03 Dec-03 Mar-04 Jun-04 Sep-04 Dec-04
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000
Contractors
Federal Civilians Major combat operations
in Iraq cease (April 30, 2003)
Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished (June 28, 2004)
17. Federal government jobs are generally divided into two classifica-tion systems. Tradiclassifica-tionally, the General Schedule is applied to pro-fessional and technical jobs, and the Federal Wage System is applied to trade, craft, and labor jobs. The occupational mix in November 2004 may not be representative of earlier periods dur-ing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Major combat operations ended on April 30, 2003, and by November 2004 (some 18 months later), federal civilians were active in the ongoing reconstruction phase.
18. Position description for the Equipment Services job series, Gen-eral Schedule 1670, from the Office of Personnel Management’s Web site, available at www.opm.gov/fedclass/1600/1600_10.asp.
Figure 3-7.