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UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY ISLAMIC

STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Written by:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

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ii

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Submitted as Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Attainment of

the Degree of Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department, Social and Political Science Faculty, Universitas

Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Written By:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

Advisor: Siti Muslikhati. S.IP., M.Si.

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

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iii

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Submitted as Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Attainment of the Degree of Sarjana IlmuPolitik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department,

Social and Political Science Faculty Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Written By:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

Advisor: Siti Muslikhati. S.IP., M.Si.

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

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UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY ISLAMIC

STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Written by:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

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ii

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Submitted as Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Attainment of

the Degree of Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department, Social and Political Science Faculty, Universitas

Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Written By:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

Advisor: Siti Muslikhati. S.IP., M.Si.

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

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iii

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

Submitted as Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Attainment of the Degree of Sarjana IlmuPolitik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department,

Social and Political Science Faculty Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Written By:

Sigit Budiyanto 20120510282

Advisor: Siti Muslikhati. S.IP., M.Si.

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

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iv

ENDORSEMENT PAGE

This undergraduate thesis entitled:

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE BY

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) IN 2014

SIGIT BUDIYANTO 20120510282

This undergraduate thesis has been examined and endorsed by the Board of Examiners from the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta on:

Day/Date : Tuesday, December 20th, 2016

Time : 15.00 PM

Place : Examination Room Head of International

Relations Department‟s Room

Acknowledged by: Advisor/Chief of Examiner

Siti Muslikhati. S.IP., M.Si. NIK: 19690724199409 163 031

Examiner I

Dr. Hj. Nur Azizah., M.Si. NIK: 19621212198712 163 004

Examiner II

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v

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this undergraduate thesis is my own work. This undergraduate thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purpose.

I certify that the intellectual content of my undergraduate thesis is the product my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this undergraduate thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Yogyakarta, 20th December, 2016

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vi

DEDICATION PAGE

This undergraduate thesis is dedicated to:

Pun Mamah, Pun Bapa,

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vii

MOTTO

It was narrated that Anas bin Mâlik said: The Messenger of Allah said

Seeking knowledge is a duty upon every Muslim”.

(Sunan Ibn e Majah, Book of Sunnah, Hadith no 224, Classified as Sahih By Allama Albani)

Sayyidina Ibn Mas‟ud (RA) reported that Allah‟s Messenger (SAW) said,

The feet of the son of Adam will not move away from his Lord on the Day of Resurretion till he is asked about five things about his life, how he spent it; about his youth, how he passed it; about his wealth, how he eared it; and on

what he poured it; and what he did with that which he learnt.

(Jami Tirmidh, Book on Description of Day or Ressurection, Hadith no 2424, Classified as Sahih By Allama Albani)

It was narrated that Abu Hurairah said: “One of the supplications that the Prophet used to say was:

ََ ٍبْلَ ق ْنِمَو ُعَمْسُي ََ ٍءاَعُد ْنِمَو ُعَفْ نَ ي ََ ٍمْلِع ْنِم َكِب ُذوُعَأ يِِإ َمُهَللا

ُعَبْشَت ََ ٍسْفَ ن ْنِمَو ُعَشََْ

0 Allah, I seek refuge with You from knowledge that is of no benefit, from a supplication that is not heard, from a heart that does not fear (You) and from a

soul that is not satisfied‟.”

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viii

FOREWORDS

Praise and gratitude to Allah SWT for all the blessings, favors, and gifts that have been given, so that the writer can finish the thesis entitled “The Establishment of the Islamic State by Islamic State of Iraq And Syria (ISIS) In 2014”. This thesis is submitted as a part fulfillment of the requirement for the attainment of the Degree of Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) or Bachelor of Political Science in International Program of International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, as well as the application of the theories that have been the writer get during the college time.

The writer aware that this undergraduate thesis is still far from the perfect one and there are still many flaws. However, the writer hopes that this undergraduate thesis will be useful in the future, for the writing of further research. The writer would like to thank for all the support and assists from all parties, and apologize for any flaws and mistakes.

Yogyakarta, 20th December, 2016

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Assalamu‘alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh “May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be with you”.

Bismillahhir rahmanir Rahim ―In the Name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful”.

All praises be to Allah, king of the king, the Lord of the world, and the master of the day after, who has given us a blessing and guidance. Sholawat and sallam may Allah send them to our Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, (Peace Be Upon Him), his families, his companions, and his followers. Who has taken all human beings from the Darkness to the Lightness.

On this occasion with great humility, the writer would like to express his genuine gratitude to all those who have contributed in the process of study and writing of this thesis, in particular, because of the help and suggestion from stakeholders, this thesis can be resolved properly:

1. Allah SWT. Indeed, you are the best place to return. I will always be

grateful for the abundance favours.

2. Prophet Muhammad ﷺ(Peace Be Upon Him). The best leader.

3. With my respect and my love, My Parents (Sumaryo & Lina Herlina) who

always give their huge support, who always give their best affection, and

who always listen to my problem. And my dear and beloved Sisters&

Brother (Sri Lestari with her husband „Adi Supriadi‟ & Azka Lutfi Mahardika „Brother-in-law & Nephew‟, Astri Wulan Dari, & Pandu Adji Satria).

4. Mrs. Siti Muslikhati, S.IP.,M.Si. as my Undergraduate Thesis Advisor

who has guided me completing my thesis. Thank you for all the

suggestions and the criticism which helps me to finish this sacred thesis.

5. Mrs. Dr. Nur Azizah M.Si. as The Head of International Relations.

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x

Takdir Ali Mukti, S.Sos., M.Si as The Examiner 2. Thank you for the

helpful advises in the examination.

6. Mr. Prof. Dr. Bambang Cipto, MA, as the Rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

7. Mr. Ali Muhammad M.A,. Ph.D. as the Dean of Social and Political Science Faculty. Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

8. Mr Djumari, Mr Waluyo, & Mr Ayub as as the administrative staff of International Relations Department of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. Thank you for your help and support especially in taking care of some important certificates and files.

9. Miss Siti Nurjannah as my Language Consultant. Thank you for making sure that my thesis has the correct grammar.

10.My Housemate Muhammad Rasyid Atmodigdo. Thank you for the last 4

years, we‟ve been together and thanks for understanding me with all my

problem, complain.

11.My Sundanese Friends, Bayu Yudaswara, Arif Ismail Firmansyah, Firda Septian, Akbar Abrary, and Mang Epox.

12.The Students of IPIREL 2012, especially for (Syifa Zia Rahmah, Dian Karolina, Ana Rizkia Umami, Ilham Hertantyo, Areza Pradana Witjaksono, Rizky Ayu Kurniasari, Linggar Pangestu, Ghiffari Yusuf), IPIREL 2013 (Khali Pascal, Jack, Barep, Reza).

13. International Relations 2012 a.k.a Cah Nom, and IPIREL Futsal Teammates.

14.KKN 77 Bambang Lipuro friends, PANCANITI & BARAYA friends, Garda Depan (Gardep 52) Dagadu Djokdja friends.

15.Last but not least, those who cannot be mentioned one by one, who have helped and support the writer to finish this thesis.

Jazakumullah Khairan Katsiran Wa Jazakumullah Ahsanal Jaza ―May Allah

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xi

ABSTRACT

The Study of the establisment of the Islamic State by ISIS in 2014, a militant group that formed by Zarqawi in 1999 and increasingly developed and conquered territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria, After seizing territories in Iraq and Syria, they proclaimed itself as the Islamic State, recently claiming Al-Baghdadi as their caliph leader. This study aims to find out the reason why ISIS establishes an Islamic State. The writer used the contstructivism theory to help analyse the problem, and used the qualitative-descriptive method. The materials of the study are obtained through internet by collecting some data from articles, journal, papers, and books to answering the research question. The data needed for the undergraduate thesis were collected through some facts that can support the data of the research.

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ABBREVIATION

AQ Al-Qaeda

AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq

FSA Free Syrian Army

IS Islamic State

ISI Islamic State in Iraq

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria JNAS Jabhat al-Nusra l‟Ahl as-Sham JRTN Jaysh Rijal al Tariqa al Naqshbandia JTWJ Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence System MEMRI Middle East Media Research Institute

MNF Multinational Force

MSM Majlis Shura al-Mujahideenn

PhD Philosophiae Doctor

PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker Party)

U.S United States

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xiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENDORSEMENT PAGE ... iv

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY ... v

DEDICATION PAGE ... vi

MOTTO... vii

FOREWORDS ... viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ... ix

ABSTRACT ... xi

ABBREVIATION ... xii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ... xiii

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ... 1

A. Background ... 1

B. Research Question ... 5

C. Theoretical Framework ... 5

Constructivism Theory ... 6

D. Hypothesis ... 8

E. Purpose of Writing ... 8

F. Method of Writing... 8

G. Scope of Research ... 9

H. Organization of Writing ... 9

CHAPTER II THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ

AND SYRIA (ISIS) ... 11

A. From Jama'at al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (JTWJ) to Islamic State in Iraq ... 12

B. Mergering Islamic State In Iraq (ISI), Jabhat al-Nusra l‟Ahl as-Sham into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ... 18

C. From Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to Islamic State ... 22

CHAPTER III THE INFLUENCE FIGURES IN ISLAMIC STATE

OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) ... 26

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xiv

B. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi ... 35

CHAPTER IV THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE ... 42

A. The Salafist-jihadi Movement ... 44

B. The Return of the Golden Age of Islam ... 47

C. Holy War Against Internal & External Enemies ... 52

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ... 56

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1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria commonly know as ISIS is a resistance group that operated in the region of Iraq and Syria, moreover the group has now conquered the territory in Western Iraq and Eastern of Syria region, the region that approximately six and a half million people lived there. Although created as one of al-Qaeda manifesto, but different from al-Qaeda, ISIS became an organization that evolves quickly, evolve using a variety of strategies in addition to terror and insurgent tactics, into an organization that is more organized. After seizing some territories in Iraq and Syria, in mid-2014. ISIS calls upon the international public by setting up an Islamic State, they claim authority over political and theological exclusively over the Muslim world. (Laub & Masters, 2014, p. 1).

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2015, p. 23) that, its state-building project, however, has been characterized more by extreme violence,

justified by references to the Prophet Mohammed‟s early followers, than

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2 In the history of its development, they have gradually growing processes. Starting from the bottom, where at the beginning of their existence was unknown by the public, even international public, even so it is hard to trace the beginning of their existence. However, there is some information that is slowly sticking above the surface of the information about what is ISIS, and where they came from. Because ISIS with surprisingly announced the formation of the Islamic State, their dominance in most areas of Iraq and Syria, under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi. (Schweitzer, Einav, & Editors, 2016).

The roots of ISIS can be followed back to 1999s, with the establishment of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ). When Zarqawi fled to Iraq, where he remained under the radar for a period of time, planning his terrorist ideals and plotting to establish the terror organization to be known as the JTWJ. The goal of the JTWJ itself is to drive the US out of Iraq, overthrow the Iraqi government, and then purge the land of all Shia Muslims and establish a pure Islamic state (Byman D. , 2015).

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3 The formation of the Mujahadeen Shura Council was a calculated move by Zarqawi to distance himself from Al-Qaeda, but Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 shortly after the Council was formed. His death allowed for the group to change the direction again, with the support of the other organizations involved in the Mujahadeen Shura Council (Schweitzer, Einav, & Editors, 2016). In October 2006, the group announced that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had been established. The ISI brought the Southern Baghdad neighbourhood of Dora under their control from 2006-2007.

When the United States began its withdrawal from Iraq in 2009, they leave the governance and security to the Iraqi military and police forces. ISI used this time as a chance to regroup and rethink the strategy, ISI is regaining their strength and engaging in fundraising activities, also began a campaign targeted at toppling/overthrown the Iraqi government. It was reported in April 2010, ISI announced that they had been completely cut off from communication with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

During the Syrian civil war, which began in Spring 2011, ISI played an integral role in the conflict as a large opposition force to the Syrian army of the Assad regime. On August 2011, the members of ISI were sent into Syria with the mission to spread out and recruit fighters for their terror cells. After recruiting, in January 2012 the members of ISI in Syria announced their names as Jabhat

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al-4 Baghdadi released a statement that the al-Nusra Front and ISI groups were about to merge, forming the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham or known also as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In April 2013 were the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) made considerable territorial gains in Northern Syria, they quickly became the strongest group in the region (Crethiplethi, 2014).

ISIS is known as one of a Salafist-jihadi Islamic organization, a part of the Sunni Islamic extremist faction which seeks to restore the early Islam‟s days of glory through jihad, a holy war directed against internal and external enemies. The Salafist movement perceives the time of the Prophet Muhammad as ideal and the first Caliphs who succeeded him as role models (the Arabic word Salaf means ancestor or first generation) (Crethiplethi, 2014). The modern Salafist movement itself began in Egypt, as a result of the desire to purify Islam of its flaws and return to what was perceived as the Golden Age of Islam

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5 That was reflected in the tape distributed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi shortly after the declaration of the Caliphate. On June 29, 2014, Baghdadi tried to take ISIS to a new level when coincidently on the first night of Ramadan in 2014 after significant territorial gains in Iraq and Syria, the group again changed its name, and declared them as the “Islamic State” (IS) a name for the Caliphate and named its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph in Islamic State. Urge called upon all Muslims to declare allegiance to the new Caliphate. He proclaimed the return of the caliphate, with himself as leader. As caliph, he would be the commander of the faithful, as written in the Quran, Muslims everywhere would owe him obedience (Pizzi, 2014).

B. Research Question

As described in the background of the study, the question of this undergraduate thesis is “Why did ISIS decided Iraq and Syria as the early step to

establish the Islamic State?”

C. Theoretical Framework

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6

of Islamic State by ISIS in 2014” will determine the reason why the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria establish the Islamic State.

Constructivism Theory

The most appropriate international relations theory used to generate the answer over the question of this undergraduate thesis is the theory of Constructivism. The constructivism theory was established after the cold war era which mainly focused on the importance of normative and material structures in shaping the political behaviour (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 201).

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7 Second, constructivism believes that the non-material structure as mentioned earlier is important to form the identities of the actors, and the identity is the crucial factor that determines the interest of actors both individual and state actors, as consequence interest will produce the actions. In taking the decision the actors will find a lot of possible options and there is no exact pattern applied in all

actors‟ preference because of their different identities will create different outcomes. Constructivism believes that understanding the reasons behind the interest creation is crucial to understand the international phenomena. It tends to analyse the identity of the actors to generate the reason behind their creation of the interest.

The last ontological proposition is that constructivism believes that the normative and ideational structures will be able to form the identities of the actors, but it will not exist without the use or practices of those structures in a knowledgeable manner. Reus-Smit (2005, p. 205) states that identities shape the behaviour of the actors through three mechanisms: imagination, communication, and constraint. Identity will form the actor‟s preference in deciding behaviour related to the phenomena that they face. Thus, it is used by the actor to legitimate their action toward certain case.

Those three main ontological prepositions will match the best to understand why the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) establish the Islamic State. This undergraduate thesis will try to verify that the establishment of the Islamic State is

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8

D. Hypothesis

From the research question and the theoretical framework, the writer assumes two influencing factors that lead to the reason why ISIS decided Iraq and Syria as the early step to establish the Islamic State.

The first is, based on their historical background, ISIS is linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as the most influential figures with the realization of the Islamic State.

The second is, ISIS adopted the Salafist, moreover, they claim as a Salafist-jihadi islamic organization, believes that as a representative of Islam, aimed to

restore the early Islam‟s days of glory through jihad, by conducting a holy war directed against internal and external enemies.

E. Purpose of Writing

This undergraduate thesis will assist the writer to attain a graduation, bachelor degree in International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, in Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

F. Method of Writing

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G. Scope of Research

In writing this undergraduate thesis, the writer limits the discussion about the proclamation of the Islamic State, from the beginning of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from 1999 until the establishment of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, accurately in 29 June 2014.

H. Organization of Writing

The undergraduate thesis will have five chapters. Each of them will be described, explained and elaborated:

Chapter I : The chapter contains the Background, Research Question, Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis, Research Methodology, and Organization of Writing.

Chapter II : The chapter will describe the historical development that consists of the chronology of ISIS divided into three parts, that happen in Iraq and Syria, and showed the development of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) status.

Chapter III : The chapter will discuss the two influential figures in ISIS namely Abu Musab Zarqawi and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

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10 Islam‟s days of glory, a holy war directed against internal and external enemies.

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11

CHAPTER II

THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

(ISIS)

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria commonly know as ISIS is a resistance group that operated in the region of Iraq and Syria, moreover the group has now conquered the territory in Western Iraq and Eastern of Syria region, the region that approximately six and a half million people lived there. Although created as one of al-Qaeda manifesto, but different from al-Qaeda, ISIS became an organization that evolves quickly, evolve using a variety of strategies in addition to terror and insurgent tactics, into an organization that is more organized. After seizing some territories in Iraq and Syria, in mid-2014. ISIS calls upon the international public by setting up an Islamic State, they claim authority over political and theological exclusively over the Muslim world. (Laub & Masters, 2014, p. 1).

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2015, p. 23) that, its state-building project, however, has been characterized more by extreme violence,

justified by references to the Prophet Mohammed‟s early followers, than

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12 In the history of its development, they have gradually growing processes. Starting from the bottom, where at the beginning of their existence was unknown by the public, even international public, even so it is hard to trace the beginning of their existence. However, there is some information that is slowly sticking above the surface of the information about what is ISIS, and where they came from. Because ISIS with surprisingly announced the formation of the Islamic State, their dominance in most areas of Iraq and Syria, under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi. (Schweitzer, Einav, & Editors, 2016).

The Islamic State, was established about 2 years ago. Starting from their actions that belong to different from his predecessor. Starting from their actions in Iraq, unlike their action in Syria. Their action is always an extreme and uncompromising, until softened, even cleverly exploit the circumstances surrounding it into an opportunity. Now they became an influential element in the area as well as a challenge for the international community.

A. From Jama'at al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (JTWJ) to Islamic State in

Iraq

According to Lister (2014, p. 6) As he has been paying attention to the activities of ISIS:

“Over the years, ISIS fighters have frequently been heard proclaiming

baqiya wa tatamadad” (lasting and expanding). This simple statement

represents ISIS fundamental modus operandi as an organization. ISIS has deep

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13 al-Nazal al-Khalayleh (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) was released from prison in

Jordan.”

In the process, ISIS in a long period of time has evolved. Answering the challenge from various parties, especially military challenge under United States military leader, then led the invasion and occupation in the Middle East especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, it turns out that this answers the desires of the organization, namely, the realization of their desire to be "lasting and expanding"

Lister (2014, p. 7) Suggests that the early establishment of the ISIS can be known when that moment:

“Zarqawi was released from Jordan's al-Sawwaqa prison after serving 5

years of a 15-year sentence for weapons possession and being a member of the

Bayat al-Imam, a militant organization. Zarqawi then moved to Afghanistan,

where he made contact with al-Qaeda's leadership and established his own jihad

group, Jund al-Sham, which he renamed within months to Jama'at al-Tawhid

wal-Jihad (JTWJ). JTWJ quickly attracted international attention for its plot to attack

Amman's Radisson Hotel and at least two other popular tourist sites in December

1999. Zarqawi's JTWJ fought alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban forces before

eventually fleeing to Iran in December 2001.”

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14 time they argued that Zarqawi is a threat to the throne in Iraq Sunni and other regions. Because Zarqawi has three main goals: a traditional enemy of Zarqawi ' Jordan ', the international community and Shia. (Riedel B. , 2010, p. 94). On the other hand, Zarqawi believed his organization could take advantage of the resulting chaos to cast itself as the defender of the Sunni community and to usher in the establishment of an Islamic state.

This is evidenced by his, in support of its action, he spread the longhand results of his thoughts.

“Zarqawi's writings were consistently riddled with anti-Shia rhetoric

harking back to the words of historical Islamic ideologues. His final public

address before his death on 7 June 2006, Zarqawi exclaimed, "The Muslims will have no victory or superiority over the aggressive infidels such as the Jews and the Christians until there is a total annihilation of those under them, such as the apostate agents headed by the rafida (Shia)." (Lister, 2014, p. 9).

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15 Lister (2014, p. 9) Exposes the rapid development of al-Qaeda in Iraq:

“On 15 January 2006, AQI announced its merger with five other groups

(Jaysh Ta'ifa Mansura, Saraya 'Ansar Tawhid, Saraya Jihad al-Islami, Saraya al-Ghuraba and Kataib al-Ahwal) to form Majlis Shura al-Mujahideenn (MSM), a coalition whose aim was to unite and better coordinate

Iraq's jihadi insurgency. Zarqawi's death on 7 June 2006 catalysed a

strengthening of the organisation. Within five days, AQI appointed Abu Hamza

al-Muhajir (Abu Ayyub al-Masri) as its new leader, and four months later the

MSM announced the establishment of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq, or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), with a fully structured cabinet. Then, on 10 November,

Masri pledged bayah (allegiance) to ISI leader Hamid Dawud Muhammad Khalil

al-Zawi (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi).”

Levitt (2014, p. 1) In his website suggests that:

“The establishment was intended to represent a qualitative evolution

whereby an insurgent group transformed into a military-political actor

responsible for governing territory. By late 2006, it had reached financial

self-sufficiency, raising $70-200 million per year through a combination of ransoms,

extortion, and oil smuggling.”

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16 In Iraq, ISI likely to continue to disrupt the social dynamics and influence the public perception of the Sunnis will reign Haidaer al-Abadi that he is not defending their rights. Particularly in Iraq, the instability of the availability of the fuel, and the occurrence of conflict into a source of strength for ISI to unite a diverse group of other Sunnis. Because of the absence of the Union of a number of such groups, it takes struggle more to get the full legitimacy.

Variety of ways done by ISI, such as adopting a strategy of diverting, and initiating the information campaign that aims to affirm the validity of their Islamic State project. These strategies are achieved by doing a terror at once informed that they have the strength to realize their projects. As was the case in mid-2009, where their group increases its attack by killing around 400 people in Central Baghdad.

According to The Economist (2013) the aggression 2009 done by ISI was not their first attack, ISI was also spread the terror in 2007.

“This shift in dynamics encouraged ISI to lash out against rival Sunni

insurgent groups and minority communities, including on 14 August 2007 when

four ISI car bomb attacks against Yazidi villages in northern Iraq killed nearly

800 people.”

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17 experienced weakening caused by the discourse of u.s. military forces withdrawal in Iraq, from June 2009 until August 2010.

The switched of the headquarters of the ISI in the northern city of Mosul, becomes one of important decision, because in that area is occurring the conflicts between Arab-Kurdish. In Mosul, the operation of ISI is under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, with Abu Qaswarah al-Maghribi as the deputy. Then, Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani continued al-Maghribi's leadership after his death in October 2008. (CBS News, 2008).

On April 18, 2010, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri had been killed. Then Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as leader of the ISI. In mid-2010, ISI offers to the members of Sahwa to join them with higher salaries than giving by the Iraq government. In early 2010, ISI is also working to regenerate their senior leader after many of their previous leaders were killed or captured. (Lister, 2014, p. 10).

In Military aspect, ISI consolidates his power in Mosul. By hiding their ambitions to the other political groups, such as those conducted by the JRTN. A similar campaign was also carried out in the province, including the cities of Anbah Hit Ramadi and Haditha, also in the province of Ninawa and Salah ad Din parts of the city.

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18 campaign aimed at bringing Sunni aspirations against international protests, and indirect invasion in Iraq. In the absence of real political progress in Baghdad, management perception that more might be done. It appears that ISIS will gradually widen the target area bombing and other attacks in the capital. They also are trying to trigger sectarian conflict between Shia militias, it is an attempt to disrupt the process of reconciliation between the Sunni-Shia in the Central Government.

B. Mergering Islamic State In Iraq (ISI), Jabhat al-Nusra l’Ahl as

-Sham into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

The occurrence of civil war in Syria, became the trigger for the establishment of a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria in August 2011, led by the leader of the ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which appointed Mohammad Suriah Abu al-Golani as a command centre. In an effort to topple the Assad regime and set up an Islamic State, the Golani and his colleagues across the border of Iraq into Syria to help liberate a number of Islamist groups which was captured from Syria's military prison. This process lasts from May to June 2011, active resistance against Syrian security forces (Blake & Benotman, 2013).

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19 Jabhat al-Nusra l'Ahl as-Sham army consists of Syrian jihadists, aiming to overthrow the Government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and to create an Islamic State under Sharia law, with emphasized from the beginning of their resistance is on the „near enemy' i.e. Syria's regime than the global jihad (Stanford , 2016).

“Syrian members of the group claim that they are fighting only the Assad

regime and would not attack Western states; while official policy of the group is

to hold the United States and Israel as enemies of Islam, and to warn against

Western intervention in Syria, al-Nusra Front leader Julani has stated that "We are only here to accomplish one mission, to fight the regime and its agents on the ground, including Hezbollah and others" (Al Jazeera, 2015).”

Iraq's deputy interior minister said in early February 2012 that weapons and Islamist militants were entering Syria from Iraq (AFP, 2012). The Quilliam Foundation reported that many of Nusra's members were Syrians who were part of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Islamist network fighting the 2003 American invasion in Iraq; (Blake & Benotman, 2013) the Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari agreed to that in 2012. The British „the Daily Telegraph‟ stated in December 2012 that many foreign al-Nusra fighters were hardened veterans from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sherlock, 2012).

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20

September 2012 attack on Tikrit‟s Tasfirat Prison liberated 47 senior ISI leaders

from death row (Arango & Schmitt, 2014). The campaign‟s finale was an assault on Abu Ghraib prison on July 21, 2013 that enabled approximately 500 prisoners to escape.

On April 9, 2013, Baghdadi confirmed in an audio statement that Jabhat al-Nusra was an offshoot of ISI and that henceforth, it would be subsumed into the expanded Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In February 2014 Zawahiri announced that "ISIS is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions." (Tharoor, 2014)

Sami al-Oraydi in 2014 acknowledged that the formation of the Group was influenced by the teachings of al-Qaeda members, namely Abu Musab al-Suri. In the Guidebook Abu Musab, there are strategies adopted by them, which are: provided services to the community, attempts to minimize the presence of labeling as a group of extremists, establish strong relationships with local communities and other fighter groups, and focus to fight against the Government. (Hassan, 2014).

“On 10 June 2015, al-Nusra fighters shot dead at least 20 Druze civilians

in a village after one of them, a supporter of the Assad regime, opposed the

expropriation of his house by a Nusra commander. Al-Nusra's leadership issued

an apology and claimed that they had been carried out against the group's

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21 Gartenstein-Ross & al-Tamim (2015) as the writer of the Foreign Affairs magazine, contends that Jazeera is engaged in actively whitewashing Al-Nusra, said that there is absolutely no reference to the Druze in Al-Nusra's "apology", since Al-Nusrah forced the Druze to renounce their religion, destroyed their shrines and now considers them Sunni.

Al-Nusra and ISI are both against the Druze, the difference being that Nusra is apparently satisfied with destroying Druze shrines and making them become Sunnis while ISI wants to violently annihilate them as it does to Yazidis.

Hubbard (2015) noted that, this could give al-Nusra Front a greater long-term advantage The tactics of al-Nusra Front differs markedly from those of rival jihadist group ISI; whereas ISI has alienated local populations by demanding their allegiance and carrying out beheadings, al-Nusra Front has cooperated with other militant groups and has declined to impose sharia law where there has been opposition.

In early 2015, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri instructed al-Nusra Front leader Jolani to pursue the following five goals: Better integrate his movement within the Syrian revolution and its people, coordinate more closely with all Islamic groups on the ground, contribute towards the establishment of a Syria-wide sharia judicial court system, use strategic areas of the country to build a sustainable al-Qaeda power base, cease any activity linked to attacking the West.

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22 they have the same goal to enforce Sharia law and the Caliphate. They intend to implement them by way of a gradual, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra criticizing the way ISIS in applying Sharia law, fully and immediately, as the consequences, they alienate many people. Al-Qaeda and al-Nusra prefer the slow and gradual approach, that is to prepare the public to accept Sharia law and suggesting communities through education before applying Islamic hudud-aspect (Joscelyn, 2015).

They particularly criticised ISIS's enthusiasm for punishments such as executing gay people, chopping limbs off, and public stoning. However, Al-Qaeda agrees that hudud punishments should be implemented in the long term. The main criticism of defectors from ISIS is that the group is killing and fighting other Sunni Muslims, and that they are unhappy that other Sunnis like Jabhat al-Nusra are being attacked by ISIS.

C. From Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to Islamic State

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23 Sunni disenfranchisement of citizens in Iraq and Syria led to the existence of a vacuum, exploited by the Islamic State. The Sunni minority in Iraq, had been ruled out in their national politics after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime by the United States in 2003. In 2011, in Syria occurred a civil war between a Government dominated by Shiite parties Alawi, and the opposition, the majority Sunnis., spawning sectarian violence.

The rebellion that occurred in Syria in 2011 to further ease the expansion carried out by the Islamic State. Analysts argued that actually have occurred a non-aggression pact between the militant of the Islamic State shrouded with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and each of them choose to focus for anti-Government forces fight to retain power in its region. Extremist groups have come to dominate the northern and eastern Syria, and moderate forces invaded. Assad claimed by validated the opinion that his Government can defend against them.

According to the Reuters (2011), the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, and the expansion done by ISIS are undoubtedly being the power to the base of the organization. That reversion of their strength and expansion done already clearly visible before the year 2011.

“In early 2011, with the Arab Spring in full flow, the ISI continued the

process of expansion and professionalization that it had begun in late 2009. It

significantly escalated its military operations in Iraq, both geographically,

incorporating southern Shi„ite areas and the Kurdish north, and in terms of scale,

carrying out 20-30 attacks in multiple provinces, often within the space of an

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24 bombings in Baghdad and 12 other locations across Iraq on August 15, 2011”

(Reuters, 2011).

The existence of a volley of attacks and covers a large area, aiming not only caused material damage for the Government but also to break the morale of the security forces, and are expected to occur in Syria..

The last three years have been extremely consequential for ISI's dramatic evolution and grown into an organization capable of conquering and governing territory. Most significantly, ISI has expanded into Syria, exploiting that country's revolution and civil war. In the following six months of 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra operated similarly to ISI, but insisted it had no links to ISI or al-Qaeda, but by mid-January 2013 the group had led the seizure of two major military facilities in Northern Syria.

Islamic State expansion in Iraq and Syria has benefited greatly from tremendous regional instability and the weakening of nation-state borders. By exploiting and exacerbating such conditions, IS has been able to gain military power, a multiplying international membership, and unprecedented financial resources.

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25 which may potentially begin to draw on assistance from Iraqi Kurdistan and place the United States in a position of needing to (directly or indirectly) support what is technically a wing of the terrorist-designated Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan

Kurdistan Worker Party‟ (PKK) as was demonstrated around Mount Sinjar in August (Tharoor, 2014).

The northern Syrian city of Raqqa is often cited as the Islamic State‟s de facto capital. There, the group has established some new institutions (e.g., judicial, police, economic) and co-opted others (e.g., education, health, and infrastructure) to provide residents a modicum of services and consolidate its control over the population.

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26

CHAPTER III

THE INFLUENCE FIGURES IN ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ

AND SYRIA (ISIS)

In taking the decision the actors will find a lot of possible options and there is

no exact pattern applied in all actors‟ preference because of their difference

identity will create different outcomes. Constructivism believes that understanding the reasons behind the interest creation is crucial to understand the international phenomena. It tends to analyse the identity of the actors to generate the reason behind their creation of the interest.

The development of ISIS were also can‟t be denied for the role of their actors

behind their presence and were able to make ISIS become an international issue. The writer believed that there are two figures that are influenced in the development of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and these figures are the actors behind that, started from establishing a small resistance group in Iraq expanded into a jihadist organization with all their controversies, in the mid-2014 they have reached to declare into the Islamic State. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the founding father of ISIS, and his successor Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi continues his idea and mastermind ISIS declaring to establish the Islamic State.

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27 that determined the interest of actors both individual and state actors, in consequence interest will produce the actions.

A. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian-born who started to radicalize as a young man while in prison for drug possession and sexual assault. He travelled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s with the intention of joining the fight against Soviet occupation (Teslik, 2006). During the 1990s, Zarqawi adopted a Salafist ideology. While in prison, he gained a following by smuggling statements out of prison to be published on Salafist websites.

These statements caught the attention of Osama bin Laden after Zarqawi was released from prison in 1999 (Kirdar, 2011). The two allegedly met after

Zarqawi‟s release, although conflicting reports claim that they had little contact. Bin Laden was reportedly suspicious of Zarqawi and disagreed about several targeting and tactical issues. The key ideological difference between the two was that Zarqawi preferred to target his “near enemies,” such as Israel and the

Jordanian government, whereas AQ leadership often focused on the “far enemy,”

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28 through Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Kurdish areas of Iraq after the 2001 American strikes in Afghanistan (Kirdar, 2011).

While Zarqawi‟s militants formed groups that were sometimes reported as

separate organizations, U.S. State Department would eventually classify them

together under the name of the most prominent Zarqawi organization, Jama‟at al

-Tawhid wa‟al-Jihad (JTWJ). JTWJ‟s first operation was in Jordan, when it organized the murder of USAID officer Laurence Foley in 2002 (Boucher, 2004). The force had a strong foundation of foreign fighters, particularly from Jordan, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kurdish regions (Laub & Masters, 2014). Some joined from the Kurdistan-based jihadi group Ansar al-Islam, which had been

operating in Iraq before Zarqawi‟s group came, and JTWJ began to actively recruit other Iraqis (Felter J. B., 2007).

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29 JTWJ and Zarqawi quickly found themselves among the most prominent faces of the insurgency.

In October 2004, Zarqawi came to an agreement with bin Laden and formally joined Al Qaeda, renaming his organization Tanzim Qaidat Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn Zarqawi, known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in English. (Kirdar, 2011) Despite the official pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi and AQ

leadership still disagreed on some key tactical issues, such as AQ‟s willingness to

cooperate with other groups against enemies, and its focus on the U.S. and the

West rather than “near enemies.” These differences would create tensions that lasted for the duration of the affiliate relationship.

Initially, many Sunnis in Iraq were sympathetic to AQI and its goal of driving American and coalition forces from Iraq and preventing a Shiite government takeover. The Shiite majority in Iraq had been oppressed by the Hussein regime,

and many Sunnis feared the Shiites gaining power. However, AQI‟s extreme and

violent tactics began to alienate potential supporters. Many Iraqis, including

Sunnis, took issue with AQI‟s use of suicide bombings and other violent attacks like assassinations; its willingness to target Iraqis and popular Sunni leaders; its perceived foreign membership and leadership; and its intentional incitement of sectarian violence (Felter J. B., 2007).

The violence was also criticized by AQ leadership. AQI‟s increasingly violent

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30 However, Zarqawi often ignored AQ orders, and continued to alienate potential supporters with his tactics, such as the bombing of a hotel in Amman that killed mostly civilians in November 2005 (Kirdar, 2011). Many Islamist groups also condemned Zarqawi's strategy of killing large numbers of Shiites and destroying Shiite religious sites to incite sectarian violence (Hunt, 2005). On February 22, 2006, AQI bombed the Askariyah Shrine, also known as the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The attack prompted at least 27 retaliatory strikes against Sunni mosques the same day in Baghdad alone, and violence between Shiites and Sunnis escalated until a curfew was instated for several days, demonstrating that in many ways, the AQI strategy was succeeding (Worth, 2006).

Local backlash against the group continued, prompting AQI to join an umbrella group of extremist Salafist groups in Iraq. The move was an attempt to present AQI as a more Iraqi group, willing to work together with other organizations as part of the insurgency. The umbrella organization, called Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSM), was a collective of six jihadi groups in Iraq that sought to consolidate jihadi efforts to expel U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq. The MSM was a coordination body at most, a media front at worst, and had little to no control over what AQI did (Bergen, 2008).

Ideologically, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi handed down to his heirs a radical Islamic, uncompromising legacy whose traces is evident in ISIS‟s actions to this

day. Noteworthy is its hostility toward Shi‟ites in general and Iraqi Shi‟ites in

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31 with pro-American Sunnis, was trying to institute a new Shi‟ite regime in Iraq, anti-Sunni and pro-American. That anti-Shi‟ite legacy, based on Arabic Islamic sources from the middle Ages, gave al-Zarqawi what he considered “Islamic

legitimacy” to carry out mass-killing attacks on Shi‟ites and the Shi‟ite-affiliated

central government. His objective was to instigate a Shi‟ite-Sunni civil war that would destabilize public order, prevent the establishment of a Shi‟ite regime and support Al-Qaeda‟s takeover of Iraq. ISIS has continued its brutality towards the

Shi‟ite population in Iraq and Syria, implementing the legacy of al-Zarqawi, who, after his death, became a revered figure and role model (Keneally, 2015). On June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed by an American airstrike.

Zarqawi‟s leadership was a chief factor in shaping the group‟s emergence as

well as directing its course throughout its evolution. His leadership style was tied

to the time he had spent in prison, where he “found” Islam and became a fully

hardened criminal and gang leader. His embrace of Salafist Islam likely stemmed from his pre-prison exposure to radical Salafist preachers in Zarqaa‟s lawless Palestinian refugee camp where his foray into criminal life began. In prison, his captivating personality and nascent brutality earned him the loyalty of a criminal gang, foreshadowing the cult-like following he would eventually engender as a terrorist leader (Kirdar, 2011).

During the group‟s emergence period, Zarqawi‟s charisma enabled him to

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32 recruits for his operations. In addition to resilience against efforts to shut down the

inflow of weapons and fighters, Zarqawi‟s networking directly endowed the group with significant amounts of its operational funds (Bahney, Shatz, Granier, McPherson, & Sude, 2010).

Zarqawi‟s time in Peshawar in the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan conflict deepened his exposure to Salafist doctrinaires. In addition to Maqdisi, Zarqawi forged a relationship with Abu Kutaiba al Urdani, whose letter of introduction

would be instrumental in Zarqawi‟s association with bin Laden in the late 1990s. Moreover, Zarqawi‟s natural networking skills allowed him to cultivate important relationships with fellow militants, especially those whose wealth would form the base for his international support network in the years to come (Kirdar, 2011).

The loss of popular support and the global backlash against AQI‟s indiscriminate violence both in Iraq and abroad, as in the Amman hotel bombings

that led Zarqawi‟s own tribes to publicly disown him, added pressure on the group to reform its operational strategy and change its leadership structure. Despite the

lack of information on AQI and Zarqawi‟s management style prior to his death,

recently declassified intelligence gives evidence of the managerial changes that followed it. First, it is likely that AQI maintains much closer ties to al-Qaeda core today than it did during the height of Zarqawi‟s reign. Zarqawi‟s dangerous autonomy, not only was a primary factor in his group‟s destruction, but also

heavily damaged al Qaeda‟s global brand. A managerial reorganization gave al

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33

operative captured a month after Zarqawi‟s death in 2006. The operative revealed to U.S. forces his role as al Qaeda core‟s strategic messenger to leaders in ISI (Cruickshank, 2007). Given that al Qaeda core‟s repeated and unsuccessful

attempts to influence Zarqawi‟s behaviour were sent in letters that risked being (and indeed were) intercepted, it seems unlikely that such a position had existed prior to his death.

Following Zarqawi‟s death, AQI‟s organizational structure became more

bureaucratic and institutionalized. Discovered AQI documents dated for a month

after Zarqawi‟s death demonstrate that the group placed a premium on managerial control, in which operational security was repeatedly sacrificed. The documents

include a standardized recruiting “application” form and detailed records of the group‟s revenues, spending, and resource allocation methods, despite the risk that such records could be found and used by the MNF (Felter & Fishman, 2007).

While it is difficult to assess the internal decision making of a covert terrorist organization, it seems likely that pressure from al Qaeda core, articulated as early as July 2005 in a letter from Zawahiri, and followed more directly with a letter from an al Qaeda core leader identified as Atiyah, to cease the divisive attacks on Shiites and rein in the indiscriminate attacks that were costing so many innocent Muslim lives, had at least some effect (Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). Though Zarqawi appears to have resisted the former request, the latter

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34 Despite significant gaps in public records, it is widely believed that this represented a gradual shift at most and, more likely, a cosmetic one at that. However, the gradual shift from a leadership-centric organizational structure to that of a highly institutionalized bureaucracy greatly accelerated after the death of Zarqawi in June 2006. Despite the high praise Zarqawi received, his death most likely was a relief to al Qaeda core leaders; his successor, Abu Muhajir, was a

member of Zawahiri‟s Egyptian Islamic Jihad and enjoyed a relationship with the

senior al Qaeda core leader dating back to 1982 (Kirdar, 2011).

The importance of this shift is demonstrated by the fact that, despite periods of change in leadership marked by successful counterterrorist strikes against successive leaders and, perhaps more damaging, questions about the leaders‟ authenticity, the group has maintained some degree of operational activity. This includes its alleged involvement in global plots, including the World Cup plot and the more recent attacks against Egypt‟s Coptic Christian population (Al-Shishani, 2011).

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35

B. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State‟s leader who now styles himself

“Caliph Ibrahim,” He was born in 1971 with original name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri. Like Bin Laden and Zawahiri, Baghdadi is well educated. In

fact, he has more serious religious credentials than Al Qaeda‟s leaders, having

received his PhD from the Islamic University in Baghdad.

Baghdadi joined the jihadist resistance to US forces in Iraq in 2004, if not earlier. US forces detained him for most of that year, but he was ultimately deemed not to be a particularly dangerous threat, indeed, according to some accounts, he got along well with camp officials and was released. In 2006, his group joined the umbrella organization for Iraqi jihadists, known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). (I and others often use ISI interchangeably with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which dominated the organization, though technically it was not the only group.) Baghdadi became a member of the group‟s senior leadership council. For several years, Baghdadi controlled forces in the western Iraqi town of Qaim, where the Pentagon claims “he was connected to the intimidation, torture and murder of local civilians” (Freeman, 2014).

Baghdadi became the leader of the ISI in 2010, just before the group began moving into Syria. As the leader, Baghdadi oversaw ISI action against Iraqi

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36 former military and intelligence officers who had served under Saddam in senior positions in ISI. Under Baghdadi, ISI also launched the “Breaking the Walls” campaign, which freed hundreds of ISI members from Iraqi prisons and sent

Baghdadi‟s prestige soaring within the organization. He cleverly exploited the

Syrian civil war to further rebuild his organization, using the fighting there to develop a haven and attract new recruits and support (Byman D. , 2015, p. 165).

Local political tensions, in addition to the absence of foreign security, expedited ISI‟s return to prominence. In December 2012, Sunnis in Iraq began protesting the policies of the Shiite Maliki government in Anbar province. When Iraqi security forces invaded protest camps, Sunni attacks against Shiite targets increased; the civilian death toll in 2013 was double that of 2012. When Iraqi security forces attempted to clear a protest camp in Ramadi at the end of 2013, a local uprising drove the security forces out of much of Anbar Province, paving the way for later ISI expansion.

Meanwhile, AQI used the ongoing Syrian Civil War as a training ground and tool for expansion. In April 2013, Baghdadi announced AQI operations in Syria

and changed the group‟s name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He

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37 reconciliation with al-Qaeda leadership failed, and AQ officially renounced any connection with ISIS in February 2014.

Despite ISIS‟s split from AQ, ISIS grew in size and power as it carried out

military offensives in Syria and Iraq. It fought against the governments of Iraq and Syria, tribal groups and militias in Iraq, the Kurdish peshmerga, and various rebel groups in Syria. ISIS made large territorial gains beginning in January 2014, when it first defeated Iraqi forces and took control of Fallujah. The following March, it seized Mosul (Semple, 2014). The funds seized through these invasions, combined with income from foreign donors and from criminal activities such as smuggling and extortion of local businesses, gave ISIS an estimated $2 billion in assets. As of September 2014, experts estimated that ISIS‟s oil revenues alone brought in between $1 million and $2 million per day.

On June 29, 2014, Baghdadi tried to take ISIS to a new level when, coincide on the first night of Ramadan in 2014. After significant territorial gains in Iraq

and Syria, the group again changed its name, this time to the “Islamic State” (IS),

declaring a Caliphate, with himself as leader. As caliph, he would be the

“commander of the faithful,” and thus „at least in theory‟ Muslims everywhere would owe him obedience. (Pizzi, 2014).

However, Middle Eastern regimes, Sunni religious leaders, and even most

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38 theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi declared that Baghdadi‟s declaration “is void under sharia” (Byman D. , 2015).

On July 1, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi posted an audiotape in Arabic on YouTube entitled “Message to jihad fighters and the Islamic nation during Ramadan.” Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the Islamic religious month of Ramadan and the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate to encourage Muslim operatives around the world to support the Caliphate, join the ranks of the jihad fighters in Syria and Iraq and wage a jihad that would lead to an Islamic takeover of the world (according to MEMRI, translations of the audiotape were distributed in English, German, Russian, Albanian and French through the Al-Hayat Center, the ISIS propaganda unit) (Crethiplethi, 2014).

The main points made by al-Baghdadi:

1. Call for jihad:

Al-Baghdadi called on Muslims to help the Islamic nation through jihad for the sake of Allah. He promised the jihad fighters that bliss awaited them in

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39 as split into two camps: one included Muslims and jihad fighters; opposite it stood

the camp of the Jews, the “Crusaders” (i.e., Christians) and their allies in all the

“infidel countries,” led by the US and Russia.

2. Praise for the Islamic Caliphate:

Al-Baghdadi called on Muslims to support the Islamic State to save themselves from enslavement to foreigners. He noted that the Nation of Islam failed after the abolition of the Caliphate (1924) and was taken over by infidels. The infidels stole their resources, denied their rights, conquered their land and appointed collaborators to rule over them by force. The collaborators waved false slogans of peace, democracy, pan-Arab nationalism, nation states and Ba‟athism.

In contrast, the Caliphate whose creation was declared “united the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, American, Arab, French, German and Australian, who became brothers, defending each other in the same trench under one flag, the flag of faith.” He said that the Muslims would erode the power of the nation-state model,

destroy the model of democracy and expose the “satanic nature” of those models.

3. Defending ISIS‟s methods:

According to al-Baghdadi, what the Arab regimes call “terrorism” is actually resistance to their false slogans and implementation of Islamic religious law

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40

homes of Muslims in Palestine are destroyed, their land is stolen and their rights are violated? Is it not terrorism when mosques are burned in Egypt, the homes of Muslims are destroyed, their women are raped and the jihad fighters in Sinai and elsewhere are oppressed? Is it what‘s happening in Turkestan not terrorism? Is it not terrorism when women are prevented from wearing the hijab in France?” All

this is not terrorism, but freedom and democracy, he added sarcastically.

4. Call for Muslims to join the Islamic State:

Al-Baghdadi rejected the concept of the modern nation states and called on Muslims to join the Islamic State he founded. He said, “There is no (need for slogans such as) Syria for the Syrians or Iraq for the Iraqis, since the earth is

Allah‘s. The country belongs to the Muslims; Therefore, Muslims, wherever they are, immigrated to the countries of Islam, since the immigration to the area (or region) of the Islamic State (Dar al-Islam) is obligatory.” He called on Muslims

who were able to do so to perform Hijrah (i.e., migration, an important symbolic act in the history of Islam which, in his perspective, is related to the establishment of the Caliphate). He called on Muslim clerics, led by sharia judges, people with military, administrative and academic capabilities, as well as Muslim doctors and engineers in all fields, to join his self-declared Islamic State, arguing that it was a necessity due to the sorry state of Muslims worldwide.

5. The vision of „Islamic takeover of the entire world‟:

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41

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42

CHAPTER IV

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

Since declaring itself to be the Islamic State by mid-2014, and includes large parts of Northwestern Iraq and Eastern Syria. The experts are still debating about the origin of the ideology espoused by the Islamic State (Hassan, 2016). It's important to understand the ideology embraced by Islamic State, as a crucial step to defeat them. Even the Commander-in-Chief of the military of the United States stressed how important it is to know the steps or solutions to fight it. As Major General Michael Nagata, a former commander of the U.S. special operations

forces in the Middle East, has noted, “We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it” (Schmitt, 2014). This is also expressed by one of the field commanders who say that in their efforts against the movement of the Islamic State in Syria, they hampered related to the ideology, it is difficult for his troops to mobilize. One of these occurs, when they get a rejection and hard to recruit the fighters in the area, because most of them refused to fight against the Islamic State. Even they don't want to join the Islamic State. This is especially the case for efforts backed by Western powers. Ideology can therefore have practical implications in the fight against the Islamic State.

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43 argue, that the presence of influence when the Iraq invasion in 2003 became the trigger for their brutal action and also the role of Iran for their support on the influence of the Shiite forces in the area. Some panellists showed that political Islam as well as the beginning of an attitude of intolerance of the Islamic State, and others suggested that the Islamic State as a sect that is driven by political opportunism and filled with regional political players. (Dalrymple, 2014).

The ideology of the Islamic State, which is diverse and cannot be traced only in individuals, time period, and their movements. In fact, even though it refers to books or writings used or created by the Islamic State, not at all informed how to understand about their ideology. But it would be nice to try researching how these groups understand, propagate and teach their ideas.

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44

A. The Salafist-jihadi Movement

The Islamic State declares that they are one of the representatives of a group that applies the values of Islam as a whole, as exemplified by the early generations of Muslims. This refers to the presumption that what IS stated by is referring to the Group of Salafism. People who apply Salafism, called Salafist. At the time of the postcolonial and modern, there are many groups that declare themselves as Salafist. Salafist stated that the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad is the best and ideal where Islam flourished. The things they make reference and vision to establish an Islamic State, as done by modern Salafist, where it began in Egypt, which aims to restore Islam into early form, back to the heyday of Islam where Islam reached its peak. The Islamic State is known as the Group of adherents of Islamic Jihad Salafist doctrine, one of the branches of a Sunni Islamic extremist factions, which aims to revive Islam through jihad, and the fight against internal and external enemies (Brown, 2011, pp. 6-8).

According to Haykel notes, committed to expanding Dar al-Islam (Islamic State), the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship is forbidden (Wood, 2015).

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45 symbol of Salafist. Al-Baghdadi was Salafist, considering he was the leader of the

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Berdasarkan analisa yang telah dilakukan sebelumnya, akhirnya disimpulkan bahwa koridor yang berpotensi untuk dioperasikannya kereta api peti kemas dan kapal peti kemas