1 Party Supervisition on its Members at Local Parliament: Study on PDIP, Golkar and
Demokrat in Bali Province
Bandiyah
Department of Political Science FISIP UNUD dyah_3981@yahoo.co.id
Abstrac
Indonesian legislative assembly is the representation of political parties. As the representative of the political parties at parliament, the members of legislative assembly have obligation to represent ideas, point of view, as well as the party’s policies and hold responsible to transform the political rights of the people. However, the fact shows that whenever the legislative member is mixed up with legal case, the political party tends to act as if it washed hands off the case and ignored the responsible to its cadre at the parliament. Based on that issue this study is conducted to find the information and knowledge about the supervision of political parties to their cadres at legislative assembly. The political parties examined in this study are political parties having seats at the Assembly of Bali Province, namely PDIP, Demokrat and Golkar. The method of this study is qualitative-descriptive by using analytical eksploration of the chosen informants as the source.
The result of this study shows that political parties (PDIP, GOLKAR, DEMOKRAT) have supervisory system to their cadres who sit as legislative member. However, there are similarity and differences on the implementation of the system. All parties’ supervisory and control gate are on the faction. It seems that the cadres who are the legislative members supervise their selves, cause the party’s administrator meaning that they play triple role as legislative member, party’s cadre, and supervisory member. The differences can be found at the supervisory mechanism of the examined parties. The supervisory system of PDIP is hierarchical institutionalism. Meanwhile, the supervisory system of Demokrat party is hierarchical, much the same to PDIP but Demokrat party has its own supervisory body but it is not independent because of the not clear cut function of this body. The problems of the cadres will be taken to Badan Kehormatan.. The supervisory system of Golkar party is non hierarchical and flexible eventhough central DPP plays a significant role to counter the problems that cannot be handled by DPD. Non hierarchical and flexible means that the legislative members are considered having a strong organizational managerial due to solid forming of cadres, so that whenever a cadre gets involved in a case and is proved to be guilty, he should now the consequences and resign from the party without waiting for the instruction from central DPP or PAW. It can be concluded that not with standing of supervisory body and Badan Kehormatan, the supervisory system at political parties is not maximal because the parties examined in this study do not perform their optimal supervisory function and it is also due to the triple position performed by the cadres as party members, legislative members, and supervisor. The loose regulation and loose implementation also contribute to the ineffectiveness of supervisory system of the parties.
2 A. Background and Problem Formulation
Implementation of the Indonesian government in the New Order era was dominated by
the executive, the position of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) into an institution that only works embracing all political decisions regimes.
The Executive not only perform the function of policy perse, but at the same time be the final
arbiter of all policies. Cooptation very strong executive is a mirror system of executive
government heavy that no operation system causes dispersion power of checks and balances. In
the totalitarian system tends to be ascertained poor because of weak government accountability
functions of supervision. When the system of government is shifting toward strengthening the
legislature, the opportunities for the birth of power management more accountable also open to
Parliament to be a strong institution. Coupled with the character of the House of Representatives
that is plural, it is great hope to build a system of government with checks and balances can be
realized. But we see interest pluralism has become the character of representative institutions
showed collective action to rob the country conducted by some members of the House of
Representatives. Uncontrolled negative behavior of the board members due to a weak
accountability mechanisms of representative institutions in the republic. Institutionalization of
representative democracy in Indonesia just reached the level seems to give a strong political
power to the House of Representatives, but the mechanisms of control over political power is not
yet standardized strong.
Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and party representatives recently
revealed many cases very poor. Phenomena such as the discovery of bribery cases, for-for
money, and the sex scandal has become a habit among some members of the House of
Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia respected. After a bribery case related to the
transfer functions of forests in some regions of Sumatra, a sex scandal, scandal laws of Bank
Indonesia, the case of roads, study abroad and BLBI scandal, and the last arrest of members of
the House of Representatives who took bribes related to athlete development at Jaka Baring
Palembang was also followed by the revelation of cases of money laundering and corruption of
local infrastructure1. In October 2014 at the start of the inauguration of members of Parliament,
the Indonesian nation was given a shock with five board members who will be inducted been
1
3 tripped corruption2. It shows integrity to become a member of the legislature is not qualified
selectively. Similarly, the same conditions followed by the regional council with bertebarnya
corruption, criminal offenses inevitable. When the New Order government, policy-making in the
hands of the executive raises many irregularities. Similarly, after the reform tends to be given to
legislative policy, showing the same deviation. Supervision of the members of the board through
the ranks of the members of the board with the establishment of the Ethics Council and the
supervision of political parties that have representation in the House of Representatives seems
not effective.
As in the cases in the House of Representatives / Regional when board members are
involved corruption, the party became a vehicle of political easily fired or directly hold PAW
(Time Shift). PAW also applies to members of the board are critical and defaulters, such as not
approve the decision and agreement of the party. In this case, the position of Political Parties
should be called into question its responsibility for the supervision of cadres who sits as a board
member. When determining whether 'something' to be formulated in parliament, board members
beforehand to discuss at the meeting at the level of political parties. When this has been done on
each of the parties that have representation on the board, then the party should also take
responsibility in decision-making on the board. Thus, political parties are not arbitrarily dismiss
cadres who sits on the board when snagging problems. So far, only political parties want to find
a clean, but does not provide a solution and cadres as a form of protection against the
responsibility of cadres deviant behavior. This happened in the case of board members in the
House of Representatives as well as at the level of parliament.
As a representation of the representation of the party, members of the board (DPR /
DPRD) should be given the protection and surveillance accountable when its cadres involved in
the problem, so the members of the House of Representatives / Regional sensed people's
mandate and responsibility to carry out the various interests of the party with the good and
honest in parliament , Nevertheless, the existence of the party happens only emphasizes the
behavior of 'politicians' for cadres who sits on the board of the party in order to build a positive
image in the public eye. Political parties finally prefer to keep the image of the party and taking
responsibility for the supervision of cadres. The events and the emergence of the phenomenon of
2
4 corruption on board members increasingly rife can be affected by several things one party
against the recruitment of cadres who are not accountable and qualified and can also be seen
from the surveillance system a very weak party.
This study is intended to determine how to form political parties conducted surveillance
against members of the Bali Provincial Parliament (DPRD Bali as a case study area). Why
province of Bali was chosen, because it is one area in Indonesia which has a bribery case that
quite a lot of legislators in each district town in the region of Bali. Legislators are from major
parties that gained seats in DPRD Bali Province (PDIP, Golkar, Democrat) in the 2004-2009
elections. In 2012 to 2014 there were eleven board members stumble graft function assignment
board3. This proved to be a region of the world tourism destination, Bali likely to be fertile
ground for corrupt transactions state officials. This study will examine; first, whether the
political parties can perform supervisory functions to the members who are sitting in Parliament
optimally. Second, how to form a political party to control the representation of its members in
the Provincial DPRD Bali?
B. Literature Review
1. Three Faces in Political Parties
Changes in the power structure and the internal and external policy of the party program
has drawn objections from the militant anti-party. Various misdirected and false allegations of
the anti-party originated during the existence of an imbalance in the party on the three faces of
the party, the party at the grassroots level, the level of central organization, and levels of
government4. One imbalance is evident from surveillance in institutional problem of appearance
of political parties, to see how far a healthy political party organizations, grassroots and power.
At the grassroots level / grassroots cadres of political parties through direct contact with
the local context, supporters of the party, the other party and the voters. As the spearhead of
political parties, at the level of the main task of cadres and party activists shows the party is an
agent that is sensitive to the interests of society, grow from and with the community, and as an
agent of transformation in society. Manivestation merging of political parties to the public takes
place in the process of day-to-day (every day life politics). This meant that the political reality
3
Bali Pos, Kalkulasi Kasus Anggota Dewan Bali, Maret 2014. Hal. 2. 4
5 not be understood merely in the sense of formal, procedural, such as political activities in
parliament and symbolic activities conducted during the campaign. Basically all the functions of
political parties will be able to run well and a strong foothold as a representation of the
community if the party to exist on this face.
At this level, parties are required to develop the function of the aggregation of interests,
political education, socialization and political recruitment, cadre members, fundraising and
monitoring functions even better for cadres who work in parliament and internal party itself.
Therefore, both the bad image of the political parties in the eyes of society is largely determined
by the behavior of cadres and political party activities that will undermine public confidence in
the party.
Second, the political parties at the central level. At this level the party is known portrait in
the national context, based in the center of capital city (Jakarta) and become part of the elements
of statecraft. Actually, the party at the central level serves as an umbrella for the party not only in
government but also at the same time support and coordinate the activities of the party at the
central level and at the local level. However, the pressure on how the role of which will be
charged to the party at the center will be also related to the type of the party concerned. Even
though this does not mean that the dynamic activity in certain facial necessarily negate the
dynamics on the other face.
Third, the level of political parties in the government. Government is meant here is the
existence of either party in legislative and executive positions. At this level, the party faced in the
context of constitutional government, other factions, parliamentary commissions and the state as
a unitary concept. Party struggle serves the interests of society that has been absorbed into
various products of state policy. That is how the party's ability to design changes through policy
instruments. Policy-making materials come from a variety of input gathered by the party at the
grassroots level directly or through a party in the center5.
Efforts to build an image and gain public confidence should be placed as a form of
long-term investment for political parties. political party cadres who work in parliament required to
work as best as possible and keep the mandate of the people of the forms of corruption.
Sebalikya political parties should have a major responsibility for the cadres employed in
Parliament as well as the internal management of the party organization.
5
6 2. Measure Strength Institutionalization and Political System
Studies on the party system has developed quite rapidly every year. Some experience of
the countries of Latin America, Africa, Middle East, Europe, the Soviet Union tried to measure
the strength of the institutionalization of the political party system has produced weaknesses in
community participation, accountability elections and uncertainty for voters and the elite6. The
weak institutionalization of a system that can create barriers to the consolidation of democracy
and a new democratic transition.
The experience of Russia and Ukraine both a weak state in the institutionalization of the
party, this is due to the absence of party discipline in parliament. There are four problems
identified weaknesses in the institutional system of the party. First, basically weak party support
patterns still tend to be stable7, however, new regulations often appear and disappear with
regularity. Voter support was often changed substantially from election to election. Secondly, the
behavior and the weak party activists in building consolidation with the citizens, constituent
relations become brittle, making it difficult making the arrangement themselves and articulate
the interests of citizens in popular preference. other than that voters had difficulty identifying
themselves to a particular political party. Third legitimacy of the actors on the political parties to
be low compared with the institutionalized system8. Thus democracy governed and developed by
the interested parties alone, and the party is just an extension of individual leaders or political
elite only, therefore the support of the people is indispensable. Such organizations do not have
the tools and power autonomously can be developed to establish the party's relationship with
voters.
When the party institution is weak, then it would become dysfunctional oversight, and
tough sanctions to politicians or party cadres in parliament, because the party was not able to
maintain the institutional party, at least not just accost any effort. Uncertainty prevention
behaviors board members involved in such cases of corruption depends on the stability of the
active voter response, because the actors do not have information that requires strategic behavior,
which in turn will raise the stakes in the election race for the future and are not interested in
keeping the democratic behavior. Case parties in Indonesia could be a picture similar to what is
6
Thames, T. Frank, “ Dicipline and Party Institutionalization Post Soviet Legislatures”, Vol 3 no 4, Sage Publication, 2007, pp. 457
7
Mainwaring, Scott ,Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 83
8
7 experienced by Russia and Ukraine, for good institutional management will significantly
influence the political system strong impact on the party and the state system.
3. The Party System Institutionalization and Legislative Behavior.
Parliament legislature is one of the arena of political contestation that give effect to the
institutional party, with the assumption that the presence of legislators because of the election
and is the focus of the relationship between legislators and their party from the standpoint of the
election. If the agency considers that the weakness of the party due to external factors that lead to
differences in the relationship between the party and cadre Partain, then the example of
legislators in the United States can be a reference and referral that is if you want to increase the
chances of re-election of candidates for the legislature have to qualify the party leadership. In
addition, political parties have to be disciplined in controlling the resources of cadres, label or
party ideology, committee assignments, control the agenda and the party's program and others9,
because in addition to legislators should improve the sound is also a potential resource that
parties must be maintained.
Results hypothesis in empirical research10, the study of the effect on the party discipline
institutionalization of the party in the legislature. First, basically people would expect that
candidates who get the higher sound will be more disciplined stints in parliament, because the
vote reflects their electoral strength. This is indicated by the hypothesis H1: Party discipline in
the legislature increase the total stock of sound. Expectations at the beginning of the vote a party
that is a measure of the institutionalization of the party, but it is limited, because of the vote in
the party made possible the existence of a strong correlation between the candidates with the
people and organizations that fund. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed H2; Discipline is
a direct factor and the argument of institutionalization and the vote. Here's a little hypothesis
could answer to the phenomenon posed above.
In contrast to the argument Mainwaring11, which indicates if the two aspects of the
weaker party (discipline and sound acquisition) as a factor of institutional weakness, then it can
be traced in terms of how the ability to maintain party discipline in the legislature. In addition,
the ability of maintaining ties at the grassroots level will be value-added for political parties, and
9
Thames,C. Frank;2007, Aldrich, 1995; Cox dan McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet dan McCubbins, 1991, Thames, T. Frank, “ Dicipline and Party Institutionalization Post Soviet Legislatures”, Vol 3 no 4, Sage Publication, 2007, pp.
459 10
Thames, C. Frank, 460 11
8 establish strong ties with social groups. As such, these parties will be better able to help the
candidates to win the election.
Hypothesis Frank and Mainwaring was an experience outside of the State of Indonesia,
which of course can vary from several aspects such as the condition of society, the diversity of
cultures, customs and habits that can provide color spectrum of its own in building democratic
consolidation in society, political parties, parliament and government, but did not rule out the
face and the model will be the same party to study outside.
4. The impossibility of services in two Functions
It is well known that political parties are public organizations that have the duty and
function to serve the public, not least as a legislator and service agent representation of election
results. Legislators result of people's choices are obliged to accommodate the needs of society
and morally responsible for the trust diamanatkannya. This is a form of representative
democracy, when the party system is not maintained will be weak or not strengthened
institutions would undermine democracy.
There are two models of democracy agent can describe a social phenomenon in this
paper. The first is the principle of democracy sole agent in the classic mass party. In a mass
party, service agency addressed to legislators the party choice with the nickname "hire". The
point is that legislators in the parliamentary party choice employed by parties supporting and
working with all the interests and the will of the party, with the concept of candidates should be
ready with the consequences of the task. It seems that in this way will result in the removal of the
constituent rights of the people that should be championed by legislators in parliament. In
addition, the issue of recruitment, the cadre is not a priority issue, but who dare provide price to
get a seat in parliament. Model this party does not have the power and legal defense, or the
so-called sense of responsibility because the legislators, all legal rules or sanctions under the control
of political parties. Whereas in the selection of a mass party leadership put forward to integrate
with the government in providing policy decisions. The party is also known as a party rooted in
its habitat, the most actively and directly involved in every element of community activities and
also the government, making it difficult clearly visible where the project where the project of the
party and the government, because it has been integrated into the symbol and power ties that
9 Pigure 1. Mass Party Principial- Agent Model with three social segments/parties and coalition
government12
Beginning of Mass Party concept is derived from the condition of democracy event,
where each party as the political committee of a certain segment of society (social class / group
recognition) to act as a collective social agent representing the interests of the community to get
a room in parliament. Coalition of parties in parliament to negotiate the formation of
pelayananan as agent expectations collective segments of society. This is an effort the support of
voters, but surprisingly, legislators employed by the government as well as agents. So the model
of a mass party it can be concluded that the members of the legislature to bring the two agents,
the first is the agent of the party workers, both agencies of government workers. The productivity
of the agents working on the legislator would have an impact on the effectiveness of the service
is run. Therefore, to fulfill the mission, members of the legislature should be able to divide,
administer and manage the service as well as the confidence of both agents. A question arises, be
realistic service agency in the two puncture ?. Simple logic suggests: that the service is not
effective, is not established performance of legislators for the worse.
As with the Downsian Party which considers that a public organization of the party in a
position of "two heads" so different that sometimes the demands made by the party leaders
would be contradictory. For example, politicians who become members of the legislature have to
serve "two masters" are derived from a combination of several interests and understanding
between the party agents and agent constituents, whereas as an agent of a particular social
segment legislator should be able to bring the representation of interests as outlined in the
product policy. Containers mission these interests can sometimes be disagreement also with the
12Katz, Richard.” No Man Can Serve Two Master”: Party Politician; Party Members, Citizen and Principal –Agent
Model of Democracy”. Party Politics. (2014). Vol 20 (2) 184 Electorate
State Administration
Segmen 1
Segmen 2
Segmen 3
Party 1
Party 2
Party 3
10 segment / group. In the hybrid situation parties vying for re-election as the agent of all voters and
social segments of society, while at the same time legislators must be able to share, meet and act
as a related party agents and supporters of the party agents.
This incident occurred on a mass party, which should not be pulled out in the party line,
but is expected to compete well in mobilizing party supporters. As a public organization, the
party is faced with difficult choices in order to decide priority of adherence to the party's policy
to accept a compromise policy of the government. The dilemma is the politicians of the party
supporters would be willing to be fired by the party leader. Basically not an excuse for one, but
more due to service problems "two masters" who are not served in the party's internal democracy
downsian in order to pursue the right policies.
Pigure 2. Downsian Principal Agent , model with three party and coalition goverment13
Policies and compromise in parliament to bring the party as a public servant who has its
own difficulties, especially in managing the party management, for example, in the management
of dualism salary, positioning ministries and other things. while the Centre Party has the
patronage of space that leads to personal interests. but party officials in Parliament should
contribute example of part of their salary should be given for the purpose of development in her
constituency. However difficult because of compromise and negotiation party in parliament, tend
to be subject to the central party. This also happens in Indonesia, party activists employed in
Parliament tend to follow a policy of supporting the party without any compromise, because the
ruling party leader more than the president.
13
Katz Richard,185 A
Elektorate Party 1
Party 2
Party 3
Ministr y
State
11 C. Methodology
1. Types of Research.
This study used a qualitative descriptive method. According Sarantakos14, descriptive
research that is research that is intended for exploration and clarification concerning a
phenomenon or social reality. In this study, cases such as the involvement of corruption or abuse
of legislative authority well publicized in the media or ongoing cases in the originating party
PDIP, Golkar, the Democrats will be used as a study and further exploration. The focus of this
study is to scour how to form political party monitoring of the councilors and whether the
political parties that have representatives in parliament can exercise oversight to its cadres in
Parliament / Parliament of Bali province.
2. Data Sources
a. Informant
In the context of qualitative research respondents, better known by the informant.
Determination of the informants in this study using purposive system taking into account the
availability of data. This technique chosen because each informant does not have the same
knowledge of the discourse "oversight function". Therefore, the subject chosen was the
informant who can master the information in accordance with the research problem.
Determination of the number of informants in this study should not be representative because in
qualitative research is not known to the population, however, with a purposive system aims to
capture as much information from various sources.
b. Places and Events
This study took place in the province of Bali. Various events related to the problem of
research focus, among others, include: supervision of Party cadres and members of the
legislature being held in Bali.
3. Data Collection Techniques
a. Observation
Is a technique of collecting data by observing and recording directly at the site of
research on the symptoms related to the object to be diterliti.
b. Interview
14
12 Primary data collection, including data from sources or informants conducted by
interview. Through this technique is expected to be gathered data about experiences, ideas,
opinions or views informants regarding various matters related to the research focus. Informants
were used in this study include actors seat legislators who came from Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Golkar, Democrat. In addition, other research sources are informants
who take charge of structural political parties such as the chairman, deputy chairman or secretary
of the party. plus informants such as journalists into supporting the completeness of the data,
because they are the source of reportage of news and information this study will be in check and
re-check its validity. Thus through in-depth interviews can be explored aspects of explicit
knowledge which is attached to the informant.
In order to avoid distortion of the data and interviews that run in focus, then assisted in
the implementation of the research instrument in the form of interview guide containing basic
thoughts associated with research focus. It is very important that the atmosphere of the interview
focused and keep it running. In this study the source to be interviewed are:
No Resources
1. Members of Parliament of Bali Province; PDIP, Golkar, Democrat,
2. Officials Political Party: PDIP, Golkar, Democrat
3. Print and electronic media journalists
c. Documentation
A data collection techniques by quoting and examine documents, records, archives of
newspapers, electronic and sets of rules that support or associated with the object under study.
4. Data Analysis Techniques
The data collected, either through field research and through research literature,
processed and analyzed through qualitative descriptive approach is to describe and explain the
phenomena associated with the object of research in accordance with what it is. Data analysis
procedures carried out through the following steps:
a. Data reduction, where data is collected and then look for themes and patterns, will find
things that are important and then compiled systematically.
b. Display data or presentation of data, namely to create a description of the results of
13 c. Draw conclusions and verification, which is set a conclusion after all the data has been
analyzed.
D. Analysis
Legislators in parliament is basically a representation of political parties. As
representatives of political parties in parliament, members of Parliament and Parliament has a
duty to represent ideas, viewpoints, and the party's policies are responsible for the behavior,
employment and political rights. However, the fact remains that whenever legislators faced with
the case law, political parties tend to raise the hand of the case and ignore the responsibility of
the cadres employed in Parliament, whereas the responsibility of political parties to the cadres
are obligations that will impact on the performance of cadres in parliament. Indeed supervisory
functions in the party be an indicator of the workings of accountability of political parties,
because it shows how much supervision has been done by political parties in Indonesia. Below
are some of the supervision of exploration has been done by the political party with the most
votes in the 2009 election and 2014 in Bali.
a. Supervisition forms on its Member Local Parliament the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)
Each political party has called a party rule management with its constitution and by laws
(AD/ART). AD/ART party usually has a management structure with basic tasks, functions and
all forms of rights, obligations of members and sanctions violations. The draw of PDIP is done in
a simple oversight function in internal party with principles of character formation with reference
to members of the organization's manual AD/ART party. Supervision in PDIP not use the name
of the supervisory board term, but can be represented by the Agency Advisory Council (BPD) in
the center (DPP), which serves to capture the competence of cadres of the party that will be
proposed and determined to be candidates for the legislature. The second is the Honorary (BK)
has the task to regulate and discipline the members of the party, but it is only giving directives
have on each party's plenary meeting in the institution (I Wayan Sutena interview with the
deputy chairman of the organization field Bali DPD PDIP: 2015). Both of these bodies (BPD and
BK) in addition to the party's organizational structure, also have the authority to carry out
oversight functions on its members or cadres. But acknowledged the oversight function
14 Board Advisory Board (BPD) and the Ethics Council (BK) is also a member of the board, which
incidentally has the dual task of internal party and faction in parliament.
PDIP cadres who sits on the board is the choice of the party who is assigned or employed
in the chair of the board and serves as a task of regeneration. Regeneration function will succeed
if the party cadre selection board members do not practice corruption and other forms of actions
that harm the state, and vice versa if the board members of the PDIP exposed cases (criminal and
civil), the function of regeneration is considered unsuccessful. Therefore the party leaders did not
hesitate and act quickly to immediately dismiss cadres or members. This form of supervision as
indicating a lack of protection of rights as a cadre in obtaining advocacy and legal assistance of
his party.
Although the cadre system in PDIP done since these cadres before being appointed as a
candidate but also do and even after his retirement from political positions. The main
requirement for example when cadres who advanced to the candidates will be assessed and
monitored about HR capabilities and its track record ranging from ethical, aesthetic, moral, to the
skills possessed by the cadre. Meanwhile, after retiring from his position on the relevant cadres
remain supervision so they do not bring disaster or calamity for the party. To avoid cadres to
avoid being trapped and obsessed corruption, PDIP provide debriefing and training of cadres at
the intermediate level and also equipping national regeneration that was sent to the DPP (center)
and continued at the local level.
As a manifestation of the consequences of party membership, each member shall receive
directives and special instructions are also given a decree that members of the central party
(DPP) that the member or cadre remain loyal and devoted to the party. These instructions also a
form of control mechanism to supervise. PDIP and supervision is carried out both bottom-up
control of the center that is directly or top down is in the party's internal respective territories and
fellow members. Regarding the control mechanisms (particularly for members of the board) is
described further in detail through interviews following:
“With the control mechanism, the violation must have known. Control in the fraction, wherein fraction task coordinate, supervise well as fostering its members. There was also a regular evaluation meetings are conducted every month. Fraction report to the parent party. Faction provide an evaluation. Therefore, control PDIP highly institutionalized and
15 Can be considered that the form of supervision in PDIP hierarchical and tiered means that
every party there are problems in terlebihi formerly handled at the level of local structures
(DPD). If the area can not afford then taken to the DPP. Therefore, PDIP not have a supervisory
board but rather the Honorary Board in each internal party officials at both central and regional
levels. Honorary Board is tasked to inform and execute the party cadres are problematic, then
reported to the central committee of the party in accordance with the level of the origin of the
relevant cadres.
If the cadres who exposed the case law, the DPD (regional party) only serves to evaluate,
consider these cadres, then the right to expel a person from the party members and management
are entirely right in the center party administrators (DPP). Furthermore, the DPP also will
reconsider these cadres. The principle is to be out of the cadre party membership because of two
reasons, namely resigning or being expelled in disgrace. If the case raises issues a negative
image of the party then direct its membership to be released in no respect, and no legal defense
of the party at all. Thus evident that supervision in PDIP yet fully implementation acquisition
rights law cadre, which in essence is the duty of the party to meet and accompany his legal case
to be completed. Impress the party only wants "what can you give to the party, and when you
get involved, the law will kick me out."
b. Supervisition Forms Democratic Party on its Member
Similarly, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) of the results of extracting
information, the Democratic Party also has oversight of the cadres who sit in the legislature.
The monitoring form elaborated through handbooks organization that AD/ART party.
Democrats supervision is done by coaching, directing the cadres and oversee the internal doors
are under the control of the party faction in Parliament and be followed up in party
administrators (DPD) and then proceed to the DPP (center). The form of hierarchical
supervision. This form been the Democratic party is regarded as a modern party that is better
suited to the hierarchical model of supervision. This was echoed by one of its cadres were
interviewed following: Supervision hierarchical be controlled directly by the Honorary Board in
this regard is the chairman of the DPP were charged with providing a report to the Council of
the Party, which is responsible for providing the means of information and communication at
16 a Board of Trustees in order to connect any, is both direct reports and other policies to the
Honorary Board, which will forward it to the chairman of the DPP. After the Honor Council to
report, at this stage is wide open to the possibility of meeting space, such as providing measures
and sanctions for cadres who violate the rules or lines of the party program. Similarly, at the
level of the DPD. Supervisory Board's role is vital, Majlis communicate with the local party
chairman DPD. The regulatory body regions present the results of this surveillance to the Honor
Council, to hammered out and presented to the board of DPD and DPP who is entitled to decide
what sanctions provided for violations committed by these cadres in parliament (interview
Chairman Development Division Kader Democrats Bali Children Supreme Sudewa: 2015).
However, in reality this form of hierarchical supervision has not run optimally. This is
due plated hierarchy of rules other party (overlapping rules/ambivalence of meaning), for
example, many legislators who do not fully understand about the hierarchy of the party
organization in developing its job, this time playing in circle board members are business and
personal interest rather than on representing the party name.
c. Supervisition Forms on its Member Golkar Party
Unlike the case with the PDI-P and the Democratic Party, the Golkar Party is very strong
surveillance and non-hierarchical. This is due to Golkar has quite a role and experience in
coaching and cadre members from the leadership of Sukarno's Old Order to Soeharto's New
Order era. For example there is no leader of the party, without going through the legislative and
executive cadre and coaching process first. Coaching and member of the Golkar Party cadre
known as a career path system starting from the DPC district/municipal, provincial DPD ladder
and so on. When the central committee (DPP) is believed to be the ability of cadres in leading
and managerial organization strong enough, then it can be given a cadre of career opportunities
outside (legislative or executive) with positions statregis.
Cadre system and fostering this positive impact on the success of its supervision. In the
body of the Golkar Party, each cadres who become members of the board must have the
capability in leading and managerial formidable, and most importantly, each cadre must know
the rights, obligations, prohibitions and sanctions for breaking the rules of the party cadres. This
finally makes cadre quite aware and know themselves when exposed cases among cadres then
17 Another positive value, that the strong guidance systems and in Golkar cadre implies also
an application of in-service task, meaning that every Golkar cadres should not be concurrent
positions on party officials and members of the legislature and executive. This policy has been
applied and has reason to believe that the dual position would eliminate the function and role of
cadre true. Besides the double position makes cadre performance is not optimal and this is one
of the values that distinguish Golkar with other parties. All Shapes and party monitoring
mechanism contained in the handbook AD / RT party. Therefore each member, committee, and
Golkar cadres are required to have the manual. And mechanisms to determine the party that
updates information provided in monthly meetings at both the DPC districts of the city, the
provincial DPD and DPP.
Form 'supervision Golkar Party' against its cadres can be seen on the authority of the
party faction in the council. Fractions, other than as a representative of a party that does not just
know about the party, faction also more aware of the actions and activities of its cadres in the
legislature. The presence of the Golkar Party faction is an important place to control and
evaluate the performance of party members. Faction given specific policies that are situational
do not have to wait for the decision of the DPP. For example faction was given the authority to
make decisions if its cadres are considered guilty by the appointment of valid evidence, based
on performance and evaluation of its territory (interview with the secretary general of the DPP
Golkar Party: DA Sri Wigunawati). Although the major political parties such as the PDI-P,
Golkar and Democrat who all have the supervision of cadres in parliament, but the third party
actually has similarities and differences in the implementation of supervision.
The equation is a door control is in the party faction of the board. It is impressed that the
cadres who are members of the board overseeing its own right, and are found also in several
large parties that board members are party officials thus have a dual role both in the council and
in the party. In a journal article written by Richard Katz (2014) argues that "No man can serve
two masters: Party Politicians, party members, citizens and principal-agent models of
democracy". The intent of this statement is that it is not possible for a party cadre can serve two
different objects or a double role both in the council and in the party, because if it happens at a
party space public services will experience a shift in the value of democracy were not met. This
situation is caused by parties in Indonesia are still not self-sufficient so that the allocation of the
18 cadres who are not satisfied that this does is double post or duplicate the role of the institutional
functions.
While there are differences in the mechanisms of supervision, namely the supervision of
the PDIP institutionalism and tiered hierarchical, meaning a problem concerning party cadres
under, first completed structure to a local (DPD), if not able to be handled will be submitted to
the DPP. While the Democratic Party is hierarchical (almost the same as the PDI-P), only the
Democratic Party has its own regulatory body, but not independent, because its function is not
clear because of all the problems concerning cadres handed over to the Ethics Council (BK).
Instead supervision Golkar Party is non-hierarchical and flexible, although the DPP has an
important role to counter the problems that can’t be handled by DPD. The nature of
non-hierarchical and flexible means board members are considered to have managerial strong
organization as the cadre in the party is quite solid, so if there are cadres who exposed the case
of the cadres should know themselves and take a stand should to quit the party if found guilty,
without waiting for instructions DPP or at PAW (the change over time) earlier.
Conclusion
It can be concluded, although there are parties Supervisory Board and Honorary Board,
functionalization of supervision in the party is not maximized. Because the parties in this study
are still half-hearted in performing supervisory functions and there are overlapping / duplicate
positions between the functions of party officials, board members, and anyone implementing
supervision. One of them is because the rules are less strict, and the party does not expressly
impose it. Almost three major parties allow members who are affected by legal cases charged,
tried without legal representation. Even if legal assistance is given, most unsatisfactory cadre so
for financial cadres who have quite a lot, would prefer to hire their own lawyers because the
party is not serious escort cadres legal cases. Basically, the quality of cadres is determined by
how big the party oversight function is implemented, because monitoring is performed
continuously for cadres will make more mawasdiri cadres behave and act in a careful and
cautious. In other words, good and bad cadre member of the board is the embodiment of the
19 References
Asnan G., Nordholt,S,H., (2003) Indonesian in Transition Working in Progress,
Yogyakarta:Pustaka Pelajar
Katz, S. Richard. (2014) No Man Can Serve Two Master: Party Politician’s Party Members,
Citizen and Principial-Agent Model at Democracy. Party Politics. Vol 20 (2). Sagepub.com
Mainwaring, Scott. (1999), Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
Thames C. Frank. (2007) Dicipline and Party Institutionalization in Post Soviet Legislatures.
Vol 3.no 4. Sage Publication; London
Media References
Kompas Edisi Maret September 2007
