(1) We didn’t see [rhinocerosai]–We saw [rhinoceroses]. (2) A: Auntie’s meal was good.
B: It wasn’t good–it was delicious! (3) A: Is the king of Italy bald?
B: The KoI isn’t bald–there’s no king of Italy.
Horn (1989: 377): MN “can be glossed 'I object to U’, where U is crucially a linguistic utterance or utterance type rather than an abstract proposition.”
(1) We didn’t see [rhinocerosai]–We saw [rhinoceroses].
(2) A: Auntie’s meal was good.
B: It wasn’t good–it was delicious!
(3) A: Is the king of Italy bald?
B: The KoI isn’t bald–there’s no king of Italy.
Horn (1989: 377): MN “can be glossed 'I object to U’, where U is crucially a linguistic utterance or utterance type rather than an abstract proposition.”
Metalinguistic Negation, Echoic Negation or Pretence of Descriptive
Metalinguistic Negation, Echoic Negation or Pretence of Descriptive
Negation
Negation
?
?
(i) How to make sense of these utterances: Do they form a natural category, or do they differ in some important way?
(ii) How shall we explain the speaker’s behaviour, and their apparent commitment to a contradiction?
(iii) Does negation play the same role in all these examples?
(i) How to make sense of these utterances: Do they form a
natural category, or do they differ in some important way?
(ii) How shall we explain the speaker’s behaviour, and their
apparent commitment to a contradiction?
(iii) Does negation play the same role in all these examples?
(i) (1)-(3) involve a particular act of denial, i.e.,
metalinguistic negation (MN). MN does not operate on the proposition expressed by the utterance, but on the utterance itself.
(ii) A speaker who utters a complex sentence of the form ‘Not P*,
Q’ does not assert the denial of ‘P’, but objects to a previous
utterance of P on the basis of some element ‘*’, which makes the conceptual or formal representation of that utterance
infelicitous.
(iii) regular, descriptive, negation is unambiguous; however, instances of presupposition cancellation or implicature denial may be pragmatically accounted for by appeal to MN.
(i) (1)-(3) involve a particular act of denial, i.e.,
metalinguistic negation (MN). MN does not operate on the
proposition expressed by the utterance, but on the utterance itself.
(ii) A speaker who utters a complex sentence of the form ‘Not P*,
Q’ does not assert the denial of ‘P’, but objects to a previous utterance of P on the basis of some element ‘*’, which makes the conceptual or formal representation of that utterance
infelicitous.
(iii) regular, descriptive, negation is unambiguous; however, instances of presupposition cancellation or implicature denial
may be pragmatically accounted for by appeal to MN.
1: The status of ‘metalinguistic’ is unclear: if its sense is ‘I object to U’, then an explanation of how ‘not’ has
acquired this sense should be offered.
2: The autonomy of contradiction:
Procedural Priority Thesis. The expression of a contradiction is what launches the reassessment of utterances like (1)-(3).
Logical Immunity Thesis. The contradiction has an
autonomous role, which cannot be accommodated by appealing to any further sense of negation.
1: The status of ‘metalinguistic’ is unclear: if its sense
is ‘I object to U’, then an explanation of how ‘not’ has acquired this sense should be offered.
2: The autonomy of contradiction:
Procedural Priority Thesis. The expression of a contradiction
is what launches the reassessment of utterances like (1)-(3).
Logical Immunity Thesis. The contradiction has an
autonomous role, which cannot be accommodated by appealing to any further sense of negation.
1: Negation is always descriptive, truth-conditional;
2: Negation is generally perceived as metaconceptual
because of the material that falls under it, which is
echoically used;
3: Once this material is conceptually adjusted (i.e.,
enriched
) so that a fully propositional form is recovered,
the utterance is fully assessable for truth;
4: Therefore, no need to appeal to a metalinguistic
operator. Contradictions are resolved pragmatically, at the
level of the proposition expressed by the speaker, i.e., its
explicature.
1: Negation is always descriptive,
truth-conditional
;
2: Negation is generally perceived as metaconceptual
because of the material that falls under it, which is
echoically
used;
3: Once this material is conceptually adjusted (i.e.,
enriched
) so that a fully propositional form is recovered,
the utterance is fully assessable for truth;
4: Therefore, no need to appeal to a metalinguistic
operator.
Contradictions are resolved pragmatically
, at the
level of the proposition expressed by the speaker, i.e., its
explicature.
(4) I don’t eat [tomeiDouz]; I eat [toma:touz].
(4) Not (I eat tomatoes).
[SEMANTIC LEVEL]
(4
) I don’t eat (
what is properly called
[tomeiDouz]); I eat
(
what is properly called
[toma:touz]).
[EXPLICIT CONTENT]
(2) A. Auntie’s meal was good.
B. It wasn’t good–it was delicious!
(2
) Not (auntie’s meal was good).
[SEMANTIC LEVEL](2
) Not (auntie’s meal is [
appropriately considered as
]
‘good’).
[EXPLICIT LEVEL]
(4) I don’t eat [tomeiDouz]; I eat [toma:touz].
(4
) Not (I eat tomatoes).
[SEMANTIC LEVEL]
(4
) I don’t eat (
what is properly called
[tomeiDouz]); I eat
(
what is properly called
[toma:touz]).
[EXPLICIT CONTENT]
(2) A. Auntie’s meal was good.
B. It wasn’t good–it was delicious!
(2
) Not (auntie’s meal was good).
[SEMANTIC LEVEL](2
) Not (auntie’s meal is [
appropriately considered as
]
‘good’).
[EXPLICIT LEVEL]
1: Echoicity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for irregular, marked negation.
2: The disagreement problem:
(5) A thinks that auntie’s meal is good.
(6) B thinks that auntie’s meal is delicious.
(7) B disagrees with A as to whether auntie’s meal is merely
good.
#(8) B disagrees with A as to whether auntie’s meal is
appropriately considered as good.
1: Echoicity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for irregular, marked negation.
2: The disagreement problem:
(5) A thinks that auntie’s meal is good.
(6) B thinks that auntie’s meal is delicious.
(7) B disagrees with A as to whether auntie’s meal is merely
good.
#(8) B disagrees with A as to whether auntie’s meal is
appropriately considered as good.
Carston’s view: contradictions are resolved at the level of the
utterance's explicature
My view: contradictions are essential to the effectiveness of these linguistic constructions.
We can’t modify the semantic profile of those utterances, but we can accept the idea that sometimes speakers explore
contradictions or inconsistencies with particular expressive intents.
Carston’s view: contradictions are resolved at the level of the
utterance's explicature
My view: contradictions are essential to the effectiveness of these linguistic constructions.
We can’t modify the semantic profile of those utterances, but we can accept the idea that sometimes speakers explore
contradictions or inconsistencies with particular expressive intents.
i. All there is to negation is its being descriptive.
ii. Negation is unambiguous: it doesn’t allow for a
wide vs. narrow scope distinction. Negation is
maximally permissible: it always has a ‘hole’ reading
iii. The particular use of negation in these cases
is pretended: the speaker is only pretending to deny an at issue content
iv. By uttering a rectifying second clause, speakers
make clear that they do not share a salient part of the common ground on the basis of some
specific elements, e.g., presuppositions, implicatures, formal aspects of the utterance, considered as
erroneous or disruptive.
i. All there is to negation is its being descriptive.
ii. Negation is unambiguous: it doesn’t allow for a
wide vs. narrow scope distinction. Negation is
maximally permissible: it always has a ‘hole’ reading
iii. The particular use of negation in these cases
is pretended: the speaker is only pretending to deny an at issue content
iv. By uttering a rectifying second clause, speakers
make clear that they do not share a salient part of the common ground on the basis of some
specific elements, e.g., presuppositions, implicatures, formal aspects of the utterance, considered as
erroneous or disruptive.
Hypothesis:
Truth-conditional operators only scope over at-issue contents
Supporting evidence:
Grammar does
not provide rules
for determining a
special behaviour
of not wrt these other elements of the CG
Hypothesis:
Truth-conditional operators only scope over at-issue contents
Supporting evidence:
Grammar does
not provide rules
for determining a
special behaviour
of not wrt these other elements of the CG
METARULE1:
Upgrade your
context with what is asserted and
what is implicated (e.g., scalar
implicatures,
presuppositions)
METARULE2:
Upgrade your
context in such a way as to discard inconsistent
assumptions (in our case,
discard either Q or not Q)
RULE implementing
MR2: Discard or
revise any
assumption based on whichever
element receives focal stress in the utterance (e.g., It wasn’t good)
METARULE1:
Upgrade your
context with what is asserted and
what is implicated (e.g., scalar
implicatures,
presuppositions)
METARULE2:
Upgrade your
context in such a way as to discard inconsistent
assumptions (in our case,
discard either Q or not Q)
RULE implementing
MR2: Discard or
revise any
assumption based on whichever
element receives focal stress in the utterance (e.g., It wasn’t good)
“It wasn’t good.”
Not P (P = The meal was good) Not Q (Q = The meal was
better than good)
Common Ground1 =
Not P & not Q
“It was delicious!”
Q (Q = the meal was delicious)
Common Ground2 =
(Not P & Not Q) & Q
Upgraded content: Q (Not Q gets discarded) “It wasn’t good.”
Not P (P = The meal was good) Not Q (Q = The meal was
better than good)
Common Ground1 =
Not P & not Q
“It was delicious!”
Q (Q = the meal was delicious)
Common Ground2 =
(Not P & Not Q) & Q
Upgraded content: Q (Not Q gets discarded)
(i) Speakers cannot be committed to contradictions
(ii) But speakers may use contradictions: for instance, to criticise the point of view that another speaker
would adopt, or has already adopted, by expressing
the semantic content of the sentences embedded in the first clauses of these constructions, along with any further assumption derivable from them.
(iii) Point of view = Portion of the common ground a speaker accepts, or thinks other speakers accept at a particular time of the conversation
(iv) Asserting or denying a proposition is a way of accepting a certain take on the CG
(v) Neither of these two actions requires actual belief in the proposition(s) expressed by an utterance
(Stalnaker, Yablo)
(i) Speakers cannot be committed to contradictions
(ii) But speakers may use contradictions: for instance, to criticise the point of view that another speaker
would adopt, or has already adopted, by expressing
the semantic content of the sentences embedded in the first clauses of these constructions, along with any further assumption derivable from them.
(iii) Point of view = Portion of the common ground a speaker accepts, or thinks other speakers accept at a particular time of the conversation
(iv) Asserting or denying a proposition is a way of accepting a certain take on the CG
(v) Neither of these two actions requires actual belief in the proposition(s) expressed by an utterance
(Stalnaker, Yablo)
A word of caution: Two senses of pretence are active here:
1. Pretence of descriptive negation: a performative action
2. Pretence of sharing a CG with one’s own interlocutor: a mental state
You enter in the second pretence just by performing the first one.
A word of caution: Two senses of pretence are active here:
1. Pretence of descriptive negation: a performative action
2. Pretence of sharing a CG with one’s own interlocutor: a mental state
You enter in the second pretence just by performing the first one.
Meaning Ambiguit
y Inference
Horn’s Meta-Negation
Two Meanings (Neg & MN)
Yes Gricean?
Echoic
Negation MeaningOne (Neg)
No Modulation
Pretence One
Meaning No Basic Logical Reasoning
Francesco Gentile – University of Nottingham – Department of Philosophy –
[email protected]
Comparing the Three Views
Comparing the Three Views
Burton-Roberts, N. (1989). On Horn’s Dilemma: Presupposition and Negation. Journal of Linguistics, 25: 95-125.
Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell.
Currie, G. (2006). Why Irony is Pretence. In S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, Oxford: OUP.
Geurts, B. (1998). The Mechanisms of Denial. Language 74, 2: 274-307.
Grice (1967). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Horn, L. R. (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Kadmon, N. (2001). Formal Pragmatics. London: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1981). Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction. In P. Cole (ed.),
Radical Pragmatics. Academic Press: 295-318.
Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and Content. Oxford: OUP.
Thanks to Greg Currie, Stefano Predelli, and all my crew: Alba, Felice, Anna, Franca and Jiyeun, Becci and Chris!
Burton-Roberts, N. (1989). On Horn’s Dilemma: Presupposition and Negation. Journal of Linguistics, 25: 95-125.
Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell.
Currie, G. (2006). Why Irony is Pretence. In S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, Oxford: OUP.
Geurts, B. (1998). The Mechanisms of Denial. Language 74, 2: 274-307.
Grice (1967). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Horn, L. R. (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Kadmon, N. (2001). Formal Pragmatics. London: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1981). Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction. In P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics. Academic Press: 295-318.
Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and Content. Oxford: OUP.
Thanks to Greg Currie, Stefano Predelli, and all my crew: Alba, Felice, Anna, Franca and Jiyeun, Becci and Chris!
