1 Ágh, Attila (ed.) (2011) European Union at the crossroads: The European perspectives
after the global crisis, Budapest: Together for Europe Research Centre, p.337
Cohesion Policy and the Europe 2020 Strategy: Constructing the EU for the next decade
Attila Ágh
Budapest Corvinus University
“The 2011-2012 period will most likely be marked by an increased polarisation between core and periphery Member States. (...) cohesion among Member States, and within Member States, should be fostered in conjunction with the current competitiveness criterion – the risk of seeing a two-speed Europe develop, with growing economic performance gaps among the 27.” (Think Global – Act European, Vol. III, 2011:XV).
Introduction: Creative crisis with controversial outcomes so far
The EU is at a crossroads in 2011, and this year can become an important turning point in the EU history. The EU may turn to a wider comprehensive profile with a Cohesive Europe along the lines of the Lisbon Treaty (LT) and the Europe 2020 Strategy (EU2020) or it may turn to a more narrow competitiveness profile with a “Eurofortress” that can produce a widening gap between the Centre and Periphery in the EU27. This crossroads as a historical turning point in 2011 necessitates a new mission statement about the future the EU is heading for. It has to formulate also the EU’s role in the global world in order to redesign the EU’s future in this “risky”, quickly globalizing world.1
Since its foundations there have been many definitions of the EU as a constant redefinition of “Europe”, both in its external and internal dimensions. Nowadays, however a future-oriented definition of the EU is needed because with the new developments - the LT, the EU2020 and recently the Europact (“Euro Plus Pact”) - the EU is heading for a new future. The impact of the global crisis on the EU has usually been described only in negative terms, although these global developments have also pushed the EU towards a creative crisis. The global crisis has been a stress test for the EU27 and it has forced the EU to invent and introduce new crisis management mechanisms. In 2010 a new five year cycle of the EU institutions started in the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC), but the European Council (EUCO) changed beyond recognition, too. The global pressures have generated urgent internal needs for the strict economic policy coordination, thus the EU has entered a new era with the strong leadership role of the EUCO and its permanent president.
2 world order. It has meant “internally” policy-wise the extension of the new union policies to a new EU policy universe and polity-wise the rebuilding the European architecture with the reform of European Governance (EG). In 2011 the next redefinition of the EU has become necessary but this time the ongoing processes demand a future-oriented definition of the EU that has to be based on the implementation of the LT and on the full elaboration of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Whereas the Lisbon Strategy (LS) was conceived in a very optimistic mood, in a full contrast to it, the Europe 2020 strategy has been initiated and prepared so far in a very pessimistic mood during the unfolding crisis. Yet, this Strategy may be the best case for a crisis-driven change, since the latest efforts have demonstrated that a breakthrough can be reached out of the crisis. The present prolonged crisis does not allow to stop the process of crisis management and to make only half-made decisions and too easy compromises. The main problem to cope with is the new concept of sovereignty. The inherited concept from Westphalia system is that sovereignty is “one and undivided” in the national framework. The latest EU development, however, has demanded the elaboration and implementation of the “multiple level sovereignty” and at some levels “the pooled sovereignty” as an “crisis -proof” economic governance (Jabko, 2011:45,51). Actually, the incoming European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the ensuing European Monetary Fund (EMF) outline already the institutionalization of crisis management and the future European common fiscal policy.
In the early 2010s the EU is facing both a long lasting crisis and a strong push for creative institutional and policy innovation. The González Report points out that “The EU can be an agent of change in the world, a trend-setter, and not just a passive witness. (…) The crisis has acted as a wake-up call for Europe to respond to the changing global order.” (González, 2010:3). Thus, the first years of the new cycle will be a tough stress test for the EU in intellectual learning and social innovation. Under the pressure of global crisis the only way out for the EU is to take a big step towards the wider and deeper integration. Ulrich Beck formulated already this idea at the early stage of the global crisis in a very marked way: “If the EU did not exist, we would have to invent it today. (…) Europe does not need less Europe – it needs more Europe. The global crisis shows that monetary union cannot be achieved without political union. (…) This crisis cries out to be transformed into a long overdue new founding of the EU. (…) an EU rejuvenated by the crisis.” (Beck, 2009).2
3 (1) The alternative of the Cohesive Europe or the Core-Periphery divided Europe, and the perspectives of the EU2020 Strategy in its close linkages with the cohesion policy and the strong economic governance as an “iron triangle”.
(2) The renewal of the regional/cohesion policy with the perspectives of the new member states (NMS) in the European Futures, especially regarding their catching-up strategies in the renewed cohesion policy.
(3) The new role of the EU in the global governance as the “globalization cum regionalization” project in the context of the Baltic and the Danube Strategy, in close connections with the West Balkan enlargement and the Eastern Partnership’s widening.3
The creative crisis management of the EU has taken place in two major steps so far. The first steps were taken from the beginning of the global crisis to the institutionalization of the crisis management in June 2010 in the good faith that it was a “V”-type of crisis, i.e. the crisis followed by recovery. The second steps have been taken as overcoming the recurring crisis from June 2010 to June 2011 that has been continued with the long stormy summer in 2011. It has been so far the regained optimism that the “W”-type of crisis – i.e. the recurring crisis - can be overcome in the second stage of crisis management and it will not turn to an “L”-type of crisis with a long stagnation and small recovery. This W-type of crisis gives the time horizon of this paper, which covers both the reform of the institutional architecture in the LT (“metagovernance”) and the reform of the EU policy universe in the new megaproject (EU2020). The Big Dilemma of the EU stays with us for the next period as well: on one side the successive crisis situations demand quick responses from the EU, and the EU have often been criticised of being slow in decisions, missing political leadership and paralysed by long internal discussions. On the other side, however, there have also been voices blaming the EU for the democratic deficit, for not discussing-consulting all the issues with all those concerned from governments to organized interests. No doubt that the EU has developed a lot of establishing its metagovernance, at the same time the decisions have been delayed by the resistance of national governments or by the other actors that have tried to engage in the political compromise with their own stakeholders.
The analysis starts with the creative crisis and with the above stages of the crisis management, and it continues with the reform processes in the institutional and policy fields. The conceptual framework of this paper is built on iron triangle, the emerging organic link between the EU2020 Strategy, cohesion policy and stronger economic governance. The paper focuses on the increasing tension between the Core and the Periphery in the EU efforts to achieve a long term consolidation after the “exit strategy”.
I. From Lisbon Strategy to Europe 2020 Strategy
4 The transition process from the Lisbon Strategy (LS) to the Europe 2020 Strategy (EU2020) was itself part of the EU global crisis management. The history of the Lisbon Strategy, in fact, came to an end already during 2009, even if the EU leaders and analysts were not aware of it. In the basic EU documents the direct crisis management measures (exit strategies) were at the forefront at the June 2009 Summit, since “Future development remains uncertain.” (Council, 2009b:5). The institutional crisis was also looming large around the ratification of the LT. Although some institutional innovations were launched in June 2009 like the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the functional macro-regions (Baltic Sea Region Strategy and Danube Region Strategy, BRS and DRS), there was no time and energy to evaluate the results of the LS. Only the October 2009 Summit produced a small remark that “The European Council looks forward to discussing a new European strategy for jobs and growth as part of upcoming review of the Lisbon Strategy.” (Council, 2009c:8). However, when the institutional crisis came to an end with the entry of the LT on 1 December 2009, the December 2009 Summit already outlined the “new EU 2020 strategy” (Council, 2009d:7-8), indicating that the March 2010 meeting of the European Council would deal with the new Strategy in detail. In the late 2009 there was a turning point in the strategic vision of the EU, indeed, the LS passed away almost unnoticeably and without a meaningful official final evaluation, with a simple summary (Commission, 2010a).
By the late 2009 EU was under double pressure with a cumulative effect of the internal and external crises. On one side it had to deal with overcoming the global crisis as a short term goal (exit strategy), but on the other it was forced to elaborate a new long term strategy, since the post-crisis world would be totally different. At the same time, the main institutions of the EU were terribly busy with the start of the regular five year cycle in the EP and the European Commission. This institutional renewal was disturbed and delayed with the long and controversial process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (LT). This long delay can be exemplified with the entry of the LT on 1 December 2009 and that of the new Commission on 10 February 2010. Hence, heavy debates began only in the early 2010 on the new Strategy under the new name of the Europe 2020 in a completely changed global situation.4
5 Gordian knot was cut by the German Bundestag decision in the Greek bailout case. With the ensuing Greek Drama and its PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, originally Ireland was also included) follow-up around the economic governance a new chapter began in the crisis management with sharp debates and firm decisions. This first period came to an end by the June 2010 Summit of the European Council with the institutionalization of crisis management.5
There was a long story of wake-up calls for the crisis driven change in the EU since the beginning of the global financial crisis. In this previous period, before the mid-2009 there were already strong incentives for breaking the status quo and for overcoming the deep social resistance to the changes/reforms of the European Governance (EG). A strong demand appeared also for the economic governance completed with the complexity management in the widening EU policy universe “inside” and with the global anticipatory risk management “outside”. But the strategic vision was pushed to the background from time to time even later, also in the early spring 2010 by the “immobilism” in the EU due to the panic reactions of economic nationalisms. The direct, narrow minded reactions to the financial, economic and social crisis disturbed and delayed the long term crisis management, although the strategic vision returned back new and again. In this situation the elaboration of the Europe 2020 strategy became vital and pivotal. It determined the future self-definition of the EU basically both in its institutional architecture and in the increasing policy universe. This vital importance was emphasized by Barroso at the presentation of the Commission’s Europe 2020 document on 3 March 2010: “Europe 2020 is about what we need to do today and tomorrow to get Europe back on track.” (Barroso, 2010:1).
6 providing the long-term vision as “the overarching policy framework for all Union policies and strategies” (Council, 2009d:7-8).6
The first occasion to discuss the Europe 2020 Strategy was on 11 February 2010 at the Informal Summit, since the main aim of this meeting was to confirm the basic tenets of this Strategy. The Summit was overburdened, however, by the Greek fiscal crisis, which on its part further delayed the whole process, but at the same time forced to accept some radical changes in economic governance. The February Informal Summit already indicated that the newly elected president, Herman Van Rompuy was ready to play an assertive and innovative role in the European Council, including the Europe 2020 Strategy. In a long speech in Bruges at the College of Europe he gave a comprehensive description of the post-crisis world and noted the necessity to make a political decision for stronger governance. At the same time he hinted at the fact that the EU’s main goal was the convergence of the member states’ economies but the opposite process could still be observed (Rompuy, 2010a:4-5). From the very beginning he pushed for the new strategy, and when the first draft of the Europe 2020 strategy was published on 3 March 2010 (Commission, 2010c), he underlined that “Work on the new strategy is only beginning” (Rompuy, 2010b:2) that can be confronted with the too optimistic presentation of this document by Barroso as a quasi completed draft. Anyway, the Commission’s basic document (2010c), although not yet the final one of the Europe 2020 Strategy, has to be compared with the 2000 Council decision launching the LS. The contrast is rather shocking, since the 2000 Council document had been prepared in a boom period and expressed naïve optimism, while this March 2010 Commission document was written in a deep crisis period and expressed a hardly concealed pessimism.
7 “(1) Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation. (2) Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy. (3) Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.” (Commission, 2010c:5). In fact, already in the LS the essential tension was that the first two principles above were reduced in fact to economic competitiveness, which contradicted to a great extent to the third principle above that represented solidarity. It is not by chance that most criticisms were formulated in the mood that this first draft was not enough green and social.7
Furthermore, the March 2010 Commission document mentioned that “EU goals are translated into national targets and trajectories”, or “Country-specific recommendations will be addressed to Member States” (Commission, 2010c:5). It emphasized the membership specificities, and outlined the five “interrelated” headline targets at the EU level in concrete indices, but without introducing the double track approach for more and less developed member states. The double track approach does not mean in itself a double speed Europe but presupposes that facilitating devices are introduced to the strategy, basically in the form of cohesion policy for the catching up of the less developed member states. This shows that the weaknesses of the LS final evaluation, i.e. the missing analysis of the “pre-Lisbon” situation in the new member states, created problems in the elaboration of the new Strategy, too. It was not pointed out in Commission document (2010a) that one of the main reasons for the relative failure of the LS was the missing realization that the new member states in many respects were still in the “pre-Lisbon” phase and the facilitating devices for their catching up were also missing, since they were not an essential part of the LS governance structure. No doubt that the LS neglected the special situation of the new member states and their “pre -Lisbon” tasks and burdens. Again, there is no sign in the March 2010 document either that the EU would realize this divergence in the starting conditions. Nor there is any reference to the efforts to prepare some special measures for the double track approach in the Europe 2020.8
8 the LS, since the LS lacked the “teeth” of the SGP: “the key ingredient of the Lisbon strategy should be (or should have been) given the same status – and teeth, of the growth and stability pact.” The duality of EU frameworks of the LS “Structural Indicators” and the “Sustainable Development Strategy Indicators” led to a confusion regarding the common “European Union indicators”, although the two strategies strongly overlapped. This controversy may disturb also the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy and it makes necessary the merging of the two strategies with a common list of key indicators as the Europe 2020 scorecard (Saltelli et al., 2010:2,6).
It is also evident that also the “key shortcoming” of the LS was kept in the March 2010 Commission document as “the omission of a very large element of European economies, namely the public sector”. The public sector provides not only a large variety of public services with its controversial and always challenged productivity level but it also sets the legal framework for social development, thus it has an enormous importance for the entire Europe 2020 Strategy (Martens, 2010:18-19). This Commission document dealt in some ways with cohesion policy, yet, it did not cover all policy areas (e.g. education) and there were also some “missing links” between/among the policies concerned (e.g. public sector – public services). Again, the separation of the Europe 2020 from the Stability and Growth Pact meant that the Strategy “does not address economic reform comprehensively”, although “integrating both policy fields would have also provided an opportunity to bind Europe 2020 into the wider economic governance mechanisms.” Finally, therefore “the proposed governance mechanism is still predominantly ‘soft’ (…) Agreeing a vision for Europe 2020 might be difficult enough – but without stronger governance mechanism to implement it, it will just remain a vision.”9
9 program by early 2011. In general, the European Council supported the March 2010 proposal of the Commission, foreseeing its “final” elaboration at the June 2010 Summit (Council, 2010a:4-5). Altogether, the Commission proposed a strict “timeline” for the 2010-2012 period (Commission, 2010c:34).
There was, however, a big step taken ahead in the Commission basic document towards the “stronger governance” what I call the EU metagovernance. It was high time, indeed, to realize that “Stronger economic governance will be required to deliver results.” This document described clearly the role of the EU institutions in the Europe 2020 governance by putting the European Council to the central stage: “The European Council will have full ownership and be the focal point of the new strategy. The Commission will monitor progress (…) The European Parliament will be a driving force to mobilise citizens” (Commission, 2010c:6). Accordingly, the proposed architecture of the Europe 2020 has been based on the central role of the European Council. Thus, the European Council has to extend its competences and to take full responsibility for the success of the new Strategy instead of the blurred competences and responsibilities of the OMC in the LS. This top-down approach means that the European Council adopts the strategic decisions first, later the various sectoral Council formations have to elaborate the detailed programs, including the necessary implementation measures. This stronger governance received a more detailed treatment in the Commission document, with the European Council in the driving seat but also inviting the contributions of stakeholders at national and levels in the MLG spirit (Commission, 2010c:27-30). It is indeed, a new turning point in the EG reform, or to some extent, in the “political union” as integrated governance, if and when it will be implemented. The decision to overcoming the Greek crisis might have given the final push towards the “stronger” economic governance that could lead to further radical changes in the European Governance (EG) by establishing the Europe 2020 governance framework. Discussing the Greek case at the March 2010 Summit, the statement of Jerzy Buzek echoed the main message that “The issue of the ‘governance’ of this new strategy is crucial.”10
10 proposal for the reform of the Integrated Guidelines in two parts (Commission, 2010d,e). This document contained a self-criticism by accepting that the former guidelines had not been enough “integrated”, since the links between/among the various policies had to be strengthened for getting synergies: “The Europe 2020 Strategy has to be underpinned by an integrated set of policies, which Member States should implement fully and at the same pace, in order to achieve the positive spill-over effects of coordinated structural reforms.” (Commission, 2010d:5,7). On 12 May 2010 the draft for Reinforcing economic policy coordination was published, in which, beyond the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Commission “proposes the establishment of a European Semester for economic policy coordination, so that Member States would benefit from early coordination at the European level as they prepare their national stability and convergence programmes including their national budgets and national reform programmes. Finally, it sets out principles that should underpin a robust framework for crisis management for euro-area Member States.” (Commission, 2010f:3). All in all, the Greek crisis revealed the deeper tensions in the EU and the ensuing turmoil was helpful to clarify the various standpoints of the member states in the different policy fields and through their conflicting social interests.
The Presidency Conclusions of the June 2010 meeting have noted proudly that “we adopt ‘Europe 2020’, our new strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. It constitutes a coherent framework for the Union to mobilize all of its instruments and policies and for the Member States to take enhanced coordinated actions.” (Council, 2010b:1). It has said repeatedly that “The European Council today has finalised the European Union’s new strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This strategy will help Europe recover from the crisis and come out stronger, both internally and at the international level, by boosting competitiveness, productivity, growth potential, social cohesion and economic convergence. The new strategy responds to the challenge of reorienting policies away from crisis management towards the introduction of medium- to longer-term reforms” (Council, 2010b:2). No doubt that after some years these solemn words will be quoted as a historical turning point by introducing the new EU strategy. The text of this EU document in general, however, contradicts to that statement indicating that the EU moves definitely from the crisis management to the long term perspectives, since the crisis management has just been institutionalized by this document. Thus, the long term perspectives have been both outlined and postponed at the same time.
11 common framework of the all EU policies, so policy cohesion and coordination will be the key issue for the success of the Strategy: “All common policies, including the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy, will need to support the strategy. (…) The European Council stresses the importance of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion as well as developing infrastructure in order to contribute to the success of the new strategy.” (Council, 2010b:3). On the other side, contradicting to this optimism, the worries about the protracted crisis that have returned from all directions new and again, and they have gone through the whole text, so crisis management has appeared as the real priority: “The crisis has revealed clear weaknesses in our economic governance, in particular as regards budgetary and broader macroeconomic surveillance. Reinforcing economic policy coordination therefore constitutes a crucial and urgent priority.” (Council, 2010b:4). The demands for the effective economic policy have been formulated in various terms and approaches from fiscal sustainability to the stronger economic governance, nonetheless these various terms and approaches themselves have not yet shown the necessary “coordination” as the ad hoc reactions of the crisis management have demonstrated.
The Europe 2020 Strategy has been launched but the content of economic governance has remained the main controversial issue. At the March 2010 Summit the Greek crisis cast its shadow on the negotiations about the EU strategy, in the same way at the June 2010 Summit the threat of the Spanish crisis – with its domino effects to the other PIGS states – did it, so the international media dealt more with the Spanish case than with the Summit itself. Most probably this was one of the shortest and quickest Summits, since it was reduced to a one-day meeting and the detailed decisions were postponed again. The EU was not yet able to overcome the crisis, but it learned to live with the crisis, so the EU institutionalized the crisis management. It has institutionalized the crisis itself in such a way that the pressure of the crisis has become a permanent part of institutional workings to forcing out the decisions and their implementations so far. Obviously, however, new policies can be pursued by the same governance structure only for a while, and policy changes sooner or later provoke new governance structures as well, as it has been the case with the EU crisis management institutions as the financial stabilization agencies.
12 world.” This positive evaluation may only be understood from the argument that the Greek Drama was “the most serious challenge in the history of European integration”. Therefore the June Solution emerged as “a huge relief”. On 7 May 2010 at the summit of eurozone leaders the EU had found itself “on the verge of a financial collapse”, and even days and hours before the June 2010 Summit “there was renewed speculation that the crisis might spread” to Spain, the current holder of the rotating presidency (EPC, 2010:1). Against this background of the evolving crisis, the relative calm and consolidation at the June 2010 Summit may be considered as a success, indeed, but also at the same time the start of a new kind of workings for the EU in institutionalizing the crisis management.11
The overall view of the political and economic landscape of the EU in the first half of 2010 was formulated in the EPC by elaborating of the European Economic Sustainability Index (EESI). “In light of the unprecedented turmoil in the euro-zone and the uncertainty over what the future holds, it is important to not only understand the current pressures on public finances but also the medium- to long-term factors which will effect the economic stability and sustainability of EU countries in future. The long-term competitiveness of European economies, their governance and their ability to carry out structural reforms to cope with long-term challenges will all influence whether countries have a sustainable economy in the long run. This will also determine the success or failure of the euro.” (Zuleeg, 2010:6).
13 Altogether, the first half of 2010 was a period of the future-oriented EU definitions - see the series of the long-term strategies as the González, Martens, Metris and Monti Reports - in both ways, globally by strengthening the EU as global actor and internally by elaborating the European economic governance. In this direction, the European Policy Centre in A Schuman Declaration for the 21st Century, issued on the 60th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration on 9 May, offered some thoughts on what Schuman might say today on the new European Challenge: “In global terms the EU and all its members are in relative decline – politically and economically. The world is becoming ever less euro-centric: global affairs are increasingly shaped in other parts of the world. Without change, the old continent is doomed to gradual marginalization and irrelevance.” (EPC, 2010a:1-2).
2. The second steps: continued crisis leads to stronger economic governance
Actually, the year 2010 was an “annus horribilis”, a turbulent year of horror with a grave euro-crisis. As a result of the global financial crisis, the euro faced a deepening public debt crisis in 2010 because of the structural problems in some eurozone countries. The following steps taken for strengthening the economic governance have also provoked deep tensions among the member states due to the large competitiveness gap between them. The MS still had “little appetite for policy reform”, therefore “Policy integration continued at a slow pace. Only modest progress was made in strengthening eurozone governance.” (Tsoukalis et al., 2010:12). Actually, the spring 2010 euro crisis of the EU had been more or less overcome by June 2010, but it turned out afterwards that the Lisbon Treaty framework was not enough for a long-term consolidation. Thus, after the first steps in exit strategy, as a direct reaction to the global financial, economic or even social crises, a long-term answer was also needed.
14 political, social, cultural and infrastructural – integration of the EU27 as Cohesive Europe can also be termed as Continentalization, in which the EU has taken the lead (Rifkin, 2011:1-2).12
Already the LT contains an extension of cohesion policy from economic and social cohesion to territorial cohesion. Moreover, parallel with the developments of the global crisis, the EU2020 as a long term vision or mega project was elaborated in a very strong linkage with the renewed cohesion policy designed in the Fifth Cohesion Report in November 2010. Indeed, the basic mission of the EU2020 is delivering the Cohesive Europe by 2020, since “Europe can succeed if it acts collectively, as a Union.” (European Commission, 2010a:5). This new vision has put forward “three mutually reinforcing priorities” as smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, indicating the “social progress” as a key term for the EU’s future. Thus, maintaining the efforts for economic cohesion, the latest EU documents have been focusing particularly on social and territorial cohesion. The “iron triangle” or the organic links between the EU2020 megaproject, the renewed cohesion policy and the stronger economic governance has been the main message of these EU documents, since the implementation of the EU2020 presupposes both the renewed cohesion policy and the stronger economic governance. This connection is the main message of the March 2011 Conclusions by pointing out that the stronger economic governance both by the European Semester (EU27) and the Europact (EU17) is needed for the successful implementation of the EU2020: “The European Council today adopted a comprehensive package of measures to respond to the crisis, preserve financial stability and lay the ground for smart, sustainable, social inclusive and job-creating growth.” (European Council, 2011b:2).13
The new European architecture built on the LT and EU2020 has been under high pressure from the very beginning, and it will be so in the coming years. Therefore, to break the vicious circle, the EU has turned in 2011 to some major reforms. The reform of economic governance became the central topic on the 4 February 2011 European Council meeting, and at the Eurozone Summits on 11 and 15 March 2011. Finally, the 24-25 March 2011 Summit endorsed the Europact. The first arrangement of the stronger economic governance was completed after the negotiations with the EP by the European Council on 24 June 2011, although many “technicalities” of regulation are still to be arranged in the coming years. Thus, after the “annus horribilis”, the year of horror for the EU in 2010, there has recently been a positive turn towards the post-crisis consolidation, although with a big question mark on the future of Cohesive Europe.
15 time, it has been supposed that the European Semester as a strong and binding coordination would support the implementation of the EU2020 instead of the “weak” OMC (Open Method of Coordination) in the former Lisbon Strategy (Börzel, 2010). The second one has been proposed as the competitiveness pact (later Europact) for the eurozone members (EU17), which has been based on the intergovernmental method relying on peer pressure for enforcement (see Delors, 2011). Altogether, because the shock absorbing capacity of the EU was very low at the outbreak of the crisis, there was a need for a new initiative. The German-French proposal for the competitiveness could not be condemned as an “intergovernmental” approach (e.g. Ponzano, 2011), since it has been based, indeed, on a combination of the Community and intergovernmental methods. The new approach has been called by Angela Merkel in her Bruges speech as a “coordinated European position” or the “Union method” (Merkel, 2010:7). In this current debate of the Notre Europe Institute the eminent analysts have pointed out that “the difference between the two methods was no longer a matter of their nature but a matter of degree” (Schoutheete, 2011:3). Thus, the main problem with the Europact is not in its intergovernmentalism, but in its neglect for the possible consequences for the growing gap between Centre and Periphery.
16 for the NMS is how to cope with this new situation and whether they can expect the proper cohesive measures from the EU in the framework of the integrative balancing. In this respect it is necessary to express some doubts concerning the “cohesiveness” and viability of the Europact, whether it leads to the convergence of all MS or to the divergence between Core and Periphery in the EU27. The message referring to the organic link between the EU2020 and the renewed cohesion policy has a particular importance also for the NMS because Cohesive Europe can produce the best - and the Two Speed Europe the worst - EU environment for their post-crisis catching up process. The future-oriented definition of the EU has also aimed at the rediscovery of these post-crisis perspectives for the NMS.
In early 2011 the EU wanted to be “inward looking”, i.e. focusing on the economic governance in order to arrange an institutional reform for more global competitiveness. The Arab uprisings forced it to a great extent, however, to be also “outward looking” that has disturbed the process of domestic reforms. In 2011 a revolt swept across the Arab countries against the age-old dictatorships, and the EU was forced to react to the radical changes at its Southern Rim at the 11 March 2011 Informal Summit. In fact, there has been no genuine process of democratization in the Arab world, just a power transition to the softer versions of authoritarian regimes. As with the “coloured revolutions” in Eastern Europe (e.g. in Ukraine and Georgia) a new hybrid democracy might have emerged in the best case, thus similar developments can be expected in the South, so democratization as a full term can be an exaggeration for this process. It is clear, however, that the EU has decided “to develop a new partnership with the region” (European Council, 2011b:9). No doubt that the former ENP strategy of the EU has been weakened by the revolt in the Arab world, since the former initiatives in the West Balkans (WB) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) that have also been connected with the renewed cohesion policy through the functional macro-regions (Baltic and Danube Strategies). Therefore this revolt has disturbed the preparations for the new neighbourhood policy in the “East”, in both the West Balkans and in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (see European Commission, 2011).15
II. Cohesive Europe in the post-crisis world
1. Metagovernance: The strategic-political leadership of the EUCO
17 developments as external structural constraints have been forcing the EU to change its institutional structure in order to be able to develop its long term planning, policy coordination and strategic vision. With the emerging new world order the EU entered a world of uncertainty, therefore it has to be mentioned again that “Future developments remain uncertain.” (Council, 2009b:5). Thus, not only the crisis management capacity, but even more the anticipatory capacity and risk management are of great importance. Consequently, the EU has to strengthen its anticipatory and adaptive capacity in the next decade, creating institutions for the “general flexicurity” in all basic policies like the European Systemic Risk Board in financial supervision (Council, 2009b:7). Given the fact that “the EU needs to go strategic”, as an early warning says, the global risk management with anticipatory capacity has become the biggest political power potential: „Political power derives from effectively dealing with the risks and challenges that have snuck into our homes and lives: energy security, climate change, financial crisis, demographic change, migration, overstretched health care systems, and social security.” (Bauer, 2008:2). The philosophy behind this message is that the EU needs, indeed, a complex goal setting with a clear vision, thus its implementation has to be managed by a metagovernance type of institution. A Governance Initiative was launched in early 2009, quite clearly outlining the complexity of the governance: “The Council acknowledges the multidimensional nature of governance, which includes political, social, economic, security, legal, institutional, cultural and environmental aspects, at all levels. All these aspects are interlinked and should be addressed in a holistic and balanced way.” (Council of Ministers, 2009b:1). The Lisbon Treaty is the long awaited institutional match to the EU2020. It has produced a new mission statement for the rejuvenation of the EU by the EU2020 as the new strategic program.16
18 three dimensions as an “integrative balancing” of the institutions: (1) between the union and the national levels, (2) within the Big Institutional Triangle of the EU and (3) at the several sub-national territorial levels with the joint economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Hence, there is a need for the strong metagovernance at the top that enables the EU to make quick integrated decisions. The extended union level program has to be completed jointly for the Europe 2020 with the coherent forms and comprehensive frameworks at the EU level of public actions, although the structural reforms have to be accomplished by the member states. The establishment of the European Council in legal terms has brought in the biggest change because the central initiative role of designing and deciding strategies has been transferred from the President of the European Commission to the newly elected President of the European Council. The role of the European Council has become vital in the new institutions’ pyramid for agenda setting and strategy formation as the political side of the Europe 2020. The Monti Report emphasizes that “The President’s leading role is particularly crucial to bring a holistic vision. (…) Now that the European Council, also through the role of its permanent President, can afford a greater continuity in steering economic governance of the EU, it would be helpful to have a top-level comprehensive guidance of the Council’s contribution to this key pillar of European integration. (…) Europe2020 is a promising overarching policy initiative, which will be crucial for the future of Europe.” (Monti, 2010:106-107).
19 strategic decisions - has also to be completed with the bottom-up structures of the vertical and horizontal competences, i.e. with the clear and transparent ownership of the national and subnational levels.17
All in all, the governance line of the Lisbon Strategy/Europe 2020 has to be considered from a long term view about the institutionalization of the EU that culminates in the Lisbon Treaty. The long overdue reform of the strong central decision making mechanism in the Europe 2020 has to be completed in the spirit of the MLG by the functional macro-regions (Baltic Sea Region Strategy and Danube Region Strategy), which have been the laboratory for social innovations in regulatory regionalism or regional governance. Moreover, as it has often been mentioned, the lack of national - and even more subnational - ownership may be the biggest threat in the implementation of the Europe 2020. The further integration of the union and national levels, as the radical reform of the governance line, is one of the main preconditions for the success of the Europe 2020: “The Open Method of Coordination has failed as an instrument because it does not provide an effective control mechanism for the common goals. In its current form it allows member states to integrate European objectives into national interests thereby making policy according to the changing facts on the ground. Without a robust and binding mode of coordination, Europe-wide macroeconomic management will be pursued in vain. A progressive growth policy must be combined with a new mode of cooperation – in fact, it depends upon it.” (Kellermann et al, 2009:4). Reading this too severe statement, one should not forget about that it reflects also the very heavy demands of the current global crisis management. Briefly said, the OMC has been useful but not committing, therefore the EU toolkit has remained too limited. Nowadays a clear commitment of the member states is needed for the refocusing on the Europe 2020 by shifting the border lines between the union and national competences giving more competences to the Union.
20 As discussed above, for the widening of the EU policy universe a new system of the basic institutions is needed based on integrative balancing with the central role of the EUCO. But the economic growth in a GDP-centred policy universe is still the magic word for many politicians and experts, although the main issue in the second period of the EU2020 from 2014 is how to reconcile economic growth and human investment with social progress. In this respect, there have also been many votes for the Europe 2020 understood in the spirit of Social Europe: “The EU 2020 strategy must make it clear to Europeans that it is now all about showing the world how qualitative economic and employment growth, social justice and sustainability can be brought together in a creative way. The times of growth for the sake of growth are gone for ever. The Europeans want a progressive social agenda which seeks to enshrine a social market economy in Europe. This is exactly what ‘EU 2020’ should be striving to attain.” (Fritz -Vannahme et al, 2010:7). The González Report has also concluded that the European model depends on the “continued balance between its social and market dimensions”, hence “a renewed emphasis on increasing economic efficiency needs to go hand in hand with new social policies” (González, 2010:15).19
21 was the “integrated”, which expressed the main effort of the EU institutions for a holistic approach or for integrative balancing.20
In this spirit of social progress the “main messages” of the Employment Summit (Prague, 7 May 2009) emphasized that the Union’s response to the crisis “should be based on a coordinated approach integrating economic, employment and social policies (…) should mobilise all available national and Community instruments and fully integrate growth, employment, solidarity, social protection and inclusion strategies” (Commission, 2009e:1). The summary of main message was that “The future Lisbon strategy should be focused on well-defined goals, relevant to European citizens, it should be reinforced to deliver sustainable growth, social cohesion and more and better jobs, ensuring long term sound public finances and modern social protection system.” (Commission, 2009e:1). Actually, since the relaunched LS in 2005 the main line of “policy integration” was the integration of various policies with their synergetic effects. The proper integrated policy mix was supposed to balance (1) between competitiveness and convergence approaches, (2) between “traditional” and “new” community policies, and (3) finally between “internal” and “external” policies, with a shift of focus from the national to the community designed policies but paying attention also to the member states’ specificities.21
In fact, the social progress based concepts have turned to the mainstream thinking, in which the proper policy mix of the economic and social policy is in social productivity (see Fitoussi, 2009 and Martens, 2010). This means that “The focus of research on social progress thus shifted from GDP to defining, measuring and attempting to explain a broader set of factors deemed to effect the well-being of individuals in societies, which together have been termed ‘quality of life’. Research on social progress has also begun taking the well-being of future generations into account by examining sustainability issues.” (Theodoropoulou, 2009:14). Actually, social progress has proven to be the “hub” in the EU policy universe around which all policy fields have been organized. Consequently, “The forthcoming Europe 2020 Strategy needs therefore to develop a broad ‘partnership for progress’; indeed, a new model of governance in partnership. (…) The Europe 2020 Strategy will also have an increasingly important external dimension. Regional and local authorities are already active promoters of vast networks of cooperation across and beyond Europe” (Stahl and Spinaci, 2010:59,62).22
22 innovation. Thus, European Governance can be formulated from this side of “integrated policies” as complexity management in a Multispeed Europe. The EU has to move from the coordinated to the integrated actions through common institutions, since policy planning with policy coherence needs common vision (“Think European”) as guidance for actions (“Think Global –Act European”).23
2. Differentiated membership or the gap between Core and Periphery
The EU has always been a “unity in diversity” that has meant differentiated memberships or flexible integration from the very beginning. This membership differentiation has become more and more marked not only with the widening, but also with the deepening process, namely with the broadening institutional architecture and the increasing policy universe. As Janis Emmanouilidis has recently noted, “More than ever before the EU needs to operate at different speeds – and there are numerous reasons why this is so. The enlarged Union is characterised by a growing diversity of interests, an increase of economic, financial, social and geopolitical heterogeneity and diverging objectives and expectations concerning the future path of integration prevent consensus about Europe’s finalité.” (Emmanouilidis, 2010:97). Thus, “Differentiated integration serves to accommodate the diversity and plurality of the member states.” (Closa, 2010:4). Indeed, at the new level of the EG stipulated by the LT the EU needs more diversity to allow some elbow room for the accommodation of the MS, but the durable and extreme plurality of the governance methods is at the same time an obstacle to implementation of the LT already in medium term and the further improvement of the EG in long term.
23 union”, as Emmanouilidis has explained it: “A group of countries creates a new separate union. (…) The new union aims at a higher level of supranational cooperation and thus includes the immediate transfer of competences and the pooling the sovereignty beyond the level inside the ‘old EU’”. (Emmanouilidis, 2010:98). Therefore, now it is a new turning point ahead to avoid the fatal split between Core and Periphery, and to elaborate a model of flexible integration.
The Two-Speed Europe that may be institutionalized by the Europact is at a closer look a Three-Speed Europe with a wider peripherialization process, since both the most developed and the least developed countries have been left out from the “Eurofortress”. Hence, the Three-Speed Europe can be the simplest description of this project. Namely, Scandinavia is the “overdeveloped” group, including the Norway and Iceland as quasi MS. This first group does not want to join the eurozone (including the UK for various reasons), but these countries are the real, long term “high speed group”. The “Eastern” new member states are the second, “underdeveloped” group, including still the eurozone MS like Slovakia and Estonia, and to some extent also Slovenia. The description of the third group, the eurozone member states is the most difficult. History matters, since some less developed countries like Greece and Portugal have joined the third group of the old eurozone states, but nowadays they are financially the most vulnerable members of the EU27. Thus, when the EU17 dares to take a big step ahead in the European integration, it finds the biggest difficulty in its own group due to public debt crisis in these high risk MS, and the Core-Periphery split re-appears within the eurozone with a vengeance.
24 However, in the last analysis, the EU27 proves to be a Multi-Speed Europe, in which the “common denominator” has always been redefined. If it is reduced to a minimum, then the Cohesive Europe will fail. The EU27 has very differentiated membership system, or a very varied legal-political and socio-economic landscape with different “policy memberships” that has been analyzed several times under various titles like e.g. the “concentric circles”. The EU needs nowadays a positive strategy for the differentiated or flexible integration (Tsoukalis et al., 2010:21-22), since as Janis Emmanouilidis has pointed out “a higher degree of flexible integration is a necessity if the EU27+ wants to remain effective (…) closer cooperation between a limited number of EU countries can help to overcome stalemate, improve the functioning of the Union and reduce tensions between those who want to deepen collaboration and those who are not (yet) ready or willing to do so.” (Emmanouilidis, 2010:97). Therefore, flexible integration and the increasingly “closer cooperation” should go together, i.e. when making a substantial decision about the convergence – as it is the case with the Europact -, it is at the same time the right moment to elaborate the proper flexible integration in order to be able to implement it. Nowadays the flexible integration as some kind of integrative balancing cannot be seen (yet?) in the Europact, since the EU is weaker and the pressure of the euro crisis is bigger than it was in 1993 when the Cohesion Countries were integrated into the eurozone by the facilitating fund. The EU27 has recently been weakened by the same Cohesion Countries, since they have fatally been wounded by the global crisis, and it has recreated and/or deepened the North-South divide in the EU. Hence, the EU is unable to prepare the same kind of facilitating fund for the NMS as it did earlier in the nineties in the case of the Cohesion Countries, so at present the integrative balancing mechanism does not seem to work. However, after these first urgent measures, the financially Cohesive Europe may be the solution with a well regulated structure of the European institutional architecture, in which the flexible transitions between the policy membership levels are to be institutionally arranged and financially facilitated.24
At this crossroads it has to be clear that Cohesive Europe has two meanings. First of all, the Cohesive Europe presupposes a general policy line for the EU27 with a broadly defined and permanently recreated strong “basic membership”. Beyond this general cohesion policy for all MS in the framework of the renewed cohesion policy, however, in the post-crisis situation Cohesive Europe demands also a special cohesion/regional policy for the less developed MS. In such a way there has been a double track of maintaining and recreating the convergence, namely for all MS on one side, but leaving way for the MS idiosyncrasies, including their catching up exercises on the other.25
25 organized structure for the upward efforts between these levels of “policy memberships” that facilitate the transitions between these policy integration levels in order to create in such a way a dynamic unity of diversity in the EU27. Otherwise, the present dangerous fragmentation processes will be accelerated and they will produce new kinds of deep division in the EU27 as diverging “sectoral” and/or “regional” integrations of the MS. As it has been described in the much-repeated analyses, the EU is a highly compound polity, in which the EU cohesion policy means a wide range of financial instruments addressing economic, social and territorial disparities in Europe. No doubt that cohesion policy is the main instrument and the dynamic vehicle to keep the MS together to create a Cohesive
Europe. The role of cohesion policy cannot be reduced to the NMS, and its importance is growing, since the European policy universe has undergone deep changes in the last years as its own “deepening” and “widening”, and much more is to come.26
Namely, the EU has tried to elaborate some new “union” – earlier “community” - policies as energy, climate change and knowledge triangle (higher education – research – innovation), and it has extended its common policy universe to the new policy fields also in the justice and home affairs. The EU has usually more initiatives in policies than for institutions, that is, despite all the delays and hesitations, the EU is more dynamic in introducing new policies than in regulating the interfaces of these policies by creating the proper institutions for them. In the present open situation it is risky that the Europact may produce strict regulations for a well defined policy field, but leaves the wider linkages and the precise social indicators of economic governance unregulated and unbalanced. There is no clear delineation between the policy integration levels that would also provide the “elevators” between the different levels of the European institutional architecture. This situation can create a “Eurofortress” with strong some bastions but with long weak walls. It will reproduce the pre-accession situation for most NMS at a higher level, since they are already within the EU legally but still just “partially”. They have to “enter” the EU again in terms of policy memberships, under more difficult conditionalities than originally. All NMS face similar difficulties, even if they are already eurozone MS. Nevertheless, it is not only an East-West Divide, even more so a North-South Divide (see Magone, 2011). The choice between the regulated-orchestrated convergence and the “free competition” with increasing divergence concerns both the European institutional architecture and the EU2020 policy universe in all MS.
Conclusion: the post-crisis vision for the global competitiveness of the EU
26 Periphery Gap”. Nowadays there has been a deep malaise in the EU about its future, and its global competitiveness with the US and the BRICs. This pessimism has been generated by the global financial crisis turning into social crisis, and finally to an identity crisis. It has also been based on the exaggerated predictions about the BRICs increasing role and the overwhelming US global capacity. Actually, however, the transatlantic ideological divide demonstrates that “the American growth model is stuck in deep crisis.” (Hill, 2011b:11). The EU has been markedly different from the other continental mega-regions, including the United States, first of all due to its commitment to the basic values of Social Europe. Referring to Social Europe, this American analyst has recently formulated in the title of his book - The European Way: A model for development in the twenty-first century (2010) – that Europe can be a model for the global developments. Even the subtitle of his book suggests that “the European Way is the best hope in an insecure age”. Steven Hill argues that reacting to the global crisis, “Europe has painstakingly pieced together the direction and details for a new economic order.” In fact, the risk of the global stalemate has been in the US policies, turning again in summer 2011 into a deep US crisis. Thus “Now if only Europe can get its laggard transatlantic cousin to pick up its pace, 2011 could be a banner year not only for economic recovery but for establishing the path for healthier and more stable global economic order.” (Hill, 2011a:4).27
27 The EU had in 2011 a long stormy summer but after the late July event one can draw a positive, optimistic conclusion on the sustainability of the EU crisis management. The Eurogroup Emergency Summit on 21 July 2011 concluded that “We confirm our commitment to the euro and to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area (...) We call for the rapid finalization of the legislative package on the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact”. Finally, this document has invited the EU institutions “to make concrete proposals by October how to improve working methods and enhance crisis management in the euro area.” (Eurogroup, 2011). Obviously, this has been so far the strongest statement not only for the defence of the euro area, but first and foremost for the institutionalization of the EU crisis management and for the continued reform of the European Governance. Indeed, this statement has “the highest political significance” in the annals of the crisis because “it demonstrated that with its back against the wall, Europe could muster the political will to save the Euro. (...) For the first time the Eurozone got ahead of the market. (...) It recognized that the EU as a whole owed some obligation of solidarity as well as self interest to find ways of stimulating growth in the debtor nations to offset the unavoidable severity of domestic fiscal austerity.” (Liddle, 2011:2-3).28
Thus, in this post-crisis period a more pragmatic EU with efficient policy making – the so called Europe of results - is necessary but it is not enough. The EU needs long term visions or key concepts at this critical juncture moving from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis world. It stands at a crossroads when the results of the crisis management as an exit strategy can already be seen but the clear contours of the post-crisis world are still not yet visible. The EU reforms have to concern both the polity and policy lines, or the institutional architecture and the widening of the EU policy universe. In both ways there have been great achievements, with the LT the institutional architecture is half-completed, since the new top-down structure is ready for political leadership, as initiatives and urgent decision-making in the global world, but its bottom-up structures are weak or missing. The same goes for the EU policy universe, since there has been a big rearrangement between the union and national competences, still the painful process of the “unionization” of the new policies is far from being completed as policy widening. The current EG reform has also to be accomplished by the institutionalization of the stronger economic governance.
28 EU’s history and it has closely connected with the change of paradigms. The social sciences have provided a strategic planning to support the basic decisions where to go, what kind of Europe has to be planned when the EU arrives at the crossroads. Social progress has been elaborated as the new paradigm for the future EU in the next decades by the leading policy institutes, and the renewed cohesion policy has been identified as its main instrument (see Fitoussi, 2009 and Martens, 2010). Following the first two steps of the policy and governance reforms, and after the stormy summer of 2011, the third steps are also urgently needed to accomplish the entire process of the exit strategy and to enter the new period of sustainable socio-economic recovery by 2013. The third steps can be the elaboration of the European Social Governance after the European Economic Governance (EEG): “the EEG architecture must continue to develop so that it can combine successful short-term consolidation and the enhanced long-term Europe 2020 goals of inclusive growth, social cohesion and social inclusion. Or, to put it another way, what is needed is a model for the future Economic and Social Governance of the EU.” (Fischer and Hoffman, 2011:8).29
29 Annex – The short history of the new European architecture
In 2010-2011 there has been an extended “crisis management” in the EU ending up with a policy triangle: EU2020 – economic governance – cohesion policy. The need for the stronger economic governance has been represented and managed by the EUCO and its new President. The leading analysts have concluded that “There is no doubt that the European Council has been a positive instrument of change. (…) But it is also clear that the European Council has gained power and political space at the expense of the original Community institutions. Quite obviously the Commission is no longer today the main initiator of the integration process, as it was in the early years of Community. The Council of Ministers is no longer the ultimate decision taker on most important issues. Those roles have been in practice taken over by the European Council.”
(EPC – Egmont Institute – CEPS, 2010:7).
(1) As a first step, the EUCO has emphasized that “Structural policies are essential for a strong and sustainable recovery and for preserving the sustainability of our social models. (…) The European Council stresses the importance of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion” (European Council, 2010a:1,4). European Neighbourhood Policy” as the globalization cum regionalization strategy (European Council, 2010c:2,5,8).
(4) The Task Force has suggested “greater fiscal discipline (…) the enforcement measures will be extended to all Member States” with “a reverse majority rule” (European Council – Task Force – October 2010, 2010:1).
(5) The EUCO has endorsed the report of the Task Force on economic governance and it has also referred to the Conclusions of the Social Summit on 21 October 2010 “Beyond the immediate action required to tackle the most pressing challenges posed by the economic and financial crisis, it is important to continue laying solid foundations for a sustainable and job-creating growth. This is the purpose of the Europe 2020 Strategy” (European Council, 2011a:1).
(8) The EUCO has reacted to the Arab uprisings and it has emphasized that “All countries of the region need to undertake or accelerate political and economic reforms.” (European Council, 2011b:1).
(9) The Eurozone Summit has completed the formal adoption of the Europact and has suggested the amendments to the LT. The process is to be concluded with the approval of the EP (European Council, 2011c:1).
30 The plethora of names is somewhat disturbing, namely “The term ‘Plus’ was, according to President Van Rompuy, added to the name to indicate both that eurozone countries have committed themselves to a higher degree of economic coordination and that the Pact is also open to Member States which have not (yet) adopted the euro.”
Ambrosetti Foundation (2009, 2010, 2011) Observatory on Europe 2009: Improving European Integration and Competitiveness. Brussels: The European House
Ágh, Attila (2010a) “The Renewal of the EU Democracy: From Multilevel Governance to Global Governance”, Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 4-20, http://www.jofcp.org/jcp/JCP-January-2010.pdf
Ágh, Attila (2010b) “Post-Accession Crisis in the New Member States: Progressing or Backsliding in the EU?, Studies of Transition States and Societies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 74-93
Ágh, Attila (2010c) “Democratic Consolidation or Backsliding in East Central Europe: Rediscovery of the Past Twenty Years of the “Lands in Between”, in Riedel (ed.), pp. 117-141
Ágh, Attila (2011a) “The complexity of a communitarian Europe: Leitbilder for the enlarged European Union in Hungary”, in Brincker and Jopp (eds), pp. 231-269
Ágh, Attila (2011b) “Global governance and integrative balancing: The EU efforts to respond the Global Challenge”, Journal of Global Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 3
Ágh, Attila (2011c) “The European Futures and Cohesive Europe: EU2020 Strategy and cohesion policy with flexible integration”, Journal of Comparative Politics, Issue 6, July 2011, pp. 49-66
Ágh, Attila (2011d) “Regional competitiveness of the EU in the global context: EU developments from regional policy to cohesion policy” (in this volume)
Ágh, Attila (2011e) “Danube Strategy and Europe 2020 Strategy: The organic link between the bottom-up and the top-down EU project” (in press)
Ágh, Attila and András Vértes (eds) (2010) From the Lisbon Strategy to the Europe 2020 Strategy: Think European for the Global Action, Budapest: Together for Europe Research Centre, p. 261
Ágh, Attila, Tamás Kaiser and Boglárka Koller (eds) (2010) Europeanization of the Danube Region: The Blue Ribbon Project, Budapest: Together for Europe Research Centre and King Sigismund College, p. 260
Barroso, José Manuel (2009) Political guidelines for the next Commission, Brussels Barroso, José Manuel (2010) Opening remarks of President Barroso at the Press Conference on Europe 2020, Speech/10/60, 03/03/2010, europa.eu/rapid/press
Bauer, Thomas (2008) Congratulations, Mr. President (…) here is our agenda, Center for Applied Policy, CAP Perspectives No. 2, www.cap-lmu.de, October 2008
Beck, Ulrich (2009) “This economic crisis cries out to be transformed into the founding of a new Europe”, Guardian, 13 April 2009, www.guardian.co.uk
Börzel, Tanja (2010) “European Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 2, 191-219
Brincker, Gesa-Stefanie and Mathias Jopp (eds) (2011) Leitbilder for the Future of the European Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 420
Closa, Carlos (2010) Differentiated integration and Flexibility in the EU under the
Lisbon Treaty (ARI), 26 April 2010,
