O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E
Boosting the Potency of Resistance:
Combining the Motivational Forces of
Inoculation and Psychological Reactance
Claude H. Miller1, Bobi Ivanov2, Jeanetta Sims3, Josh Compton4, Kylie J.
Harrison1, Kimberly A. Parker5, James L. Parker6, & Joshua M. Averbeck7 1 Department of Communication, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA
2 School of Journalism & Telecommunications, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506, USA 3 Department of Marketing, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK 73034, USA 4 Institute for Writing and Rhetoric, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA 5 Department of Communication, Bellarmine University, Louisville, KY 40205, USA 6 Department of Student Affairs, Mansfield University, Mansfield, PA 16933, USA 7 Department of Communication, Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL 61455, USA
The efficacy of inoculation theory has been confirmed by decades of empirical research, yet optimizing its effectiveness remains a vibrant line of investigation. The present research turns to psychological reactance theory for a means of enhancing the core mechanisms of inoculation—threat and refutational preemption. Findings from a multisite study indicate reactance enhances key resistance outcomes, including: threat, anger at attack message source, negative cognitions, negative affect, anticipated threat to freedom, anticipated attack message source derogation, perceived threat to freedom, perceived attack message source derogation, and counterarguing. Most importantly, reactance-enhanced inoculations result in lesser attitude change—the ultimate measure of resistance.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2012.01438.x
Over the past 50 years, inoculation theory has emerged as the most consistent and reliable method for conferring resistance to persuasion. This ‘‘grandparent theory of resistance to attitude change’’ (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 561) has proven to be a robust strategy across diverse social influence contexts, including interpersonal, mass mediated, commercial, political, and health (see Compton & Pfau, 2005 for a detailed review). If we consider inoculation to be ‘‘at maturity,’’ as Compton and Pfau (2005, p. 97) suggest, based on its advancement and longevity within the communication literature, we may be tempted to conclude the theoretical basis of inoculation is settled, its contribution to resistance research exhausted, and its potential for further development minimal. On the contrary, Compton and Pfau (2005) have noted that
while some may dismiss inoculation as ‘‘antiquated theory,’’ it continues to grow in its theoretical development and application, and it is by no means ready for retirement. One area in need of theoretical improvement concerns the function and opera-tionalization of threat, perhaps the most basic aspect in the resistance process. Insko (1967) was one of the first to suspect some other hidden mechanisms—beyond those of threat and refutational preemption originally theorized by McGuire in 1961a, 1961b—may play key roles in conferring resistance. A number of researchers have focused on uncovering such mechanisms; and although subsequent research has successfully teased apart various structures and sequences within the process of resistance, the very search seems to have shifted focus away from the traditional mechanisms underlining the inoculation process. Moreover, this shift may have been hasty, given that issues concerning the original core constructs of the theory—threat and refutational preemption—have yet to be fully resolved. Questioning the pre-mature reification of inoculation theory, Pfau (1997) recommended a return to the construct’s core assumptions in experimental efforts to refine, extend, reformulate, and test their logic in the laboratory.
Accordingly, the current investigation is focused on improving the potency of inoculation treatments by incorporating psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966)—a forceful mechanism of resistance in its own right—as a potentially powerful device for boosting the threat component and fine-tuning the role of refutational preemption. Contrary to the focus of virtually the entire reactance literature on attempts to avoid or minimize the generally negative effects of reactance, the present research seeks to
exploitreactance within inoculation messages designed to transform and maximize the nature and level of threat, and thus stimulate, redirect, and optimize the manner of counterarguing output useful in prompting resistance to attitude change.
Inoculation theory: Tracing threat and refutational preemption
The conceptual origin of inoculation theory sprang from the medical analogy of immunization against disease. McGuire (1964) believed inoculated cognitive structures could be protected against counterattitudinal persuasive attacks just as inoculated immune systems could be protected against biological attacks, and he identified two mechanisms responsible: threat and refutational preemption.
According to McGuire (1962), threat, ‘‘the most distinguishing feature of inocu-lation’’ (Pfau, 1997, p. 137), is a requisite construct within the process of inoculation (Compton & Pfau, 2005). Although the nature and optimal magnitude of threat necessary to generate the highest levels of resistance has yet to be determined, the essential importance of threat in resistance has been empirically supported by research demonstrating how threat alone can lead to increased resistance (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964; Wyer, 1974).
McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961). Eventually, McGuire introduced more explicit forewarnings of impeding attacks to manipulate threat (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962); yet, he never directly tested for its presence, nor did he measure threat in any way.
In the late 1980s, inoculation researchers began to test levels of message-elicited threat for the first time (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), beginning a trend now commonly practiced in inoculation research (Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005). The results, however, have been largely disappointing, with elicited threat levels appearing to be marginal at best (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) and seldom exceeding the midrange points on the various threat measures used (Compton & Pfau, 2005).
Perhaps not surprisingly, Banas and Rains’ (2010) recent meta-analysis of inoc-ulation, which examined threat as a trichotomized measure, did not provide support for the hypothesis that perceived threat plays a significant role in inoculation. These findings, coupled with the generally small range of effect sizes obtained for threat in the literature (ranging betweenr=0.06 and 0.27), have lead researchers to question the
effectiveness of current threat manipulation methods, and to call for additional ways of manipulating threat to increase its potency and effect, and ideally, the potency and effectiveness of inoculation treatments (Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005). Following vested interest theory (Crano, 1995), Pfau et al. (2010) attempted to enhance threat by altering a traditional forewarning to emphasize greater relevance, certainty, immediacy, and seriousness (stake) of potential persuasive pressures on current attitudes. They attempted to show that enhanced threat, when accompanied by the increased response efficacy provided by refutational preemption, should increase danger control processes (Witte, 1992). This increase, in turn, should result in increased resistance, much the same way a successful fear appeal leads to danger control. However, with one exception (increased attitudinal certainty), their manipulations did not produce outcomes significantly different from traditional forewarnings (Pfau et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, beyond instigating fear, threat can also function through the elici-tation of anger—whether it is anger in its own right, or as a coping behavior for fear (e.g., Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009b; Lee & Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al., 2001). Moreover, relative to fear, anger may function as a more effective motivation to focus attention and heighten desire to protect attitudes already in place, especially if those attitudes are deemed important and/or hedonically relevant (Miller & Averbeck, in press). Thus, an anger-induced, heightened state of motivation could be expected to generate more effective and focused counterarguing activity (Ivanov et al., 2009b; Pfau et al., 2009), which should in turn enhance resistance. However, focusing on anger alone to enhance threat may also be shortsighted, especially when one considers the practice of refutational preemption is perhaps foremost a function of the processing of negative cognitions.
is thought to take advantage of that motivation by stimulating disputations of the potential attack, and guiding the initial production of counterarguments (Compton & Pfau, 2005; McGuire, 1964). Refutational preemption is assumed to provide the defense-motivated individual with a sample of cognitive structures useful in germinating subsequent counterarguments to rebut future attacking messages.
Beyond providing material useful in constructing such defenses, refutational preemption is also thought to interact with threat to stimulate, exercise, and reinforce resistance during what—again drawing from the medical analogy—might be thought of as an incubation period. During this time, counterarguments, like cognitive antibodies, may be developed in preparation for a potential counterattitudinal attack (e.g., McGuire, 1961a, 1961b; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961).
Given that inoculation seems to confer resistance through threat and refutational preemption, the question becomes: How can both processes be enhanced to create more effective inoculation treatments? To formulate an answer to this question, we turn to the potential utility of Brehm’s (1966) theory of psychological reactance.
Psychological reactance: Drawing on threats to perceived freedoms
Psychological reactance theory (PRT) (Brehm, 1966, 1972; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) posits individuals become psychologically aroused when others are perceived as intending to threaten or eliminate their behavioral freedoms. According to PRT, the aversive arousal—simply termed, reactance—motivates individuals to attempt to restore the threatened freedom. Moreover, the potential magnitude of reactance is a direct function of how aware the individual is of that freedom, and how subjectively important the behavior associated with that freedom is perceived to be (Brehm, 1966; Chandler, 1990).
In response to messages perceived to be intentionally persuasive, PRT delimits a number of outcomes associated with methods individuals will use to restore their threatened freedoms, including ignoring or rejecting the message, adopting the contra-advocated position (termed a boomerang effect), and perhaps most damaging of all, derogating and/or directing hostility at the message source. Furthermore, PRT posits that if an attempt to restore a threatened or eliminated freedom is inhibited or fails, the individual will tend to become more attracted to that freedom (Austin, 1980; Chandler, 1990) and/or to others who are able to engage actively in that freedom (Worchel & Brehm, 1971). In summary, reactance theory provides an explanation for how individuals are likely to respond when they perceive important or hedonically relevant freedoms to be threatened or removed by a persuasive message.
Generating reactance within the inoculation treatment
Burgoon, Grandpre, & Alvaro, 2006; Miller et al., 2007), the present investigation concerns what can be done tocultivateresistance by exploiting reactant anger and negative cognitions generated from the theoretically unique and potent form of forewarning associated with threatened freedoms.
Framed in terms of appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996; Scherer, 1982; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), reactance should follow from an individual’s appraisal of the relationship between self and a motivationally relevant and goal-incongruent object or event in one’s social environment. In this regard, the degree of motivational significance—and thus the potential for reactance—a threatened freedom holds for an individual must be assessed via the appraisal process. This process involves primary appraisals in reference to the individual’s current goals (in this case, involving the holding of a particular attitude), and secondary appraisals in reference to the implications the threatened freedom has for coping with interference with those goals (i.e., with attacks on the held attitude) (Smith & Lazarus, 1993).
According to Roseman (1996), when a situation (e.g., an attack on one’s attitude), or an implication of that situation, is inconsistent with one’s goals, the resulting motivational inconsistency should elicit negative emotion, such as fear, when one feels compelled to avoid and retreat from the threat; anger, when one is compelled to approach and remove the obstacle in an aggressive way; and/or resentment, when one feels displeased at an event presumed to be desirable for another, but undesirable for the self (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Beyond motivational inconsistency, an appraisal of responsibility or blameworthiness will further reinforce these negative emotions, especially if the individual feels resentment and holds another person (e.g., an attack message source) accountable (Roseman, 1996).
Based on their examination of the extant PRT literature, Dillard and Shen (2005) characterized reactance as a motivational state prompting hostile feelings linked orintertwinedwith anger and negative cognitions. Thus, exciting reactance as part of an inoculation message should serve to enhance its ability to motivate the counterarguing processes thought to occur between inoculation and attack. Based on appraisal theory, anger should stimulate a message receiver to cope by advancing upon and retaliating against a threatening source in order to protect held attitudes. Based upon the intertwined model of reactance (2005), anger should interact with negative cognitions to reinforce the effect and generate a heightened motivational state of reactance. This heightened state should increase resentment, augment threat sensitivity, bolster resistance toward the threatening agent (i.e., the attack message source), energize the counterarguing stimulated by refutational preemption, and ultimately lead to increased levels of resistance relative to traditional inoculation treatments. Following this reasoning, we predict the following main effects for inoculation pretreatment type:
H2: Relative to traditional inoculation treatments, reactance-enhanced treatments result in greater resistance to persuasion in the form of: (a) greater levels of counterarguing output and (b) lesser attitude change after exposure to an attack message.
H3: Relative to traditional inoculation treatments, reactance-enhanced treatments result in greater source derogation in the form of reduced levels of (a) perceived credibility and (b) greater levels of negative affect directed at the attack message and its source.
Generating reactance within the attack
Inoculation studies have manipulated counterattitudinal attacks on inoculated atti-tudes in terms of both the number of attacks (Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009a) and the cognitive versus. affective nature of the attacks (e.g., Pfau et al., 2001). In this study, we introduce an additional type of counterattitudinal attack varying in intensity and relative controllingness of language. The strength or intensity of language used in a persuasive message is known to influence an individual’s response to an advocated behavior (Burgoon, Jones, & Stewart, 1975; O’Keefe, 1997). Language intensity, generally defined as the direction and degree of distance from neutrality conveyed by a message source (Bowers, 1963), may also be expressed in terms of explicit-ness, or what Miller et al. (2007) refer to as controlling language. Such language is characterized by increased use of imperatives (i.e., commands and directives) as opposed to propositions or indirect suggestions (McLaughlin, Shutz, & White, 1980). Several studies have demonstrated persuasive messages using high-controlling language lead to greater levels of reactance (e.g., Grandpre et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2007). As a result, counterattitudinal attacks aimed at inoculated individuals should be less effective if they use high levels of controlling language; consequently, we predict:
H4: Relative to low-controlling language, counterattitudinal attack messages using high-controlling language will be perceived as (a) more threatening to freedom of choice, and generate greater levels of (b) anger at attack message source, and (c) negative cognitions.
H5: Relative to low-controlling language, counterattitudinal attack messages using high-controlling language will generate greater resistance to persuasion in the form of (a) greater counterarguing output and (b) lesser attitude change.
H6: Relative to low-controlling language, counterattitudinal attack messages using high-controlling language will generate greater source derogation in the form of (a) lower levels of perceived credibility and (b) greater levels of negative affect directed at the attack message and its source.
At one extreme, traditional forewarning inoculation pretreatments (merely threat-ening the attitude under attack) met by low levels of controlling language in the attack message should result in the least resistance to attitude change. At the other extreme, a reactance-enhanced inoculation message (designed to threaten the free-dom to even hold the attitude under attack) met by high levels of controlling language in the attack message should result in the greatest resistance to attitude change.
The combination of traditional forewarning treatment and high-controlling attack message, and reactance-enhanced forewarning treatment and low-controlling attack message, should fall in-between the two extremes. The former should produce more resistance than the latter. This prediction is based on the likelihood of a recency effect favoring the proximal effects of controlling language in the attack message relative to the more distal effects of the threat to freedom presented in the inoculation message). Thus, we hypothesize the following additive effect:
H7: There is an additive effect involving the nature of the forewarning within the inoculation pretreatment in combination with the level of controlling language within the counterattitudinal attack message, such that, (a) the greatest resistance results from a reactance-enhanced forewarning coupled with a high-controlling attack, and (b) a lesser level of resistance results from a traditional forewarning coupled with a
high-controlling attack, and (c) a still lesser level of resistance results from an enhanced forewarning coupled with a low-controlling attack, and (d) the lowest level of
resistance results from a traditional forewarning coupled with a low-controlling attack.
Resistance in the above relationships will be indicated by the same criterion measures specified in H1–H6: greater threat to freedom of choice, anger at attack message source, negative cognitions, negative affect, and counterarguing output, as well as lesser attitude change and lower levels of perceived credibility attributed to the source of the attack message.
Method
Issue selection
Participants
Participants (N =420) within five universities from varied geographical regions
within the United States were recruited with IRB approval via e-mail and recruitment flyers to participate in exchange for course extra credit. The recruitment materials included a URL address sending participants to the first phase of a three-phase experiment, which was the first inoculation study conducted exclusively online. The five university data collection sites varied in size (1,200–30,000 students) and region—two in the Southeast (one large and one small), two in the Southwest (one medium and one large), and one in the North Central U.S. (medium). Participants’ initial attitudes toward the issues did not differ as a result of university size or location (p=.90), nor were there differences on any of the dependent or manipulation check
variables (p=.17). Attrition rates were unaffected by location, and acceptable across
all three phases - retention rate of 87% from Phase 1 (n=531) to Phase 2 (n=461);
and 91% from Phase 2 to Phase 3 (n=420).
Experimental materials
The investigation featured three types of attitude protection messages: inoculation with traditional forewarning, inoculation with reactance-enhanced forewarning, and control (no inoculation). Separate but equivalent inoculation messages were designed for both supporting and opposing positions on each of the four issues, and participants were queried as to the nature of their positions on all four issues. As a result of the initial attitude position on the four issues, 55.6% of participants were placed in a counteradvocacy condition, and 43.7% in a proadvocacy condition. The experimental design allowed participants to subsequently be presented with an inoculation message specifically designed to protect their established position on one of the issues, regardless of whether their position was in support or opposition to the issue.
Pfau (1995) considered threat to be an instrumental component in inoculation. Thus, congruent with recent inoculation studies (e.g., Ivanov et al., 2009b; Pfau et al., 2005, 2009), threat in both inoculation conditions was explicitly manipulated in the opening paragraph of the inoculation messages. More specifically, participants were warned that some of the counterattitudinal arguments they were likely to face on the issue at hand would be ‘‘very persuasive, and they might cause [them] to rethink [their] position on this issue.’’ Also within both inoculation conditions, refutational preemption, the second component of an inoculation treatment, was operational-ized by introducing counterattitudinal arguments in the opening sentences of the paragraphs,1which were successively countered by refutations.2
and preferences regarding’’ the issue, but also specifically of the threat to their ‘‘very freedom to hold’’ those relevant ‘‘beliefs and preferences’’ posed by those who would argue the opposite side of the issue, threatening the participants’ freedom to hold their attitudes, ‘‘or even choose how to think for [themselves]’’ (italicized for emphasis within the messages).
The noninoculation control message, which pertained to the history and process of regulation, used a factual and historical tone to provide innocuous information about the issue. All inoculation and control messages were designed to be equivalent in length and readability and were measured using Becker, Bavelas, and Braden’s (1961) Index of Contingency. All messages—including controls—produced index scores from 0.8 to 1.2, indicating relative equivalence, with the exception of one traditional inoculation message on the issue of legalizing marijuana, which generated a somewhat higher score than the rest.3All messages were comparatively equivalent in terms of reconstructability of sentences and readability. In addition, the Flesch-Kincaid reading age index (Flesch-Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975), which assesses the approximate reading age based on number of words per sentence and syllables per word, indicated inoculation and control messages were roughly at or below the grade and reading age level of all participants (range 13.9–21.2), thus suggesting proper comprehension.
Two sets of randomly presented attack messages used in Phase 3, designed in a similar manner and based on previous inoculation studies (see Pfau et al., 1997, 2005, 2009), provided participants with reasons they should change their positions on the issues. The argument content of each attack message was different from the argument content in each of the inoculation messages to ensure the potential effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the attack messages would not solely be attributable to the specific content of the inoculation messages themselves.
One set of message attacks, equivalent across all issues and experimental con-ditions, used low-controlling language closely resembling the wording style used in previous inoculation studies (see Pfau et al., 1997, 2005, 2009).4In contrast, another set of attack messages, although comparatively equivalent in content across all issues and experimental conditions, used more highly controlling language consisting of explicit, reactance-producing imperatives, such as ‘‘should,’’ ‘‘ought,’’ and ‘‘must’’ (cf., Miller et al., 2007).5
Procedure
This experiment was conducted in three phases over a 5-week period.
participants received a follow-up e-mail warning of the possibility of exclusion from the study if they continued to supply incomplete information in subsequent phases. Participants who did not provide attitudinal information on any of the issues were excluded from the study. Upon completion of Phase 1, participants were informed they would receive an e-mail notification from the research team with a link to the next phase of the study, approximately 1 week later.
As mentioned, participants were assigned to conditions based on their initial positions on the four issues. To avoid some of the drawbacks of using median or mean splits to place individuals in groups, this investigation followed a method used by Pfau and colleagues (2009) whereby participants were assigned to conditions based on the valence and scale position of their initial attitudes on an 11-point, multi-item averaged scale.
Participants whose average attitude position on a randomly assigned issue was 8.6 or higher were placed in the positive (pro-advocacy) condition. Conversely, participants whose attitude position was 5.5 or lower were placed in the negative (counter advocacy) condition. Those whose attitudes fell in the intermediate range between 5.5 and 8.6 on that issue were randomly assigned to one of the other three issues, and this procedure was repeated if participants’ attitudes fell in the intermediate range on the second randomly selected issue as well. All participants scored outside of the intermediate range on at least one of the four issues, thus all participants were retained. The average time between participants’ completion of Phase 1 and beginning of Phase 2 was 17 days.
Phase 2. Participants logged onto the secure data collection site using the link provided in the follow-up e-mail, and were assigned to read either an inoculation message (consistent with their position pro or con relative to the issue) on one of the four issues, or a control message presented in text format on the computer screen. After participants read their message, they completed a questionnaire to assess the level of treatment message-elicited threat and anger they felt directed at the anticipated attack message source. These emotions were operationalized as cognitions, affective responses directed toward the potential attack message and its source, anticipated credibility of that source, and threat to freedom of choice anticipated to come from that source (in Phase 3). Finally, at the end of the Phase 2 materials, participants were informed they would receive an e-mail reminder in approximately 1 week with a link to the final phase of the study. The average time between participants’ completion of Phase 2 and the beginning of Phase 3 was 16 days.
hold his or her position; and once again, the credibility of and negative cognitions toward the attack message and source. Finally, levels of counterarguing and attitudes toward the relevant issue were assessed, after which participants were debriefed and thanked for their involvement.
Dependent variables and manipulation check
Treatment-elicited threat. Threat to held attitudes introduced during the inoc-ulation message was assessed in the second phase of the study with a scale used extensively in previous inoculation research (e.g., Ivanov et al., 2009b; Pfau, 1992; Pfau et al., 2005). Using the following bipolar adjectives, the scale addressed par-ticipants’ feelings concerning the possibility they may come into contact with persuasive arguments designed to change their position on the relevant issue, asking whether they find the possibility: nonthreatening/threatening, not harmful/harmful, not dangerous/dangerous, not risky/risky, calm/anxious, and not scary/scary. This scale demonstrated excellent internal consistency: 6-item α=0.95 (M=3.53; SD=1.60).
Anger at attack message source. Agitation-related emotion toward those who would disagree with the participants’ position on the relevant issue and try to persuade them to change was assessed in the second and third phases of the study with a scale used in previous inoculation research (e.g., Ivanov et al., 2009b; Pfau et al., 2001, 2009). This scale was comprised of three items concerning how much anger, irritation, and annoyance participants anticipated (Phase 2) or felt following the attack message (Phase 3). These items were disguised within a larger 14-item scale (e.g., including cheerful, surprised, sad, fearful) measured on a 7-point (0=‘‘none
of’’ to 6=‘‘a great deal of’’ this feeling) scale, which demonstrated good internal
consistency: 3-itemα=0.86 (Phase 2;M=4.07;SD=1.57) andα=0.90 (Phase
3;M=3.79;SD=1.62).
Threat to freedom. Perceived threat to freedom of attitudinal choice in Phase 2 (anticipated) and Phase 3 (perceived following the attack message) was assessed with a 4-item scale adapted from Dillard and Shen (2005). This scale assessed how ‘‘those whose position on the issue differ from mine’’ (Phase 2), or ‘‘The message you just read’’ (Phase 3) ‘‘threaten (threatened) my freedom to choose’’; ‘‘try (tried) to manipulate me’’; ‘‘try (tried) to make a decision for me’’; and, ‘‘try (tried) to pressure me.’’ All items were measured on a 5-point agree/disagree continuum. This scale also demonstrated good internal consistency: 4-itemα=0.88 (Phase 2;M=3.12; SD=1.04) and 0.90 (Phase 3;M=3.07;SD=1.17).
α=0.90 (Phase 2; M=3.54; SD=0.93) and α=0.94 (Phase 3; M=4.21; SD=1.14).
Counterarguing. Participants’ counterarguing output following the attack mes-sage in Phase 3 was captured using three separate measures—two quantitative and one qualitative. First, in a quantitative self-assessment, participants were asked for their response to the counterattitudinal viewpoints presented in the attack message on a 7-point scale (‘‘I accepteda lot of the arguments offered’’=1; ‘‘several of the
arguments offered’’=2; ‘‘at least one of the arguments offered’’=3; ‘‘I thoughtof
arguments both for and against the viewpoints in the message’’=4; ‘‘of at least one
argument against them’’=5; ‘‘of several arguments against them’’=6; ‘‘of a lot of
arguments against them’’=7) (M=3.13;SD=1.38).
Second, in a standard thought listing process used in previous inoculation research (e.g., Pfau et al., 2009), participants were directed to list the thoughts and feelings that came to mind as they read the attack message, regardless of attitudinal direction (i.e., pro or con). Once their thoughts were listed, participants were directed to go back to each thought and label it as either pro- or counterattitudinal in nature, after which they were asked to go back a second time and rate each for its perceived strength on a 7-point scale. Thus, this second aspect of counterargument output was assessed not merely by the number of arguments but also by multiplying each argument listed by its self-rating. This produced a weighted index value representing net output as the difference between the calculated values of the total congruent and incongruent listed arguments (e.g., Pfau et al., 2009) (M=6.98;SD=12.70).
The third measure of counterarguing output was assessed by content analyzing Phase 3 qualitative data (following Kaid & Wadsworth’s, 1989, method) in the form of open-ended responses coded for argument relevance and argument position. The unit of analysis was each single argument provided. Argument relevance—indicated by whether details in an argument were clearly connected or associated with the participant’s assigned issue—was coded as either relevant or irrelevant. Argument position—indicated by the extent to which details of an argument supported the participant’s current attitudinal position—was coded as either proattitudinal, neutral, or counterattitudinal. After assessing participants’ attitudinal position of each argument the numerical difference between their pro- and counterattitudinal arguments was calculated and served as the third counterattitudinal output measure (range= −8 to 8;M=0.83;SD=2.40).
The same process of content analysis used for coding Phase 3 qualitative data was also used to code Phase 2 qualitative data. Three coders evaluated all arguments in both phases, and overall intercoder reliability from independent coding wasπ=0.92
(Scott, 1955), with individual coding categories rated as: argument relevance,π=
0.98; argument positionπ=0.90; negative cognition,π=0.90; and negative affect, π=0.89. Negative cognition and negative affect were only coded after establishing
criteria of being both relevant and proattitudinal were further coded for negative cognitions and affect.
All three counterarguing measures (self-assessment, weighted index, and qualita-tive coder-assessed) in Phase 2 and Phase 3 of this experiment were used independently to assess counterarguing output. Because the bivariate correlations between these three measures were relatively low (belowr=0.50 in both phases), they were
ana-lyzed separately within the analyses below rather than being combined into a single composite counterarguing variable.
Negative cognitions. This variable was defined as the extent to which details in the argument contradicted or argued against the attack message or its source. It was coded by assessing each proattitudinal argument for presence or absence of negative cognitions (e.g., ‘‘the [message] argues that studies have shown violence viewed on television is responsible for increased levels of violence. In reality, however, the numbers and trends don’t support this conclusion’’). This variable was measured separately in Phase 2 (M=0.18;SD=0.54) and Phase 3 (M=0.17;SD=0.55) as
the number of negative cognitions provided by each participant.
Negative affect. The extent to which details in an argument indicated negative affect—in the form of anger, irritation, or frustration aimed at either the attack message or its source—was assessed by coding the language within relevant proatti-tudinal arguments as either including the presence or the absence of negative affect (e.g., ‘‘[I felt] annoyed that they were trying to. . .’’). As with negative cognitions,
negative affect was assessed also separately in Phase 2 (M=0.62;SD=1.08) and 3
(M=0.65;SD= 1.08) by adding the number of negative affective accounts provided
by each participant.
Attitude change. Treatment-moderated attitude change on the relevant issues was captured by computing Phases 1 and Phase 3 differences on an attitude assessment scale used in previous inoculation research (e.g., Ivanov et al., 2009b; Pfau et al., 2009). The scale measures participants’ attitudes toward the relevant issue with a series of seven 11-point semantic differential items anchored by bipolar adjective pairs: neg-ative/positive, bad/good, dislike/like, desirable/undesirable, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, and wrong/right. These measures demonstrated excellent internal consistency across both phases: 7-itemα=0.94 (Phase 1) andα=0.95
(Phase 3).
To control for initial Phase 1 attitudes (M=9.38;SD=1.35), and capture the
inoculation-moderated change, the final Phase 3 postattack attitudes (M=8.18; SD=2.48) were subtracted from the initial Phase 1 preinoculation attitudes.6
The resulting inoculation-moderated attitude change index value (M= −1.20; SD=2.42) serves as a primary dependent variable in the analyses. An index value
Table 1 Manipulation Checks—Traditional Inoculation vs. Control
Control Condition
Traditional Inoculation
Outcome Variables M SD M SD t N η2
Phase 2
Message threat 3.02 1.46 3.40 1.54 1.82∗ 246 0.01
Phase 3
Self-assessed counterarguing 2.28 1.01 2.95 1.38 3.67∗∗ 239 0.05
Weighted index counterarguing 2.15 10.82 5.94 11.05 2.48∗ 246 0.02
Attitude change (resistance) −2.19 2.96 −1.50 2.32 1.98∗ 246 0.02
∗∗p< .01.∗p< .05, df
=(1, 304).
Results
Manipulation checks
First, manipulation checks using independent sample t-tests were performed to ensure that, relative to no-inoculation (control) messages, traditional inoculation treatments generated greater levels of message threat, counterarguing, and attitude resistance. The results of the tests provided evidence of successful operationalization (see Tables 1 and 2).
Preliminary analyses
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test was conducted to examine the influence of three factors: inoculation treatment (traditional/reactance-enhanced/no inoculation control), counterattitudinal attack language (low-controlling/high-controlling), and issue topic (legalizing marijuana/restricting TV violence/restricting handgun use/ legalizing gambling) on a series of outcome variables (see Table 2). The omnibus results of the 4 issues×3 experiential condition×2 counterattitudinal
attack MANOVA indicated statistically significant main effects for issue, experimen-tal condition, and counterattitudinal attack and a statistically significant interaction between inoculation treatment condition and counterattitudinal attack language (see Table 3). No additional statistically significant interaction effects were discovered.
Although the univariate results demonstrated a statistically significant effect for issue topic on a few outcome variables, these effects were relatively small, did not appear to form a pattern, and were limited primarily to three Phase 2 dependent variables (see Table 3). The unpredicted significant main effects on issue were analyzed using Sheffe’s post hoc comparisons. Participants receiving the handguns issue reported higher (Phase 2) message-induced threat (M=3.99,SD=1.76,n=
95), compared to participants receiving the gambling issue (M=3.28,SD=1.43, n=90),t(183)=6.13,p< .01,η2=0.17. Participants receiving the TV violence
Table 2 Experimental Message Condition Mean Comparisons
Note:Higher means indicate greater resistance (excepting attack message source credibility). Means with matching letters indicate significant difference atp< .05.
AAnger directed at attack message source.
BSource credibility applies to attack message source.
n=63), compared to participants receiving the gambling issue (M=3.75, SD=
1.61, n=90), t(151)=6.53, p< .01, η2 =0.22. Also, participants receiving the
marijuana issue reported a higher level of (Phase 3) weighted index counterarguing, (M=13.05.,SD=15.54,n=57), compared to participants receiving the handguns
issue (M=6.35, SD=12.49,n=95),t(180)=7.23,p< .01, η2 =0.23. Finally,
participants receiving the TV violence issue reported higher (Phase 3) negative affect (M=1.21, SD=1.45, n=63), compared to participants receiving the handgun
issue (M=0.38,SD=0.77,n=95),t(156)=9.51,p< .01,η2=0.37. Moreover,
Table 3 MANOVA Results for Condition and Univariate Results for Issue
Independent Variables
Dependent variables F df η2p(η2)
Issue 2.56∗∗ (45, 831) 0.12
Phase 2 message threat 3.98∗∗ (3. 304) (0.04)
Phase 2 anger at attack message source 5.20∗∗ (3. 304) (0.05)
Phase 2 negative affect 8.46∗∗ (3. 304) (0.01)
Phase 3 weighted index counterarguing 3.63∗ (3. 304) (0.03)
Experimental condition 10.78∗∗ (15, 275) 0.37
Counterattitudinal attack language 8.71∗∗ (15, 275) 0.32
Condition×attack language 2.86∗∗ (15, 275) 0.13
∗∗p< .01.∗p< .05.
Table 4 Inoculation (traditional vs. enhanced) Main Effect
Outcome Variables F η2
Phase 2
Message threat 9.31∗∗ 0.03
Anger at attack message source 6.98∗∗ 0.02
Negative cognitions 5.08∗ 0.02
Negative affect 9.01∗∗ 0.03
Anticipated threat to freedom 49.89∗∗ 0.14
Anticipated attack message source derogation 23.59∗∗ 0.07
Phase 3
Anger at attack message source 39.06∗∗ 0.11
Negative cognitions 6.56∗ 0.02
Negative affect 16.91∗∗ 0.05
Perceived threat to freedom 63.37∗∗ 0.16
Perceived attack message source derogation 13.33∗∗ 0.04
Self-Assessed Counterarguing 29.62∗∗ 0.08
Weighted Index Counterarguing 10.01∗∗ 0.03
Coder-Assessed Counterarguing 22.91∗∗ 0.07
Attitude Change (resistance) 17.20∗∗ 0.05
∗∗p< .01.∗p< .05.df=(1, 304).
significant. Consequently, the four levels of issue topic were collapsed across the remainder of analyses.
Table 5 Attack Language Main Effect, and Additive Effect of Treatment by Attack Language
Counterattitudinal Attack Language
Additive Effect of Treat. by Attack Lang.
Phase 3 Outcome Variables F η2 F η2
Anger at attack message source 24.10∗∗ 0.07 0.23 –
Negative cognitions 4.41∗ 0.01 4.04∗ 0.01
Negative affect 6.74∗∗ 0.02 5.20∗ 0.02
Attack message threat to freedom 17.07∗∗ 0.04 2.00 –
Attack message source credibility 35.32∗∗ 0.09 17.27∗∗ 0.05
Self-assessed counterarguing 43.56∗∗ 0.11 8.46∗∗ 0.02
Weighted index counterarguing 5.24∗ 0.02 0.15 –
Coder-assessed counterarguing 13.06∗∗ 0.04 0.93 –
Attitude change (resistance) 40.21∗∗ 0.11 0.05 –
Note:∗∗p< .01.∗p< .05.df
=(1, 304).
Concerning the interaction between inoculation treatment condition and coun-terattitudinal attack, as Table 5 indicates, univariate results for Phase 3 outcomes were statistically significant for negative cognitions, negative affect, perceived attack message source credibility (i.e., source derogation), and self-assessed counterarguing.
Hypotheses
As the univariate results in Table 4 (H1–H3) and Table 5 (H4–H6) show, and the pattern of means in Tables 1 (H1–H3) and Table 6 (H4–H6) indicate, support was found for all six hypotheses. Regarding H7, Table 3 shows that the additive effect involving experimental condition (traditional vs. enhanced inoculation forewarn-ing) and counterattitudinal attack (high- vs. low-controlling attack) was statistically significant and in the predicted direction for four of the Phase 3 outcome vari-ables related to resistance. These were negative cognitions (see Figure 1), negative affect, self-assessed counterarguing, and perceived attack message source credibility (indicating attack message source derogation; see Figure 2). Consequently, planned comparisons were conducted using Dunn’s multiple comparison procedure (e.g., Kirk, 1995) to examine the simple effects. These comparisons provided a measure of support for most of the predicted relationships (see Tables 7 and 8). More specifically, planned comparisons indicated reactance-enhanced inoculation messages coupled with high-controlling language attack messages generated the greatest levels of resistance relative to the other three combinations.
Table 6 Counterattitudinal Attack Language Mean Comparisons
Counterattitudinal Attack Language
Phase 3 Outcome Variables
Low-controlling n(SD)
High-controlling n(SD) d
Anger at Attack Message Source 3.56∗ 165 (1.52) 4.30∗ 81 (1.53) 0.49
Negative Cognitions 0.12∗ 165 (.34) 0.27∗ 81 (.75) 0.26
Negative Affect 0.54∗ 165 (.98) 0.87∗ 81 (1.26) 0.29
Perceived Threat to Freedom 2.96∗ 165 (1.15) 3.43∗ 81 (1.04) 0.43
Attack Source Credibility 4.47∗ 165 (.97) 3.71∗ 81 (1.02) 0.76
Self-Assessed Counterarguing 2.81∗ 160 (1.29) 3.78∗ 78 (1.28) 0.75
Weighted Index Counterarguing 6.74∗ 165 (12.07) 9.17∗ 81 (13.44) 0.19
Coder-Assessed Counterarguing 0.51∗ 165 (2.59) 1.39∗ 81 (2.59) 0.34
Attitude Change (resistance) −1.76∗ 165 (2.36) −0.30∗ 81 (1.88) 0.69
Note:Higher means indicate greater resistance (excepting attack message source credibility).
∗p< .05.
received the same traditional inoculation message coupled with a high-controlling attack message. However, this result fell just short of the 0.05 level (p<.07).
On the other hand, as predicted, for Phase 3 perceived attack message source credibility, those who received traditional inoculation messages coupled with high-controlling attacks showed significantly greater levels of resistance (in the form of attack message source derogation) relative to those who received reactance-enhanced inoculation messages coupled with low-controlling attacks. No additional differences were discovered for the interactions involving the other two criterion variables. Consequently, based on the univariate results and planned comparisons, H7 appears to have received a fair measure of support.
As previously mentioned, the univariate tests for five of the nine outcome variables (anger at attack message source, perceived attack source threat to freedom, weighted index counterarguing, coder-assessed counterarguing, and attitude change) were not statistically significant. However, even if the univariate results are not statistically significant, conducting planned mean comparisons is justified as long as the simple effects are theoretically predicted (Huberty & Morris, 1989). Moreover, when specific comparisons are planned based on theory-based, a priori hypotheses, there is no logical need to conduct an omnibusFtest (Bedeian & Mossholder, 1994; Keppel & Zedeck, 1989; Quinn & Keough, 2002).
Low Controlling Language High Controlling Language
Attack Type
Inoculation Treatment
Traditional Forewarning Reactance-Enhanced Forewarning
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Mean of Negative Cognitions
Figure 1 Additive effects of inoculation by attack language on Phase 3 negative cognitions.
freedom, where the difference between the enhanced inoculation/high-controlling language attack combination and the enhanced inoculation/low-controlling lan-guage attack combination fell short of the 0.05 level of significance. Concerning the traditional inoculation/low-controlling language attack combination versus the traditional inoculation/high-controlling language attack combination, statistically significant differences were found for four of the five variables, the exception being the weighted index counterarguing variable.
Contrary to theoretical predictions, however, the traditional inoculation/high-controlling language attack combination did not produce greater levels of resistance on four of the five variables relative to the reactance-enhanced inoculation/low-controlling language attack combination. The exception was perceived attack source threat to freedom, which was actually in the opposite direction predicted. On the other hand, as predicted for all five criterion variables, traditional inoculation messages coupled with low-controlling attack messages yielded the least resistance relative to all other combinations (see Table 8).
Discussion
Low Controlling Language High Controlling Language Attack Type
Inoculation Treatment Traditional Forewarning Reactance-Enhanced Forewarning
Mean of Attack Source Credibility
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
Figure 2 Additive effects of inoculation by attack language on attack source credibility.
Table 7 Plan Comparisons for Additive Effects of Inoculation by Attack Language
Negative Cognitions
Negative Affect
Attack Source Credibility
Self-Assessed
Counterar-guing
Comparisons F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2
TI-LC vs. EI-HC 14.41∗∗ 0.14 22.39∗∗ 0.06 50.55∗∗ 0.12 73.23∗∗ 0.16
TI-HC vs. EI-HC 14.94∗∗ 0.04 21.82∗∗ 0.06 30.74∗∗ 0.08 35.60∗∗ 0.08
EI-LC vs. EI-HC 11.67∗∗ 0.03 12.05∗∗ 0.04 55.22∗∗ 0.13 46.62∗∗ 0.11
TI-HC vs. EI-LC 0.17 – 1.36 – 3.83∗∗ 0.01 0.86 –
TI-LC vs. EI-LC 0.25 – 1.91 – 0.01 – 3.88∗ 0.01
TI-LC vs. TI-HC 0.01 – 0.07 – 3.33 – 8.28∗∗ 0.02
Note:TI-LC=traditional inoc/low-controlling; TI-HC=traditional inoc/high-controlling; EI-LC=enhanced inoc/low-controlling; EI-HC=enhanced inoc/high-controlling.
Effect sizes only calculated for significant results.∗∗p< .01.∗p< .05.
H.
Miller
et
al.
Inoculation
a
nd
Reactance
Table 8 Pattern of Means for Additive Effects of Inoculation by Attack Language
Traditional Inoc/Low-Controlling
Traditional Inoc/High-Controlling
Enhanced Inoc/Low-Controlling
Enhanced Inoc/High-Controlling
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Phase 3 Outcome Variables n=68 n=81 n=78 n=78
AngerA 3.01ab (1.39) 3.74a (1.59) 3.99b (1.43) 4.84ab (1.25) Negative cognitions 0.09a (0.29) 0.10b (0.30) 0.14c (.39) .47abc (1.05) Negative affect 0.43a (0.70) 0.48b (0.81) 0.69c (1.20) 1.32abc (1.55) Threat to freedom 2.39ab (1.08) 3.08ab (1.21) 3.50a∗ (0.95) 3.80b∗ (0.68) Source credibilityB 4.45a∗ (1.09) 4.16b∗ (0.99) 4.46b (0.91) 3.31ab (0.89) Self counterarguing 2.57ab (1.40) 3.15a (1.29) 2.97b (1.20) 4.31ab (0.96) Weighted counterarguing 4.26ac (12.06) 7.49b (10.43) 8.65a (11.39) 11.74bc (15.96) Coder counterarguing 0.00ab (1.79) 0.81a (2.31) 1.03b (2.35) 2.13ab (2.70) Resistance −2.12ab (2.22) −0.79a (1.99) −1.29b (2.34) 0.34ab (1.39)
Note: Higher means indicate greater resistance (excepting attack message source credibility). Means with matching letters indicate significant difference atp< .05.
∗p< .10.
AAnger directed at attack message source.
BSource credibility applies to attack message source.
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attitudinal position, the introduction of a threat focusing on the receiver’s very freedom to hold that attitudinal position may act to both sensitize the receiver and add extra motivational force to the counterarguing process. As the present results demonstrate, psychological reactance, a potent motivational source of resistance in its own right, can be used as an effective device for supplementing and enhancing the traditional threat component of inoculation to augment the process of refutational preemption and intensify resistance to persuasion.
In short, our expectations were confirmed. The combined forces of inoculation and psychological reactance lead to stronger resistance effects—stronger than both the no-inoculation control condition, and the traditional inoculation treatment con-dition. Moreover, we found this comparable advantage on every observed outcome of resistance: (1) more optimal levels of threat, anger at attack message source, negative cognitions, negative affect, anticipated threat to freedom, and anticipated attack mes-sage source derogation immediately following the inoculation treatment; (2) more optimal levels of anger at attack message source, negative cognitions, negative affect, perceived threat to freedom, attack message source derogation (across three separate counterarguing assessments); and most importantly, (3) lesser attitude change—the ultimate measure of resistance—following the attack message. The results of this study indicated reactance-enhanced forewarnings combined with traditional inoc-ulation treatments generated a ‘‘booster’’ effect (see Compton & Pfau, 2005) on resistance.
A second unique aspect of this experiment involved varying the controllingness of the counterattitudinal attack language, which also produced statistically significant results across all outcome variables. Moreover, this effect was compounded by what we suspect was a heightened threat sensitivity generated by the reactance-enhanced pretreatments. Thus, we observed the additive effects on four key outcome variables, including heightened levels of negative cognitions (Figure 1), negative affect, counterarguing, and attack message source derogation (Figure 2). Statistically significant differences were not found for three other Phase 3 outcome variables. Although with one exception, the means were in the predicted direction, and the overall consistent pattern of data does appear to indicate a notion of support for the hypothesized relationships.
so. That is to say, people seek the immediate restoration of freedom, they do not wait hours, or days, much less weeks.
What this tells us is that an inoculation pretreatment can stimulate increased reactance at a time far removed from the initial reactance producing stimulus. Such a pretreatment, therefore, has the capacity to increase inoculated individuals’ sensitivity to controlling messagesindependently from the controllingness of the attack message. We know this because those who did not receive the reactance-enhanced inoculation message did not react to the high-controlling attack message as much as those who did.
Another point of significance is that the reactance enhancement introduced in the Phase 2 inoculation was directed at someoneother than the source of the message(i.e., it was directed at the Phase 3 attacker), which to our knowledge has never been done previously. So the inoculation not only sensitized the message receiver to generate reactance at a much later date (on average, 16 days later),it redirected the receiver’s reactant response somewhere else, both immediately following the inoculation message at Phase 2, and much later following the attack message at Phase 3. This is a fully unique finding for both inoculation and reactance.
Future research
Having established that reactance can enhance conventional inoculation treatments, research is needed to gain a better understanding of how reactance functions within the process. Reactance-enhanced forewarnings may be adding threat, but they may also be making individuals more sensitive to threat. Thus, Banas and Rains’ (2010) finding that threat level was not a significant moderator of resistance may be because of the fact that the level of threat measured is not as important as the target’s sensitivity to that threat—which, as yet, has not been measured in any inoculation study. As Brehm and Brehm (1981) and Grandpre et al. (2003) have noted, targets do not want to protectspecificfreedoms (e.g., an adolescent’s freedom to smoke), but rather that they want to protect their freedom tochooseto exercise those freedoms. Thus, threats to specific freedoms may not matter so much as individuals’ sensitivity toanythreats associated with their freedom to make decisions for themselves.
1965), which have yielded mixed results relative to refutational strategies (Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Tannenbaum, Macaulay, & Norris, 1966).
Whereas Stone (1969) called for inoculation research to focus more on attack message source derogation, Tannenbaum and colleagues compared the effective-ness of attack message source derogation and refutations independently and jointly (including two separate messages—one to generate source derogation followed by another to generate inoculation). They concluded that the greatest effects are expe-rienced when the two are coupled and presented before the attack. The present experiment went a step further by combining an attack message source derogation prime and a refutation in the same inoculation pretreatment message. This combi-nation generated reactance that sensitized individuals to a potential threat to their freedom to make choices posed by the eventual attack message.
Using psychological reactance to boost the threat component of inoculation treatments seems particularly promising. The only research we know of examining the use of a threat booster has employed the use of a second conventional inoculation treatment (e.g., Pfau et al., 2006). Unfortunately, the findings associated with that research failed to confirm significant increases in threat (Compton & Pfau, 2005). However, instead of going to the time and effort of repeating a second inoculation treatment, future studies might more fruitfully focus on enhancing motivation and sensitivity to threats during the initial inoculation process. That is to say, a reactance-enhanced booster could provide the needed impetus for more persistent counterarguing, and ultimately stronger resistance to influence. As the results of this study indicate, the specific focus of a threat (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), or the specific content of a message (Ivanov et al., 2009a), may be secondary to the motivational impact of that threat, or the linguistic structure of that message (Grandpre et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2007).
The findings presented here concerning language controllingness also suggest the need for continued work with other language variables used in both inoculation and attack messages. For example, concerning the former, Burgoon and Chase (1973) found inoculation pretreatments with moderate language intensity to be more effective at bolstering existing attitudes, whereas concerning attack messages, Burgoon and King (1974) found greater resistance to persuasion when the attack messages were high in language intensity. Burgoon and King (1974) also found resistance conferred by an inoculation message could be overcome by an attack message using low levels of language intensity.
The findings from this experiment may also inform inoculation operations as cur-rently practiced. Campaign designers may choose to incorporate reactance-enhanced forewarnings as part of their inoculation efforts. Alternatively, if communicators find themselves on the other side of an inoculation campaign—that is, as the source of attack messages—they may wish to consider low-controlling, autonomy-supportive language choices (Miller et al., 2007; Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006). Such mes-sages might vary in language intensity depending on the passive versus active nature of inoculation pretreatments (Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Burgoon & King, 1974), or the source versus message focus of inoculations targeting high- versus low-esteem receivers (Stone, 1969).
In summary, inoculation’s efficacy at conferring resistance to influence has been substantiated by scores of studies over nearly 5 decades of research (Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005). This study has added to this literature by returning to the core mechanisms—threat and refutational preemption—while seeking to enhance their efficacy by incorporating a powerful psychological device from a sister theory of resistance, namely, psychological reactance. This theory-driven method of fine-tuning the basic inoculation model should help to sustain and enrich inoculation as an active and dynamic theory of resistance to attitude change.
Notes
1 As an example, an inoculation message designed to protect attitudes in favor of limiting television violence offered the following sentence in its opening paragraph of the refutational preemption component: ‘‘Opponents of regulation also assert that television programming is protected as ‘free speech’ under the First Amendment.’’ (See Supporting Information, Appendix S1).
2 The following is an example of a refutation to the counterattitudinal statement offered above: ‘‘However, this position is questionable. First, children don’t enjoy the same First Amendment protections as adults.’’
3 No interaction effects for issue and experimental condition were found. Main effects for both variables are reported in the manuscript’s body and tables.
4 The following is an example of a counterattitudinal statement as used in a traditional inoculation treatment: ‘‘Despite the evidence denying that television violence is damaging to children, there is a second reason why government action is not needed. For those who want to limit the amount of television violence their children are exposed to, there are effective, less restrictive ways to achieve this.’’
5 The following is an example of a counterattitudinal statement designed with more controlling language (italics added): ‘‘Despite the clear and overwhelming evidence denying that television violence is damaging to children, there is a second reason why we
mustnot resort to government action. For those who want to limit the amount of television violence their children are exposed to, there are obvious, effective, less restrictive ways to achieve this. Parentsmustcontrol television content through filtering devices, which have unmistakably proven very effective.’’
apply to all participants, and are all in the attitude congruent (positive) direction, with higher scores corresponding to more favorable attitudes.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1 Traditional Inoculation and Reactance Enhance Messages.
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