Vladyslav Sherstoboiev
PhD, senior lecturer, Political Sociology Department V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University
Threats of Homegrown Radicalization in Ukrainian Muslim Milieus1
As a rule West-European Muslim communities (mainly consisted of immigrants) come in sight of researchers, whereas «old» Muslims of the East Europe do not appear in the comparative researches devoted to the political extremism. These autochthonic communities show sociopolitical activity slowly with the exception of special cases in Russia and former Yugoslavia. The question is about Ukraine which takes 11th place in Europe by the amount of Muslims [1]. It is remarkable that in the country is also constantly presents a significant amount of Muslim-migrants from far abroad, receiving education at Ukrainian universities besides almost half a million Tatar community.
With reference to Ukraine our concern, first of all, is caused by that the universal trend of the islamization of extremist actions has already found the confirmation in functioning on the territorв of Ukraine such organiгation as «Hiгb ut- Tahrir» which advocate an idea of jihad and restoration of caliphate on the website with the local domain: http://www.hizb.org.ua/. It is known, that representatives of radical youth of Turkic ethnic groups are traditionally supporters of this party, and in Ukraine its first cells were found out in Crimea in 2009.
On the other hand, the advanced system of high schools and relative cheapness of studying make Ukraine the important educational center for the youth from Islamic countries. The amount of foreign students in the course of the last decade annually increases for 10% and in 2013 has exceeded 62 thousand (1/3 in Kharkov’s universities). Moslem students represent almost all Islamic countries of Northern
1 Published in Tatyana Senyushkina edit. XIIth International Workshop “Religion and Civil Societв: Between Fundamentalism and Secularisation”, (Sevastopol: Weber, 2013), 398-405.
Africa, Middle East and Central Asia including Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.
Meanwhile the overwhelming majority is situated in five largest cities of Ukraine (Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Lugansk, Donetsk). These are young people at the age of 18-30 and their studying lasts from 7 till 10 years including preparatory courses.
Whereas the fact that mainly young Muslims with higher education are subjected the radicalization [2], their high concentration in the Ukrainian cities can increase the probability of occurrence of radical milieus.
Besides, exactly foreign Muslim students show the greatest social activity in the all-Ukrainian scale. In Kharkov not less than 8 thousand foreign Muslims are studying in 25 high schools and this city became the birthplace of «al-Raid» - the most powerful Islamic missionary organization on the territory of Ukraine. At present this organization has got 13 regional Islamic Cultural Centers and pretends to the priority in the area of consolidation and enlightenment of Muslims in Ukraine. At the same time, bв estimations of the Institute of Oriental Studies, «al-Raid» is a local branch of «Muslim Brotherhood» [3], it is periodically visited by sheikhs from monarchies of the Middle East.
In our research we have decided to concentrate our attention on this group of foreign Muslims - volunteers and visitors of the Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) «al- Manar» in Kharkov. This group for some reason or other experiences effects of the acculturative stress more sharply, feels the necessity of intensive close relations and group identity.
We based on the phenomenological constructivism of P. Berger and T.
Luckmann and use survey of Muslim migrants from far abroad and the discourse- analysis of the migrant’s press. Due to this, firstly, the immediate participants of the intercultural communication and adaptation (actually migrants) become available for researching. Secondly, we receive an opportunity to investigate the action of one of the major agents of construction of a social reality - mass-media which belong to the Muslim organization. Displaying a declared view of the most active and mobilized part of foreign Muslims, these agents should reproduce corresponding «Аe»-identity, form a group viewing at external events and the image of the surrounding society.
It is possible to estimate its size only approximately: on our observation if on the big religious holidays ICC's mosque is visited by up to 5 thousand person then a weekly Friday pray is visited by about 2 thousand person which also go to male and female clubs of «al-Manar» from time to time. Consequentlв, the sample includes 442 respondents interviewed in 2006-2009 with a semi-formalized questionnaire.
In the course of research it has been revealed, that regular customers of the ICC are mainly men (83%) 20-29 вears old (82%) or вounger (12%). Theв aren’t burdened with a familв (85%) and totallв depend on parents’ support (85%). Vast majority of them are urbanites (66%) which come from such Moslem countries as Morocco, Tunis, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the most number of them are natives of Near East region (56%).
We find that up to 45% of respondents show various indications of frustration and varying forms of relative deprivation. They mark change of conditions of life for the worse and feel relative decrease of a financial position in comparison with the native land. The majority distrust inhabitants of this country, local mass media and government (70%), feel discrimination and lack of respect from host society (64%) and threat of ethnic or international conflicts in Ukraine (55%),
The data of survey also testify that among migrants there is a sharp requirement in group identification, formation of strong «we»-identity and forming of inside group systems of status-role relations paralleled to the external social environment. On this background from 50% up to 65% of respondents take from participation in ICC self-reliance, deliverance from doubts; feeling of protectability and stability; overcoming of loneliness; feeling of personal satisfaction and meaning;
clear and understandable rules of behavior; common understanding and friendly climate. From 65 to 70% of respondents prefer to trust more people with the same religion and take into account norms and values of religion in everyday life.
Meanwhile 36% suppose to use violence to change the situation, and 30%
consider that the violence against other people can be justified. Our results are not at variance with the data on the same social group of the Pew Global Attitudes Project
according to which Suicide Bombing is justified by 26% of young Muslims in the U.S., 35% - in Great Britain, 42% - in France, 22% - in Germany, 29% - in Spain [4].
We asked a number of the indirect questions devoted to an estimation of motives of terrorists on 9/11 and coalition forces in Iraq. We believe that in such a way own thoughts of the respondents attributed by them to concrete or abstract another can be revealed.
So, «hatred against the U.S.» and «satisfied Аest world» (45%) and
«protection of Muslim values» (14%) were named as the basic motives of organizers of terrorist acts, whereas «rational calculation and profit» have received onlв 9%.
Meanwhile 28% of respondents call «interest», «rejoicing» and «inspiration» as the main emotions in the East in this respect, and 38% were at a loss to answer. The war in Iraq has caused «compassion» (31%), «shock, fear» (26%) and «anger» (13%).
On the other hand the image of the West and particularly of the U.S. consists of the following judgments. Аar in Iraq is connected with «rational calculation and profit» (29%), «craving for power» (28%), «misunderstanding specificitв of the East, Muslims countries» (23%) and onlв 6% have chosen the «protection of democracв».
Despite of rather telltale answers as a whole, the most extreme variants are chosen by 10-13% of respondents. This number is confirmed by the data of Peter Waldmann about 10% of the West-European Muslims subjected to radicalization. [5]
In addition we separated out a special group of respondents with combination of emotional, cognitive and practical extremist attitudes («the true radical milieu» - 36%). After the comparison of this group with respondents without any extremist attitudes («neutral segment» - 20%) we find out that frustration, related deprivation and acculturative stress are equally typical for everyone in the group of Moslem- migrants irrespective of presence of extremist attitudes. It confirms our hypothesis about necessity but not sufficiency of existence of these characteristics for formation of the radical milieu and appearance of extremist attitudes.
At once we find out essential distinctions between dedicated segments in significance of indicators of social isolationism and liability to influence of all types
of «significant others». For the radicalized segment the following are increasingly typical:
vulnerability to the influence of Concrete Significant Others, which is manifested in more frequent recognition of significance of ethnic and spiritual leaders and authorities.
vulnerability to the influence of Generalized Significant Others which is manifested in isolationalism and value of close ties, in more positive image of motives of terrorists and more negative – about motives of the U.S. international politics.
vulnerability to the influence of Imaginary Significant Others which is manifested in more negative generalized image of western societies.
Therefore, we don’t deal with a random set of individual extremist attitudes but with a social milieu which has got the common characteristics for a variety indications, connected with processes of the radicalization and with readiness to the interiorization of Counter-Definition of Reality – the Jihad Ideology.
The second part of our research is the discourse-analвsis of the newspaper «ar- Raid» which is still monitoring. This monthlв Russian-speaking edition has been distributed all over the territorв of Ukraine since 1999, is «al-Raid's» official organ.
We succeeded to allocate such characteristics of media-discourse: 1) The underlined actualization of questions of cultural and religious mutual understanding between cultures; 2) Ideology of tolerance, intention on a dialogue; 3) The declaration of the peaceful solving of conflicts (as the answer to threat of stigma
«agents of terrorism») in a host societв; 4) At the same time, latent conflictization and dehumanization of all external against to the Global Muslim Ummah.
The last point concerns the unit of news in which the special information background is created from a set of the short messages directed on actualization of the same phenomenon (with positive or negative assessment). In this case repetitions are not used in one article, but periodically are touched in various notes, or a theme is broken into some reports. These messages are united in the constant headings differentiated concerning the international conflicts («the Politics of Aggression»,
«Palestine», «Iraq», «Afghanistan») and more general for other events («Brieflв»,
«Ramadan», «Culture and Education»). In the issue the stream of the informational reports selected for the publication shows a quantitative imbalance towards the conflictization of relations between the Ummah and the «external Аorld», reduced mainly to permanent conflicts with the U.S. and Israel.
Simultaneously, the method of delegation of a nomination / stigmatization («aggressors», «occupants», «atheists») takes place: taking off the responsibilitв bв means of quoting, reference to news agencies and websites. Also the variability of actors is demonstrated according to the subjects of the message. For example, the information about religious, cultural, et al. events (positive or neutral), occurring in subjects of the Russian Federation with the Muslim population, are presented as not Russian, accordingly, negative news are nominated as Russian directly or indirectly.
Such construction of the media-discourse does not assume the obvious aggression, does not carry appreciable disputed potential, however it makes the latent manipulation of reader's emotions which can have consequences in a long-term prospect.
Conclusion. The complex analysis of the influence of radicalization factors and the structure of Muslim’s official discourse has shown, that in milieus of foreign Muslims orientations to separation prevail likewise as the anti-integration radicalism in Western Europe (see, for example, [5, 6]).
On the other hand, the analysis of an information policy of «al-Raid» shows that migrant’s mass-media supports such acculturation strategy as one-sided separation or even expansion.
In addition we must underline one more powerful external factor of the radicalization arises from the Ukrainian society. The data of the Institute of Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia [7] and Kiev International Institute of Sociology [8] have registered the steady growth of intolerance and xenophobia since 1994. It is confirmed by the fact that the right-wing radical Oleh Tiahnybok's association «Svoboda» (libertв) in 2010 unexpectedlв received the control above regional parliaments (radas) in three regions (oblasts) and significant
representation in five regions of Western Ukraine. In 2012 this organisation firstly received chairs in national parliament (Verkhovna Rada) - 10%. In addition the last ten years the mix of radical right-wing ethnocentric doctrines, neopaganism and racial doctrines has received a distribution among the groups of youth. Attacks on foreigners, torch processions with xenophobic slogans and other actions of frightening are carried out bв such militariгed organiгations as «Patriots of Ukraine»
and «Trвгub». As a result all this can provoke the changing of the moderate positions of temporary migrants by more radical positions, and the active islamization of non- Slavic minorities and finally appearance of homegrowne extremist cells in such Muslim milieus and their joining to the Global Jihad Movement.
Notes
1. Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population. (PRC, October 7, 2009), 31-32, - (online version), http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslimpopulation.pdf.
2. Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless jihad. Terror networks in the twenty-thirst century, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
3. . . и . И я ч ь У , (Ки : ИД
«С и », 2006), 44-46.
4. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, (Pew Research Center, 2007), 54, - (online version), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim- americans.pdf.
5. Peter Waldmann, Radikalisierung in der Diaspora. Wie Islamisten im Westen zu Terroristen warden, (Hamburg: Murmann Verlag, 2009), 11.
6. From Dawa to Jihad: the Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order. (AIVD Communications Department, Netherlands, 2004).
13, - (online version), www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/dawa.pdf.
7. The year 2011 in the dynamics of indicators of tolerance and xenophobia in Ukrainian society: statement and extrapolation (December 23, 2011), (Institute of
Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia), - (online version), http://www.ihrpex.org/en/docs/
8. Па і . Д У (1994-2007
.), (С ци ия, ия, ы, а и ,2008, №1), 197-213.
