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Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
ISSN: 0007-4918 (Print) 1472-7234 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbie20
A Population Projection for Indonesia, 2010–2035
Peter McDonald
To cite this article: Peter McDonald (2014) A Population Projection for Indonesia, 2010–2035, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 50:1, 123-129, DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2014.896240
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.896240
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ISSN 0007-4918 print/ISSN 1472-7234 online/14/000123-7 © 2014 Indonesia Project ANU http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.896240
A POPULATION PROJECTION FOR INDONESIA, 2010–2035
Peter McDonald
The Australian National University
In the context of its long-term planning, from time to time the Indonesian
govern-ment publishes an oficial population projection. The latest projection was released
on 29 January 2014. In this article, I describe and evaluate the methods and assump-tions used to produce the projection, and provide key results.
Keywords: population projections, fertility, population growth, life expectancy, migration
JEL classiication: J10, J11, J13, J62, O15
BACKGROUND
On 29 January 2014, the latest oficial population projection for Indonesia was
launched by President Yudhoyono in the Istana Negara, in the presence of most of the Indonesian cabinet (see Kementerian PPN/Bappenas, BPS, and UNFPA 2013). Population projections are a periodic requirement of the government’s National Long-Term Development Plan 2005–2025 (Rencana Pembangunan Janka Panjang
Nasional) and therefore inluence planning in Indonesia. This projection super
-sedes the last oficial projection, which was published in 2005.1 The methodolo-gies used in the two projections are the same.
As explained in the irst chapter of the report, Proyeksi penduduk Indonesia (Indo-nesia Population Projection): 2010–2035,the latest projection combines the work of Bappenas, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), the United Nations Population Fund, and Indonesian academic demographers. This large group has produced just one pro-jection, based on a single set of assumptions. There are no high or low variants, nor any indication of the potential range of variability, and the report gives no rea-sons for producing only a single projection. If the projection is used for short-term planning or for distributions of legislative seats or government budgets in the next few years, there is an obvious logic to producing only one. A new projection will be made using the results of the 2015 Intercensal Population Survey (Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus), and will supersede this projection. Yet the context of the projections is long-term planning, and variation will certainly occur in the long term.
The second chapter of the report provides a discussion of the input assump-tions for Indonesia as a whole, while the third chapter provides some basic results
1. http://www.datastatistik-indonesia.com/proyeksi/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id=910&Itemid=923.
124 Peter McDonald
for Indonesia and for each province. These results include the rate of population
growth in each ive-year period from 2010 to 2035, the proportions of the popula
-tion aged 0–14, 15–64, and 65 and over at ive-year intervals, the dependency ratio at ive-year intervals, the net reproduction rate for ive-year periods, the expecta
-tion of life at birth for both sexes for ive–year periods, and the propor-tions liv
-ing in urban areas at ive-year intervals. The chapter also provides back-casted
population estimates for every year from 2000 to 2010 for Indonesia and each of the 31 provinces.
Finally, the report provides the detailed results of the projection. The published output shows the following for Indonesia and each province:
• the age distribution, by ive-year age groups, to 75 and over, for males, females, and persons, for every calendar year of the projection period
• population age pyramids at ive-year intervals
• a summary table showing the total population by sex; the proportions in broad age groups (0–14, 15–64, and 65+); the dependency ratio; measures of fertility and mortality; and the net migration rate for every calendar year of the projection period
METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The irst stage of the collaboration saw the group produce a projection for Indone -sia as a whole, followed by separate projections for each of the provinces. The pro-vincial projections were then adjusted mathematically, to constrain their totals, to add to the totals for Indonesia. No information is provided about how close the sum of the provinces was to the Indonesia projection, so the extent of adjustment that was required to the initial provincial projections is unknown.
The Initial Population
The starting point of any projection is the initial (in this case, 2010) population total and its distribution by age and sex. Following the 2010 Population Census of Indonesia (Sensus Penduduk Indonesia) and the post-enumeration survey (PES) of that census, there was considerable debate about the level of Indonesia’s popu-lation. The census recorded a population of 237.6 million, but the PES estimated that this number undercounted the population by 3.6%, implying a total
popula-tion at the time of the census of 246.1 million (BPS 2011). The 2005 oficial projec -tion of popula-tion for 2010 was 233.5 million.
The irst major assumption of the 2013 projection was to ignore the PES result and use the unadjusted 2010 census count as the oficial 2010 estimate of popula -tion. The report gives no reasons for this decision. Thus, as reported on page 2 of the report, the initial population total for the projection was the census-recorded population brought forward from the census date to June 2010, or 238.5 million.2 This procedure was used for all provinces, as well as for Indonesia as a whole. As a result, the distribution of population across the provinces is almost exactly
2. If this total is simply an update from 15 May to 30 June, the number is on the high side. Also, the adjustment to the census-count population is three times higher for females than it is for males. Furthermore, some provinces were adjusted at much higher rates than oth-ers over this short period.
the same in the initial populations used in the projections as it was in the 2010 census.3 For some policy purposes, the total size of the population does not have much relevance compared with the characteristics of the population and the rate
of growth of the population. Yet the size of the population has signiicance at
sub-national levels in matters such as the distribution of budget funds and the deter-mination of the number of legislative seats. This would not be a problem if the undercount was uniform across the country, but, according to the PES, the extent of the undercount at the provincial level ranged from 0.4% in South Sulawesi to 9.8% in Papua. If Papua’s population was indeed understated by 9.8%, it will have major implications for most planning purposes.
The 2010 population for Indonesia used by the United Nations (UN) Popula-tion Division for its World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision is 240.7 million, above the BPS estimate but well below a correction based on the PES results. The
UN seems to have rejected the indings of the PES to a very large extent. Further -more, the population totals projected by the UN Population Division up to 2035
are quite similar to those in the 2013 oficial Indonesian projections (table 1).
Initial Age and Sex Distribution
Censuses tend to misreport ages, often because information is provided for a whole household by one member, who may not be familiar with the ages of all the people living in the household. The ages of many persons are therefore rounded
to ages ending in zero or ive (such as 55, 60, and 65). This type of error was
much less common in the 2010 census than it was in previous censuses, probably
because of extensive reference to identiication cards (kartu tanda penduduk). For the projection, simple mathematical methods were used to smooth the bumps at the rounded ages. However, the age groups 0–4 and 5–9 were estimated on the basis of estimated fertility and child survival rates in the decade preceding the
census. Given that some uncertainty surrounds fertility and child mortality rates
in 2000–2010, there is equivalent uncertainty about the estimated numbers aged 0–4 and 5–9 in the initial 2010 population. For example, an error of 0.2 births per woman in the assumed total fertility rate (say, 2.6 rather than 2.4) would convert to an error of 8% in the size of the population aged 0–4. The population aged 0–4 in 2010 estimated by the UN Population Division (in its 2012 Revision) is 7%
larger than that in the oficial Indonesian projections, even though the initial fer -tility assumption in the former is lower than that in the latter.
A comparison of the initial population’s age-speciic sex ratios (males per 100
females) with an expected model pattern shows that the ratios are abnormally low between the ages of 15 and 50 and abnormally high between the ages of 50 and 70.
3. The back-casted population in 2000 is exactly the same as the 2000 census count, both for Indonesia and for each province, because the annual estimates were obtained by ap-plying the annual rate of population growth held constant between the 2000 and 2010 census counts. The projections therefore assume that the census counts for 2000 and 2010 are accurate.
126 Peter McDonald
Fertility Assumptions
The assumptions about the initial (2010) and future fertility levels were based on the trend of the estimates of fertility recorded by six Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys (IDHSs) between 1991 and 2012, together with a target set by the National Population and Family Planning Board (Badan Kependudukan dan Keluarga Berencana Nasional [BKKBN]) that Indonesian fertility will fall to 2.1 births per woman by 2025.4 A logistic curve was itted to the seven points (the six surveys and 2025) and constrained to hit a fertility rate of 2.1 in 2025. The same approach was used for the provinces, although without a standard future target. Of course, the provincial fertility rates in total had to be consistent with the national target for 2025. The report (p. 9) states that where a province’s fer-tility rate was already at 2.1 or lower, the ferfer-tility rate would be kept constant or its decline would not be continued to a very low level. Yet it seems that this constraint was not applied. The assumed fertility rates for provinces (table 2.2 of the report) show fertility continuing to fall in all provinces until the end of the projection period. Indeed, fertility in the province with the lowest fertility by the end of the projection period (DKI Jakarta) is actually falling faster at the end of the
projection period than it did at its beginning. In the oficial projection of 2005, the
target fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman was assumed to be achieved by 2015 rather than 2025. The slower fall in fertility is the main reason that the projected population in 2025 is 11.7 million higher in the 2013 projection than in the 2005 projection.
In the end, the projected fertility trends are only as good as the data obtained in the six IDHSs, and the accuracy of the fertility rates in these surveys has been questioned on the basis that the surveys systematically under-enumerate single women (Hull and Hartanto 2009). As indicated above, small variations in fertility have a very large impact on population growth in the youngest age groups. Indo-nesia relies on the IDHS to measure fertility and child mortality rates, but survey estimates are relatively unreliable compared with accurate vital registration.
The assumptions about current and future fertility made by the UN are roughly
similar to those made in the oficial Indonesian government projections, although
the initial fertility is lower in the UN projections (table 1). While it is unusual to apply a policy target in a population projection (a fertility rate of 2.1 by 2025), this level is comparable to that projected by the UN.
Mortality Assumptions
The problems of using unreliable data are magniied when measuring mortality.
In effect, there are no direct Indonesian data on mortality above the age of 5. The Indonesian practice is to estimate by inference the level of mortality above this age, by using the measured level of mortality under the age of 5 and introducing a model life table. This practice deserves greater scrutiny, but, in the end, indirect estimates of mortality will be weak whatever method is used (McDonald 2014). Accurate death registration is the only approach that will provide reliable
mortal-4. Since the early 1970s, BKKBN has been responsible for reducing fertility in Indonesia to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. The inclusion of the BKKBN target in the projections recognises its continuing role in this policy endeavour. The setting of targets is unusual, but not unknown, in producing population projections.
ity data in Indonesia. Leaving aside the quality of the input data, the assumptions about future improvement in life expectancy seem to be very conservative. In two decades from 2010–14 to 2030–34, as shown in table 1, the increase in life expec-tancy assumed by the UN (3.7 years) is considerably higher than that assumed in
the oficial Indonesian projections (2.1 years). In the single decade from 1995–2000
to 2005–10, life expectancy in Indonesia increased by 3.2 years, according to the UN Population Division website,5 so an improvement of just 2.1 years in the next two decades represents a considerable deceleration in mortality decline. And it gets worse: by the end of the projection period, the increase in the assumed life expectancy almost stops. As life expectancy is a product of the levels of education, economic development, lifestyle behaviours, and the quality of the health deliv-ery system, this is a fairly depressing view of the future. Indonesia will almost certainly do better than this.
International and Internal Migration Assumptions
Throughout the projection period, international net migration was assumed to be zero. In effect, the large number of Indonesians working overseas are assumed to return. For internal migration, annual net migration rates were obtained for each
sex and ive-year age group for each province. These were based on the reported
5. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/.
TABLE 1 Results and Inputs of the 2013 Oficial Projection for Indonesia and the
Medium Projection of the United Nations Population Division
Population (millions)
2010 2020 2030 2035
BPS (2013) 238.5 271.1 296.4 305.7
UN (2012 Revision) 240.7 269.4 293.5 303.4
Total fertility rate (births per woman)
2010–14 2020–24 2025–29 2030–34
BPS (2013) 2.44 2.21 2.10 1.99
UN (2012 Revision) 2.35 2.12 2.04 1.98
Life expectancy at birth (years, both sexes)
2010–14 2020–24 2025–29 2030–34
BPS (2013) 70.1 71.5 72.0 72.2
UN (2012 Revision) 70.7 72.7 73.6 74.4
Sources: Kementrian PPN/Bappenas, BPS, and UNFPA (2013); United Nations (2013).
Note: BPS = Badan Pusat Statistik. UN = United Nations.
128 Peter McDonald
net migration levels in the ive years preceding the 2010 census. These age-, sex-, and province-speciic rates of net migration were then assumed to remain
constant from 2010 to 2035. High in-migration rates are expected in Riau, Kepu-lauan Riau, Bangka-Belitung, Banten, Central and East Kalimantan, and West Papua. The highest expected rates of outmigration are in DKI Jakarta, as people
move from the capital city to the suburbs of Greater Jakarta in West Java and
Banten.6
Questions can arise about the wisdom of assuming constant rates of net migra-tion while paying no heed to the size of the populamigra-tion. In Kepulauan Riau, for example, where there is strong demand for labour, the population aged 20–24 is projected to fall from 184,600 in 2010 to 136,000 in 2018, despite the projection that the province will have the highest rate of overall population growth of any province during 2010–19. Likewise, the population aged 20–24 in DKI Jakarta is projected to fall from 1,026,000 in 2010 to 720,900 in 2022 (a fall of more than 300,000). At the same time, the population aged 20–24 in Central Java, the largest source of migrants to Jakarta, increases by an equivalent of 300,000 in the same period. These results seem very unlikely.7 Also unlikely is the continuation over 25 years of far higher in-migration rates for males than for females in Kalimantan and Papua, which, by 2035, would lead to highly imbalanced sex ratios in these islands.
Urbanisation
The 2013 urbanisation projections use a simple mathematical method based on the difference in the rates of growth of urban and rural areas during 2000–2010. For the projections, this difference was assumed to shrink gradually in provinces where the difference was large (owing to substantial rural–urban migration or the
reclassiication of areas from rural to urban) and to expand gradually in provinces
where the difference was small (owing to little rural–urban movement and little
reclassiication).
With 130 million (78%) of Java’s estimated 2035 population of 167 million pro-jected to be living in urban areas, Kota Jawa would be close to reality.8 The urban proportion by 2035 is projected to be 89.3% in West Java and 84.9% in Banten. An amazing 76 million people are projected to be living in urban areas of Jakarta,
West Java, and Banten by 2035. About two-thirds of the population of Greater
Jakarta now live outside the boundaries of DKI Jakarta, and this proportion will
increase over the projection period. Greater Jakarta is already arguably the second largest urban agglomeration in the world; only Tokyo is deinitely larger. Indeed,
the urban growth projected for West Java and Banten suggests that Jakarta may overtake Tokyo by 2035. Jakarta is a huge planning challenge, but one that needs
to be addressed in the interests of an eficient, economically productive Indone
-6. Net migration to DKI Jakarta is strongly positive at ages 0–4, 15–19, and 20–24 but strongly negative at all other ages.
7. Indeed, DKI Jakarta and Kepulauan Riau are the only two provinces to have both strong demand for labour and a projected fall in the population aged 20–24 years.
8. Kota Jawa (Java city) is the notion that Java may well be considered as one huge urban agglomeration. In 2035, the population density of Java is projected to be 1,346 persons per square kilometre, which is 3.6 times the current density of metropolitan Sydney.
sia. Floods, trafic congestion, energy shortages, housing, ports, and airports—all
require massive infrastructure investment if Jakarta is to function as well as Tokyo or Shanghai. The answer does not lie in attempting to spread Jakarta’s growth to other places. The projections show strong urban growth in other parts of Java and Indonesia as well, and these places are even less prepared for population growth. The problem is well known but money and organisation are the missing com-ponents. Decentralised decision-making will only exacerbate the problem. Aside from subsuming land used for food production, urban expansion is fertile ground for corrupt practices and will need to be a focus of planning policy.
BROAD RESULTS
The results of the PES raise doubts about the accuracy of the projection’s initial population total and age structure. Future population growth, however, will not be greatly affected by these initial assumptions; rather, it will be driven by the demographic parameters: fertility, mortality, and migration. Based on the 2013 projection’s assumptions, the population of Indonesia will increase by 67 million during 2010–35: 30 million in Java, 18 million in Sumatra, 4 million in Bali and Nusa Tenggara, 6.5 million in Kalimantan, 5 million in Sulawesi, and 3.5 million in Maluku and Papua. The rate of population growth is projected to fall from 1.4% per annum in 2010–14 to 0.6% per annum in 2030–34.
During the projection period, the proportion of children falls and that of older people rises. The proportion of those in the working ages remains concentrated between 66.5% and 68.1%,9 which is favourable for economic development and will advantage Indonesia in the next 25 years—provided that policymakers pay attention to multifactor productivity.
REFERENCES
BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). 2011. Laporan PES sensus penduduk 2010 [Post-enumeration survey 2010 population census report]. Jakarta: BPS.
Hull, Terry, and Wendy Hartanto. 2009. ‘Resolving Conlicts in Indonesian Fertility Esti -mates’. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 45 (1): 61–71.
Kementerian PPN (Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional)/Bappenas, BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik), and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2013. Proyeksi penduduk Indo-nesia (IndoIndo-nesia Population Projection): 2010–2035. Jakarta: BPS. http://www.bps.go.id/ hasil_publikasi/proyeksi_penduduk_2010_2035/.
McDonald, Peter. 2014. ‘Indonesia’s Demography in Comparative Perspective’. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 50 (1): 29–52.
UN (United Nations). 2013. World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. New York: UN. http://esa.un.org/wpp/.
9. The projection for the working-age population and the concept of dependency ignore the relatively high labour-force participation rates in the ages 65–74.
