GEORGE C. THORPE'S

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PURE L O G I S T I C S

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GEORGE C. THORPE'S

II I

I I

PURE

LOGISTICS

THE SCIENCE OF WAR PREPARATION

I I

An NDU Press Edition with an

I N T R O D U C T I O N by

STANLEY L. FALK

1986

National Defense University Press Washington, DC

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National Defense University Press Publications

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600593

First printing, April 1986 Third printing, October 1996 Second printing, December 1987

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FOREWORD /x

INTRODUCTION, by Stanley L. Falk xi

PREFACE 1

P A R T ONE: L O G I S T I C S 7

I°

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

DEFINITION 9

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 12

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 21

GERMAN' ARMY 27

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

OF FIGHTING FORCES 38

NAVAL ORGANIZATION 48

ARMY ORGANIZATION 61

THE FIGHTING MACHINE 65

PEACE-TIME LOGISTICS 68

FACTORY PREPAREDNESS 71

LOGISTICAL PROBLEM 74

P A R T T W O : E D U C A T I O N 87

ENDNOTES 103

INDEX 107

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FOREWORD

W e p l a c e a p r e m i u m o n f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g m i l i t a r y thought, but a reflective look at literature f r o m the past can also be useful, especially w h e n that literature marks the intel- lectual heritage o f A m e r i c a n p l a n n i n g ['or national defense.

At the Industrial College o f the A r m e d Forces, one o f the accepted classics o f military literature is Pure Logistics: The Sci- ence of War Preparation, written by L i e u t e n a n t Colonel George C. T h o r p e of the United States Marine Corps a n d published originally in 1917. In his introduction to this new edition of T h o r p e ' s work, Stanley L. Falk tells us Pure Logistics stands out as a m i l e s t o n e b e t w e e n t h e s e m i n a l w r i t i n g s o f B a r o n d e Jomini, published one h u n d r e d years before, and later trea- tises e x a m i n i n g logisitics f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r II. T h o r p e ' s observations a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in Pure Logistics have held up over time, even in the face of the technological advances of nearly seventy years. His call for p r e p a r a t i o n in peacetime to accelerate d e f e n s e industrial p r o d u c t i o n in the event of war is as valid today as it was in 1917.

Despite its merits, Pure Logistics has been out of print for years and not conveniently available to m e m b e r s o f the de- f e n s e c o m m u n i t y . T h e r e p u b l i s h i n g o f this classic was sug- g e s t e d by two o f o u r I C A F m e m b e r s w h o m wc g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge: Colonel Barry M. Landson, US Air Force, Dean o f Facuhy and Academic Programs, a n d Dr. Ralph Sanders, J.

Carlton Ward Jr. Distinguished Professor. O u r h o p e is that b o t h p l a n n e r s a n d s c h o l a r s will d i s c o v e r - - o r r e d i s c o v e r , p e r h a p s - - T h o r p e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l a n d useful work.

Albin G. W h e e l e r

Major General, US A r m y

C o m m a n d a n t , Industrial College o f the A r m e d Forces

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Stanley L. Falk

T h e word logistics has been in use in the United States barely m o r e than a century. For most o f this period, m e m b e r s o f the profession of arms, as well as military historians a n d theorists, have had difficulty in a g r e e i n g on its precise definition. Even today, the m e a n i n g o f logistics is s o m e w h a t i n e x a c t - - d e s p i t e its f r e q u e n t a p p e a r a n c e in official and unofficial military dic- t i o n a r i e s a n d its l e n g t h y d e f i n i t i o n in s e r v i c e a n d .joint regulations.

Logistics is essentially moving, supplying, and m a i n t a i n i n g military forces. It is basic to the ability o f armies, fleets, and air forces to o p e r a t e - - i n d e e d , to exist. It involves m e n and materiel, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , q u a r t e r s a n d d e p o t s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , evacuation and hospitalization, p e r s o n n e l replacement, service, and administration. In its b r o a d e r sense, it has been called the e c o n o m i c s o f w a r f a r e , i n c l u d i n g i n d u s t r i a l mobilization, r e s e a r c h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , f u n d i n g , p r o c u r e m e n t , r e c r u i t m e n t and training, testing, and, in effect, practically ev- e r y t h i n g related to military activities besides strategy and tactics. Logistics, in short, in the words of one i r r e v e r e n t World W a r II s u p p l y o f f i c e r , is " t h e s t u f f t h a t if you d o n ' t h a v e e n o u g h of, the war will not be won as soon as."

Stanley L. Falk is a military h i s t o r i a n - - a u t h o r , lecturer, consuhant, with MA and PhD d e g r e e s from G e o r g e t o w n University. He has been C h i e f His- t o r i a n o f t h e A i r F o r c e , P r o f e s s o r o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s at t h e Industrial College of" the A r m e d Forces, and Deputy C h i e f Historian for Southeast Asia at the US A r m y ( ' e n t e r o f Military History. H e is tile a u t h o r o f five books on W o r l d W a r II as well as textbooks oll national security affairs and many articles and reviews. He has lectured at the National War College, the A r m y W a r College, the Smithsonian Institution, and elsewhere, and is active in professional and scholarly organizations.

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W h a t e v e r its c u r r e n t detinition, in 1917, w h e n L i e u t e n a n t Colonel George C. T h o r p e , USMC, published all unusual little book entitled

Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation,

the word

logistics

was not particularly u n d e r s t o o d nor even gener- ally used in the United States. T h o r p e , indeed, may well have been one o f the few military thinkers a n y w h e r e in the world to employ the t e r m p r o m i n e n t l y at this t i m e - - a n d almost cer- tainly the only one to a t t e m p t to define it carefully as a science. T h u s , his t h o u g h t f u l and perceptive analysis stands out as a m i l e s t o n e b e t w e e n t h e g r o u n d - b r e a k i n g t r e a t i s e o f Jomini, published nearly a c e n t u r y earlier, and later writings on logistics that did not begin to a p p e a r until about the time of World War II. More importantly, T h o r p e ' s effort to define logistics was m o r e than just an academic exercise. A p r o p e r d e f i n i t i o n , he a r g u e d , was e s s e n t i a l f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e true role and function of logistics in war, for e n s u r i n g that n o n e o f its aspects were neglected, and for achieving u h i m a t e victory in any conflict.

Logistical Systems

As Colonel T h o r p e suggested, logistics has had a long, neglected, and often m i s u n d e r s t o o d history. Over the centuries, since primitive man first g a t h e r e d stones to hurl at his neighbor, logistics has o p e r a t e d with various means and methods at both tactical a n d strategic levels. In its earliest form, it was simply a matter of individual warriors carrying sufficient food and weapons to s u p p o r t a battle or campaign. In later years, as w a r f a r e b e c a m e m o r e e x t e n d e d a n d c o m p l i c a t e d , m o r e elaborate m e t h o d s of provisioning and sustaining forces e m e r g e d . T h e logistical system that d e v e l o p e d perforce for large military organizations saw armies bringing along their own supply of weapons and e q u i p m e n t while relying on tile c o u n t r y s i d e in w h i c h t h e y o p e r a t e d f o r f o o d a n d f o r a g e . T h u s , X e n o p h o n and A l e x a n d e r r a n g e d far and wide over great distances from Greece to India; a n d Hannibal, cutting himself off from his base ill Africa, for a dozen years lived off the land in Italy. W h e r e local supply was inadequate, as was the case with Xerxes' m u c h larger Persian armies, a series of depots and magazines along the route of advance assured a

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T h e Romans blended all of these methods effectively into a f a r - r e a c h i n g a n d flexible logistical system. S u p p o r t e d by c a r e f u l l y o r g a n i z e d supply a n d service forces a n d a net of well-engineered roads to speed movement and communica- tion, they carried their own stores, drew on local resources, and established fortified depots.

Feudal and medieval armies were less effective in sup- porting themselves, in part because of advances in offensive a n d d e f e n s i v e w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f heavy armor increased the weight of arms and equipment and the need for armorers and others to maintain and repair this material. T h e introduction of" g u n p o w d e r and cannons fur- ther enlarged the n u m b e r and weight of weapons and ammu- nition, and the size and n u m b e r of" wagons and the animals to pull them. And since heavy ordnance obviously could not be requisitioned locally, it had to be carried along with the army in sufficient amounts for the entire campaign.

As weapons became move powerful, so did the defenses erected against them. T h e walls of medieval castles and forts rose higher and thicker. This meant, on the one hand, a supply of heavy materials and machines with which to construct and repair them, and, on the other, more cumbersome war engines to knock them down. Siege and baggage trains grew in size and length, adding to the already overwhelming crowd of laborers, carpenters, tentmakers, repairmen, cooks, laun- d e r e r s , g r o o m s , s u r g e o n s , and o t h e r s who s w a r m e d in the wake of an army. All of these people and thousands of animals had to be fed a n d s u p p o r t e d . A h h o u g h c o m m a n d e r s made major efforts to collect, organize and transport supplies and e q u i p m e n t , they w e r e severely h a m p e r e d by the s h e e r bulk and numbers of their forces. Heavily laden wagons, poor or n o n e x i s t e n t roads, a n d f r e q u e n t b r e a k d o w n s h i n d e r e d m o v e m e n t a n d flexibility. Armies t r a v e l l e d slowly a n d for s h o r t d i s t a n c e s , s t r i p p i n g the c o u n t r y s i d e as they w e n t of food, fodder, goods, and means of transportation.

In sharp contrast were the logistical efforts of the 13th century Mongol horsemen whose armies swept across Eurasia in a m a g n i f i c e n t display o f s p e e d , flexibility, a n d well- disciplined military o r g a n i z a t i o n . C a r e f u l l y p l a n n i n g their

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routes and camp sites, they travelled with large trains of wagons, horses, pack animals, and cattle, supported by a network of grain stores. As they n e a r e d hostile forces, they m o v e d swiftly ahead of their supply train, r e p l e n i s h i n g themselves f r o m the c o u t r y s i d e as they r o d e . Lightly a r m e d a n d e q u i p p e d , each w a r r i o r c a r r i e d his basic rations a n d led a string of r e m o u n t s to assure mobility a n d speed. Only the availability of" p a s t u r e for the animals slowed or h i n d e r e d Mongol movements. Long, static engagements could also be a problem because of the difficulty of resupply, so the Mongol logistical system could rarely support a drawn-out siege deep within enemy territory.

By the beginning of the 17th century, European armies had grown so large and ponderous that their movements were dictated primarily by supply considerations. Since logistical support from a p e r m a n e n t base was practically impossible, they lived almost entirely off the land and were thus forced to keep going in order to find new sources of replenishment in areas they had not already s t r i p p e d and p l u n d e r e d . What supplies they did carry with them, as well as their weighty artillery, were most easily transported by water. So successful commanders like Maurice of Nassau and Sweden's Gustavus A d o l p h u s p l a n n e d their advances along the great rivers of central Europe, and sought as well to dominate those water- ways in order to prevent their use by enemy forces. Gustavus also established depots in captured towns and made practical efforts to lighten his artillery and shorten his baggage trains.

But even he had to live primarily off the country, and, despite his reputation for mobility and initiative, his movements were largely influenced by the need for food and forage.

The logistical pattern ['or the next two centuries was much the same. Despite innovations and improvements, armies were not self-sustaining but continued to rely for the bulk of their supplies on the land they occupied. Commanders attempted to calculate logistical needs more carefully and precisely, and they established series of fortified depots, or magazines, supported by well-defended supply convoys. This depot system sometimes worked during sieges. Yet by and large the system was only useful in the early days of a campaign. Magazines, whether fixed or "rolling," were incapable of providing more

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vanced beyond its national borders. T h e h u g e military forces carried with t h e m the same excessive "tail" o f people and animals that earlier armies had to feed; to bring along sufficient provisions would have far e x c e e d e d the capacity o f any m e a n s of transportation then available.

An elaborate system o f requisitions t h r o u g h local authori- ties a n d o f p u r c h a s e s f r o m local m e r c h a n t s o r c o n t r a c t o r s e m e r g e d to replace m o r e primitive forms o f p l u n d e r . Food and forage r e m a i n e d the p r i m a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s , for, despite advances in weaponry, a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e s were relatively low and could usually be h a n d l e d without resupply. So military campaigns c o n t i n u e d to be shaped by the need to find provisions in the field o r to d e n y t h e m to the enemy. A n d it was not u n u s u a l for a siege to be e n d e d by the starvation o f the d e f e n d e r s but r a t h e r because the besieging forces had ex- h a u s t e d the r e s o u r c e s o f t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y s i d e a n d were forced to move on to m o r e fruitful areas.

T h e N a p o l e o n i c logistical system was a c o m b i n a t i o n o f m a n y e a r l i e r m e t h o d s , u s e d f l e x i b l y a n d a c c o r d i n g to t h e needs and problems o f a particular campaign. N a p o l e o n himself d e v o t e d a great deal o f attention to logistic concerns, a n d p l a n n e d a n d organized supply and s u p p o r t in careful detail.

H e c o u n t e d heavily on swift campaigns, which would e n d before any logistic weakness could h a r m him o r would, in vic- t o r y , g a i n w h a t e v e r s u p p l i e s a n d p r o v i s i o n s his a r m i e s required. T o this end, he m a r c h e d his troops at a faster pace and stripped his baggage trains o f their heavier loads, shifting m u c h o f this weight to the backs o f his u n c o m p l a n n i n g sol- diers. T h e s e rapid m o v e m e n t s and an efficient requisition system m a d e it possible for F r e n c h armies to live o f f the land without exhausting local supply. In some campaigns, Napo- leon did without depots o r resupply convoys, while in others he d e p e n d e d heavily on magazines and an efficient transportation system. N o r did he hesitate to c h a n g e plans or impro- vise as n e c e s s a r y . W h a t was r e m a r k a b l e a b o u t N a p o l e o n i c logistics was n o t t h a t it f a i l e d o n o c c a s i o n - - a s in S p a i n o r R u s s i a - - b u t t h a t it p e r f o r m e d so well o v e r s u c h g r e a t distances in the face o f s t r o n g e r and m o r e n u m e r o u s enemies.

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T h e c e n t u r y between Waterloo and World War I b r o u g h t with it technological d e v e l o p m e n t s that were to have an important impact on logistics. T h e growth o f railroads, the introduction o f s t e a m - p o w e r e d ocean vessels, and the e m e r g e n c e o f g a s o l i n e - d r i v e n m o t o r vehicles p r o v i d e d n e w m e a n s a n d m e t h o d s o f s u p p l y i n g a n d s u p p o r t i n g m i l i t a r y forces. Ad- vances in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - - t h e t e l e g r a p h , t e l e p h o n e , a n d r a d i o - - a s s u r e d c o m m a n d e r s o f s w i f t e r , s u r e r m e a n s o f transmitting their needs for logistical backup. Yet, at the same time, the arrival o f m e c h a n i z e d transportation b r o u g h t with it greater r e q u i r e m e n t s for fuel supplies, while d e v e l o p m e n t s in w e a p o n r y i n c r e a s e d q u a n i t y a n d w e i g h t o f o r d n a n c e to be towed or m o u n t e d on warships and the a m o u n t o f a m m u n i - tion to be provided.

T h e impact o f these d e v e l o p m e n t s would not be fully felt before the First World War. But in the Civil War in America, the Franco-Prussian W a r in E u r o p e , and the Russo-Japanese War in the Far East, the signs of" c h a n g e were evident. T h e Civil W a r s h o w e d w h a t r a i l r o a d s , s t e a m b o a t s , a n d t h e tele- g r a p h could do and, above all, m a d e clear the military impor- t a n c e o f i n d u s t r i a l p o w e r . T h e F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n c o n f l i c t seemed to d e m o n s t r a t e the decisive effect of well-organized railways. And the Russo-Japanese struggle illustrated every- thing f r o m the tactical value of t e l e p h o n e and radio c o m m u n i - cations to the strategic impossibility o f waging war at the e n d of a long supply line u n s u p p o r t e d by a m o d e r n rail system.

Much has been written about the Prussian logistical organization: the use o f a carefully p l a n n e d strategic rail net to c a r r y t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s f o r w a r d , c o m b i n e d with t h e so- called

Etappen

system, shuttles o f h o r s e - d r a w n weapons and service troops to rush cargo from railheads to the front. It seemed to make possible for the first time a logistically self- sustaining [orce, continously resupplying itself. In practice, as recent analysis has shown, this was not the case. T h e Prussian railroads p e r f o r m e d admirably d u r i n g the initial d e p l o y m e n t but, once the shooting began, proved incapable of" keeping u p with the moving front and were not, in [act, even as good as t h e s u p p o s e d l y i n f e r i o r F r e n c h railways. T o m a k e m a t t e r s worse, the

Etappen

system collapsed u n d e r the pressures of re- ality and failed to deliver m u c h in the way o f anything. So

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F r e n c h h a r v e s t , a n d r a r e l y n e e d e d m o r e a m m u n i t i o n t h a n they had with them, thanks to comparatively low a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e s and to the relative brevity o f the war. T h e Prus- sian v i c t o r y was less a logistical t r i u m p h t h a n t h e r e s u l t o f m o r e c o m p e t e n t l e a d e r s h i p , s u p e r i o r staff-work, a n d b e t t e r artillery m o r e efficiently employed.

T h e 20th c e n t u r y thus began with logistical systems basi- cally u n c h a n g e d from the traditional forms. Armies still lived primarily off the countryside, p l u n d e r i n g or requisitioning as they went to m e e t food and forage r e q u i r e m e n t s that military transportation was incapable o f filling over m o r e than short distances. Much o f World War I was s u p p o r t e d in the same m a n n e r , a l t h o u g h heavily increased a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e s r e v e a l e d t h e i n a d e q u a c i e s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l system e v e n as they u n d e r l i n e d the g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f industrial mobilization and production. Not until the Second World War did armies and fleets b e c o m e a n y w h e r e n e a r self-sustaining, o r logistics d e v e l o p i n t o a n y t h i n g like t h e s c i e n c e t h a t C o l o n e l T h o r p e had insisted it. should be. A n d not until then did a significant body o f literature about logistics begin to e m e r g e . Early Attempts at Definition

By World War I, as T h o r p e noted, war had "become a business," in which logistics was a basic a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e el- ement. Yet, he wrote, "while Strategy and Tactics are m u c h talk o f . . . , t h e r e has not yet been recognized a science o f Lo- gistics." Few, indeed, either used or even a t t e m p t e d to d e f i n e the word.

T h e term

logistics

is, in tact, o r relatively m o d e r n origin.

A l t h o u g h some writers a t t e m p t to trace it back to the G r e e k w o r d

logistikos

("skilled in c a l c u l a t i n g " ) o r t h e r e l a t e d Latin

logi.~ta

(a R o m a n or Byzantine administrator), both words and their derivatives have to do with mathematics, calculations, or o t h e r n o n m i l i t a r y subjects. N o t u n t i l t h e late 18th o r e a r l y 19th c e n t u r y did

logistics

e n t e r the m i l i t a r y v o c a b u l a r y a n d take on a n y t h i n g at all like its m e a n i n g today.

T h e term derives directly from the French

marachal

or

mar~chal-g~n~ral des logis,

translated as " q u a r t e r m a s t e r general"

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(logis

m e a n i n g " l o d g i n g " o r " q u a r t e r s " ) . E s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r Louis X I V , t h e

mar(chal des logis,

like t h e P r u s s i a n

quartiermeister,

was responsible for billeting and subsequently for the routine administration o f marches and camps. U n d e r some circumstances, the

mar~chal-g~n(ral

became a sort of chief of staff, with greater administrative duties; these did not in- clude, however, a n u m b e r of supply and service functions. Af- ter the French revolution, the title

mar~chal des logis

appears to have been d r o p p e d , but the word

logistique

r e m a i n e d .

It was the Swiss Baron Antoine H e n r y J o m i n i - - w h o had served as a Napoleonic staff officer and who wrote extensively about the military campaigns of" the p e r i o d - - w h o m a d e the first significant use of the t e r m

lo~stic~.

In his classic

Summary of the Art of War,

published in 1838, J o m i n i established logistics as one of" five basic tools for c o n d u c t i n g war, the others being strategy, g r a n d tactics, e n g i n e e r i n g (by which he m e a n t fortifi- cation only), and m i n o r tactics.

J o m i n i d e f i n e d logistics as " t h e practical art o f m o v i n g armies," but he gave it a far b r o a d e r and d e e p e r meaning.

T h e "old

logistique,"

he explained, had been "quite limited."

However, warfare and h e n c e logistics had grown far b r o a d e r a n d m o r e c o m p l e x . T h e n a r r o w r o l e o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e chief o f staff had now e x p a n d e d to take on a wide variety of"

duties "connected with all the operations o f a campaign," in fact practically e v e r y t h i n g e x c e p t c o m b a t a n d p l a n n i n g for combat. Logistics thus included the " p r e p a r a t i o n o f all material necessary for setting the a r m y in motion"; the d r a w i n g up o f initial and subsequent orders; provision for security and re- connaissance; m o v e m e n t and sustenance of the troops; establishment of camps, depots, a n d supply lines; organization of m e d i c a l s e r v i c e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; a n d a h o s t o f o t h e r tasks.

Logistics, declared Jomini, "comprises the means and ar- r a n g e m e n t s which work out the plans o f strategy and tactics."

It was a m a j o r function o f c o m m a n d , and a good c o m m a n d - ing general r e q u i r e d a skillful and efficient logistical staff and an even m o r e c o m p e t e n t logistician to head it. This chief o f staff', J o m i n i wrote, "should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art o f war," for logistics, in its ultimate sense, was " n o t h i n g m o r e nor less than the science of applying all

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Jomini's works were widely read, but primarily for their strategic and tactical lessons. His use and broad definition o f the word

logistics,

however accurate it may have been, did not find wide acceptance in the military literature o f the 19th century. Clausewitz, Jomini's c o n t e m p o r a r y who also had d r a w n i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m N a p o l e o n ' s c a m p a i g n s , n e i t h e r u s e d t h e word nor considered logistical matters to be o f m a j o r concern.

Obsessed with the i m p r o t a n c e o f o p e r a t i o n a l o v e r logistical considerations, o f the moral forces o f war over the material, Clausewitz paid lip service to logistics but refused to a d m i t that it played any part in "the c o n d u c t o f war p r o p e r l y so called." War was strategy and tactics. All else was merely "sub- servient" services, useful and necessary perhaps, but insignifi- cant in the actual clash o f war.

T h a t the widely read Clausewitz reflected the s t a n d a r d prejudice of fighting m e n against the n o n c o m b a t a n t services may p e r h a p s explain why logistics--both word and c o n c e p t - - failed to a p p e a r in o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y military writings. Yet, as the industrial revolution spread across E u r o p e , few could ignore the growing logistical impact o f industrial a n d technological d e v e l o p m e n t s on the c o n d u c t o f war. T h u s , Prussian and o t h e r military leaders gave increasing i m p o r t a n c e to the place o f logistical activities in the structure o f their military forces and in p l a n n i n g for conflict. But they did not write about it.

In the United States, meanwhile, Jomini's

Art of War

had been available in translation since very shortly after its original 1838 p u b l i c a t i o n , w h e r e a s an E n g l i s h e d i t i o n o f C l a u s e w i t z did not a p p e a r until 1873. T h u s , Civil War generals were said to have fought with a sword in one h a n d , a copy o f the

Art of

War

in the other. Perhaps so. But like their E u r o p e a n c o u n t e r - parts, they were m o r e impressed with Jomini's strategic a n d tactical advice than with what he had to say about the importance o f logistics. T h e logistical resources o f the N o r t h may have t r i u m p h e d over the tactical skills o f the South, yet few pointed it out in .just those terms. I n d e e d , the first use o f the word

logistics

in A m e r i c a n military literature a p p a r e n t l y did not come until the late 1870s. Its later e m p l o y m e n t by A r m y officers was limited a n d i n f r e q u e n t , focusing m o r e on move-

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m e n t a n d q u a r t e r i n g t h a n o n t h e b r o a d e r s u p p l y aspects suggested by J o m i n i .

T h e Navy, however, was b e g i n n i n g to show s o m e interest in logistics. In 1888, in a lecture at t h e Naval War College, C a p t a i n Alfred T h a y e r M a h a n i n t r o d u c e d both the t e r m a n d t h e c o n c e p t to naval strategy. A s u b s e q u e n t lecture that year by a n o t h e r o f f i c e r f o c u s e d m o r e d i r e c t l y o n naval logistics, while still others, in articles a n d essays, soon b e g a n to stress the n e e d for a system o f bases for fleet s u p p o r t a n d to e x a m - ine t h e e c o n o m i c f o u n d a t i o n s o f naval power.

M a h a n h i m s e l f asserted that l o g i s t i c s - - a l t h o u g h he actually u s e d t h e w o r d i n f r e q u e n t l y - - d o m i n a t e d w a r f a r e . G o o d s u p p l y lines, fixed a n d floating bases, a n d a d e q u a t e stocks o f fuel were essential for the p r o j e c t i o n o f seapower. M o r e o v e r , Control o f the sea lanes, p r o t e c t i o n o f national t r a d e a n d com- merce, a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e e n e m y ' s e c o n o m y were vital functions o f naval strategy: a b r o a d logistical calculus in which t h e British naval historian Sir J u l i a n C o r b e t t w o u l d soon j o i n him. A n d on t h e eve o f W o r l d W a r I, t h e Navy's o w n g r o w i n g awareness o f t h e e c o n o m i c a n d industrial roots o f its develop- m e n t lent a new a n d g r e a t e r m e a n i n g to t h e c o n c e p t o f logistics. T h e w o r d itself, however, was still n o t widely used.

Pure Logistics

It was in t h i s a t m o s p h e r e t h a t t h e n - M a j o r G e o r g e C.

T h o r p e arrived in N e w p o r t in D e c e m b e r 1914 to s p e n d a stu- d e n t y e a r at t h e N a v a l W a r C o l l e g e a n d to w r i t e his s t i m u l a t i n g essay on logistics. Like m o s t Marine officers o f t h e early 20th c e n t u r y , T h o r p e h a d e n j o y e d a varied career. B o r n in 1875, he h a d served as a t e m p o r a r y 2d l i e u t e n a n t d u r i n g t h e S p a n i s h - A m e r i c a n War a n d t h e n received a r e g u l a r com- mission as 1st l i e u t e n a n t in time to see action in t h e Philip- p i n e s a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n . T h e r e h e e a r n e d a c o m m e n d a t i o n for bravery a n d a brevet p r o m o t i o n . B u t he also s u f f e r e d d a m a g i n g f o o t i n j u r i e s , w h i c h , a l o n g w i t h a

~eries o f illnesses, were to p l a g u e h i m all his life, i n t e r r u p t i n g his career a n d l e a d i n g to his early r e t i r e m e n t .

In 1903, C a p t a i n T h o r p e c o m m a n d e d t h e M a r i n e detach-

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Addis Ababa. T h i s was an a s s i g n m e n t testing both his logistical a n d tactical skills, involving an a r d u o u s m o n t h - l o n g trek by m u l e a n d camel aross s o m e 300 miles of" E t h i o p i a n d e s e r t a n d m o u n t a i n s , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with hostile t r i b e s m e n , a n d a m u t i n y o f s p e a r - c a r r y i n g c a m e l d r i v e r s . T h o r p e r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e m i s s i o n w i t h a m e d a l f r o m t h e e m p e r o r a n d Ethiopia's gift for P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt o f two live lions, which t h e e n t e r p r i s i n g Marines s o m e h o w m a n a g e d to carry ill cages on t h e backs o f f r i g h t e n e d camels.

T h o r p e ' s s u b s e q u e n t c a r e e r i n c l u d e d service in the West Indies, Cuba, a n d t h e P a n a m a Canal Zone; as Fleet Marine Officer o f b o t h t h e Atlantic a n d Pacific fleets a n d t h e Euro- p e a n S t a t i o n ; a n d as c o m m a n d e r o f t h e P o r t s m o u t h , N e w H a m p s h i r e , naval prison. H e g r a d u a t e d f r o m both t h e Naval War College a n d t h e A r m y G e n e r a l Staff College, a n d served twice o n t h e staff at N e w p o r t . His e d u c a t i o n also i n c l u d e d two years at the US Naval A c a d e m y , studies in psychology a n d in- t e r n a t i o n a l law at B r o w n a n d New York Universities, a n d BS, L L B , a n d M A d e g r e e s . H e was a d m i t t e d to t h e b a r in Massachusetts a n d New H a m p s h i r e , p u b l i s h e d several articles, a n d d u r i n g t h e final years o f his c a r e e r was at w o r k on a long, b u t n e v e r p u b l i s h e d , s t u d y o f t h e evolution o f warfare.

F r o m 1917 to 1919, T h o r p e was s t a t i o n e d in S a n t o D o m i n g o as a r e g i m e n t a l c o m m a n d e r a n d b r i g a d e chief" o f s t a f f . H e also b e c a m e t h e f i r s t c o m m a n d a n t o f t h e n e w l y f o r m e d G u a r d i a Nacional D o m i n i c a a n d was c o m m e n d e d for action against b a n d s o f outlaws that were t e r r o r i z i n g t h e c o u n - tryside. By this time, tie was a full colonel with a r e c o r d that m i g h t well h a v e s u p p o r t e d f u r t h e r a d v a n c e m e n t . B u t his e a r l i e r i n j u r i e s a n d c o n t i n u e d illinesses w e r e b e c o m i n g t o o heavy a b u r d e n . I n c a p a c i t a t e d for duty, he retired f r o m active s e r v i c e in 1923. A f t e r y e a r s o f i n c r e a s i n g l y s e v e r e m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s , he died in 1936.

D u r i n g his l o n g career, T h o r p e ' s most e n d u r i n g c o n t r i b u - tion m a y well have been his a u t h o r s h i p o f Pure Lo~stics, published after o n e - a n d - a - h a l f years as s t u d e n t a n d staff naember at t h e Naval War College. T h e time at N e w p o r t h a d been most p r o d u c t i v e , | o r it was t h e r e that T h o r p e e n i o y e d w h a t may well have been his tirst real o p p o r t u n i t y to study a n d t h i n k

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about some o f the b r o a d e r aspects of the art o f war. T h e few pieces of his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e that r e m a i n indicate his interest in military history, and it is clear that his interest soon focused on the area o f logistics. He quickly discovered that military c o m m e n t a t o r s o t h e r than J o m i n i o f f e r e d only "silence" on the subject. T h e "conclusion is irresistible." T h o r p e noted, "that the military themselves know next to n o t h i n g about Logistics."

H e thus began to write his own definition and analysis, and to develop a theory and set o f principles for the organization a n d direction of this long-neglected branch o f warfare. T h e result, Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation, was com- pleted in the s u m m e r of" 1916 and published the following year.

T h o r p e viewed logistics as a science which, like o t h e r sci- e n c e s , c o u l d be d i v i d e d b e t w e e n " p u r e " a n d " a p p l i e d , " between theory and practical usage. "Applied Logistics" d r e w on the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f " P u r e Logistics," c o n c e r n i n g itself with the specific details of logistical functions before and d u r - ing a war. "Pure Logistics" was theoretical, abstract, "a scientific i n q u i r y i n t o t h e t h e o r y o f L o g i s t i c s - - i t s s c o p e a n d function in the Science o f War, with a broad outline o f its or- g a n i z a t i o n . " A n d this "scientific i n q u i r y " was w h a t T h o r p e proposed to condnct.

T h o r p e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f logistics was a k i n to t h a t of"

Jomini: strategy and tactics constituted the c o n d u c t o f war; logistics provided the means. But this means was not limited to the narrow functions o f transportation and supply. Logistics indeed e m b r a c e d the entire range suggested by J o m i n i as well as all those larger and d e e p e r aspects s u b s u m e d within the economics of warfare.

Logistics as thus broadly d e f i n e d , a r g u e d T h o r p e , consti- t u t e d a n e n t i t y . It c o m p r i s e d m a n y a c t i v i t i e s , b u t was nonetheless a single whole. T o ignore or reject its unity and the interrelationship o f its p a r t s - - a c o m m o n e r r o r - - w a s to di- vide or splinter a natural functional category o f the art of war.

Separating supply and transportation, for example, from en- g i n e e r i n g , m a i n t e n a n c e , hospitalization, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d o t h e r aspects o f logistics was u n n a t u r a l and d a n g e r o u s . It left these i n t e r d e p e n d e n t activities to be p l a n n e d , organized, and m a n a g e d without unifying direction and coordination: a cer-

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in short, was "a distinctive branch o f warfare," e m b r a c i n g "a large n u m b e r o f activities that should be c o o r d i n a t e d , but not confused, with tactical o r strategical activities."

T o p r o v e t h e v a l i d i t y o f this c o n c e p t , T h o r p e o f f e r e d t h r c e historical examples: N a p o l e o n in Russia, S h e r m a n ' s At- lanta campaign, and the Prussian a r m y in the war with France.

Napoleon, noted T h o r p e , had m a d e great personal efforts to e n s u r e s u f f i c i e n t s u p p l i e s a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , yet his cam- p a i g n failed b e c a u s e t h e logistical f u n c t i o n s of" t h e F r e n c h army were poorly organized and coordinated. S h e r m a n , on the o t h e r hand, had p l a n n e d and established an efficient logistical organization which enabled him to carry out his bold, ambitious campaign. T h e Prussians had been the most fore- sighted o f all, felt T h o r p e . Several years before the start o f the Franco-Prussian war, von Moltke had m a d e a careful estimate of the logistical base o f both the French a n d Prussian armies, p l a n n e d for war accordingly, and organized his staff to e n s u r e p r o p e r logistical s u p p o r t of" his strategy and tactics.

B u i l d i n g o n his a n a l y s i s o f t h e G e r m a n g e n e r a l staff, T h o r p e p r o c e e d e d to d r a w up a suggested organization for the direction o f A m e r i c a n fighting forces. It was an ambitious and far-sighted plan, reflecting broad logistical considerations and concepts in m a n y ways a h e a d of" their time. T h o r p e rec- o m m e n d e d the establishment of" a National Board o f Strategy to be responsible for strategic p l a n n i n g a n d national logistic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h e N a t i o n a l L o g i s t i c S t a f f o f t h e B o a r d would m a n a g e those logistical activities c o m m o n to both A r m y and Navy, including certain types o f p r o c u r e m e n t and services, as well as peacetime industrial p r e p a r e d n e s s . Within each o f the a r m e d forces, logistical functions would be clearly de- lineated and h a n d l e d by a separate logistical staff, m a n n e d by m e m b e r s o f a p e r m a n e n t logistical staff corps. C o m p a r a b l e or- ganizational a r r a n g e m e n t s would exist at major s u b o r d i n a t e levels.

T h e entire military organization would be based on an effective m i l i t a r y e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m ; f o r e d u c a t i o n , a r g u e d T h o r p e , was a part o f logistics, in the sense that like all o t h e r s u p p o r t and service functions, it h e l p e d to p r e p a r e the nation's military system for "efficient operation." T h o r p e did not

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specifically discuss logistical training a n d education, but he did u r g e that all strategical and tactical problems e x a m i n e d at the staff colleges "be solved logistically" to d e t e r m i n e the feasibil- ity of any proposed action. By way o f illustration, he provided a detailed example o f such a logistical solution in an exercise i n v o l v i n g a m a j o r f l e e t o p e r a t i o n f r o m a n a d v a n c e d base against an e n e m y effort to seize that base.

S e v e r a l m o n t h s a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f Pure Logistic,s, while c o m m a n d i n g a r e g i m e n t in S a n t o D o m i n g o , C o l o n e l T h o r p e e n l a r g e d on his t h o u g h t s about military education. In a proposal submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, he u r g e d the establishment of a National War College as a joint educa- tional a n d p l a n n i n g organization atop the existing structure o f A r m y and Navy schools. T h e p r o p o s e d National War College would be an adjunct to a national strategic s t a f f - - p r e s u m a b l y similar to the National Board o f Strategy suggested in Pure Logistics--and w o u l d n o t o n l y c o o r d i n a t e A r m y a n d N a v y p l a n n i n g and education but also link logistics with strategy in national war planning. By the time o f this proposal, however, the United States was fully e n g a g e d in World War I. Given t h e p r e s s o f w a r t i m e r e q u i r e m e n t s , it s e e m s d o u b t f u l t h a t T h o r p e ' s proposal received m o r e than passing notice in busy Washington.

N o r d i d Pure Logistics f a r e a n y b e t t e r . T h e small b o o k - - a n d T h o r p e ' s broadly conceived view o f logistics and his ideas for i m p l e m e n t i n g i t - - a r o u s e d little or no interest at a time w h e n n e i t h e r the A r m y nor the Navy was p r e p a r e d to d r o p traditional concepts o f supply and support. N o r did logistical d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e a f t e r m a t h o f W o r l d W a r I d o m u c h to c h a n g e this attitude. As T h o r p e had anticipated, the war h a d e m p h a s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f i n d u s t r i a l a n d eco- n o m i c m o b i l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e Act o f 1920 gave the A r m y p l a n n i n g responsibility in this area. It led to the establishment in 1922 o f the A r m y and Navy Munitions Board as a .joint agency to c o o r d i n a t e p l a n n i n g for acquiring munitions and supplies and, in 1924, o f the A r m y Industrial College to train officers in military p r o c u r e m e n t and industrial mobilization. For several years in the late 1920s, also, the N a v a l W a r C o l l e g e o f f e r e d a c o u r s e o n logistics. Yet few shared T h o r p e ' s ideas.

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w o r d h a d e n t e r e d t h e military lexicon b u t was still d e f i n e d in the traditional sense o f m o v e m e n t a n d s u p p l y of" t r o o p s in t h e field, a d e f i n i t i o n that l i n g e r e d o n well into World War II. It was n o t until the later stages o f that war that logistics b e g a n to take o n t h e b r o a d m e a n i n g ascribed to it by Colonel T h o r p e . A n d it was n o t until well into the p o s t w a r p e r i o d that this con- c e p t a n d its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n h a d a n o t i c e a b l e e f f e c t o n t h e A m e r i c a n military establishmcnt.

P o s t - W o r l d War II Writings on Logistics

I n 1945, s o m e o n e d i s c o v e r e d five copies o f Pure Logistics in the library at the Naval W a r College. T h e College consid- e r e d p u b l i s h i n g a revised edition, but n o t h i n g a p p e a r s to have c o m e o f this. Since t h e n , only a few copies o f t h e book have been available in special libraries of" p e r s o n a l collections. A n d , aside f r o m a brief" m e n t i o n in a single e n c y c l o p e d i a article, Pure Logistics has received little public notice. Nevertheless, it r e m a i n s u n i q u e as a n a n a l y t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f a l o n g - neglected subject a n d as an a t t e m p t to d e f i n e scope a n d con- t e n t a n d to e s t a b l i s h a t h e o r y o f p r a c t i c e . W h i l e m u c h h a s been p u b l i s h e d o n logistics in t h e years since World War II, b o o k - l e n g t h studies have been p r i m a r i l y historical a n d analytical r a t h e r t h a n t h e o r e t i c a l in n a t u r e . N o n e w J o m i n i o r T h o r p e has e m e r g e d to o f f e r a m o d e r n t h e o r y o f logistics.

A few a u t h o r s have, however, p r o d u c e d b r o a d logistical overviews. T h e most recent, a n d most controversial in s o m e o f its conclusions, is Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenatein to Patton (1977), an analytical history o f West- e r n logistics f r o m the 17th c e n t u r y t h r o u g h W o r l d W a r II.

A m o n g o t h e r useful insights in this book, Van Creveid's con- v i n c i n g e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n W a r h a s de- s t r o y e d t h e m y t h o f P r u s s i a n l o g i s t i c a l s u p r e m a c y in t h a t c o n f l i c t . I n The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1 7 7 5 - 1 9 5 3 (1966), J a m e s A. H u s t o n has written an impressive, c o m p r e - hensive a c c o u n t o f the A m e r i c a n A r m y that includes an e f f o r t to e s t a b l i s h s o m e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f l o g i s t i c s . A c o m p l e m e n t r y work is Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939 (1962). No c o m p a r a b l e

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volumes have been written for the Navy and Air Force, but Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles discusses logistical history, organization, and planning in his broadly based Lo~stics in the National D~f[ense (1959). O n e noteworthy earlier book, actually published on the eve of World War I l, is George C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War (1938), which conceives of logistics in more traditional terms.

F h e r e have also been a n u m b e r of efforts to examine logistics in specific American wars. No one, unfi~rtunately, has seen fit to write a logistical history of military efforts d u r i n g the colonial period. Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organimtion and Administration (1967), deals ahnost entirely with the E u r o p e a n side of what Americans call the French and Indian War (1754-1763) but offers a valuable description of French logistical organization and practices o f the time. By contrast, the American Revolu- tion boasts several works on logistical subjects, including Erna Risch, Supplying Washington's Arm~ (1981), David Syrett, Ship- ping in the American War, 1775-1783 (1970), and R. A r t h u r Bowler, Logistics and the Failure oJ the British Army in America (1975).

Major volumes on Civil War logistics are scarce, Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply (1969), b e i n g t h e o n l y g e n e r a l study. Carl Davis, Arming the Union: Small Arms in the Union Army (1973), and Robert Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (1956), cover weapons d e v e l o p m e n t and p r o c u r e m e n t in the North, while Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords: Jo- siah Gorgas and Confederate Ordance (1952), does the same for the South.

Historians o f logistics h a v e t e n d e d e v e n m o r e to avoid W o r l d W a r I. R o b e r t D. C u f f , The War Industries Board:

Business-Government Relation~s in World War I (1973), examines i n d u s t r i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n , o n e o f t h e n e w e r logistical t h e m e s e m e r g i n g from that conflict. Beyond this volume, however, World War I logistics has been left to the memoirs of participants. Thus, Major General J a m e s G. Habord, The American Army in France, 1917-1919 (1936), Brigadier Genral J o h n s o n H a g o o d , The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (1927), and Admiral Albert Gleaves, A History of the Transport

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authors. Former Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell and Robert Wilson, How America Went to War: An Account from the Official Sources of the Nation's War Activities (6 vols., 1921), grew out of Crowell's e x p e r i e n c e in industrial mobilization, manpower management, and oversea munitions supply.

T h e bulk of r e c e n t writing on logistics has focused on World War II, much of it the product of the official history p r o g r a m s o f the a r m e d services. Richard M. L e i g h t o n and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strateg).' (2 vols.; 1955, 1968), and Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logistics in the Sec- ond World War (1947), provide an overall view of worldwide logistics. R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (1959), Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Indu.~trial Mobili- zation in World War H (1951), and Byron Fairchild and Jona- than G r o s s m a n , The Army and Industrial Manpower (1959), examine economic and industrial mobilization and procure- m e n t . Men and Planes (1955), the sixth v o l u m e in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.), The Army Air Force in World War H, describes recruitment and procurement, and the latter topic is also the subject of Irving B. Holley, Jr., Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement/or the Army Air Forces (1964).

J o h n D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Arm,~ Serv- ice Forces (1954), is a history of the Army's central logistical or- ganization. Worrall Reed Carter, Beans, Bul&ts and Black Oil:

The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat During World War H (1953), and Carter and Elmer Ellsworth Duvall, Ships, Salvage and Sin- ews of War: The Story of Fleet Logi.stics Afloat in Atlantic and Medi- terranean Waters During World War H (I 954), do for the Navy what Services Around the World (1958), the seventh Craven and Cate volume, does for the Army Air Forces. Army theater lo- gistics in Europe is covered in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logis- tical Support of the Armies (2 w)ls.; 1953, 1959). More than a score of additional volumes in the official history series de- scribe the activities of the Army technical services.

Logistics in the Korean War has yet to lind a historian.

But a useful picture of Army service operations in the field emerges from more than 100 interviews with participants that appear in Captain J o h n G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (1955).

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Considerably more, however, has been published about logistics in V i e t n a m . C o l o n e l Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airl!/t (1983), is a detailed official account of an important aspect of Air Force logistics. Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, Mobility', Support, Endurance: A Story ~" Naval Operational Lo~stics in the Vietnam War, 196.5-I968 (1972), takes a b r o a d e r view of Navy logistics. And tile Army's series of Vietnam Studies includes several logistical m o n o g r a p h s by s e n i o r officers w h o s e r v e d in Southeast Asia: Lieutenant General J o s e p h M. Heiser, Jr., Lo- gistic Support (1974), Major G e n e r a l R o b e r t R. Ploger, U.S.

Army Engineers, 1965-1970 (1974), Lieutenant General Carroll H. Dunn, Bc~e Development in South Vietnam, 1965-1970 (1972), M a j o r G e n e r a l T h o m a s M a t t h e w Ricnzi, Communications- Electronics, 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 7 0 (1972), L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J o h n J.

Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971 (1973, and Lieutenant General Charles R. Myer, Division-Level Communications, 1962-1973 (1982). Finally, the US Joint Logistics Review Board, Logistic Support in the Vietnam War: A Report (3 vols., 1970), contains eighteen m o n o g r a p h s on various aspects o t logistics.

Despite the long, if somewhat spotty, list of books on logistics published since the appearance of Pure Logistics, Colo- nel T h o r p e ' s slender volume remains unrivaled as a svstemic and structural analysis. Many of his thoughts and ideas have been overtaken by the passage of time, but his primary view of logistics as an indivisible branch of war, co-equal with strategy and tactics, remains unchallcnged. I n d e e d , his stress on logistical unit,,, a n d c e n t r a l c o o r d i n a t i o n is r e f l e c t e d in m o d e r n techniques of centralized m a n a g e m e n t and control. His book can be read today both as a u n i q u e contribution to the all-too- limited literature of logistics and as a stimulating discussion of the "science of war preparation." Its republication at this time makes available a m i n o r classic too long d e n i e d to m o d e r n readers.

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To

GEORGE B A R N E T T MAJOR GENERAL, COfflMANDANT

US MARINE CORPS

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N

' a p o l e o n n e v e r used t h e w o r d l%4stics. O f c o u r s e he employed all the e l e m e n t s o f Logistics necessary to war in his day, as h e d i d t h e e l e m e n t s of" Strategy a n d Tactics. B u t while he conceived o f t h e two l a s t - n a m e d fimctions as distinct divisions o f labor, he d i d n o t realize (except, p e r h a p s , w h e n it was too late) that logistical f u n c t i o n s c o m p r i s e d a t h i r d entity in war functions.

It is curious, t h e n , that the only classical l i t e r a t u r e n o w to be f o u n d in libraries o n Logistics, eo nomine, was c o n t r i b u t e d by a p r o m i n e n t officer o f N a p o l e o n ' s Staff. T o this subject B a r o n de J o m i n i devotes a p a r t o f o n e c h a p t e r in his "l'r6cis de l'Art d e la G u e r r e . "

Nearly every civilian is familiar with t h e t e r m s strate~' a n d tactics, a n d nearly all intelligent patriots k n o w that the f o r m e r has r e f e r e n c e to the g e n e r a l plan f0r t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e nation's f i g h t i n g forces a n d t h e latter to t h e m a n n e r of" fighting. But, if we m a y j u d g e of" t h e m a t t e r f r o m t h e silence o f books o n the Science a n d Art o f War, t h e c o n c l u s i o n is irresistible that the military t h e m s e l v e s k n o w next to n o t h i n g a b o u t Logistics. S o m e a u t h o r s have m e n t i o n e d Logistics as o n e c~f t h e t h r e e great divisions o f war work, b u t t h e n say n o m o r e a b o u t it---except, possibly, that it relates to t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d supply.

J o m i n i goes to t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e , for, after r e a d i n g o v e r the list o f activities that h e assigns to Logistics, o n e w o n d e r s what can be left to Strategy a n d T a c t i c s - - v e r y little i n d e e d . B u t the Baron's exposition is w o r t h y o f serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n , for, it will be r e m e m b e r e d , he served as h i s t o r i o g r a p h e r for N a p o l e o n d u r i n g t h e Russian c a m p a i g n , a n d thus was in a po- sition to know all t h e facts o f the most c o n s p i c u o u s logistical failure in the history o f warfare.

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George C. Thorpe

T h a t Logistics has r e c e i v e d so little a c a d e m i c a t t e n t i o n and is so little m e n t i o n e d in the literature of war is readily explained.

Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is r e p r e s e n t e d by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage m a n a g e m e n t , accessories, and maintenance. T h e audi- ence, thrilled by the action of the play and the art o f the per- formers, overlooks all o f the cleverly h i d d e n details of stage m a n a g e m e n t . In the conditions now a d h e r i n g to the d r a m a it would hardly be incorrect to assert that the part played by the stage director, the scene-shifter, the p r o p e r t y - m a n , and the lighting expert equals, if it does not exceed in importance, the art of the actor. This, o f course, has been a relatively recent development, for d u r i n g the earlier periods of" the d r a m a the actors were forced to rely almost entirely u p o n their interpre- tative skill in creating the illusion o f place and time. Stage- craft, with its elaborate settings, its mechanical accessories, and its complete efficiency, is a comparatively recent addition to dramatic art.

Logistics is the same d e g r e e o f p a r v e n u in the science of war that stage m a n a g e m e n t is in the theater. Battles between the earliest tribes probably were fought on the spur o f the mo- m e n t of provocation, without p r e d e t e r m i n e d plan and without providing special means of fighting; that is to say, Tactics only was involved. After e x p e r i e n c e in battle, some intelligent warrior suggested to his fellows that they might secure advan- tages over their adversaries by p l a n n i n g the affair in advance;

the plan naturally suggested the stratagem. Stratagems were multipled and elaborated until the contest became s o m e t h i n g m o r e than a single battle fought out in one day, the final deci- sion, indeed, only being expected from a combination o f battles. H e n c e in the earliest and simplest combinations of this sort we tind the b u d d i n g science o f Strategy revealed. As soon as the battle became s o m e t h i n g m o r e than the s u d d e n fight o f short d u r a t i o n , m o r e or less o f organization and p r e p a r a t i o n of means o f fighting, or o f executing stratagems, were called for: it was necessary to p r e p a r e hiding-places, traps, means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and to provide food for warriors who would be p r e v e n t e d f r o m h u n t i n g , by r e a s o n o f m i l i t a r y e m p l o y -

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ments, for a l o n g e r period than usual. This stage in the devel- o p m e n t o f warfare marks the b e g i n n i n g o f Logistics.

It is easy to imagine that these early warriors r e g a r d e d such logistical functions as of s o m e w h a t less i m p o r t a n c e than their strategy, or plan, a n d the plan as of less i m p o r t a n c e than the actual fighting, since the contact was the most obvious contribution to the result. This relative o r d e r o f the t h r e e roles is still recognized, but it is quite certain, that down t h r o u g h the stages o f history Strategy has robbed Tactics o f ever m o r e and m o r e o f its glory, a n d that Logistics has been c r o w d i n g both.

As, m o t h e r e d by Invention, i m p r o v e m e n t s in the means o f fighting one by one have c o m e into use, the items o f Logistics have accumulated. At the same time, while Strategy and Tac- tics are m u c h talked o f u n d e r the topic o f Science o f War, t h e r e has not yet been recognized a science o f Logistics.

T h e c a m p a i g n records o f all m o d e r n wars cry out this lache; history repeats itself, war after war, giving the world s t o r y a f t e r s t o r y o f m u d d l e d p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e m e a n s o f fighting. War has b e c o m e a business; t h e r e f o r e training and p r e p a r a t i o n for war is a business--vast a n d c o m p r e h e n d i n g m a n y d e p a r t m e n t s . Like commercial activities, it is susceptible o f analysis in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e u p o n p r o p e r division o f labor, to estimate necessities r e q u i r e d to m e e t the situation, and to avoid duplication a n d waste.

T h e obscurity o f Logistics may be explained, again, by the fact that warfare itself is in a primitive stage o f d e v e l o p m e n t . Despite the 3,165 years o f fighting d u r i n g the past thirty-four centuries,* r e p r e s e n t e d by some 8,000 r e c o r d e d wars,* it must be admitted that progress in war has been slow. We now know that there are live distinct elements to be c o n s i d e r e d as medi- ums o f fighting: the land surface, the water surface, the air, the s u b t e r r a n e a n , a n d t h e s u b m a r i n e . F i g h t i n g on t h e first and second of" these elements, only, has been fairly developed;

the others are in the e x p e r i m e n t a l stage; air fighting is not yet reliable, h e n c e is only auxiliary; the same may be said o f the s u b m a r i n e ; a n d s u b t e r r a n e a n f i g h t i n g is b u t slightly devel- o p e d by means o f trenches and sapping. T h e cycle o f evolu-

"I. S. Block, Modern Weapons and Modern War, Preface, p. xcvii.

tj. Novicow, War and Its Alleged Benefitq New York, 1911, p. 14.

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George C. Thorpe

tion can not be satisfied until s u p e r - s u r f a c e and sub-surface elements have been fully exploited. T h e quick e m p r i s e o f the p r e s e n t c e n t u r y has i n d u c e d lively consideration o f these new t h e a t e r s o f w a r , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e s u p e r - s u r f a c e has yielded the best r e s u l t s - - h a s c o n t r i b u t e d most to the ultimate object of w a r - - a s might have been expected, since the resist- ance e n c o u n t e r e d is less in the s u p e r - s u r f a c e than in the sub- surface. W h e n means a n d m e t h o d s o f fighting in the air have been intensively developed, g r e a t e r attention will be given to t h e s u b - s u r f a c e . W h e n all possibilities t h e r e h a v e b e e n ex- hausted, w a r f a r e will t h e n be a finished art.

In m o r e ways than o n e it is revealed to us that the way to u n i v e r s a l p e a c e lies in t h e d i r e c t i o n o f p e r f e c t i o n o f w a r m e a n s . Peace can c o m e o n l y t h r o u g h d i s c o u r a g i n g p e o p l e s from fighting; d i s c o u r a g e m e n t will follow close u p o n the heels o f s u c h e x c e l l e n t p r e p a r e d n e s s as will p l a c e b e l l i g e r e n t s against each o t h e r with no c h a n c e o f l a u n c h i n g an offensive that can not be met successfully. W h e n nations so p r e p a r e for war that the offensive can not o v e r c o m e the defensive, the eternal energies o f m a n will find exercise in o t h e r pleasures than p r e y i n g u p o n his fellows in industry and war. T h e cri- terion o f wordly a c h i e v e m e n t will then shift f r o m acquisitive- ness to fellow service.

At the same rate in which we find m o d e r n war losing its mystery a n d chivalry, we find it r a n g i n g itself in close alliance with i n d u s t r y o f t h e c o m m e r c i a l k i n d , f r o m w h i c h w a r is acquiring "business methods." T h e lessons o f every war o f the past h u n d r e d years have e m p h a s i z e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f the business factor. As the nation at peace is a hive o f industry, so the state at war is a nation in a r m s - - e v e r y individual with a part to p e r f o r m e i t h e r in the actual fighting or in providing means for fighting. T o be etficient, in this great task, t h e r e must be "team-work." T h e tasks to be p e r f o r m e d must be clas- sified a n d the p e r f o r m e r s distributed to the various classes o f work in such m a n n e r as to eliminate duplication and waste.

This is almost exclusively the province o f Logistics.

I f c o u n t r y X is p r e p a r i n g for war, she can not possibly conceal any considerable part o f h e r p r e p a r a t o r y activities; a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f h e r e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r a r m a m e n t m u s t be m a d e public; large armies can not be t r a i n e d even in a year, or