FORGOTTEN VILLAGES? THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS IN RURAL JAVA AND THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT | Kutanegara | Populasi 12340 24360 1 PB

(1)

FORGOTTEN VILLAGES?

THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS INRURAL

JAVA

AND THE ROLEOFTHE GOVERNMENT

PandeMadeKutanegara andGerbenNooteboom*

Intisari

Tulisan iniberusahamenganalisisduahal pokok, yakni darnpakkrisis di

perdesaanJazvadanresponspemerintahlokal/pemerintahandesaterhadapkrisis moneter.Secara tegas dikatakan bahwamasyarakat perdesaan]awaheterogen

danpenuhdenganvariasi danketidaksamaan. Oleh karenaitu,dampakkrisis

moneterdidesajuga sangat bervariasi tergantungpada wilayah,statussosial ekonomi,pekerjaan,dansistemekonomi. Karenakrisis,adakelompokmasyarakat yang"menang"(_diuntungkan)_{yaitukelompokyang}mempunyaiakses terhadap

sumberdayadanada kelompok yang"kalah"(dirugikan)yaitukelompok masyarakatmiskin. Selama krisis,berbagaiinstitusitradisionalyangberfungsi sebagaisocialsecurity,sepertigotong-royongdan solidaritassosial lainnyatidak

berperanbesar. Bahkan,pemerintah lokal/pemerintahandesapuntidak

melakukanupayamaksimaldalam menghadapinya.Dalamkenyataannya,peran

aktivitasindividualjauh lebihbesardibandingkan denganaktivitas

kolektif.

Introduction

The anthropologist

Jellinek

statedthat the effects of thecrisis,

whichhit Indonesiaayearbefore,

didnotaffectruralpeoplethat

much. Onbehalf of theWorld

Bank,she had carriedout arapid appraisaloftheeffectsofthe crisis in Indonesia in four places. Accordingtoher,the effects ofthe

crisis weremuchworse inthe cities (Kompas, 10February, 1999).At thebeginningofthecrisis (1997/1998), Harmoko (the

spokesmanof parliament and

prominentmember of Golkar) visitedsome ruralareas inCentral

Java

toobserve thesituationinthe villages (

safari

Ramadhan). He

* Drs. Pande Made Kutanegara, M.Si.isstaffonPopulationStudies Center,

GadjahMadaUniversityand staff educationonFacultyof Letter,Gadjah

MadaUniversity,Yogyakarta.

(2)

PandeMade Kutanegara and Gerben Nooteboom

spoketovillage officials and had

dinner1 in one of the visited villages. The dinner was well

prepared and after his visit,

Harmoko statedin interviewson

the television and innewsarticles

that the situationintheruralareas was notsobad becausehehada goodmeal,implyingthat much

foodwasavailable inthevillages.

Bothstatementsof

Jellinek

and

Harmokoare indicative for the

attitude of the Indonesian government and a number of academicsinrespecttothecrisis. Inthe dominant government

discourse inIndonesia,villages

are often regarded as homo¬ geneous and harmonious

communities,abletotakecarefor

itsweaker membersbygotong

royong and other traditional

arrangements ofsolidarity and mutual help. In fact, this stereotypicalview hashighly blindedgovernment employees

andintellectuals forthehardships ofthe ruralpoor andtheexisting inequalities, like inequalities between regions, economic

sectors, classes and within

villages.It iscrucialtostudythis diversity on the local levelto understandthedifferentialeffects of the crisis and the -often

misplaced- responses of the

government on itseffects.

Inourview,during thecrisis, government concern,analysisand policieshave been muchmore

focused

—

if focused at all

—

on citiesthan onruralareas.Thisis toacertainextentunderstandable

asin-depth studies of the crisis werenotmade andhardly any informationor the effect of the crisis was available. The central

governmentdirecteditsattention mainly on the huge urban problemsasmassunemployment, budget deficits, firm bankruptcy and restructuring of the banking

sector.Thecause of this lack of

concern for rural areas in Indonesia,wasthe lackofreliable informationof theseareas.Onthe

local level, the government

administrative systems were thereforenotequippedandnot

ableto anticipate and fight the crisis.

Ourarticlewillpresentthe case

oftwopoor villagesin

Java

du¬

ring the crisis and show the

differentialeffectsofthe crisis for

different categories of people

within thesevillages. Thearticle is based on long periods of

anthropological fieldwork's during the crisis and offers

in-1 _{Buka puasa, breaking the fast}_at_{the end of the Ramadhan after}_{sunset as}_the

(3)

Forgotten Villages?The

Effectsof

the Crisis in Rural

Jam

depthdataaboutpoverty,copying

strategies, labour andmigration and the role of the local govern¬ ment.2ThestudyofKutanegara

took place in the village of

Sriharjo, CentralJava,3 while Nooteboom'sstudywas carried

outinKrajan,4a remotevillagein Bondowoso, East

Java.

Sriharjois

anexampleof alowland village with mainly commercialised agriculture,anexcluded majority fromaccesstoland and withalot

ofurbanworkers. Landowner¬ shipinSriharjooftenhasmoreand more asymbolicfunctionthana production function. Krajanisan example of those Indonesian upland villages whicharemore remote,morevillagers with

—

direct and indirect

—

accessto landand with lessurbanworkers. Although Krajanisincorporated

in the market, subsistence

productionis still important. Long-term research is really neededtounderstand the impact

of the crisis onthe locallevel. Foster states: "Long term participant observation[...]can yield understandingof social

changethatissimplynotpossible

inany other way"(Foster, 1979). Moreover,especiallyinJava,itis

difficult to gather in-depth informationabout difficultiesand hardships inlife.As,duringa surveypeopledonoteasilytalk aboutthesesensitivesubjects.This

articlethereforetries tooffer an 'inside' view of the crisis. It deals

withfour majorsubjects: 1) the

questionabout thenatureof the

crisis andlocal perceptions and experiences of the crisis, 2) the changesinpovertyandinequality duringthe crisis 3) changes in

labour and migration and4) the role of the localgovernment in respondingtothecrisis.

The CrisisinIndonesia

Itcanbe said,thatthe crisis in

Indonesia took placeat three differentlevelsandatthesame time. Three crises can be distinguished:1) acurrencycrisis, 2)afood crisisand3) apolitical

crisis.These criseshadseveral

interrelatedcausesand reasons, which cannotbe dealt within

2 _{The article}_is_based_{on two}_{PhDresearches carried}_out_{from mid}₁₉₉₇_{till the}

end of 1998 andatthebeginningof1999.Bothstudiesarepart ofalarger

projectonSocial Security andSocial PolicyinIndonesia carriedoutbythe Gadjah Mada University ofYogyakarta,theUniversityof Amsterdam and the University of Nijmegen.

3 _This_research_is_a_restudy_and_extension_of_{the well known poverty studies} of Masri Singarimbun (1973,1976, 1993).

(4)

PandeMade KutanegaraandGerbenNooteboom

detailinthisarticle, aswe want focusespeciallyonthe locallevel effects.Inthefollowing, the three

criseswill be describedbriefly.

1)The currencycrisis started in July1997withslightlydeterio¬ rating exchangeratesdevalu¬ ating faster betweenSeptem¬ berandNovember1997.Atthe beginningof January1998,the Rupiahhadalready devalu¬ ated100percent(Figure1).In thesame month,the Rupiah cameinafree fall.Inaresponse onthis devaluation, inflation

gotchallengedandfood prices startedtorise.The firstriseof basic foodprices,whichisim¬ portant for ruralpopu-lations, started afterOctober 1997(Fig¬

ure 2). Inthevillageof Krajan, villagerswere awareof rising prices, butreallystarted to worry about the foodprices duringthe Ramadhan(Decem¬

ber/January 1997/1998) (Fig¬ ure3). InSriharjo this process

started somewhat earlier,

whichhasa greaterproportion of itspopulation workingin

the urbansector.

2) The foodcrisisstartedalready with the effects of ElNifto,

which causeddroughtsand forest fires. Production ofrice

startedtofallandin 1998the

riceproduction declinedwith nearly10percentin1998com¬

pared with the 1996 level

Figure1

ExchangeRatacRupiahtoUS$

i

H!

t|j|||||jlMt||

fit

ÿMtk

(5)

ForgottenVillages? The

Effectsof

the Crisis inRural

Java

Figure 2

Food PriceIndex March 1997

-

September1998

300 250

-200

-150

-100

-50

-i

Source: Central Bureau ofStatistics,Jakarta

Figure 3

Average Monthly RicePrice 1997/1998

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

500

s s

(6)

Pande MadeKutanegaraand Gerben Nooteboom

(FAO, 1998).Manysmallhol¬

dersexperienceddifficultiesin

repayingdebts.Nationalshort¬ ages ofricestartedtoenforce

theriseof riceprices. Statisti¬

cal dataareoftennotthat reli¬ able in Indonesia. Weusefor

the riceprice data from the

FAO,whichcorrespond ex¬ actly withthe ricepriceswe

found inourresearch areas.

3) Relatedtothesedevelopments, apoliticalcrisisstartedtode¬

velop.The NewOrderregime startedtoshow cracksandlost legitimacyculmi-natinginthe

fallof Suharto inMay 1998.

One of thereasonsof Suharto's fallwasthat hedidnothingto curb thecrisis.The research periodsof 1998andof 1999 were periods ofpoliticaltur¬ moilenforcedby corn-petition betweendifferentfactionsand regions. Habibie,the interim

presidentcouldnotdo much. Thepoliticaldisarray surelyis

oneexplanation for the lackof government policies,stand¬

pointsandleadership thatbe¬

cameclear duringthecrisis.

But,morestructural reasons

canbementionedaswell.

Inthevillages,the step down

of Suhartoassuchdidnotimpress mostvillagers. InKrajan(East Java) for instance,itlookmore

thanthree daysbeforethe majority of thepopulation realisedat all that Suhartohadsteppeddown

indeed.And whenvillagersheard

the news,theywerenotexcited.

In their lifeworld,

Jakarta

isfar

awayandvillagersinfactdidnot expect much from thenational

government insolving their pro¬ blems.InSrihaijo(CentralJava), villagers were also not that impressed by the news,butthe reasons weredifferent.Invillagers perceptions,

Jakarta

is geo¬ graphicallynotsofar away,but according to them, national politicsarenotthat relevant for

theirlives.

The Crisis inRural Indonesia

In 1996, the Australian

economist Hal Hillwrote an optimistic book about the

modernisationanddevelopment oftheIndonesian economy:"The Indonesianeconomy since 1966: Asia's emerging Giant". His analyses of the Indonesian economyincludeda coresection

onagriculturaldevelopments.He

statesthat the NewOrder (Orde Baru)regime has been successful increatingruraldevelopmentand

improving rural people's livelihoods. However, he

overlookedthat the attention of the OrdeBaru regimefor rural

(7)

Effects

of

the Crisis inRural

Java

attentionfrom thegovernment.

Thismattermaterialisedinaseries

ofruraldevelopmentprograms liketire GreenRevolutionpolicies, the Colt Revolution, road

constructionprojects,electricity, andthedevelopmentofa small-scaleindustry.This createdarapid agriculturaldevelopment,and alsoput astrainonemployment.5 While agricultural production increased, inequality grew, employmentforlandlessvillagers decreased andagrowingnumber ofyoungvillagers startedtowork inthe cities. Another effect of all these developments was that villages started tobecomeless isolated and partlyurbanised. Manyruralareas in

Java

started

to look like desa kota or rurban regions(McGee,et.al., 1997)and urbanandruraleconomiesstarted to merge. Therefore, when urbanised

Java

gotaffectedby the

severecrisis of 1997/98,rural areas werebasicallyaffectedalike andat thesame time.Evenin remoteruralareas

—

inside and outside

Java

—

the crisiswasfelt

forcefully.

Forthisarticle, it isimportant tonote the effectsof thecrisis on

the poorinthese ruralareas.

Contrarytosomeexpectations,the poor are affectedmostby the

crisis.Levinsohnet. al. (1999)for instancestateina recentpaper about the

97/98

crisis:"Wefind that the poorhaveindeedbeenhit hardest.

Just

howhardthe poor have beenhit,though,depends cruciallyonwhere the household lives,whether the householdisin ruralorurbanarea,andjust how the cost of living index is computed.Whatisclearisthat the

notionthat the very poor are so poor as to be insulated form international shocksissimply wrong. Rather,inthe Indonesian

case,the very poor appear the mostvulnerable."As wefocuson

the rural poor in this paper, poverty studies like that of Levinsohnet.al.areinterestingbut

sometimes raise morequestions thananswers.Thepresentationof

quantitative data alone doesnot tellusmuchabout thenatureand experience ofpoverty.We found

in ourresearch forinstancethat accordingtopovertydefinitionsof localpeople,the very poorarenot thosevillagerswho lacksufficient income,butthosewhoarenotable

totakeplaceintheritualexchange economy ofvillagers anymore. Added to this, structural categories of poorarethose who

arekasihan (pitiful) like widows withouthelp

and/

oroldwithout

5 _{As for}_instance_hasbeen_{reportedabout}_the_{GreenRevolution}_{(Collier, 1981;}

(8)

PandeMadeKutanegaraand Gerben Nooleboom childrenor withoutbeing cared

for. In order tounderstand the dynamicsofpoverty,wetherefore

needamoredifferentiatedand dynamicapproach.Most poverty studies donottelluswho the poor are and why they are poor.

Therefore,wemake inthis article acombinationof poverty studies

andmoredynamic studiesdealing withvulnerable poor like social security studies.

Most poverty studies,like thoseof forinstancethe World

Bank,arequitestatic.Definitions, like a povertyline ofonedollara

day, donotmake muchsense on

the locallevelandinasituationof arapiddevaluationofthe national currency.SingarimbunandPenny

{1973) was among the first Indonesians to do poverty

researchinIndonesiaandtriedto

deal withtheproblemofinflation by usingrice as adefinition of

poverty.Accordingtohim,the verypoorarethose withincomes

less than 240kgriceequivalent/ capita/year andthepoorarethose whohaveanincomeless than320

kgof rice.Hisdefinition,although animprovement at that time, remainsrather staticandincome oriented. A social security approachmigiht helptosolvethis

problem.Inouropinion,the crux

ofthematterinpoverty isthe lack

of accesstoresources. F.andK. von Benda-Beckmann state:

"povertyorwealth refersto the economiccondition measuredby lack of ownership or command

over resources and monetary

incomes.Social securityrefersto theconversionof resourcesinto

actually (un)fulfilled social security needs"(Benda-Beckmann

and Benda-Beckmann, 1994).

Socialsecurity studiesarebroader andmoredynamicthanpoverty

studiesinthesensethatthey study

notonlythematerialpossessions of people, but their socially secured (potential) access to

resourcestoo.AmartyaSen,who did many poverty studies did somethingsimilar indealingwith the limitations ofpoverty studies by introducing the concept of entitlements(Sen,1977, 1992). He

states that it isnot the actual positionof materialwealthwhich

makespeoplepoor,butthe lack entitlementstoresources.Added tothis,wethinkit isimportantto

lookattherelationaldimensionof poverty. As indicatedbylocal

people,socialisolationforthemis

theutmostproblemof poverty (Townsend,1993).Isolatedpeople havelessaccess to information,

power, labour opportunities,

networks,and systemsofsupport

andredistributionwhichhave the potential of offering (some) security. Being poor (havingno

possessions), lackingaccess to

(9)

ForgottenVillages?The

Effectsof

the Crisis in Rural

Java

fromredistribution mechanisms

associal security arrangements

makes people much more

vulnerable for economic crises.

These aspects of povertyand vulnerability areatthecentreof ouranalysisinthisarticle, which

dealswiththe effectsofthecrisis inIndonesia.

GovernmentPolicies

Atthe beginningofthecrisis,

thegovernment wasvery hesitant

totakeaction.Theystill seemed

tobelievethat theruralareaswere notaffectedandcould cope with the difficulties. Soeharto saidon

televisionafewmonthsbeforehis fallthat thecrisiswouldsoonbe

over. ("Badaipastiberlalu";"The storm will soon be over",).

Governmental responsesonthe

crisis werenoteffective and did havenothingtodowiththecauses ofthecrisis.Asforinstancethe call to CintaRupiah(loveyour own

currency), to give gold for strengthening the currency, distribute ricepackages (nasi

bungkus)and thepublic exchange

of US dollars for Rupiahby government andrichpeople.In Augustus 1998,whenthe crisis

continued anditssevere effects couldnolonger beneglected, Social SafetyNetprograms(JPS JaringPengaman Sosial)became effective.These programswere

designed tolessen the negative

social effects ofthecrisis.Among theseprogramswere:l)Programs forenhancingfood security(cheap rice, subsidies for sembako, increasedBuloginterventions, etc.), 2) employment creation

programs, 3) credit support programs forsmalland medium enterprises,4) social protection programs for education and health.Inthenextsections,wewill describeindetail for Sriharjoand

Krajanwhattheeffects of thecrisis werefor different groups andhow effective these policies inthe villageswere.

2 The CrisisinSriharjo, Central

Java

a. Typicality'sofSriharjo's

Economy

Sriharjo liesatthe foot of the limestonehills(PegununganSewu)

thatstartfromtheIndianOcean atSouth Central

Java.

It issiteda

25kilometresSouthofYogyakarta onthe roadtoGunungKidulclose totheImogiricemeterieswhere

theSultansof Yogyakartahave

been buried for centuries.Desa

Sriharjo consists of a fertile lowland part with irrigatedrice

(10)

PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerbenNooteboom

consistsof40 percentofthe total

area with 70 per cent of the population.Thehillypartismuch moreisolatedandpoorer thanthe

lowerpart.Their inhabitantsare

usuallyreferredtoaswonggunung (mountainpeople) which hasthe

negativeconnotation of being

backward, uneducated and

traditional,whilethe inhabitants ofthe lowerpart arereferredtoas

wong ngare (lowland people) which has a very positive meaning.

Thehigher partof Sriharjo producescassava, maize,and

somebananasfor subsistence,teak

wood, some chilly, and other vegetables for the local and regionalmarket. The irrigated lowlandpartproducesrice,maize,

soybean, and vegetables for the market.

Asinallotherpartsoflowland Java, transport facilitiesoflower

Sriharjoarevery good.Becauseof

thismanyvillagerstravelbackand

forththeir work inYogyakarta everyday.Where asmostofthe wong gunung by bike,mostofthe wong ngare by motorcycle. ContrarytotireearlyNewOrder pears (1969),when all villagers workedinruralareasandwere

poor(seeSingarimbunandPenny,

1973),nowadaysthe majority of

the villagers derive their main incomefromthecityandarebetter

off.Thenis,however,still much

poverty inSriharjo.

In1969-1970,Singarimbunand Pennystudied the widespread

poverty inSriharjo,andpublished thefirstIndonesian bookonthis subject(Singarimbun and Penny,

1973).Fromthattimeon,the rural

development programs which

were implemented byThe New

Order started toincrease the economicconditionsinrural

Java

andtherefore, povertystartedto decline slowly. A restudy conductedbySingarimbunin1989

(Singarimbun,1996)showedthat

poverty (incomeless than320kg rice/capita/year) declined from

70percentin 1969 to 42percent in1989.Butincrisis time (1998) 70percentofthevillagerswere

poor.It isapossible explanation ofthisgrowthis thatinthe same a periodof twentyyearsincomeout

ofnon-farmingactivities rosefrom 16percentto 69 percent.The contributionof theagricultural sector to average household

incomesfellsubsequently from84

percentto31percent.

The number of villagepeople havingaccesstolanddeclinedin

thelastthirty years accordingly. Thepercentageof villagers with littleor nolandrosefrom49per

cent to 76 per cent and the percentageof villagers who have

(11)

Effects of

the Crisis inRural

Java

Table1.

Distribution of Sawah inLowerSrihaijo(Hamlet Miri)

Sawah(hectare) 1969 1989 1999

No land 37 48 53

0,001-0,050 13 16 23

0,051-0,100 17 13 14

0,101-0,200 17 13 6

Subtotal 83% 90% 96%

0,021-0,400 11 6 3

0,401-0,800 4 4 1

0,801-more 2

-

-N 101 100 167

Source: 1969 & 1989: from Singarimbun, 1993 1999: fromdata survey1999.

to53per cent.6Villagersdidnot

sell their land, but childrenof smallholders were notable to

inherit or buy anything. As

employment in agriculture decreased also, most of the villagers nowadayshave lost access toland. Thisprocessliesat

the basis of the increased

migrationtothebigcitiesand the increasedimportanceof non-farm

activitiesforvillagelivelihood. ThepoorpeopleofSrihaijocan be found amongthose who have noaccess toland and who lack

sufficient economic and social

capital.But the reallypoor are

those categoriesof peoplewho

lack sufficientnetworks offamily members as well. As widows,

widows/widowers

without

children or with very small

children, old peoplewithout

children andhandicapped.Or those whoarenotabletogetaccess to other sources of incomelike: agriculturallabourer,harvest labourer, becak driver,construc¬

tion worker, etc.But, if these

categories ofpeopledon'thave

6 _This_phenomenon_meets_{the expectation}_as_described_byHayami_{and Kikuchi}

that by agriculturalmodernisation increasing numbers of the rural

(12)

PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerbenNocteboom

accesstoincome,theystillcanbe relativelywelloff iftheyarecared forbymoreaffluentrelativesor

village members. Very often,

social relations make the differencebetween the rich and the poor.

Contrary to thepast,notthe

full-time farmersarethe well off

people of Sriharjo anymore,but thosewho combine fanning with non-farming activities, like teachers,army officials, traders, andcivilservants.

b. Perceptionsofthe Crisis

Atthebeginningofthe crisis,

villagersconstantlychattedabout the crisis. Forexample, during

arisan(rotatingsaving groups),at villagemeetings andattheronda

(nightwatch) the topic and its causes was discussedover and over again. Villagers did not

understandwherekrismon7_came

fromandtheysawitasthesource

ofall theirproblemsin life. Like the loss of their job as a

constructionsand fabric worker in the cities, like budgetary problems,risingprices ofbasic needs,thepriceof food,therising

prices ofpesticidesand fertiliser

etc.Inthese discussions many

different views concerningthe

crisiswereexpressed. According

tosomevillagers,theeventswere

severe, butaccordingto others, they were easyto overcome.In general,villagers' opinions varied accordingtosocio-economic and

demographic factors such as status, occupation, age, and

gender. Young people perceived

krismon as a serious crisis,while on the contrary, the older

generationperceived thecrisesas anormal condition of rural life. Accordingtothe oldervillagersa

crisis isarealfamine whennofood of goodqualityisavailable.The oldgenerationsawthe1998crisis only as little turmoil,asbasic needswerestillavailablealthough expensive.Therefore,they regard

the crisis in1998onlyas anormal conditionof villagelife.Intheir

lives,theyhad beenhitbyworse

crises before. For them, the

availability of food isthe main indicatorforacrisis.Inthe 1930's,

duringthe worldeconomiccrisis

(villagerscall this the missedera, jaman meleset,)8 theysufferedso badly from famine that they ate

the skin of cassava,therootsof banana threes and grassroots.

DuringtheJapanese occupation,

7 _{For tire}_villagers_krismon_means_that_they_losttheir_job_{as a}_construction_worker

and fabric worker in thecitiesand also theroseofthe price ofgodsand the agricultureintake ie.pestiside, fertilizer,etc.

(13)

Effectsof

the Crisis inRural

Java

people sufferedeven moreand

died of starvation. During the revolutionaryyearsof 1945-1950,

foodavailabilitywaslimited. At

the end oftheOld Order or the beginning of the New Order

(1965), the most recent crisis

occurred. That one is still perceivedasbeingmuch worse

thanthe 1998 one. Theyounger

generation however, who has

neversuffered form anycrisisor faminebefore,regards thiscrisis

as very bad. For the younger

generationsnotonly the lack of good foodmeans crisis,butthe

decline of other consumption goods

—

cigarettes,sweetsetc

—

as

well.

The socio-economicstatusalso influencestheviewonthenature of the crisis.Middleto upper classesrealisedtheystillcoulddo quitewell. For thelowerclasses, itwasveryhardtoaccept that they hadtoeconomiseonthequality and the quantity of food. In

contrast tothelower classes, the

middle and upper class seemed howevermoreworried aboutthe crisis.Althoughthey were less affected,the middleandhigher classes tended todiscuss much

moreabout the crisis. The lower classeshowever,weremoresilent

andoftenseemedtothink itbeing less important to express their demands.9

Betweenmenandwomenalso

differentperspectivesonthe crisis exist. In general, women, encountered,wentthrough

...

etc. moredifficultiesduringthe crisis and therefore,theirperceptionson

the crisisdifferfrom men's. But

this doesnot count for women withanindependentincome.For instance,households where the

woman wasmakingembroidery did better than those

—

under

sameconditions

—

whowasnot.

c. Effects ofthe Crisison

Villagersandtheir

Responses

The crisis caused most difficulties for the poorer people

of Sriharjo.But also for those peoplewhodepend only

onnon-farmactivities,the crisis turned

out tobeamajorsetbackaswell. At thebeginning of the crisis,

nearlyallconstructionwork inthe cities stopped, many factories went bankrupt and work

opportunities decreasedseverely.

9 _They_{often put}_it_{themselves this way: "kami}_harus/selalu

hidup prihatin.We must/havetoacceptourfate. We havetorunavery simplelife.Prihatin: eatingless,sleepingless,demandingless.Wehavetobetoughand patient

andentrustourlivestoGod'smercy".Butthesestatementsgenerate more

(14)

PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerbenNooteboom

Those whoworkedinthecities suddenly lost their source of

income and some of themreturn tothevillage.Atthe beginning of

the crisis,morethan100people who workedin theindustries of Bandung, Bogor and

Jakarta

in

came back to Sriharjo. Only, around10percentofthemwere female. Most womenworked as domestichelpersorinthetextile

industrydidnotlose theirjobs.In general,domestic servants were notfired afterthe crisisand those working inthe textileindustry

were protected by one of managers who originatedfrom Sriharjo. Therefore,mostof the

womenwhomigratedtodidnot return. Also, more than 200

villagers who worked as

constructionworkers and becak drivers inandaroundYogyakarta and weretravellingtoand forth Sriharjoeveryday,lost theirjob

and didn't go to Yogyakarta anymore.Somevillagers,wholost

theirjobs inthe cities, werenot

comingbackto thevillage,but found other work. Ingeneral migrantsreturnedtothevillageif theycouldnotdoanything else. Atfirstthesereturneesfromthe bigcitieswere notso obvious and

seemednot at easein thevillage. Theyat first didnotengagein

manyactivities inthevillage, but

aftersomeweeks,theystartedto

assistwith any kindof work, like

cutting grass, wage labouring, fishing, making embroidery, and tradingbirds. Some time later,

mostofthemstartedtogo backto

thecitiesagainandfoundsome kind ofajob.For thecommuters,

those who stayed athome,the

situation was different.They straightaway took up whatever

work available inthe village

becausetheywerealreadyusedto combine ruralactivitieswiththeir

urban work. Both groups constantlytriedtogetinformation

aboutjobpossibilitiesfromfriends and relativesand someof them indeedgota newjobsoon. Those who had established good networks of social relationships weremoresuccessfulthan those who were operating more

individually.The lower class

constructionworkers for instance, whousedtoworkfor abrokergot

quicker work again than skilled constructionworkers operating individually.Somehowever,who haddifficulties findingasimilar job likethey had before were

forcedtochangefromurbanwork

toruralwork(buruhsrabutan) and

turned for instance to cut sugarcane, milkingcows,cutting

(15)

Effectsof

the Crisis inRural

Java

were not even sufficient for feedinga family.10 To survive, theywereforcedtochangetheir wayoflivetotally.They startedto

mixricewithtiwul (lowquality foodmadefrom driedcassava) andatethiswithout anysidedish liketempe, tahu,fishoregg.They stopped using sugar for tea, changedtocheap-sometimes

self-made-cigarettes,andcoulduse onlyalittlebitcheapofcooking oil.

Thefate ofthe already poor villagers like widows e.g.was evenworse.Atnormaltimes,their lives hadalreadybeen full of

difficulties,and the crisisonly addedtothis. Likefor instancethe case ofbuNgadinem,awidow withtwosmall children:

BuNgadinem looks likea

fiftyyears oldwoman,but she didnotyetreachher for¬

ties.Herhusbanddiedseven

years ago because of pneu¬

monia.Sheworks herselfas arurallabourerwhenatone

dayIsawher cryingin the

waning(smallshop)because

she couldnotpayherdebts totheshopowner and had toborrowmore tobuy food.

Atthatmomentshealready

hadadebt of Rp25,000.00.

Shewantedtobuysalt,some

spices,lampoilandakiloof

ricetomixwith tiwul(cas¬ sava).Shehadtobuyrice,

because her children could notstandto eatonlytiivul. Sheaskedthe otherpeople presentif they knewan or¬ phanage for her children. "Instead ofstarvation,itis

betterIsend themto anor¬ phanage", she said. Aftera few months,indeed,one child enteredanorphanage inYogyakarta.

Also less poor families experiencedproblemswithfood

for their children. Mostchildren had never eaten tiwul dried cassavaandwere cryingif they

hadto eat that.Added tothis,

there were also other minor complaints of children about the food,like stomach problems,

abouthungryfeelings(ascassava doesnotgiveafullfeeling)andthe badsmell ofcheaprice.Another widow said: "anak-anak saya sekarangtidakpernahdapat uang jajan" (My childrennowadays never getmoneytobuysnacks). In one hamlet, the villagers complainedto the head of the

hamlet about thepeddlerswho weresellingsmallsnacks likeice and bakso.Everytimethepeddlers entered the village, children

10 _The_average_{wage for this kind of}_work_was_Rp4,_{000.00 for}_a_{long working}

(16)

PandeMadeKutancgaraandGerben Nooteboom

startedtocry andtobegformoney to buy asnack. To lessen the

economicpressureof hisfamilies,

the headofthe hamlet forbid the peddlers to enter thehamlet everyday.Since then,theywere only allowedto enterthehamlet

two times aweek.

Another difficulty for poor people during the crisis was meeting the expectations of

exchanginggifts(sumbangan)at funeralsandweddings.Theywere afraidtoslopgiving thesegiftsin fear ofsocial exclusion,of gossip and of being calledgreedyor a-social.They triedin allpossible waystograsp moneytomaintain

the ritual exchange networks of

societyatlarge.

During the crisis, some villagers who had goodaccessto

resourceslikeland,cattle and

other resources were able to improve their position.People who earned a salary out of agriculture andcombinedthis with income outof non-farm activitiesbenefited most.One householdfor instance, which

runs awarungandalsorentshalf a hectare sawah became rich

becauseof risingpaddypricesand

anincreasedincome out of the

waning.At thebeginningofthe

crisis, tireprofitoutofthewaning

wasvery high,becausetheysold

stocks thatwereboughtatamuch

lowerprice beforethe crisis. Due

tothecrisistheycouldrebuilttheir

houses andbuysome furniture

likeasofa,gasstove,etc.Villagers

inhigherareasof Sriharjowhohad

cattle benefitedalso from the risingpricesbysellingsome of their cowstobuyasecondhand

motorcycle.More than 20people soldcattiesandmanymotorcycles entered the village. These motorcycleswerenotonlybought forworkingoutsideSriharjobut

also for the socialstatusattached tohavingone.

The impact ofthe crisis isalso regionally differentiated and differs in several parts of the village. Inthe higher part of Sriharjo, whichismoreisolated,

subsistenceorientedandpoor,the peopledidnotpaymoreattention

tothe crisis than those who lived

elsewhere although they were harderhit.Inthattime,they tried tosufficetheir basic needs (simple food only). They more easily changedtheirconsumptiontothe low quality food (tiwul). The

opposite took placeinMiri, the lower partof Sriharjo, which is

moreopenand market oriented. Thepeople there paidmuchmore

attentionto the crisis indaily

conversationsbecausethey hada

lotmoreexpensesandneedslike, electricitybills,education,health,

etc.andcomplained all thetime althoughmanywerehitlesshard.

(17)

Effectsof

theCrisis inRural

Java

crisis that does not indicate anythingaboutbeingaffectedby thecrisis.Thepeoplefrom thehilly part had never beenableto get access togood healthcareand

education and yetadaptedmore

quietly.

d. The Role of the(Local) Government inFightingthe Crisis

Didthe local government

(villageheadsandvillageofficials) give goodnoticetothe crisis?

When Iasked government

employees duringthe crisis in 1998about whattheydidabout it, theyanswered: "Thecrisisis not

so severe inthevillagescompared tothesituationinthe cities.Pitiful

arethose who cannot eatinthe

cities. Forushere inthe villages thesituationisreasonable.Wecan stillpickleaves freely foradding

toourfood".Theyalsoreported

inthesewords about the situation inthe village to the regional

government officials. They believed themselvesto acertain

extentthat in their ownvillages notmanypeoplewereaffected. The neglectof the problemsin

their own villages has three

reasons:1)localvillageofficials

don't know muchabout poor peopleintheir ownvillages.They hardly ever meet them, and poverty in

Java

is relatively invisible.2)Theywereinfluenced

bydominant discourses inthe media andhigher government

echelons that depicted only the

severe situation inthecities. 3) Localvillage officialsingeneral

are more orientedto servethe higher levels of the government thantoservevillagers.Becauseof

this,theywere verybusywith carrying out government

programs andinstructions from above and therefore werenot capabletotacklespecificproblems

andneedsof villagers.The local villageofficials therefore didn'tdo much to enhance the living conditionsofthe localpoor.They neverproposednew ideas or programs, and thegovernment

programsthat wereemployedin fact more benefitedthe rural

middleclass,notthe poorestofthe

poor.

Duringthe crisis, Itseemed

thatthe localgovernmentdidnot pay muchattentiontothecrisis.

Theyjust carried onwith the

routinejobs asbeing partoftire

lowestbureaucracysystem in Indonesia.Infact,theywerebusy

indeedwiththeroutineprograms andinassistingthehigherlevel officials(kecamatan andkabupaten).

(18)

PanaeMadeKutanegara and Gerben Nootcboom

ofcourse, thelowest levelofficials were readytoservetheirhigher officials.But ittookmonthsbefore somethingwas done about the

impact of the crisis,whereas the

localgovernment didnottake any

initiatives. The crisis made painfullyclear that the local

government turnedout tobean

administrative unit instead of

havingagoverning function. Duringthe crisis, thevillageof

Sriharjoreceivedseveralformsof

aidtofighttheimpacts ofcrisis. Thishelpwasratherunorganised. Before the program from the

government came, thevillagehad already received help fromnon¬

government sources,like from religiousinstitutions,private sectorinitiatives,theRedCross of

Singapore,etc.This supportwas distributedonthe basisof three

differentsetsof data about the

needy.Sometimes data from the

village office were used, sometimes data from BKKBN

(family planning),and sometimes from theDepartmentof Social Welfare.Sometimesevenaregion wasselectedandonly villagers of onehamletgot all thehelpboth

letting poor andrich members

benefit.Poorpeople livingin a

richer regiondid notbenefit. Unclear and unreliabledatawere the mainreasonfor the many problemsrelatedtohelpprograms

inthe village.Butalso dormant

and hiddenconflicts,hierarchies

and competitions between

villagerscame painfullyto the

fore.People startedtobejealous toothersfromdifferenthamlets, from different classes and

especially within families and

neighbourhoods. Youngsters organised threedemonstrations in

villages and asked the local governmentabouttheinjusticeof the distributionsystem.Becauseof these demonstrations,the local governmentdecidedtodivide the helpequallyoverallfamilies,both poor and rich villagersgothelp.

Inthis way,help onlymeantfor

thepoor,wastransferredpartlyto

thericher echelons of society. Besidesdemonstrations the aid ledtosomefunnyexperiences.For instance,helpfrom Singapore

contained someluxury food like

creamer, spaghettisauce with spaghettiand somecannedfood. Thevillagers hadnever seenthat

foodandwereconfused.Like the

family of Pak Jeno, a poor

household.Theyreceivedonebox

offood,andtriedtocookitand

they mixed everything together,

but, in the end,neversucceeded

to eatthatfood.

Later,the governmentoffered cheap rice (sembako) _for _poor

villagers at RplO,000.00per 10

kg's. The village of Sriharjo

received 613packetsamonthand

(19)

Effectsof

the Crisis

in

Rural

Java

hillypart ofSriharjo.Thatwas a

goodidea,becauseinthat part

livedmostofthe poor households.

But,theheadofhamlet distributed thataidnotonly to thepoorer

households,but every household

gotashare ofit.Eventually,every household received around 7

kilogram a month. The local government legitimised their decisionby stating thattheywere afraidof conflicts inthevillage.

Asmallamount ofthe cheap

rice wasdistributedinlower part of Sriharjo. Sinceaccess to non-farmactivities inthatareaismore open, there arenotmanypoor households. During thecrisis however,most of them were affected.Nevertheless,they did

not receive aid from the government,as they were not registeredaspoor householdsin

the pre-crisissituation.

Inshort,inthebeginningof the crisis,programsweremoreabout

food(sembako)butlateron, also

other elementswereincluded,like

health, work and income

generatingactivities.Totalhelpto

Sriharjo, exceeded 200 million

Rupiah, for severalprograms. Sincethe village administration hadnever received so much

money before,oneoftheheadsof

thehamletssaid that hedidnot understand thatsomuch money wascominginto thevillageforhe

couldnotspent it.Hegotconfused

because he had not received

informationaboutaclearprogram with clearcriteria. Somevillagers expressed the feeling that the

government wasted a lot of

money,and misuse of fundsby lower government officials

becameindeedpossible.

3. The Crisis inKrajan, East

Java

a. Typicality of Krajan's

Economy

Thevillage of Krajanliesonthe

slopeof mountainArgopuroat a

distance of 20kilometres from Bondowosotown,East

Java.

The

village has alwaysbeen much moreisolatedthanSriharjo until recentlythevillageroadhas been

improved and irregular daily transporttoBondowosoorBesuki

isavailable.Nevertheless,Krajan

islocatedfar fromthebigurban

centresin

Java.

Thefirst

middle-sized city is

Jember

at a 60

kilometres distance and little villagers have ever been there.

Krajan has around 3400

inhabitantsofwhomthemajority is poor andengagesmainlyin

subsistence farming.AsKrajanis

situatedontheNorthEastof Java, thepopulationisfully Madurese.

The villagehas been founded before1850,longbeforethe main

(20)

PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerben Nooteboom

DesaKrajan liesatanaltitude

between 800and1,100meterand the terrain ishilly.Thered ladang

soils inthevillagearewashedout

and lessfertilethanmostofthose

inrural Java, butthey aremore fertilethanthelimestonesoilsof

higher Sriharjo.The few saioahs of Krajan however, are of much lowerqualitythan those of Miri, lowerSriharjo.Inthe longdry season,nocropscanbeplantedat

allasthe irrigationislimited.After the first rains,maize,rice,cassava andsomevegetablesareplanted.

These crops are mainly for subsistence purposes and are

hardly commercialised and monelarised.Aftertheharvest of

maize,as asecond (cash) crop, many farmers plant tobacco(for the domestic market). Duetothe shortage ofrain,thepoorsoils,tire limited use oftechnology, inputs

andknowledge,theproductionof cropsarerelativelylow inKrajan. Due to these less favourable agriculturalconditions,Krajanis

—

likeSriharjo

—

avillagewitha

lowagriculturalproductionbase.

Onlylower Sriharjo (Miri)has

fertilesawah,buteventhere, rice

productions are a bit lower becauseof problematicaccessto irrigation in the dry season. Therefore,bothvillagesdidnot

profit much from the positive effects ofthe crisisonagricultural production and export related crops.InKrajanonlyafew farmers

(less than one per cent) own enough landtosellrice or cornon themarket.AlthoughKrajanis

rich in cattle,mostfarmers who

soldcowsneededtheprofit dearly

tobuyrice,maize,or topayoff

debts.The onlyother important non-agriculture basedsource of incomeis the making of besek

(smallbamboo baskets). Incomes

outofthe besek, however,arelow anddecreasedduringthe crisis.

Contrary toSriharjo, migration rates arelow11 andtherefore,cash

inflows from outside are not significant. Added to the weak

production base of Krajan,isthe insecurity incrop output. The

harvestsindry land agriculture, are morefluctuatingthenthosein

irrigated agriculture.Farmers thereforeareusedto dealwith

fluctuationsinincome andfollow

risk avoiding and investment extensiveagriculturalstrategies. InKrajan, where irrigated plots are scarce,erratic rainfall,poor

soils andtobacco productionadd

tofluctuations in income. To a certainextent,peopleare usedto

these insecurities. But inKrajan this didnot

—

contrary to the

11_Less_than_5%_of_the_population_has_a_family_member_working_somewhere

(21)

Forgotten Villages? The

Effects of

the Crisis inRural

Java

expectation(Wolters12)

—

leadto collectivevillage-widearrange¬ ments to coverthe risks ofincome

fluctuation(Wolters, 1998).Oneof theconclusionsoftheresearch is that the insurance against these risks takesplace individually and

ofthe householdlevel. Insurance

againstincomefluctuationstakes

placebythe meansofsaving (in

gold, cows,and

—

to a certain

extent

—

social relations),by avoiding andspreadingrisks,by agricultural diversification (combiningdifferent crops andby thegrowingofsubsistence crops), andbyoccupationalpluralisms (the combination of different sourcesof income). Incontrastto Sriharjo,thepossessionofland as

production factors is very importantinKrajan, where land

has more and more a status function.Another differenceisthe rateof villagers havingaccess to land.LandownershipinKrajanis slightly less unequal than in

Sriharjo, but generally this conditionasunequalasanywhere inrural

Java

(Hart, et.al., 1989; Hefner, 1990;Husken, 1989). In

Krajanaround 75percentofthe

villagersatleasthavesomeaccess

to land,either by ownership,

shared tenancy arrangements or

by other forms of labour

arrangements.Theonlycashcrop, tobacco, is a main source of insecurity initself. Prices are

unstableandtheproductionneeds quitesomeinputs.In 1997many

farmers took loans from richer

villagers,thevillagehead, anda

cheap credit programsfor the tobaccoproduction. Usuallythis borrowingtakesplaceat ratesof

50per cent for 6 months, and

manywentbankrupt.13duetolow tobaccopricesand the lowquality

of itaffectedbythe prolonged

rains.Eventhrough,theprice of

tobaccohasbeenrisingduringthe crisis, the realpriceof tobacco declined.14 Profits declined while productioncostsrose.Thisprocess

in facttookalreadyplace several years beforethe crisis,but then accelerateddramaticallyleading many farmers tobankruptcy.A

significantnumber (50)of these bankrupt farmers fled to Kalimantaninthehopetofinding work andmoneytocover their

financialproblems.Others were

forcedtosell, pawn,or rentout cows orlandtocovertheirdebts. Most of the migrants to Kalimantan

—

also those who

were notdebt-driven

—

didnot

succeed andcameback poorer

12 _Personal_{communication.}_Compare_Plateau,_{(Plateau, 1991).}

13 _With_bankruptcy_I_mean_technically_bankrupt;_not_being_able_to_repay_debts. 14 _{The real}_{price declined}_from_ten_kilo_rice_equivalent_for_one_{kilo tobacco}_to

(22)

PandeMade Kutanegara and Gerben Nooteboom

thanwhentheyleft.Becauseofthe

crisis andrisingpricesof transport

some couldnever succeeded to comebackatall.

b. Effects cf the Crisisonthe

Villagersand their Responses

Accordingtothevillagers, life

hadneverbeeneasybefore. From

time totime,theyface insecurities

in access toincomeand food due

tolifecyclecrises,bad harvests, andfluctuatingincomes.Addedto

tliis,anumberofwiderregional, economicand nationalcriseshave hadanimpactinthevillage.From thebeginning of the 20thcentury onwards, the people of Krajan

have experienced six major economic crises.1)Thecrisisofthe

thirties with deflation and

stagnating ruralprices,15 2)the

Japanese occupation,3)the Dutch

Agressie, and the following revolutionary years, 4) the eruption ofmountAgunginBali

in 1963 in which ash rains

destroyedmostfood crops,5)the

turmoil and inflation aroundthe end of the Sukarno era, and eventually6)theeconomiccrisis of 1997.

Whereasbeforethe 1997crisis

thevillage economyof Krajanwas

foranimportantpart subsistence oriented, the monetary crisis

affectedonlypartsofthevillage economy.Thosepoor depending onmonetary isadjective never

verbal income sources were among thehardesthit, likewage

labourers,petty traders and part-time carpenters. The domain of

subsistenceproductionhowever,

stayedmainlyuntouched and

evenproliferated.16It'simportant forthe subsistence ofvillagersto

maintainthe domesticproduction

of maize,paddyand cassava,

which is consumed by the

household. This includes sub¬

sistenceproduction relations17as share cropping arrangements (withmostimportantbabunan18

takinga

1/5

shareofthe harvest inreturnfor the labouring),

15 _{See for}_instance_Van_der_Kolff_1936[?],_{who describes}_the_{impact of the}

recession inthe thirtiesatthevillagelevelinanearbyregion. The effects of the 1997crisisshowsomesimilaritieswith thecrisisoftire thirties.

16 _With_this_we_don't

want toargue thereissomethingas adual economyon

villagelevel(Boeke,_J.H.1953)On thecontrary,the cash oriented and the non-cashpartofthe societyarehighlyinterrelated.Mostvillagersmakea living by combiningthesetwoandonly bythis combinationareableto survive.

(23)

Effects

of

the Crisis inRural

Java

exchangelabour,rotatinglabour,

andlabour forhelpingout.Only three percentof the farmersown

enough landtosell foodcropson

the market.

Onthe locallevel,the national

crisis wasamonetary crisis. The

rising prices

—

inflation

—

were the talkofthe dayatthebeginning ofthe crisis. InKrajanthe crisis begantobefeltduringthemonth of Ramadhan (January 1998)19

whenvillagers started preparing forIdulFitri,theyearlyMuslim's Celebrationthe end of the fasting. Everyvillager experiencedthe higherthanusual20 prices ofrice,

cookingoil, flour,andclothes. After thesemonths,the prices continued to increase dra¬ matically. As often during a suddenriseof prices,villagers respondedbycuttingbackontheir consumption.Families,whoused todrink coffee,startedtodrink tea.Theones whodrankteadrunk sugarwater,and those who could

evennotaffordtobuysugar drank only plain water. Eggs and

noodles, which were common

foodbeforediecrisis,hadbeencut

hornnearlyallmenusexcept from

dinnersatweddingsandfunerals.

Andkue, cookies and snacks,

essentialfor selamatan and for maintainingsocialrelations,were

lesssweet,andlessabundant than

in the past. Newclotheswere hardly bought. At the second

researchperiod (May

—

August

1999),for somefamilies the lack

ofmoney fornewclothes started tobecomerealproblematic.

Oneoldmansaid:"Sekarang makanan sama dengan jaman

Belanda. Kita makan nasijagung denganikankeringlagi.53 Tahun

merdeka,tapi tidak ada hasilsama

sekali". (Atthemoment weeat

similartowhatwedidduringthe Dutch periodagain.

Just

rice

mixedwithmaizeand dried fish.

53years of freedom didn't bring usany advantageatall).

These effectsandresponseson

thecrisismightseem subtle,butit meansalotinKrajanif youcannot offer coffee to your guests

anymoreorexchange therequired snacks and cookies.21 The crisis meant not only a drop in

consumptionbutwasperceivedas

adropinstatus aswell. Further¬

more,only heavysmokers can

understandwhat itmeanstohave toshiftfrom_GudangGaram,the

19 _Five_{months after the first devaluation of the}

RupiahinJuly1997.

20 _{Every year} _at _X-mas_and _at _the_{end of the Ramadhan, the prices of}

consumptiongoodsarerising.

21 _Usually_{the number of cookies could be}_met,_{but the}_quality_{(used quantity}

(24)

Pande Made Kutancgara andGerbenNooteboom good quality filter cigarettes,to

cheapalternatives.22

Theeffects of andresponsesto

the crisis by agricultural producersinKrajanarediverse. Somefarmersreactedtoavoiding

risk,otherswentbankruptand all

of them were facing risingcosts

andloweryields. Nevertheless,

somefarmers were stillable to make goodprofitsand some even

benefited by the crisis. It is

importanttodistinguishbetween

effects of the crisis andmore

generalclimatic effectslikeElNino

(drought) whichhadeffectsonthe food production aridlateronLa Nina (extensiverains)whichwere

disaslrousfortobaccoproduction. Effectsofthese climaticchangesin

agriculture hadbeenexplicitly mentioned.

Thedifferential responsesand effectsonthe1997crisis werebeen partly due the specific compositionwere of thefarming activitiesand due to theunique characteristics of farm labour

processes itself: "containinga complexwhole of interlinking

tasks,eachwithits owndegree of flexibility and particular procedure[...] Decisionsthatare crucial for theend resultcanbe made only during the labor

process itself.Thereinliesthe

craftsmanship of farmlabor:the

interaction between direct producerand laborobject;i.e.the

continual observation, inter¬

pretationandevaluationofone's ownlabor in ordertobeableto

re-adaptit"(Ploeg,1990).

In the tobacco season, followingthebeginning of the crisis the area planted with

tobaccoinKrajan declinedfifty percentandmostfarmers shifted

fromthisrisky cropto thesafer subsistence crop ofmaize. Most

farmersworriedsaidandthatthey would not make muchprofit because ofthe risingcostsand preferredtoplantcorn,rice or cassava "karenaperutharuskenyang

dulu" (because wehavetofillour stomachsfirst). Duetothe rising

prices offood andlabour, many of richer farmers (who are in

control of60percentofthe land

area)were reluctanttouse any paid labour, or even huge numbers of unpaid labourers.

These labourers still needed

considerable amounts of food, coffee, and cigarettes towork.

Some farmers, who wereusedto grow tobacco on a largescale,

speculatedonliigher pricesand

borrowed money to produce tobacco intiresameway asthey wereusedtodo(byusing wage

22 _Bythe_way,nobody_quit_smoking_{becauseof the}_crisis._According_to_villagers,

(25)

Effects

of

the Crisis inRural

Java

labour andmanyexternalinputs).

But,mostofthesewentbankrupt andonlysome wereabletomake

someprofits,byshiftingquickly

toformofnon-paidlabourduring thegrowingseason.Only farmers,

whowereabletomobiliseunpaid labour,23hadothersourcesofcash income, or were successfulin tobacco trading, succeeded in

makingprofit with tobaccointhe

summer of 1998.For smaller numbersof farmers (30

—

40 per cent of total population), who couldnotmobilisemuchlabour

force,onlytheamountofseedlings

ahouseholdwithcloseneighbours or friends could master was planted(with a maximumof

1/

3

—

Vihectare ladang).They were

abletomakesomeprofitbecause

oftheir access tolabour andthe use of non-commodity labour

arrangementsfortheproduction ofcommodities(seePloeg,1990). However,this profitwas

—

in

relative terms

—

lower thanin

previous years and seldom enoughtomakeall ends meet. Addedtothis,the pricesof inputs

like fertiliser, seedlings and pesticides24rose.Theimpact ofthe risingprices ofagriculturalinputs

inKrajanwasmuchsmaller than

inSriharjo becauseof theminor

roleof inputs initsagriculture. In1999,whenfor thesecond time afterthe start of the crisis

tobacco wasplanted, little had changed.Fewvillagers decidedto plant cashcrops because they wereafraidtoborrow moneyand ifthey planted,themtheydidthis

withaminimumof inputsleading

toabad harvest.Theheavyand

earlyrainsatthebeginningofthe season,andthetotal lackof rain

atthe endaddedtothe problems. Onlyafew richer farmers who plantedcashcrops gothighprofits because prices of tobacco had increasedsteeply.

Generally, during thecrisis,

makinga cashprofitinKrajan agriculturewasonlypossiblewith theuseof non-cash labour and non-commodityresources.The

economiccrisis inKrajan,thus led to ageneralwithdrawal from the market, risk avoiding in agricultureactivities andtrading, andtothecash-shortagesinthe

village.

c. Effects ofthe CrisisonRural Labour

Asthe majorityofthe Krajan population doesnot ownany

23 _These_are_usually_{patrons who}_before_the_crisis_{already had}_a_considerable number of clients tiedtothem.Orvillagerswhowerepart of rotatinglabour

groupsorexchangelabour arrangements.

(26)

PandeMadeKutanegaraandGerben Nooteboom

land,25 thesepeoplearedepended

onwage labour astheir main sourceofincome. Asitdescribed previously,inKrajan both wage

labour andnon-commodityforms of labour are importantto get

access to land. After thecrisis brokeout, the need for wage

labourers had decreased more

than 60percentandfor free (non-tied) wage labourers, the possibilitiesoffindingpaidwork

nearlydiminishedtozero.Onthe

other hand,forms of co-operative

work,aslocal forms ofgotong

royong,exchangelabour,rotating

work groups andhelping-out labours increased inimportance. Thevillage economy shiftedfrom semi-subsistence to a highly subsistenceeconomyagainexcept for thosehavingaccessto the outsideeconomy.

It isimportanttorealise that ruralpeoplemake combinations of different types of work

(occupational pluralism)andin

thatwayoften areabletosurvive crises.Onlyfew Krajanfamilies

weresolely dependedonwage

labour.Villagerscombinedwage labour (whenever possible)

exchange labour arrangements

andhandicraftproduction at

home. As with the embroidery makersinSriharjo, manywomen

inKrajanplayedacrucial role for the households survival by earningmoneyathome.InKrajan, women make sellbesek,small

bamboo baskets, andbringthem

regionally to Bondowoso and

Jember

as containers for the production of tape (sweet fermentedsnack of cassava).In

somehamlets before the crisis, 30

—

40percentofallwomenwere

periodicallyengagedinthese besek

productions.Women usually makethemincidentallytocover short periods of cash or food shortages,inslackperiods during

theagricultural cycleorwhen the prices ofbesek arehigh.When the

crisisbrokeout,nearlyallpoorer villagers madebesek the whole year round. It increased popularitybecauseitwastheonly work available, it iseasy and

cheap tomake,the bamboois locallyavailable,ityieldscashand

itofferstheopportunitycfsmall

loansorcash advancementsby traders.Butmoreimportanteven,

25 _{Idefine landless}_as_those_{with little}_{or no}_{land. As}_nearly_all_villagers_have

userightsofsomeland(thelandwhere thehouseisstandingonandagarden oradjacent plot)Iuseasdefinitions oflandless those categories whose domesticproductiondoesnotexceedmorethantwomonthsof food (paddy,

maizeorcassava)orwho donotshareahousehold with those who have

access.LandlessnessinKrajanmeans on anaverage,those families owning

(27)

Effectsof

the Crisis inRural

Java

the workcanbe doneathomeby the wholefamily,incombination

withother householdactivities

such as cooking, fire wood collection,dryingrice or maize,

childcare andthe like. Increased household productionof besek enabledvillagerstobuyriceand

maize and prevented many villagers fromstarvation.The availability of non-agricultural sourcesof incomewasmuchmore

important then theaidprograms ofthegovernment incoping with thecrisis. However, asdemands for tape declined andsupply increased,prices stayedconstant andincontextofhugeinflation relatively declined. Before the

crisis in 1997,aday workof one

personmakingbesek wasenough

to buy 1.5—1 kg of rice of reasonablequality,ayear later, only theequivalent of 0.5toless than1kg of lowqualityrice or maizecould be earned.Asbefore thecrisis,thesupplyofbesekwas

dependingonthe price,nowthe supplybecame inflexibleand

villagers continuedtoproduceit evenunder diminishingreturns becausethey hadnochoice.

Asasideeffect ofthe crisisand theavailabilityofhandicrafts,we

foundindications that labour divisions between man and

womenhad changed.Women in

poorer households are tra¬

ditionallystronginthesubsistence part of the household, then

becameresponsiblefor asteady cash flow by selling besekaswell. They were infact muchmore

successful than men in guaranteeingsubsistenceand in

copingwith the crisis,therefore gained a stronger and more

independent position within the householdand

—

insome cases

—

insociety.

ContrarytoSriharjo,migration

inKrajanisnotmassive.Beforethe

crisis,fivetotenpercentof the householdshadafamilymember engaged in some kind of

migration.Contrarytothe general picture of

Java

where rural villagers migrate to cities,26

migrationoutofKrajanismostly rural-rural.Someofthesevillagers weresearchingfor work inthe regionofBondowoso,Besukiand Madura. Otherswent toBalito workasstreetpeddlers andsome young women, recruited by

outsiders,went toMalaysia.Only someofthese migrantshavebeen successful and many of them

26 _In_Krajan_no

migrationtothebigcitiesof_Java(Surabaya,Semarang,Jakarta) tookplace.ButevenDenpasar,Kuta,Jember andMalangdidnot attract

villagers. Maybe becauseof therelative isolation ofKrajan,orbecause of

languageproblemsorsimplybecausenobodyevertriedand had returned

(28)

PandeMadeKutancgaraandGerben Nooteboom

returned without anyprofit.The

majorityof theKrajan migrants

however,followed campaigns of Dcpnaker (department oflabour)

whichlured workers for theoil

palmplantationsinKalimantan. When the crisisbrokeout, not many of thesemigrantsreturned

toKrajan.Onlysomewomenwho worked inMalaysiareturned, somehad beensuccessful, others

not.27Thosewho usedtogotoBali decided to stay at home after

receivingnewsthat business in Baliwasslack. Many villagersin Kalimantan didn'twishtocome back,or were trapped because they couldnotpaytheboat trip anymore. Onlyin1999,when GN

returnedfor the second time in

Krajan, many former wage labourers had found work in the

forests of Banyuwangiandearned reasonable incomes that they broughthometobuyrice.These

groups ofpoorwereamong the firsttorecoverandturnedout to falldownbelow thepovertyline onlytemporary.

d. Effects of the Crisison

Poverty

Like inSriharjo, those who

haveno access tolandexperience

difficultiesinliving,butnotall of

them areautomaticallypoor.Only

thosewho alsohaveno access to

other sources of income are. Categoriesas widows, widowers,

widows/widowers

without children or with very small children, old people without

childrenand the handicapped usually makeup thepoor,ifthey

are notcaredforbymoreaffluent

relatives or village members.

Therefore,social exclusion and isolation are important in understandingthe realhardsides

of poverty.Relationswith other peoplearecrucial and make the differencebetweentheneedyand caredfor.Thepooreryouare, the

moredifficult tomaintainsocial

relationslike the example of bu

Sahamishows:

BuSahamilivesin asmall bamboo shed witharoof of alangalanggrass. Shehasone bedonwhichshesitsallday longmakingbesek.Withthat,

sheearnsjust enoughtobuy

maizeandriceandsome¬

timessomesalt.Shenever goesto selamatan,because

shecannotaffordtogivetwo kilo's ofrice.Shetherefore,

hashardlynocontacts,never

gets visitors,and theheadof

27 _One_{of the}_women_was_able

tobringalot of ringgit.Twoothers had earned

(29)

Forgotten Villages? The

Effects

of

the Crisis inRural

Java

the hamlet doesnoteven know her.

Sheneverbuysoncredit,be¬ cause "then the money wouldnotbe enough for food"asbuyingoncreditis moreexpensive. "Atfirst,

when

the cheaprice came (sembako)Ididnotknowit. I onlystartedtotakepartsince

thelastfewmonths".

Shealso cares for hergrand¬ daughter offive yearsold. Besidesthat girl, she hasno

relativesinthevillage and neighboursdonotcareabout her. Herchildren leftafew

years ago for Kalimantan andbuSahaminever gotany

news of them. Her main

worryisherslant house of whichsheisafraid will col¬

lapse one night and fall downonherandhergrand¬ daughter.

Poor familiesrespondedonthe

crisis inseveral ways.Evenmore

thaninthepastnon-cashbenefits

werepreferred abovecash ones.

One farmer engaged in

sharecroppingtold GN: "Saya

tidak mauuang tapiberas,karena rupiah sekarangtidak somadengan

dulu.Rupiah sekarang kurangkuat, tidak kuat untuk beliberas". (Idon't

wantmoneybutrice [formywork, GN]becausetheRupiahisnotlike itusedtobe.TheRupiahis not strongtobuyriceanymore).

Verypoorvillagerscouldnot do much than cut their coat

accordingtotheircloth.They only

onceortwiceaday,mixed their

ricewithbigger shares ofmaize. Muchdependedonwhere they

got their income from.The far

mostpoor,peoplelikebuSahami reallyexperienced the painof

inflationwhile shereallyowns

nothingand thereforetotallycash depended. Those categoriesare

notthemostsubsistenceinsociety, asthey areoftenexcludedand

isolatedfromanyaccesstolocal

resources. Others, widows,who

forinstance areallowedtoclean the fields from leftovers after harvesting(aclearexampleof a

socialsecurityarrangement) could lessenthepainto some extentand did not experience major differencesasthey couldnotfall any furtherlivingforyearsatthe edgeofstarvation.

But, weretherelocal arrange¬ mentsandinitiativewhocaredfor

the localpoor? Hefner writes

about moralconsiderations in caringfor weaker membersof

society:"The socialorientation

emphasizes neither selfless

collectivism nor self-possessed individualism.Ideallyhouseholds

guarantee itsownsubsistenceand welfare".And about the moral villageeconomy:"Its norms are

(30)

PandeMadeKutancgaraandGerbenNooteboom andexchange[.

.

.]It'seffectislife¬

style conformity not selfless sharing"(Hefner 1990).Isharethe

opinion of Hefner. A major conclusionisthatnotmuchofa village-wide social safety net existed. Therule isthatvillagers

take care of their own social security.

Incontrasttopoor villagers,

richer villagers hadnot much

difficultyindoingthis,asmanyof

them evenbenefited from the crisis orwereabletoconsolidate their way ofliving.Amongthose

whoweredoingwellduring the

crisiswerebiglandownersableto sellrice or corn (lessthan 5 per centofthe total population) and

tradersofcattle,chicken,birdsand tobacco.These richer villagers however werehitmorebyclimatic irregularitiesandsubsequentcrop failurethanbythe crisisitself.A major effectof the crisismight have been that inequalities

betweenthe richand thepoor will increase again. This time

—

in

contrast tothe greenRevolution

—

notbythe increaseofincomeby richer members of society,but by

the fallbackofincomebythepoor

resources.

e. The Role of the Local GovernmentDuringthe Crisis

Thebeginningofthecrisiscan be characterised byageneral lack

ofpolicies,bothon anationaland regional level. The regional government that deals with

village affairsisthe kecamatanlevel (district) and the kabupaten (regency) level. Officialsatthose

levelshavealwaysonlybeenused

to carry out programs of the nationalgovernment,butwere not very adapted to react on the

differentialneeds of the local people.At thebeginningof the crisis, bothnationalandregional governments continued their normalresponsesupuntillvillage levels.Itseemed thatthenational

governmenthadnosolutions at hand and the regional ones

continued to carry out the ordinary programsandwerebusy with visitstovillages presenting

their usual stories about development, mutual help and

Pancasila,the five pillars of the NewOrder society.Anexample ofthe visitofthe Bupati(headof regencyBondowoso)toKrajan:

Once,duringthe ramadhanof January 1998 the Bupati

cametoKrajan.Heopened

the dinnerinthehouseof the

villagekiai(religiousleader)

andprayed with the village

peopleindie mosque. Inhis

speech,hefocusedonthere¬ sponsibility ofvillagers to makeabetterliving,toobey

Godand the government

andtokeepsilent and har¬

(31)

Forgotten Villages? him,the bestthingtodo in

thistimeof economicimpair was tobeactivein gotong

royong,followingthe govern¬

ment developmental

projects, thetillage of el¬

ephantsgrass andkoptrakyat

(peoplescoffee),usingmod¬ erninputsas fertiliser, new varietiesofrice,maize and tobacco. He larded his

speech with humour and

populistreferencesto reli¬ gion and norms to

strengthen hisargument. Unfortunately,mostvillag¬ ersdidnotunderstand him, ashespoke highclass Indo¬

nesianandnotMadurese.

Whenthecrisishadcontinued,

governmental officials startedto

visit the villagesmoreoften.At first, somefunds for small local projects as alphabetising programs,PKK,and reforestation increased.Thanthefunds forthese projects dried up andwerenot renewed. The other normal developmentprogramsonvillage levelskeptrunning. AsKrajanis

an IDT-village (inpres desa tertinggal (literary abackward village)) thevillageisentitledto specialdevelopmentalprojects. This hasimplicationsfordie funds available for the village cooperative (KUD), the IDT

projectsasroadbuilding,poverty

alleviation,etc. and for cheap credit (KUT)programs.These

The

Effectsof

the Crisis inRural

Java

programsjustkeptonrunningas theywerebeforeexcept that the IDTprogramswereterminated.

OnlyataroundApril1998the first special programs started to helpthe poorwho were noaid longerabletobuyfoodstuffs. The

government, army and private donors(Muslims,Christians and Chinese) startedtosupplybasic needsasrice,cooking oil and salt totheruralpoor. These

—

often

spontaneous

—

aid campaigns, locally simplycalledsembako,can be characterised by a lot of showingoff,little organisation, and alack of reliable old

(pre-crisis)data.Thedecisionofwhom

wasentitledtohelpwasdecided by the village leader andhis officials, butnotbasedondear

criteria.OftenIwitnessed that the mostneedy didnot getwhile others close to village offirials

wereabletosecure one ormore thanonepackage.Moreremote hamlets of Krajan oftengotless helpthanthosenearby.Thiswhole campaignofspontaneoussembako aidwas moresymbolicalthan reallyeffective. Krajanreceived

fivetimesaround150packages, while theneedymadeup much more.Moresignificant sembako helpwasgiven later(startingin

(32)

PondsMadeKntanegaraand Gerben Nootcboom caseof Krajan,thismeantthat 12

tonsservedapopulationof3,400

villagers.Thisnotonlydecreased the ricepricesinthevillagebut led adozen smallwaningtotheedge ofbankruptcyasthese smallshop owners were dependent onthe

selling ofrice.Theamountofrice was sohuge(3.5kg per head of thepopulation permonth),thatit

was sometimes hard to find

enough buyersfor tire rice.The villageheadand later hissecretary

were selling some of the rice illegallybackto townformarket

prices. Nevertheless what went wrong,for thosepoor whowere

shocked by the sudden fall of purchasepowerwerevery helped byit.Many poor villagerswere preventedfor starvation inthis way.Unfortunately, the utmost poor had no access to this

program.EvenRp10,000.00was toomuchforthemaspoorpeople haveno access to incomeand

credit.Onlyaftersometimethey wereofferedloans fromthemain

shopowner ofthe village

-

the mother ofthevillage head

-

who

asked 60percentof thereceived

riceinreturnwhatshe soldwith

profitinher shop. The village

middle class were mainly profiting from this program including that quitesomeofthis rice disappeared in the dis¬ tributingprocess.Inneighbouring villages, theamountofrice was

alwaysfivetilltenpercentlower than promised. Government officersat the districtlevelsold thisricepercent"tocoverthecosts oftheextrawork"astheyjustified

it. Aswithmostothervillage aid projects, lower government employeesbenefitedfromthis aid

programs. The cheap credit

prog