Index
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B. and Renner, E., The moonlighting game. An
experi-mental study on reciprocity and retribution 265
Amaldoss, W.,seeRapoport, A. 483
ArrunÄada, B.,seeGonzaÂlez-DõÂaz, M. 167
Basu, K., Bell, C. and Bose, P., Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic
interaction 445
Beetsma, R., Peters, H. and Rebers, E., When to ®re bad managers: the role of
collusion between management and board of directors 427
Bell, C.,seeBasu, K. 445
Berck, P. and Lipow, J., Managerial reputation and the `endgame' 253 Bolle, F., Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence? Remarks
on Bester and Guth 131
Bolle, F.,seeKritikos, A.S. 137
Bose, P.,seeBasu, K. 445
Charness, G., Bargaining ef®ciency and screening: an experimental
investiga-tion 285
Charness, G., Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market 375 Clark, D.J. and Riis, C., Allocation ef®ciency in a competitive bribery game 109 Dayton-Johnson, J., Choosing rules to govern the commons: a model with
evidence from Mexico 19
Deephouse, D.L. and Wiseman, R.M., Comparing alternative explanations for
accounting risk-return relations 463
DõÂez, J.S.,see GosaÂlbez, M.P. 385
Durham, Y., An experimental examination of double marginalization and vertical
relationships 207
FernaÂndez, A., seeGonzaÂlez-DõÂaz, M. 167
GonzaÂlez-DõÂaz, M., ArrunÄada, B. and FernaÂndez, A., Causes of subcontracting:
evidence from panel data on construction ®rms 167
GosaÂlbez, M.P. and DõÂez, J.S., Disclosing own subsidies in cooperative research
projects 385
Hausken, K., Cooperation and between-group competition 417 Heckelman, J.C., Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US
Senate 97
Holt, G., A comment on indentured servitude: in response to Kritikos and Bolle Ð
February 15th, 1998 135
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation Vol. 42 (2000) 561±562
Irlenbusch, B.,see Abbink, K. 265 Kritikos, A.S. and Bolle, F., Indenture: a viable contract for a sequential one-shot
Prisoners' Dilemma. A reply to Holt 137
Kwasnica, A.M., The choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions 323
Lipow, J.,seeBerck, P. 253
Liu, P.-W. and Yang, X., The theory of irrelevance of the size of the ®rm 145 McKelvey, R.D., Palfrey, T.R. and Weber, R.A., The effects of payoff magnitude
and heterogeneity on behavior in 22 games with unique mixed strategy
equilibria 523
Nyborg, K., Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: interpretation and
aggrega-tion of environmental values 305
Palfrey, T.R.,seeMcKelvey, R.D. 523
Peters, H.,seeBeetsma, R. 427
Phillips, H.E., Toward Finance With Meaning, The Methodology of Finance: What it is and What it Can Be(JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1996), pp.
xx+260, $76 George M. Frankfurter and Elton G. McGoun, 279 Possajennikov, A., On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful
pre-ferences 125
Rapoport, A. and Amaldoss, W., Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of
knowledge 483
Rebers, E.,seeBeetsma, R. 427
Renner, E.,seeAbbink, K. 265
Riis, C.,see Clark, D.J. 109
Santos, V., Alternating-announcements cheap talk 405
Saussier, S., Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of
EÂlectricite de France 189
Spurr, S.J., The role of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution in litigation 75 Villalonga, B., Privatization and ef®ciency: differentiating ownership effects from
political, organizational, and dynamic effects 43
Visser, B., Organizational communication structure and performance 231 Vogt, C., The evolution of cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma with an endogenous
learning mutant 347
Volckart, O., The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking,
and the rise of the modern state 1
Weber, R.A.,seeMcKelvey, R.D. 523
Wiseman, R.M., seeDeephouse, D.L. 463
Yang, X.,seeLiu, P.-W. 145
Yotopoulos, P.A., New Theories in Growth and Development. Fabrizio Coricelli, Massimo di Mateo, and Frank Hahn, Macmillan and St. Martin's, London and
New York, 1998 141
Zhu, T., Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition 549
