Report on Asian Development Bank
Yuxin A. Zhang
Historical Background & Missions Overview
In 1963, at a trade conference hosted by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Thai banker Paul Sithi-Amnuai proposed a concept for
regional Asian banks to develop trade and foster economic growth in the region. A
resolution was soon passed at the first ministerial conference on Asian economic
cooperation. Three years later, the Asia Development Bank (ADB) was founded, with a
goal of facilitating postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as economic
development in Asia. Manila, the Filipino capital, was chosen to host this new Asian
institution. Soon after, ADB established three representative offices in Tokyo, Frankfurt,
and Washington, D.C., and twenty-eight resident mission offices worldwide.
ADB’s goal is to help developing member countries (DMCs) in the Asia and Pacific region
alleviate poverty and ensure economic growth. According to the bank, the region remains
home to approximately 1.7 billion poor people—two-thirds of the world’s impoverished
population.1 ADB plans to achieve this goal of poverty reduction by providing loans,
grants, policy dialogue, technical assistance, and equity investments to the requisite nations.
ADB has made widespread investments in infrastructure, health care services, and financial
and public administration systems.2 Currently, its core strategy is environmental
sustainability, as it believes that environmental damage and resource depletion are
impeding development and reducing the quality of life in the region.
ADB doesn’t work independently to carry out its missions. It cooperates with member-state
governments, international development agencies, multilateral institutions, private sectors,
nongovernment organizations, civil societies, and other financial institutions—including the
non-regional World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) on project
implementation. Through partnerships, ADB shares knowledge, resources (financial,
human, and other), risks, responsibilities, competencies, and benefits to achieve a common
1
Poverty is defined in the context as living on less than $2 a day with denial of accessibility to essential goods, services, assets, and opportunities to which every human is entitled.
2
purpose or task. Partnerships are central to planning, financing, and implementing ADB
operations.3
The bank admits the 53 regional members of the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, then as the ECAFE), 9 associate
members, and non-regional developed nations like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.4 Today, ADB has 67 members in total—48 are from the Asia-Pacific
region and 19 are non-regional.
Management and Structure
Under the leadership of President Takehiko Nakao, ADB has a management team
comprising six Vice-Presidents and one Managing Director General. The six
vice-presidents execute different responsibilities in the interest of their individual departments.
They usually supervise more than one department or office within the bank. The Managing
Director General supervises ADB’s operational, administrative, and knowledge
departments.5
The top managerial position, ADB’s President, has always been selected from Japanese
nationals and Japan has enjoyed a dominant position at the institution from the start. ADB
is the first international institution that has been created and led by the Japanese. Japan is
also a major financial donor to ADB. According to the annual report for 2013, Japan holds
the largest portion of shares at 15.67%, while the United States holds 15.56% and China
holds 6.47%. There has been a debate about the Japanese government influencing ADB’s
development. Historic records reveal that ADB’s past presidents have either been Japan’s
Minister of Finance or Vice-Minister of Finance. A research fellow at Harvard’s Center for
International Affairs argues that the close connection between the ADB and the Japanese
Ministry of Finance has not only allowed Japanese officials to influence bank policies from
behind the scenes, but also allowed them to identify with the ADB.6 This remains a crucial
3
Retrieved March 17, 2015 from http://www.adb.org/about/partners
4
See appendix for UNESCAP member states and associate member states.
5
See appendix for management team.
6
issue to be discussed and addressed, as government’s influence could impact ADB’s
efficiency and mission fulfillment.
Apart from the management team, ADB has 12 Board of Directors, who are elected by the
Board of Governors. The Board of Governors consists of one governor and one alternate
governor from each member state. ADB-member countries from within the Asia-Pacific
region elect 8 Board of Director members, while member countries from outside the region
elect the remaining 4. Each Director appoints an Alternate. The President of ADB chairs the
Board of Directors.
The Board of Directors performs their duties at the ADB headquarters in Manila, holding
formal and executive sessions regularly.7 The Board is responsible for the overall direction
of ADB, including approval of policies, loans, grants, equity investments, and guarantees.
The Board supervises and analyzes ADB’s financial statements, budget and borrowing
program, budget framework, and the salaries and benefits of staff. The board approves the
ADB budget and submits the accounts for each financial year to the Board of Governors at
each annual meeting for their approval. They also visit developing countries to observe
ADB operations. The Board maintains close contact with government officials, other
development stakeholders, and people who benefit from projects funded by ADB.8
The voting process of the Board of Directors is modeled on the World Bank, where votes
are distributed in proportion with members’ capital subscriptions. If any Director requests a
formal vote on any matter before the Board, the vote is taken in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 33 of the Agreement. In the absence of any such
request, the Chairman may ascertain and announce the agenda of the meeting with regard to
any matter. The Board shall be deemed to have acted in accordance with the announcement
by the Chairman without the necessity of undergoing a formal vote. A Director dissenting
7
Retrieved March 18, 2015 from http://www.adb.org/about/board-directors
8Board of Directors’ 2013 Annual Report.
from the decision of the Board requires that his views be recorded in the minutes of the
meeting.9
Current Projects and Programs
Asia Development Fund
The ADB developed the Asian Development Fund (ADF) to fulfill the organization’s
overall mission. ADF serves as a major instrument for concessional financing that has
supported equitable and sustainable development in the region since 1973. Funded by
ADB-member countries, ADF offers loans at low interest rates. It also offers grants with the
ultimate goal of reducing poverty.10 Since 1973, ADF has provided more than $50 billion
for projects and programs that focus on poverty alleviation. Most recently from 2010 to
2013, ADF implemented various projects as follows:
• Built or upgraded educational facilities for the benefit of over 17 million students.
Trained over 700,000 teachers with quality or competency standards. More than 20
million students were educated and trained under improved quality assurance systems;
• Built or upgraded 31,000 km of roads, which saw over 11 million vehicle-km of daily
use on average in the first full year of operation;
• Provided over 2 million households with access to clean water by installing or
rehabilitating 16,000 km of water supply pipes, and upgraded sanitation in 291,000
households. Over 2 million hectares of land have been improved as a result of irrigation,
drainage, and flood management initiatives;
• Installed 230 megawatts of new generating capacity, and built or upgraded 18,300
kilometers (km) of transmission and distribution lines;
• Reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 600,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per
year by promoting more efficient and cleaner energy operations.11
In 2013-2014, over 100 loan and grant projects totaling $6.9 billion were processed for
ADB developing member countries to assist them in similar development projects.12 The
9
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. 10
Retrieved March 20, 2015 from http://www.adb.org/site/adf/overview
11
ADF-funded projects are usually aimed at establishing infrastructure and improving living
environment in ADB member states. This aligns closely with the organization’s overall
mission and goals. Ever since the ADF was funded in 1973, the organization has focused on
investments related to the goal of reducing poverty in the region. ADF’s policy focus has
shifted from postwar rehabilitation to economic growth over time while continuing to focus
on regional development.
Strategy 2020
ADB continues to work on a cardinal project, Strategy 2020, to alleviate poverty. This was
initiated in 2008 and set a long-term framework for development in the post-millennium
period. The project reaffirms ADB’s goal of improving living conditions for the DMCs in
the Asia-Pacific region. To achieve this goal, Strategy 2020 proposes three agendas for
complementary development:
• Inclusive economic growth
• Environmentally sustainable growth
• Regional integration
This project mirrors ADB’s policy focus and is consistent with Asia’s evolution. By 2020,
the Asia and Pacific region has the potential to move to a higher level of economic
development.
As growth rapidly continues, it may become increasingly difficult to reach those who
remain excluded from its benefits. Disparities could widen between the DMCs. This trend
and the mounting environmental costs could begin to threaten sustainability of their
development. The Midterm Review of Strategy 2020 indicates that Strategy 2020 would
address these issues by:
• Strengthening regional connectivity and fostering trade and commercial
opportunities between economic hubs;
12
• Improving business environment in DMCs to facilitate private investment;
• Strengthening governance systems and institutional capacities to support effective,
timely, and corruption-free delivery of public services in conflict-affected DMCs;
• Expanding the overall operational scale
• Increasing investments in education and vocational training to help DMCs increase
productivity, employability, and innovation.13
By addressing these issues as part of its 2020 strategy, ADB is looking to foster greater
economic relationships and reduce disparities between DMC’s for the growth and
development of the region.
The white paper addresses another concern—the environment. ADB’s current core strategy
focuses on environmental sustainability, as it believes that environmental degradation and
resource depletion are jeopardizing development and reducing the quality of life. ADB has
spent 11 times more from 2008 to 2012 on financing for clean and renewable efficiency
projects and 6 times for energy efficiency and conservation operations. The share of
financing for environment-friendly urban transport increased to 10% of the total transport
financing from 2008 to 2012. ADB also increased its financing for water, sanitation, and
waste management interventions by approximately 70% in the same period.14 In 2012
alone, ADB financed over US$3.3 billion for climate change and lent US$ 6.2 billion for
other projects related to environmentally sustainable growth.15 ADB has been very
supportive of environment-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), specifically
those related to improvement of drinking water supply and reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions. But ADB lacks efficiency in improving accessibility to proper sanitation.
Research indicated that by the end of 2012, ADB-assisted sanitation reached only 51% of
the new households targeted between 2009 and 2012.16
13Midterm Review Strategy 2020: Meeting the Challenges of a Transforming Asia and Pacific. 14
Id. 15
Id.
16Strategy 2020: Working for an Asia and Pacific Free of Poverty.
Though founded in 1966 and nearly 50 years old, ADB has been flexible on its policy
focus—adapting to environmental changes and challenges while remaining steadfast in its
commitment to poverty alleviation and economic growth. Its projects are closely aligned
with its missions and goals. ADB’s efficiency and program effectiveness is also visible
through its responsiveness and risk management ability to certain events, for instance, the
response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Response to 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The bank considers an underlying structural problem as a cause of the Asian financial
crisis. This was exemplified by the widening account deficits in Malaysia and Thailand
during 1997-98. ADB also identified another cause for the crisis—the vulnerability that
resulted from high interest rates, pegged exchange rates, and a false sense of investment
security. Lastly, ADB also suggested that family owned and management businesses with a
lack of proper bankruptcy laws may have led to the financial crisis.
ADB responded very quickly to the Asian Financial Crisis by promoting structural reforms
with the immediate objective to improve financial systems and corporate governance, and
to orient Asian governments towards the long-term objective of successful integration of all
its member countries into the global capitalist economy. The bank also sought to strengthen
the international financial architecture. It supported the promotion of international standards
of financial regulation and supervision, as advocated by the G22 and IMF. It expressed a
preference for flexible exchange rates and suggested the implementation of regional
institutions, like the Asian Monetary Fund, as part of the newly emerging financial
architecture. This was meant to enhance the efficiency of global financial markets and
minimize their systematic risks.17 To sum up, ADB responded to the crisis by promoting
certain reforms:
• Negotiating minimum international standards of financial practice;
• Introducing prudent regulation of capital accounts;
17
• Reforming exchange rate regimes;
• Creating the framework for an orderly restructuring of problem debt; and
• Encouraging private sector credit lines.
In addition to structural reforms, ADB actively promoted freer regional and inter-regional
trade, as a response policy with the objective of heightening competitiveness and increasing
labor productivity in the region. ADB urged DMCs to create a more flexible labor force,
turning human beings into human resources by effectively utilizing them for economic
recovery. The bank also urged them to pursue trade, investment and internal reform to
transform the forces and relations of production in its pursuit. ADB’s intellectual output has
been conditioned by changes in the economic and financial structure of society and it is
consistent with the bank’s ideological commitments.18 ADB interprets the Asian Financial
Crisis as:
• A need to implement structural reforms,
• To improve the global financial system and standard
• To promote freer trade in the Asia-Pacific.
It responded to the crisis with efficiency by facilitating the global capitalist economic
integration, accelerating the development of world market, transforming state-society
relations, and promoting social relations of production in the region.
Love or Hatred: Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in November 2014, Chinese
president Xi Jinping proposed the idea of founding a nascent Asian bank for investing in
infrastructure in Asia. Xi intended to help the region, specifically the developing and
underdeveloped Asian states to improve their infrastructure by harnessing China’s vast
financial resources and spreading the expertise acquired from the modernization in recent
China’s infrastructure.
The rationale behind Xi’s proposal was to offer financial assistance for Asia’s infrastructure
improvement project. According to ADB, Asia needs to invest about US$ 8 trillion in
national infrastructure and US$290 billion in regional infrastructure between 2010 and
2020 to sustain its economic growth trajectory.19 The proposal is made on
“supply-and-demand.” Southeast Asian countries such as Laos and Myanmar lack the necessary
resources to invest in infrastructure. Other developed Asian economies like South Korea
and Japan and even other non-regional economies would be able to offer sufficient loans,
since the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) would be open to participation by all
states.
Europeans have welcomed Xi’s proposal, as they see it as an opportunity for the European
financial market. The United Kingdom played a leading role in seeking participation. It
became the first Prospective Founding Member (PFM) from the West at the end of March
2015, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Italy. A crucial reason
for the western countries to rush to join is that investment in the bank will give western
companies an opportunity to invest in the world’s fastest growing markets.20 Many western
countries see this as a win-win situation for them.
However, AIIB has not received support from everyone. The central criticism comes from
the United States, as it believes that China is practicing a sophisticated “banking diplomacy”
to replace the US leadership role by seeking to expand its influence beyond its territory and
the Asian region. Until March 2015, China retained only 5.47% voting rights, in stark
contrast to the combined 26% of Japan (15.7%) and the US (15.6%) in ADB’s voting
process. The US has also blocked China’s leading role in the IMF and the World Bank. The
US looks at AIIB as China’s wish to dominate international organizations. It also views this
as a threat to break the US-led world system, thus threatening the US national interests. The
US desires to protect the Bretton Woods institutions over which the US and Europe wield
19
Retrieved March 22, 2015 from http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/10/asian-infrastructure-bank-1
20
veto power.21 The US is concerned about AIIB’s international standard on governance and
the establishment of environmental and social standards. This argument appears to be
crippled, since other western countries like the UK and Germany have shown willingness to
help AIIB adhere to strict banking procedures to meet the high international standard.
In addition to the criticism from the US, the Japan-led ADB is dubious about AIIB’s motive.
(Remember that Japan is a strong political ally of the US in Asia.) Some have suggested
that AIIB is designed to compete with the US and Japan-dominated institutions like the
World Bank, IMF, and ADB. This appears to be more of a conspiracy theory than an
effective argument. The World Bank and the IMF policies are not subject to the White
House even though they are under the leadership of the US. The World Bank has already
described AIIB as a potential ally through its head Jim Yong Kim. The IMF has also shown
goodwill to AIIB, as its managing director Christine Lagarde visited Beijing and met
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. ADB remained cautious about AIIB, but Japanese finance
minister Taro Aso expressed interest in seeking cooperation. Recently, ADB’s head
Takehiko Nakao welcomed the creation of AIIB and offered to partner with them on several
projects.22 Most recent estimates indicate that Asia requires around US$20 trillion to
finance its infrastructure needs. And without such a major investments, Asia’s growth will
be stunted. Since AIIB’s mission overlaps with some of ADB’s, AIIB could work in
conjunction rather than competition with ADB.
The rest of Asia is still following the US leadership and watching China’s AIIB. They
remain cautious about taking further action except submitting applications to join the
organization as PFMs. China’s replacement of the US, at least in Asia, is a matter of time.
The US has started losing its influence not just from now, but from the moment when it sent
troops to Iraq and the Middle East fifteen years ago. The US impotence became obvious
because it went into wars for the wrong reasons and later mismanaged the implementation
of the invasions. The US involvement in the Middle East shattered the illusion of the US
21
Retrieved March 22, 2015 from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c58cbd66-dcee-11e4-975c-00144feab7de.html#axzz3XmUg8rBE
22
security umbrella. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Japan that previously believed they
would be safe under the US security alliance started to act more independently. Hillary
Clinton’s article America’s Pacific Century also suggested that the US has lost its
dominance in the Asia-Pacific. That is why, substantial investments—diplomatic, economic,
strategic, and otherwise—in the region has coincided with China’s rise.23
Less assured by the Abenomics’ impact on domestic economic recovery as well as the US
protection, Japan is now faced with the dilemma of whether or not to join AIIB or continue
to rival with China by sticking to the conventional US-Japan alliance. AIIB is a promising
growth engine, but it is becoming a political game between the current US-centered world
system and the emerging Chinese institution. There is no real need for this much
complexity under the leadership of a different nation. AIIB could easily exist as a
complementary agency that adds to the current system since its members are not
newcomers but participants from the traditional one. On the other hand, countries could
continue to go to ADB because ADB has almost US$100 billion in loans outstanding in
Asia. This is twice the initial capital proposed for the AIIB. ADB’s total authorized capital
stands at over US$150 billion. ADB and AIIB present equal lending opportunities for
loans-seekers in the region. They are suppliers in the market.
ADB in Emerging Financial Order
As AIIB comes into being, one concern prevails. Will AIIB function as a substitute for the
current ADB or as an independent banker? China can be a new banker in Asia, but this may
deviate from AIIB’s mission. Otherwise, China’s AIIB could take the lead by accepting the
inclusion of the World Bank. The World Bank is under-investing in Asian infrastructure,
either lacking motive or money. This provides AIIB with an opportunity to utilize China’s
vast financial resources to fill the vacancy. But one burgeoning question remains: why is
ADB not playing a role in infrastructure investment?
This relates to ADB’s focus on social sectors. A review of ADB’s archives show that the
bank mostly provides technical assistance and invests in the education sector—much more
23
than infrastructure. Of ADB’s 6,401 sovereign projects dated from January 1998 to January
2015, 4,647 are for technical assistance (72.60%) and 1,233 are in the sector of education
(19.26%).24 In comparison to other sectors, ADB provides the least support to infrastructure,
while the demand continues to expand rapidly. At this point, AIIB is making investments in
real physical infrastructure—for example, airports, road, and high-speed trains—which is
the need of the hour in the region.
If ADB desires to sustain its pivotal role, it needs to enlarge its investment portfolio to
include infrastructure projects. This is not a platform for competition between different
banking institutions. The best strategy for ADB is to work with AIIB on urgent projects and
to provide sufficient assistance to the DMCs. One good example would be The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s infrastructure gap. The World Economic Forum
detected a gap of US$ 8 trillion in infrastructure needs in South East Asia in 2014. However,
ADB’s Vice-President Stephen P. Groff has been insisting that most (60%) of the
infrastructure investments in the region should come from local governments—showing
little intention to support infrastructure projects, as they are not considered “bankable.”25 If
that’s the case, ADB may need to adjust its strategy by articulating the definition of
“bankable” projects and its standards on approving and disapproving projects.
ADB will not benefit nor keep its financial leverage by simply overlooking the needs in
infrastructure, which has shown an increasing trend. AIIB’s participation to fill the gap will
pose an invisible stress on ADB. The traditional argument that the private sector has
difficulty in making a return on building runways at airports, for example, has been
downplayed by AIIB’s mission statement—financing Asia’s infrastructure projects for
regional co-prosperity and sustainable development. Again, ADB and AIIB are not
competitors. They can be complementary. The creation of AIIB encourages ADB to make a
strategic shift in developing a strong political vision and long-term goals for the region. It
also encourages better policy and planning to better adapt to the regional evolvement.
24
Data retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.adb.org/projects/terms-use
25
Recently, ADB’s president Nakao proposed Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)s in one of
his articles. Nakao suggested cooperation between public infrastructure investment by
governments and the ADB. According to Nakao, the partnerships will require each
government to mobilize more tax revenues through stronger enforcement, while tapping
private-sector resources—including local and foreign expertise and skills. He suggests that
an innovative form of infrastructure development is through the Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) model.26
In short, ADB and AIIB have different mission focuses in the region—with the former
focusing on social sectors and the latter on infrastructure. This provides them with an
opportunity to start working together for the overall good of the region, rather than
independently, as they work towards a shared common goal. The birth of AIIB also drives
ADB to make strategic changes for its long-term development.
Conclusion
In the past four decades, ADB has implemented programs and projects that align closely
with its mission—to alleviate poverty and accelerate economic growth in the region. Its
management team and board are experts and professionals from a variety of fields and
backgrounds, with (past) titles and affiliations to multilateral international organizations
and governments. ADB’s annual meeting with the Board of Governors serves as a platform
for policy-makers to consult with member governments on issues like governance,
administration, public policy, finance, and operations. Its projects are not to serve the
interest of the bank, but to benefit the DMCs’ immediate and long-term development. ADB
also demonstrates efficiency and professionalism dealing with events like the Asian
Financial Crisis by providing strategies to facilitate economic recovery.
However, ADB has the scope for improvement. The bank can do so by welcoming
co-operation and supporting other emerging institutions such as AIIB. The bank should
re-consider its investment strategy in infrastructure, which ADB still appears as reluctant. It
26
should also develop poverty measurement methodologies that respond to the challenges
from other international organizations. Its current measurement of poverty is income or
expenditure of less than US$1.25 per day per person. However, as ADB’s Chief Economist
Shang-Jin Wei has realized, this figure is simply not enough to maintain minimum welfare
in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region.27 A more comprehensive understanding of poverty
is needed to help policymakers develop up-to-date approaches to address the challenge. The
new standard of US$1.51, as the regional poverty line, will need further assessment—
considering the rising food prices without a commensurate increase in income.
In addition to poverty reduction, ADB’s current focus leans towards environmentally
sustainable development programs. Environmental changes are posing new threats to the
region. For example, the Philippines flood in 2010 devastated the country’s economy.
Although ADB had implemented flood management programs with the government, the
country had a hard recovery. Most would say that the country has not yet recovered from
the disaster. The country is still receiving international assistance from other sectors and
governments. Statistical reports unveil that ADB does not invest heavily in relative
reconstruction programs. The harsh environment of the present and future should drive
ADB to re-think the bank’s missions, goals, and strategies. This would enable ADB to
better contribute to regional development and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.
27
Retrieved March 31, 2015 from
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The White Paper. Midterm Review Strategy 2020: Meeting the Challenges of a
Transforming Asia and Pacific. Asian Development Bank.
The White Paper. Strategy 2020: Working for an Asia and Pacific Free of Poverty. Asian
Development Bank.
Paul Cammack. The Asian Development Bank and the Asian Financial Crisis: Openness
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An Asian Infrastructure Bank: Only Connect. The Economist. Retrieved March 22, 2015
from http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/10/asian-infrastructure-bank-1
UK support for China-backed Asia bank prompts US concern. British Broadcasting
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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31864877
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http://goo.gl/Tasa5K
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Appendix: UNESCAP Member States and Associate Member States
Since its founding in 1947 the membership Economic and Social Commission has grown to 53 members and 9 associate members.
Member States
• Afghanistan** 24 April 1953
• Armenia 26 July 1994
• Australia 28 March 1947
• Azerbaijan 31 July 1992
• Bangladesh** 17 April 1973
• Bhutan** 6 January 1972
• Brunei Darussalam 26 July 1985
• Cambodia** 20 August 1954
• China 28 March 1947
• Iran (Islamic Republic of) 10 July 1958
• Japan 24 June 1954
• Kazakhstan 31 July 1992
• Kiribati** 26 July 1991
• Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 31 July 1992
• Korea (the Republic of) 20 October 1954
• Kyrgyzstan 31 July 1992
• Lao People’s Democratic Republic(the) **16 February 1955
• Malaysia 17 September 1957
• Maldives 5 August 1976
• Marshall Islands (the) 31 July 1992
• Micronesia (Federated States of) 31 July 1992
• Mongolia 21 December 1961
• Myanmar** 19 April 1948
• Nauru 20 July 1971
• Nepal** 6 June 1955
• Netherlands (the) 28 March 1947
• New Zealand 8 March 1948
• Pakistan 30 September 1947
• Palau 18 July 1996
• Papua New Guinea 27 August 1976
• Philippines (the) 28 March 1947
• Russian Federation (the)*** 28 March 1947
• Samoa 5 July 1963
• Solomon Islands** 3 August 1979
• Sri Lanka 10 December 1954
• Tajikistan 31 July 1992
• Thailand 28 March 1947
• Timor-Leste** 18 July 2003
• Tonga 20 July 1971
• Turkey 18 July 1996
• Turkmenistan 31 July 1992
• Tuvalu ** 26 July 1985
• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the)v28 March 1947
• United States of America (the) 28 March 1947
• Uzbekistan 31 July 1992
• Vanuatu** 27 July 1984
• Viet Nam 23 August 1954
Associate Members*
• American Samoa 28 July 1988
• Cook Islands (the) 11 July 1972
• French Polynesia 31 July 1992
• Guam 24 July 1981
• Hong Kong, China**** 25 November 1947
• Macao, China ***** 26 July 1991
• New Caledonia 31 July 1992
• Niue 3 August 1979
• Northern Mariana Islands (the) 22 July 1986
Notes:
* Not a member of the United Nations ** Least Developed Country
*** Continuation of membership of former USSR
**** Change of name from Hong Kong to Hong Kong, China (1 July 1997)
***** Change of name to Macau, China (20 December 1999) and further changed to Macao, China (4 February 2000)
Source: http://www.unescap.org/about/member-states
