by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) into the civil service. It is widely per- ceived that the reason for singling out representatives of these two groups for civil service employment is that the current president, Lech Kaczyński (2005– ), had performed managerial functions in these favored institutions earlier in his career.
Consequently, these regulations became the loopholes by which the president could promote his “own people” into the civil service corps. To the extent there are varia- tions in recruitment and promotion procedures employed in civil service as com- pared to those utilized by local government and the NIK, these regulations are incompatible and may breach the constitutional principles of equal access.16 As of this writing, legislation is awaiting the verdict of the Constitutional Court to resolve this problem.17
from professional administrative positions, some of its regulations were politically biased. The separation of politics from administration was reconfirmed one year later, however, with the adoption of the 1997 constitution. The constitution clearly forbade the functions of Poland’s members of Parliament (lower house, Sejm) and senators (upper house, Senat) to be combined with those of government administra- tors, with the exception of the prime minister and ministers and secretaries of state.
Poland’s 1997 constitution also made direct reference to the expected apolitical character and professionalism of the civil service in Article 153.
The main challenge in creating a professional civil service corps was to prevent political interference in its formation, a temptation that was increased by the parlia- mentary elections of autumn 1997. For example, although 300 candidates had com- pleted the qualifying exam required for nomination in the two months preceding the parliamentary elections, evidence suggested that special training was provided for “own group” candidates, and manipulation of certification to meet the foreign language requirement to promote “own” cadres was suspected. Consequently, the newly elected government of Jerzy Buzek (1997–2001) accused its predecessors of politicizing the administrative process and was able to prove such political manipula- tion by the preceding regime.20
The essence of difficulty in building an apolitical civil service in postcommunist countries is represented by the policy adopted toward directors general in govern- ment regional offices. Generally speaking, directors general hold the most senior administrative positions in Poland’s civil service, and according to the rule of law, their positions are to be preserved even if the government changes as a result of an impending election. Therefore, the appointment of 35 out of 49 directors general immediately preceding the 1997 parliamentary elections was especially controver- sial, because some of these 35 appointees were former communist apparatchiks who abruptly resigned from party membership to quickly appear to have transformed themselves into apolitical civil servants. The Peasant Party, the junior partner in Poland’s coalition government, was so offended by these “apolitical pools of spoils”
that it threatened to leave the governing coalition.20, 21
In response to such questionable behavior, the Buzek government not only ini- tially withheld nomination procedures but also proposed a new CSA, which passed parliament in December 1998. Despite the positive evaluation of the CSA of 1998 and acceptance of the arguments concerning serious politicization of the CSA of 1996, adoption of the new act served to reinforce the existing philosophy of politi- cal interference in the functioning of the civil service through institutional reform when conditions were unfavorable for the government. Nonetheless, the goals of professionalizing civil service and protecting civil servants from politicization were again advanced, this time by the introduction of registered competition procedures for senior civil service positions. Competitions, at least theoretically, would result in senior positions being awarded to the best qualified candidates as determined by their professional credentials and their performance on qualifying exams. It was assumed that in the majority of cases, the winners of competitions would be
nominated civil servants who had earlier proved their professional qualifications, although competitions were also open to other candidates. It is in this vein that com- petitions provided a mechanism by which bureaucrats employed in positions other than mandated civil service posts could be promoted.22 Although there were fre- quent irregularities in the competition procedures, reformers’ efforts to strengthen neutral competence in the civil service gradually and eventually proved beneficial and can be viewed as a positive development in Polish administrative reform.
Not surprisingly, decisions concerning senior administrative positions proved to be the most difficult civil service arena in which to ensure the separation of poli- tics from administration. In the case of Poland, this can be positively measured on one hand by the proportion of positions in which position holders were selected as a result of competition procedures. On the other hand, however, the scale of politi- cization in the selection process can be measured by the proportion of those who were appointed as “acting managers.” As shown in Table 7.2, the number of regis- tered and publicly announced competitions is significantly smaller than the num- ber of vacant senior positions in each of the six years for which data are presented.
However, to the extent the exact number of vacancies was fluctuating over time, interpretation of the data provided in Table 7.2 is not entirely straightforward. Fur- ther complicating precise understanding of the extent of politicization of the civil service is the fact that organizational changes were sometimes instrumental in dis- missing cadres appointed during the tenure of the previous government.
The introduction of the CSA of 1998 during Buzek’s government was a time of focused efforts to employ competition procedures for senior administrative positions, although the number of vacancies was relatively small at this time.
Table 7.2 Trends in Competitions for Senior Positions in Poland’s Civil Service
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total number of senior
positions
1,630 1,678 1,657 1,430 1,549 1,606 1,732
Senior position vacancies 79 291 451 737 759 697 596 Senior positions registered
for competition
83 215 146 216 671 338 383
Competitions publicly announced
8 123 191 143 226 328 367
Competitions conducted 0 64 153 101 185 308 282
Senior positions filled through competition
0 21 121 64 175 254 174
Source: Adapted from Yearly Reports of the Chief of Civil Service (Sprawozdania Szefa Służby Cywilnej), Office of the Civil Service, Warsaw, http://usc.gov.
pl/usc/index.jsp?place=menu06&news_cat_id=224&layout=1.
And although the number of vacancies for these positions increased under Leszek Miller’s government (2001–2004), the pace of competition significantly slowed.
For example, in the 22 months between January 2000 and November 2001, 428 competitions were registered, whereas only 265 competitions were registered in the 17 months between November 2001 and April 2003.23 Moreover, especially radi- cal attempts to interfere with appointments to senior positions in civil service took place during Prime Minister Miller’s tenure, when in December 2001, an amend- ment aimed at facilitating increased political control of the civil service was added to the CSA of 1998. This amendment, Article 144a, withdrew the requirement to conduct competitions for senior administrative positions because these competi- tions were the main existing barrier to administrative politicization.
The withdrawal of competition procedures was subsequently recognized as a breach of the constitutional principle of equal access based on merit, and Arti- cle 144a was reversed one year later by the Constitutional Court. In 2003 and after annulment of Article 144a, the number of registered competitions nearly tripled to 671, although only 226 competitions were publicly announced as a result of serious challenges to the defining criteria required for the majority of those 671 positions.
In addition, 65 percent of controlled senior administrative positions were filled by “acting managers,” many of whom were appointed without being subjected to competition procedures.24 In sum, these behaviors may be interpreted as a form of political sabotage by the numerous ministers and regional governors who opposed reducing political control of public administration in Poland.25
The situation improved during the tenure of the next prime minister, Marek Belka (2004–2005). His declaration that the time for “fake civil service is over”
created a positive atmosphere, which produced a marked increase in the number of publicly announced competitions. Moreover, there was a significant increase in the proportion of competitions conducted when measured against the number of available vacancies during Belka’s tenure.26 Unfortunately, individuals working as acting managers frequently received favorable treatment during competitions and consequently often won them.27 Finally, in May 2005 Prime Minister Belka enacted legislation that expanded competition procedures to include 34 chiefs of central offices and agencies in an effort to, once again, move toward increasing professionalism and strengthening the separation of politics from administration in Poland’s civil service.28
The transitory regulations of the CSA of 1998 ended in mid-2004, and since that time, competition procedures for senior administrative positions have been limited to include only nominated civil servants. This has resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of positions for which no competitions have been con- ducted. For example, there were no competitions for only 0.4 percent of available positions in the first half of 2004, when those who were not nominated civil ser- vants—mostly political appointees—were allowed to enter competition procedures.
In contrast, during the second half of 2004, when the requirement of nomination became effective, the proportion of senior administrative positions for which there
were no competing candidates increased to 22 percent, and this percentage rose again to 31 percent in 2005,29 thus creating a shortage of qualified candidates to fill senior positions in the civil service.
The current structure and functioning of public administration in Poland are defined by two principal legislative acts passed in 2006, both of which formally question the validity of separating politics from administration: the CSA of 2006 and the State Personnel Reserve Act. The State Personnel Reserve Act created a new governmental institution, the State Personnel Reserve (SPR), which is currently in its infancy. Personnel resources for the SPR are comprised of two groups: (1) nomi- nated civil servants and (2) those who pass the entry exam organized by the NSPA.
The NSPA-designed exam is most often taken by those individuals who are politi- cally affiliated and dependent. To the extent preference is given to politically biased exam takers at the expense of qualified civil servants, this arrangement will surely undermine the stability of employment for nominated civil servants who decide to enter the SPR, thus further enhancing the politicization of public administration.
The principal idea of the SPR raises fundamental doubts about the future exis- tence of the civil service for senior positions and the model of the civil service as defined in the Polish constitution. The SPR has been established to appoint personnel to top administrative positions in central and regional governance (i.e., directors general; directors of departments in ministries, central institutions, and regional offices; chairmen of central offices and agencies; regional governors). In addition, appointments to these positions will be made by the prime minister or ministers who will choose their candidature from the SPR and who will have the right to dismiss them at any time. This formula overrides the previously noted com- petition procedures for senior administrative positions. In other words, most nomi- nated civil servants enjoying stability of employment will be replaced by political appointees who, wishing to preserve their positions, will be even more indebted to their political patrons. These types of political appointments, authorized under the CSA of 2006 and with the creation of the SPR, extend to all senior positions in Poland’s civil service. The new regulations further reflect substantial weakening of the civil service by liquidating the Office of the Civil Service, which was committed to developing professional and apolitical public administration and to transferring its responsibilities to the prime minister’s chancellery. On a more positive note, however, if these new regulations lead to an eventual increase in the professional qualifications and competencies of politically affiliated individuals appointed to senior positions within civil service, the 2006 CSA and the SPR may ultimately increase, to some extent, professionalism of Poland’s public administration as a whole.