Administrative reform presupposes public, private, or voluntary institutions whose existence is motivated by work toward common goals and socially motivated prob- lem solving. Since modern statehood was successfully linked with the principle of nationalism in the Wilsonian era (i.e., the 1920s and the aftermath of World War I), the sovereign nation-state has been taken for granted as the chief guar- antor of public services. Ever since the works of Joseph Schumpeter on political entrepreneurship in the 1930s, however, the sovereign state as chief administrator has been under attack theoretically, ideologically, and in practice.6 Globalization is thus shifting the balances between political, economic, and social powers with uncertain outcomes and putting the territoriality of the nation-state as the ordering principle in world affairs increasingly into question.
The dethroning of the state is inextricably linked with globalization.7 With the state under pressure, it is looking for a new role and new ways of doing things, none of which seem to be leading back to the heyday of national bureaucracies. As iden- tified by Jessop, there are three major changes pertaining to the role of the state8 and, by extension, to its capacity to assume new administrative tasks. To meet the challenges of economic globalization, first of all, states have become entrenched in macroregional patterns of cooperation and coordination. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU are indicative of how differ- ent nations have come together to manage the economic forces of change. Second, government becomes governance, as nations voluntarily enter into partnerships and projects where the leading role is either shared with or assumed by nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations and private banks and enterprises. There is also a growth in semigovernmental organizations as states seek shared forms of ownership in a variety of service markets, such as energy and health care. Third, looking attractive to international investors has become a common goal among states as international policy regimes increasingly serve as guidelines for govern- ment policy. In such cases, nation building is substituted for mere positioning in global competition for investment-friendly status and in creating a positive climate for international business.
Consequently, globalization leads to a general search for alternative forms of organization, administration, and financing. It remains unclear, however, which specific effects can be expected from the dethroning of the state.9 In the post-cold- war era, however, ideas about “good governance” have become widespread. Good governance is usually defined as including the attributes of being participatory, accountable, transparent, consensus oriented, responsive, effective, efficient, inclu- sive, and equitable and as following the rule of law.10 Good governance is also often defined as the strengthening of local government and of legislative and judicial institutions, promoting decentralization and working with civil society organiza- tions.11 Moreover, a central component of good governance is administrative reform.
As discussed by Harrison, the World Bank has taken an interest in administrative
reform since the early 1990s and incorporated such reforms in its structural adjust- ment lending and in its technical assistance loans.12
In this respect, globalization has implied the pressure to adopt and adapt to the so-called Washington consensus, as expressed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on national economic management and economic pol- icy. Countries in the developing world have had little choice but to accept the conditions deriving from that consensus to be able to borrow money. Their lack of choice is usually referred to as the “politics of adjustment” but could perhaps also be called the “politics of conditionality.” The success of adjustment and conditionality is undeniable in the sense that there has been what Burnell and Randall described as a “near universal movement” toward neoliberalism and marketization, driven by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank with their focus “on economic policy and national economic management.”13 The effects of the Washington con- sensus in terms of achieving development and eradicating poverty, however, are open to interpretation and generate much heated debate.
The ideas underpinning the Washington consensus have also had implica- tions for the World Bank’s take on administrative reform. The bank has funded a number of administrative reform programs in the developing world. Such pro- grams have typically involved the basic ideas of New Public Management (NPM), that is, results-oriented management, privatization, contracting out, incentiviza- tion, and outcomes-oriented planning. The bank has also stressed the importance of capacity building and ownership. The way in which the World Bank has been involved in administrative reform in Africa, for example, has been summarized in the following way: “The World Bank and others work with African states to fashion a state which facilitates market-based economic growth which derives from the liberalization of markets and integration into the world economy. In order to do this effectively, the state’s administrative apparatus—or more specifically a cor- rectly motivated elite cadre within the administration—must become appropriately skilled (capacity building) and motivated (ownership).”14
Another aspect is what Harrison identified as the politics of postconditional- ity. Postconditionality is more about carrots than about sticks and about promot- ing changes rather than about threatening to withdraw funds. Donor intervention continues but is exercised not only through conditionality but through a closer involvement in state institutions.15 Administrative reform programs are crucial in this respect. In Uganda, for example, soft and hard reforms have been combined.
Soft reforms concern personnel and skills and involve training and measures to enhance performance and motivation. Hard reforms concern systems and technol- ogy and involve, for instance, new systems of budgetary management.16
As seen in the discussion about good global governance, there is a clear element of convergence among the ideas and programs that international institutions and other organs currently apply as guidelines in their global activities. It is early yet, too early, to make any definite statements about the real effects of this new line of global thinking. As witnessed by the cases discussed here, mainly in relation to
developmental issues, there are signs that globalization can be seen as the harbinger of public reform based on ideas such as individual citizen’s rights, participatory principles, and the general idea that public administration should facilitate interac- tion in the economic and social spheres of any given country. The developmental status of such a country is vitally important, however, as witnessed by processes in sub-Saharan Africa, which have been “brutal, contradictory, and crisis-driven”
meaning that it is important to “recognize that any improvements in the efficiency of state action are significant in a generally difficult environment.”17 To traverse on an old saying, how you meet with globalization depends on where you are located in the world. Therefore, it is likely that between-country differences in citizens’
quality of life, political and administrative corruption, social violence, and cultural traditions will continue to have great impact on the ability of political, social, eco- nomic, and administrative systems to harness the volatile forces of globalization within and among nation-states.
In addition, globalization in the shape and form of good governance also ties in with an increasing number of peace-building operations managed by the United Nations (UN) in postconflict societies. According to former secretary general Kofi Annan, peace building is about “the creation or strengthening of national institu- tions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programs, as well as creating conditions for resumed development.”18 Some observers think that international peace-building operations raise questions about what sovereignty really means, because the UN has become such an important actor in helping to manage huge political, administrative, and social transformations in sovereign states. Paris described UN peace building as “an enormous experiment in social engineering—an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states.”19
It is almost a truism to say that different groups of countries are dissimilarly affected by globalization. Nevertheless, it points to an analytically important fact.
In advanced countries in Europe, such as Germany and Sweden, for example, it is patently difficult to separate the effects of globalization from those of European- ization.20 To further complicate this, studies show that there are also differences between policy areas, such as heavy industry and medical care. Whereas policy changes and the related administrative reforms in Germany and Sweden show signs of a heavy international influence on the industrial sector, factors are blurred in other areas.21 Similarly, in newcomers to the EU, such as Poland and Romania, the direct influence of globalizing factors and institutions seem less important than the recent process of adaptation to EU standards and norms.22 Generally, in the Euro- pean setting, the direct effects of globalization and related institutions are hard to distinguish from the influence of informal regional networks and autonomous policy adjustment by the nation-states proper. The discussion in this chapter shall return shortly to this complex interaction of factors.
To briefly summarize the effects of globalization on advanced countries, which for the most part already enjoy functional systems of public administration and
financing, it seems as if the deterritorialization aspect of globalization (i.e., the dethroning of the state) is the major bone of contention. Their dependency on the ability to tax citizens and enterprises to collect the resources needed for the success- ful implementation of public programs is also their major weakness. In a world of increasingly important transnational flows, one strategy is to redefine the role of government in identifying commonalities across nations and in solving common problems. A two-pronged approach could involve, first of all, political decision mak- ers’ allowing more discretionary freedom for public administrators and economic and social actors’ developing new, depoliticized forms of social problem solving and implementation. This would have different implications in different countries, depending on which levels of institutional development and citizen awareness have already been achieved. Of course, experiments along these lines have been attempted with varying degrees of success around the world. What we are suggest- ing, however, is the possibility of institutionalizing an increased role for nonpoliti- cal actors in the processes of public sector problem solving and policy formulation.
Second, a complementary strategy would be to increase and strengthen proactive, strategic interaction with other states to identify international commonalities and facilitate adaptation to globalizing forces before crises develop and require imme- diate response. For example, problems of global pollution would likely be more easily resolved if leaders of concerned nations had addressed the problem when the potential environmental effects of increased industrialization were first suspected, or at least when the known problem was in its infancy.
The deterritorialization aspect of globalization is vital precisely because it forces countries and their governments to compete globally for limited resources and mar- ket attention. Coming together with other governments in a pooling of sovereign- ties might increase the scope of government, but it might also condemn the same governments to never-ending political squabbles. Both strategies, either by them- selves or in combination, open up for new forms of problem definition and solu- tion implementation in the wake of globalization. Regardless of which strategy is chosen, however, deterritorialization provides governmental, economic, and social decision makers with the opportunity to rethink problem-solving strategies.23
Increasingly, however, both national and subnational governments seem to be strategically adapting to supranational institutions. The adaptation process takes on different forms and characteristics on different continents but seems generally to stem from and involve efforts at economic readjustment. Economically driven reform has immediate and direct effects, which is why globalization in the eco- nomic sphere is also the strongest argument for globalizing change. Looking at the world today, there is an emergent political and administrative level in the wake of change, which is neither global nor national but at the same time seems strongly linked with globalization. Concerted efforts between groups of states to overcome the adverse effects of global competition lead to the creation of world-regional insti- tutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR), NAFTA, and the EU. Most of them
are strictly skeletal constructs to facilitate economic cooperation. However, one of them, the EU, has taken several steps further and created what amounts to an administrative space, revamping different forms of cautious international coopera- tion on economic issues and taking steps toward embedding global economic forces of change in a set of political, legal, and administrative institutions.