7 Corruption: the peculiarities of
It does possess, however, a certain resonance in the private domain, where fragmentary concerns of this nature have been voiced time and again in various ways, but have not as yet been articulated into a more reasoned and cohesive view of the matter.3This chapter may be seen as a small con- tribution to the development of such a view, and perhaps also of a continu- ing dialogue on the entire issue of corruption in Singapore.
Given the unusual thrust of the chapter, the nomination of a point at which to begin the discussion must be debatable. An arguably good place to start, however, may be the widely held notion that Singapore is, in some sense, corruption-free. Though certainly supported by indicators of various sorts, this notion exists very much as an article of faith, and is rarely subjected to any close scrutiny. There is some need to confront and interrogate this notion in order to assess its credibility. In so doing, some significant insights into conditions in Singapore may be gleaned. This is a task that will be pursued in the following section.
Singapore’s corruption-free image
To a significant extent, the image of Singapore as a pristine-clean, corrup- tion-free country rests heavily on the surveys conducted by a variety of organizations monitoring corruption. There are, of course, a large number of these, both of a commercial as well as non-commercial nature, with each producing an impressive array of indicators gauging the level and extent of corruption around the world. Some of the more influential of these include the Berlin-based Transparency International and its annual Corruption Perceptions Index; the Hong Kong-based Political and Eco- nomic Risk Consultancy Ltd (PERC) and its series assessing corruption trends in Asia; Business International – currently owned by the Economist Intelligence Unit – and its index of corruption; and finally, Political Risk Services, which produces a Corruption in Governmentindex to assess the level of such activity.
A small sampling of some of the indicators compiled by these organi- zations will be sufficient to demonstrate the extremely favourable position Singapore commands in these assessments. Table 7.1, for example, pre- sents data extracted from the annual Corruption Perceptions Index pro- duced by Transparency International. As it should be readily apparent, Singapore scores extremely well in this index, consistently being ranked far ahead of other Asian nations, particularly those from Southeast Asia.
This favourable perception of Singapore is strongly corroborated by annual surveys conducted by PERC. As reported in Table 7.2, in PERC’s series tracking corruption trends in Asia, Singapore has always held the distinction of scoring lowest in perceptions of corruption. As a result of this, it has consistently been ranked first in this index – an honour enjoyed since 1995.
Indices of this nature can and do play useful roles, guiding commercial 150 Alfred Oehlers
and other decisions as well as shedding light on aspects of a country’s social, economic and political profile. They are also useful in a compara- tive sense, highlighting the relative incidence of corruption in different countries. In especially this last regard, these indices have been extremely valuable for the government in Singapore. The release of each favourable result is customarily greeted with much fanfare and publicity, and por- trayed as once again affirming Singapore’s dominant lead as a ‘safe’ venue for international investors. The media blitz that accompanies such events is extensive, contributing as much to the mythology of Singapore as a country devoid of corruption as the rankings themselves.
Singapore: peculiarities of corruption 151 Table 7.1 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, rankings of
selected countries, 1995–2002
Country 1995 1998 2001 2002
China 40 52 57 59
Hong Kong 17 16 14 14
India 35 66 71 71
Indonesia 41 80 88 96
Malaysia 23 29 36 33
The Philippines 36 55 65 77
Singapore 3 7 4 5
Thailand 34 61 61 64
Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org).
Note
Rank is out of 41 countries in 1995, 85 countries in 1998, 91 countries in 2001, and 102 coun- tries in 2002.
Table 7.2 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd, corruption trends in Asia, scores of selected countries, 1995–2001
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
China 7.30 8.00 8.06 6.97 9.00 9.11 7.88
Hong Kong 2.80 2.79 3.03 2.74 4.06 2.49 3.77
India 7.00 6.86 8.20 7.40 9.17 9.50 9.25
Indonesia 7.30 7.69 8.67 8.95 9.91 9.88 9.67
Malaysia 4.60 5.00 5.80 5.38 7.50 5.50 6.00
Philippines 6.60 6.95 6.50 7.17 6.71 8.67 9.00
Singapore 1.20 1.09 1.05 1.43 1.55 0.71 0.83
Thailand 5.90 6.55 7.49 8.29 7.57 8.20 8.55
Source: PERC (www.asiarisk.com/lib10.html).
Note
Scores are scaled from 0 to 10, with 0 being the best grade possible and 10 the worst. Scores for 2002 were only available to registered subscribers of the service. According to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Board (CPIB) in Singapore, however, Singapore has retained its first place for 2002, though comparative scores for other countries were not presented.
CPIB, ‘Singapore’s Transparency International and PERC Rankings’, http://app.cpib.gov.sg/
data/News_Doc/news_article2.htm, accessed 12 August 2003.
While of undoubted utility to a variety of users, it should always be remembered that these indices are far from perfect and do suffer a number of significant limitations and shortcomings. Many, for example, have been criticized for their methodological weaknesses.4Further, based as they are on the subjective perceptions of respondents, there is also an inherent danger the surveys may be predisposed to particular findings.
This danger is heightened considerably since most surveys typically only poll the expatriate managers of large multinational corporations. Often, what is reported on are issues of significance to, and the subjective percep- tions of, such expatriate managers, and not matters that may be of wider relevance to the issue of corruption.5The findings, as such, may hardly be described as representative either in terms of the respondents polled or the range of issues canvassed. All that is captured, in effect, is a small subset of issues relating to corruption, directly affecting the operations of foreign investors. All other corrupt activity is ignored.
This bias towards a narrowly focused conception of what constitutes corrupt activity is in fact inherent in the very conceptual underpinnings of these surveys. Most of them typically employ a definition of corruption based on a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conception as activities involving ‘the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit’.6As should be clear, while this is a fairly reasonable defini- tion capturing in all likelihood a significant proportion of corrupt activity, it nevertheless remains restricted in its coverage, confining corruption to a well-defined set of activities. In particular, by emphasizing the malprac- tices and malfeasance of public officials, the definition ignores other forms of corruption practised by other actors in society. Significantly, it also ignores corrupt practices guided by motives other than personal profit, whether these are perpetrated by public officials or otherwise.
These findings carry important implications. Despite the great store that is placed on indices such as those mentioned, it will be quite reason- able to suggest the significance of these indices may have been exagger- ated considerably. In all truth, the indices only provide an indication of the existence and incidence of a particular type of corruption – a parasitic or predatory corruption involving the abuse of public office for private gain.
They offer little guidance on wider issues concerning corruption, and indeed, the potential existence of altogether different forms of corruption.
In the light of the foregoing, how then should the extremely favourable scores and rankings achieved by Singapore in these indices be interpreted?
Viewed in a narrow sense, they may certainly be taken to be indicative of the absence of a particular form of corruption in Singapore – the parasitic or predatory variety, bane to all foreign investors. Even if such corrupt practices did indeed exist, Singapore’s exceptional ratings on these indices would tend to suggest they are rare occurrences, and in a comparative sense, definitely far less obtrusive, spectacular and scandalous than in other countries. When viewed in another light, however, these results are 152 Alfred Oehlers
suggestive of a different and perhaps, more important insight. In emphati- cally declaring Singapore free from one form of corruption, the indices draw attention to the possibility that corruption in Singapore may manifest itself in a differentform, unrecognized and uncaptured in surveys.
Bearing this latter point in mind, a potentially fruitful line of enquiry may be pursued. In a speculative sort of way, if it were to be hypothesized that corruption did indeed exist in Singapore, then what form might it be expected to take? To answer this question, it may be useful to examine the evolution of Singapore’s political economy since independence was gained in 1965. The identification, in particular, of some salient and enduring fea- tures of this political economy may prove instructive in delineating the broad contours of any corruption that may exist. This will be the task of the next section.
Singapore’s political economy
The evolution of Singapore’s political economy may be considered any- thing but usual. Cast off from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 following two years of an acrimonious and ultimately ill-fated merger, the fledgling republic had to carve for itself a niche in the world using the very slender resources at its disposal. Led firmly by the PAP, it experimented with and pioneered a series of innovations that – clearly today – served to sustain the development of the country well. In this atypical journey to where it presently stands, there are, of course, a number of important facets merit- ing attention. The distinctive developmental model pursued, for example, involving a unique blend of free-market conservatism together with a paternalistic Asian authoritarianism, certainly stands out. So too does the critical role assumed by foreign investment within this model, propelling very much the entire trajectory of development of the nation. Broader social and political issues also deserve consideration, such as the ever- present tensions around ethnicity and communalism, as well as the endur- ing preoccupation with a Singaporean identity. The list could go on, but the point should be apparent.7
Despite the diversity of issues that might be canvassed, it would be fairly uncontroversial to suggest that in considering the broad sweep of Singapore’s modern history, one particular feature certainly captures most attention: the uninterrupted rule of the PAP, first under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, then from 1990, Goh Chok Tong, and soon, it is widely rumoured, Lee Hsien Loong – the eldest son of Lee Kuan Yew. This remarkable continuity in political leadership, dating back to when self- government was first granted by the British colonial authorities in 1959, dominates the history of the nation and very much defines what Singapore is all about. Given this exceptionally long period in office, the PAP has put an indelible stamp on the country, defining its very character, modes of thought and conduct. In many respects, the notion of a ‘Singapore Inc.’, Singapore: peculiarities of corruption 153
embodying a corporate identity and ethos defined by the PAP, may be much less a fiction than conventionally thought. In view of the high degree of interpenetration between party and government, as well as the perva- siveness of government in everyday social, economic and political affairs, Singapore may be as much the PAP, as the PAP is Singapore.
In the light of this centrality, the PAP considers itself much more than just a political party. In its view, it is without question a fundamental insti- tution in Singapore society – most definitely the principal architect of past successes, but perhaps more importantly, a fixture essential to the future survival of the country.8 With such an elevated sense of importance and indeed, duty, it is not surprising the PAP jealously guards its power and pre-eminent position in Singapore politics. Unlike most other political parties around the world – and with disturbing similarities to totalitarian- ism – it considers itself inseparablefrom government, and indeed, nation.
As others have pointed out before, the protection of this pre-eminent position is largely achieved through a range of punitive measures govern- ing political activity in Singapore. There are, for example, a vast array of stringent rules – explicit and otherwise – governing the boundaries of permissible political discussion and debate. Similarly strict rules apply to political organization, constraining the formation of political groups, their recruitment, funding, operations, and ultimately, survival. Further inhibit- ing political discussion, all forms of print and broadcast media are directly or indirectly controlled by the PAP, as well as all channels of telecommu- nications, including the Internet. According to some observers, further, with its dominance of parliament, the party has also routinely amended electoral rules in order to place it at an advantage over rivals. A series of constitutional innovations has also been introduced, designed to buttress its role in Singapore politics.9
It bears emphasizing that, in all this, the central objective of the party and its functionaries has been – and remains – the maintenance of political power. In this respect, though these measures have undoubtedly been con- troversial and debatable, it must nevertheless be recognized that the motives guiding these actions certainly are reflective of a higher order of thinking and purpose, beyond the mere pursuit of personal vanity, enrich- ment or pecuniary gain (although these may very well be by-products of the process). It is, above all else, political survival and the retention of power by individuals and the party that are the central project.
This insight into the party and wider political elite in Singapore is extremely instructive. It certainly suggests that if corrupt behaviour were to be countenanced in such quarters, this would be of an order markedly and qualitatively different to that found in other countries. Bearing this in mind, the inappropriateness of conventional understandings of what con- stitutes corrupt behaviour should readily be apparent. Under the peculiar circumstances of Singapore, where public office may be used or indeed, abused, for higher political purposes, a rather different conception of what 154 Alfred Oehlers
corruption involves is necessary. Sketching what this might be, together with a consideration of some specific practices that may fall under this rubric, will be the task of the following section.
Understanding corruption in Singapore
What might the retention of political power entail? Viewed in a narrow light, this may simply be taken to mean the successful re-election of a given political party. Imperfect as this may be, for a great many political parties around the world operating in diverse forms of democracy, such a straightforward understanding could well be more than adequate. In the case of Singapore, however, any understanding of this process must be taken further, particularly in the light of the pervasive role and influence exercised by the PAP over nearly every aspect of life in the country. For the PAP, the retention of power implies far more than just a simple victory at the ballot box, important as this may be. For it to govern as effectively as it has done in the past and exercise the degree of influence it has always possessed, a wider consent and acquiescence to its authority must be secured and reproduced over time.
At one level, this acquiescence is obtained through an overarching hege- monic project articulated by the PAP. The constituent elements of this project are, of course, diverse. Historically, however, it is possible to identify a number of critical efforts that have made important contributions to the elaboration of this framework. The persistent efforts to try in some way to craft a national identity as well as inculcate a set of common national values are one such. So too are the ideology of meritocracy and imperative of stability and survival, in what is portrayed to be a highly uncertain and hostile world. Even the careful management of crises and panics – whether of an economic origin or attributable to so-called ‘declining’ social, moral or polit- ical mores – is relevant in this regard. Together, operating through extremely powerful channels such as the mass media and socializing agencies like the education system and national service, these have all contributed to the artic- ulation of a view that emphasizes the precarious and vulnerable nature of Singapore’s existence, and the consequent need for strong, decisive leader- ship. In so doing, the PAP has been cast in absolutely indispensable lights, all Singaporeans must accept it as a matter of necessity.10
Significant as this hegemonic framework may be, it must be recognized as but one part of a much larger story. As others have pointed out, while formally eschewing any notion of a ‘welfare state’, the PAP nevertheless maintains an elaborate system of welfare support for citizens.11These pro- visions, of course, may be seen in an entirely positive light as the efforts of a paternalistic government seeking to enhance the well-being of its charges. For present purposes, however, it should be noted that another less charitable and considerably more sinister interpretation is possible. In particular, when viewed as potential instruments of corruption, these may Singapore: peculiarities of corruption 155
equally be construed as inducements seeking to influence the public into particular modes of behaviour supportive of, or at the very least, not prej- udicial to, the interests of the PAP. Such practices, of course, are by no means unusual and have strong parallels with systems of clientelism and patronage found in other countries, especially in Southeast Asia.12Defini- tions of these abound,13but to paraphrase one coined in a previous study of the phenomenon in a different context, this is a form of corruption that typically involves the following: the use of public resources by politicians to create and maintain an incentive scheme to induce a constituency to perform their bidding.14
With such a definition, a considerable number of PAP practices may be seen in a very different light, as a small sample will illustrate. The discus- sion will first focus on a range of budgetary and extra-budgetary measures frequently used by the PAP. Following this, some attention will be given to its programme of public housing renewal, and finally, some issues relat- ing to employment and career advancement in Singapore will be raised.
Budgetary and extra-budgetary measures
This category covers a diverse range of instruments, ranging from the more traditional fiscal measures such as taxation and expenditure, to a series of discretionary payments the PAP has often made under a variety of guises. Focusing on the issue of taxation to begin with, it would be fair comment to point out the PAP has regularly made use of various rebates and concessions as ‘sweeteners’ in its budgets. These are rarely instituted as permanent features of the taxation system, but offered on an ad hoc, one-off basis, as and when it suits the PAP.15 On the other side of the ledger, through its expenditure, it is also clear the PAP maintains an extensive system of subsidies in services such as education and health, public infrastructure, and business development.16 During its many years in office, moreover, the party has also often made discretionary payments through schemes of different sorts. One particularly well-known practice involves the so-called ‘topping-up’ of Central Provident Fund (CPF) accounts: an exercise involving an independent contribution by the PAP to all accounts held with this compulsory retirement savings scheme.17 Further, in the midst of the severe economic downturn that has gripped the nation since late 2001 – and, it might be added, just prior to general elections in November that year – yet another scheme was announced to facilitate transfers of a similar nature. Dubbed the ‘New Singapore Share Scheme’, this allotted citizens ‘shares’ according to their level of income, with the lowest income brackets receiving the largest allotments. Part of this allotment was immediately redeemable for cash, thereby providing the needy with a critical source of supplementary income. The remaining shares held, meanwhile, guaranteed an annual dividend payment as well as bonuses related to the rate of economic growth achieved.18
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