Introduction
Part I collects the chapters on East Asia. It is a region which shares more than geography: its societies have a long history and a long bureaucratic tradition. Yet in the imperialist period its states, already diverse in size, went through very different experiences, and the same applies in the age of globalisation. The cases of corruption on which the authors choose to focus are thus bound to differ. Even so, it may be possible to identify gen- eralities or particularities that could contribute to programmes designed to improve governance and reduce corruption.
Observers of Japan’s post-war economic performance have swung from perhaps undue wonder and admiration, if not emulation, to perhaps undue caution, even despondency. Extensive government intervention, bureau- cratisation, and producer-oriented policies promoted rapid development, but that has come to a halt. The ‘Japan Inc’ system lent itself to corruption in two of the ways discussed by Nicholas Tarling in the Introduction: in the sense that private individuals gained at the public expense, and in the sense that institutions, including parliament itself, were mis-used or emas- culated. Attempts to alter the overall system, challenging in themselves, were the more difficult to carry out, given the entrenched interests. Yet in the low-growth phase the public became more sensitive to corruption.
Will that be a means of breaking down the obstacles in face of change?
Could Japan’s democratic institutions be made a check on corruption?
Policies in Japan are made by tight groups, as Dr Sato so clearly sets out in Chapter 1, and that will change only slowly. Citizen groups and lobbies could, however, help to make policy-making more pluralistic. Pressure from outside Japan would be limited in effect: it is a creditor nation.
China’s economy is, by contrast, growing rapidly, while its political system is a complete contrast. Corruption arises in particular from rent- seeking during the transition from state-controlled production limited to capitalism. Anti-corruption measures since the early 1990s have had relat- ively little effect, even though capitalism has been accompanied by capital punishment. The urge to get rich quick is at odds with them. Indeed, the
tolerance of corruption has increased: it is seen as lubrication, a necessary stage in the reform process. Moreover, as Dr Chen argues in Chapter 2, there is a conceptual vacuum at the heart of the proclaimed the system of the ‘socialist market economy’. The government offers only slogans. To do more might challenge the Communist Party’s hold on power. Could its rhetoric be used even so to check corruption? Or does it block action?
Two smaller East Asian states became industrialised economies in the late twentieth century. In both Taiwan and Korea, rapid industrialisation was associated with authoritarian government and institutionally and informally linked with it. Democratising regimes have sought to deal with the corruption involved, but with limited success.
Popular attitudes are obviously relevant. In Taiwan, corruption is so extensive – and so widely practised – that some consider the problem to be cultural rather than societal. The change of government in 2000 had disap- pointing results, as Professor Liu and his colleague point out in Chapter 3.
There are critics, but often they are stronger among those in opposition than those in power. There have been attempts to draw the line between the acceptable and the unacceptable. Laws are not enough: they have to be enforceable and enforced. Democracy is important, but the type of democracy more so. Transparency is essential. But, above all, people must be persuaded that it is not, after all, the thing to do.
In the Republic of Korea the relationships that characterised the authoritarian regimes continue in the more democratic phase. As Kyong- soo Lho and Joseph Cabuay show in Chapter 4, the president’s office remains very powerful, the economy is still highly regulated, elections are exceedingly costly and the relevant legislation contains loopholes. Kick- backs are common, even in the office of the president. Again changes of government have proved disappointing, offering, sometimes spectacularly, the mixture as before.
Vietnam is included in this part also, partly on historical and geographi- cal grounds, partly because its more recent experience shares some fea- tures with that of its large neighbour. It wants to retain Communist Party dominance, but also engage in capitalist development. Its ‘discourse’ is contorted and provides no clear behavioural guidance. What Dr Fritzen describes in Chapter 5 echoes some of the comments of Dr Chen.
Under the pressure of the Thai Binh riots, the regime attempted ‘grass- roots democratisation’. That did not reduce corruption, however, for there was no coherent reinforcement strategy, local institutions had no incen- tive, and local people had no training in participation. It did, however, raise expectations: it had a signalling effect. That may be of value in what is bound to be a slow process. Outside donors, however, want quick results.
The final chapter in this part of the book deals with the control of cor- ruption in late colonial Hong Kong. Dr Ying Shang attributes its success to two changes: (1) the creation of a fully legalised regime, characterised by a 20 East Asia
separation of powers among the judiciary, the executive, the civil service, and the checks and balances among them; and (2) the construction of a social consensus. It may be argued that Hong Kong is exceptional in respect of its size and experience. But its measures for controlling corrup- tion may have a wider application.
East Asia 21